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THE

EUROPEAN REVOLUTIONS

OF 1848.

"The great inheritance of man is a commonwealth of blunders. One race spend their lives in botching the errors transmitted to them by another. The main cause of all political—*i. e.* all the worst and most general blunders—is this. The same rule we apply to individual cases we will not apply to the public. All men consent that swindling for a horse is swindling: they punish the culprit and condemn the fault. But in a state there is no such unanimity. Swindling! Lord help you, it is called by some fine name, and grows grandiloquent, and styles itself 'policy.' In consequence of this, there is always a battle between those who will call things by their right names, and those who pertinaciously give them the wrong ones."—Sir E. B. Lytton.

THE

EUROPEAN REVOLUTIONS

OF 1848.

BY

EDWARD STILLINGFLEET CAYLEY,

OF THE INNER TEMPLE.

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IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

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PREFACE.

It has been considered desirable to state the circumstances under which this work was written. Its publication was an after-thought.

The extraordinary events which convulsed nearly every European state, during the year of Revolutions, 1848, induced the author to investigate the political phenomena connected with them. For this purpose, he collected most of the historical works bearing on the subject, as well as all the printed political articles and pamphlets that could be procured, both foreign and English. He also gathered such oral information as was available to him, and extracted from this mass of material the main facts with their characteristic features. Subsequently, in order to arrange his own ideas, he threw his notes into the form of a narrative.

In a work thus compiled, by one whose object was to arrive at facts for his own satisfaction, and not to make out a case to suit preconceived views, both opinions and truths were found occasionally to stand out too nakedly for the public taste. Without attempting the "dignity of history," the author has endeavoured to clothe them somewhat more decorously, but still to declare them honestly.

The publication of the work was decided on when the war with Russia seemed about to bring into active operation some of those political events which were likely to arise from the settlement of Europe after the convulsions of 1848, and which appeared greatly to influence the position both of the contending and the neutral powers.

FEBRUARY 1856.

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ERRATA.

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...	4,	last line,	,,	Sejanum,	,,	Sejanus.
...	81,	line 9,	*after*	raised,	*insert*	their voices against.
...	83,	,, 15,	*for*	Delahodde,	*read*	M. Chenu.
...	84,	,, 2,	,,	M. Chenu,	,,	the pistol been.
...	181,	,, 24,	,,	republic,	,,	republics.
...	211,	,, 3,	,,	Giovine,	,,	Giovane.
...	236,	,, 14,	,,	populare,	,,	popolare.
...	384,	,, 22,	,,	they are,	,,	it is.

THE

EUROPEAN REVOLUTIONS OF 1848.

FRANCE.

"When histories or historical evidence abound, even those that are false help to the discovery of the truth. Inspired by different passions, and contrived for opposite purposes, they contradict, and in contradicting convict one another. Criticism separates the ore from the dross, and extracts from various authors a true history, which could not have been found entire in any one of them, and will command our assent when it is formed with judgment and represented with candour. If this may be done, as it has been done sometimes, with the help of authors who wrote on purpose to deceive, how much more easily and more effectually may it be done with the help of those who paid a greater regard to truth. In a multitude of writers, there will always be some incapable of gross prevarication, from the fear of being discovered, and of acquiring infamy, while they seek for fame, or else attached to truth on nobler or firmer principles."—BOLINGBROKE *on the Study of History*, p. 108.

"Ut ad bella suscipienda Gallorum alacer ac promptus est animus, sic mollis ac minimè resistens ad calamitates perferendas mens eorum est."

CÆSAR *de Bello Gallico*, lib. iii. sec. 19.

CHAPTER I.

THE FALL OF THE THRONE.

THE first French Revolution has left behind it in France, and in many parts of the Continent, an unfortunate coincidence of circumstances and ideas, which renders any

government difficult and all governments insecure. Mankind awoke from the opinion which they had long practically entertained that they were the personal property of the prince on whose estates they happened to be born. They awoke from the delusion that they existed for his benefit alone; but they fell into the equally mistaken idea that popular will was the safest guide for civil government. They forgot that the growth of a nation is slower than that of a man, that the ages in the life of a nation are of longer duration, that a course of policy must be longer persevered with in national than in individual existence to render it successful, and that popular will is more readily guided by immediate than by remote objects, and is consequently wanting in the consistency which is necessary to the prudent management of the interests of a state. From the one error, that these interests should be conducted alone at the dictation of the sovereign or a knot of confidential advisers by whom he is surrounded, the reaction has run into the equal fallacy that they can be well administered according to the momentary popular opinion. The latter error appears to be quite as great, more dangerous, and much more troublesome than the former; with the one there was occasional consistency in policy, with the latter fully carried out there could seldom be any. An indifferent scheme well acted on may be at least less hurtful than a series of policies good, bad, or indifferent, alternately adopted and rejected, as a succession of experiments.

The former error, however disastrous had been its consequences during that stormy period, was too flattering to the vanity of mankind to be easily eradicated. The common sense of the nation had under Napoleon submitted itself to a powerful and rigorous despotism, and after the peace to the restoration of the Bourbon rule, to save it from anarchy; but the people had been taught to imagine

that they could think for themselves politically, and had not taken the trouble practically to learn how to do so.*

In consequence of the First Revolution there is the want of an element in France, which deficiency adds greatly to the difficulty. The whole of the French aristocracy or gentry as a body perished. There is in France no class of gentry residing on their properties, influencing thought in their neighbourhood by their opinions and by the gentle persuasion of good offices, and who can in matters of political interest take the lead and combine the action of their less wealthy neighbours, whose interests are the same as theirs; no class to whom the peasant can look for help and for advice, with full trust that the advice would be disinterested and the help given if deserved: there is no one for him to look up to as his natural protector, with whom he has occasional but kindly intercourse; there is no one to give employment save those as poor as himself. There is no class with the prestige of ancient race, whose position is alike independent of the plebs and the crown, which may serve as a barrier to the encroachments of either, and thus give stability to the state. The small properties, frequently heavily burdened, are scarcely sufficient to afford a miserable pittance. The peasant's land is ill cultivated, from his want of knowledge; nor are there any wealthier than himself to teach him how to cultivate it better. Hence, though well disposed and orderly in their conduct, the peasantry are a body of small political influence, generally speaking; they are wanting in leaders and wanting in substance, and though

* M. Chenu, for instance, "a small artificer in shoes," a trade in which he was probably educated, might have fitted a customer very indifferently, but had no hesitation whatever in helping to revolutionize France and Europe and fit her and it with a new constitution, or as many more constitutions as might be required, on the shortest notice—a business of which he was necessarily entirely ignorant.

more numerous, more important, and really more powerful than the urban populace and the bourgeois class, from want of combination they have been of little weight in the political scale; and when the populace and the shopkeepers have settled the form of government, the people seldom think of anything but ratifying it.

In short, the shopkeepers of the towns naturally form the aristocracy of those towns whose labourers they employ, especially when there is no class above them; and though perhaps not always conducting their dealings on the principles of strict honour, yet, as they are better educated and have more to lose than their work-people, they become naturally a conservative element. Thus in France it is not surprising that it should have been the object of the government to gain the confidence, to extend the influence of the bourgeoisie, and to place political power in their grasp; for even though they have in all ages and countries shown themselves to be unworthy of the charge, yet, from the peculiar circumstances of France, they were the only class who it was thought could be so intrusted. But it was owing to their sympathy with the crowd from momentary whim, their cowardice in not daring to repress civil tumult (for by means of the national guard they wield military as well as civil power), that every one of the late disturbances in France have taken place, many of which have given them such deep reason to regret the folly of their behaviour. Another cause of the extreme difficulty of governing the French is the laxity of morals in the capital, and a too general want of real religious feeling, and of knowledge of right from wrong.* A man's objects in public life are too often, it is to be feared, to make a noise, to become celebrated in the world—"salutari sicut Sejanum"—to guide the coun-

* See, for example, Lamartine's account of Lady Hamilton, in his Life of Lord Nelson.

try by his opinions, not because he thinks it for the benefit of the country, but for that of his own glory. Another very troublesome element of the democratic character is its inordinate vanity. There is scarce one of the pamphlets of 1848, from Lamartine's account to that of M. Chenu, where the author does not ascribe the principal share in the revolution to himself, assisted perhaps by others, but chiefly to his individual exertions.

The number of liberated convicts always in Paris and the great towns, owing to the absence of transportation, forms, together with the enormous number of illegitimate children, a whole class whose hands are against every man, who have everything to gain and nothing to lose—a rabble ready for any outbreak, on any occasion and on any pretext.

Not that this class is all-powerful. On the contrary, in all states the conservative elements are more powerful than the destructive; but in times of popular excitement, when there is no intermediate body on whom the crown can rely for support or the people for protection, as the case may require, there is very apt for a time to result either tyranny or anarchy, and not unfrequently a succession of both alternately. It has happened, that from the want of such a body, the crown, in times of popular commotion, having no portion of the people to rely on for support, has acted with an indecision which has resulted in its overthrow. On the other hand, it has happened that, from the want of a class whose hereditary traditions give it a knowledge of their value, that the entire liberties of a nation, won by its blood and sufferings, have been sacrificed to the first military commander who has gratified its pride by conquest, or who by military despotism has restored and enforced order and tranquillity at home—certainly a discreditable spectacle. For though mankind may exist under despotism, and cannot under anarchy,

yet it too frequently happens that despotic power is abused, and that abuse of despotism brings about the recurrence of that anarchy to avoid which it was first endured.

In order to be permanent, the form of government should not possess either uniformity or unity, for thereby only one person or class is in power, whose interests alone are attended to. It is necessary to the permanent stability of government, that all interests should be so represented that no one separately can injure the others; it is necessary that the interests of all should be consulted before acting, and that the majority should not have, as in the United States, the power of tyrannizing over those who differ from them in opinion, or be able, as in Russia, by means of the one so-called autocrat, backed by the illiterate and ignorant many, to tyrannize over the educated and intelligent few, who are all that ever oppose him. The destruction of an aristocracy (and by that word is meant a body having in a state position and power alike independent of the plebs and the crown) has almost invariably led to despotic rule, or to temporary anarchy succeeded by it. And the substitution in its place of a mass of state-paid functionaries has merely added to the burdens on the people, without adding to the security of the crown; for they have neither had the patriotism to support the interests of the one, nor the loyalty to preserve their allegiance to the other. From the centralization of everything in Paris, whoever gets possession of that city gets possession of every functionary from one end of France to the other. These circumstances, together with the desire for national glory which could not be gratified, have rendered the French, despite their many estimable qualities, difficult to govern. Passionate and excitable, they are easily aroused; ardent in action, and bold in execution, their love and their hate are alike vehement. We have felt

the latter—we rejoice in the former; indeed we may fairly admit that they have proved themselves much pleasanter friends than enemies.

It was perhaps more the fate than the fault of Louis Philippe that he relied mainly for support on the bourgeois class. It was to them he owed his throne; it was to the military defection of the national guard that the downfal of Charles X. may be directly attributed. They were thus to Louis Philippe both the cause of the downfal of his predecessor and the only conservative element on which he could rely for his own support; hence it was his policy during his whole reign to consult their interests, to increase their political importance, and to enhance their prosperity. For this purpose European peace was essential at all costs, and he was at times obliged to maintain it by a reasonableness in his diplomacy which was highly offensive to the aspirations of some of his people, who, remembering with pride the glories of the Empire, were ambitious as then to dictate to Europe. It was the policy of the citizen-king to provide for material prosperity—for the increase of wealth and the development of manufactures.

This policy indeed he had to a certain extent inherited from the Elder Bourbons whom he displaced. It was to the policy or perhaps to the necessity of maintaining peace that they owed a great part of their unpopularity. It was to remove their unpopularity—to do something great for the glory of France, that led to the expedition of the Duc d'Angoulême into Spain, the attack on Algiers, and the planting there of a French colony. So far had this necessity driven them, that though bound by every tie of gratitude to maintain peace abroad, it was seriously contemplated to annex Belgium and Rhenish Prussia, and compensate Holland and Prussia out of Hanover, which was to be divided between them—a possession at that

time of the British crown. And there is little doubt, that had they succeeded in striking such a blow, they might have hidden their internal policy in a blaze of military glory, and that, having dazzled the people, they would at the same time have saved them from the results of their own folly. But the blow was not struck. The Spanish and Algiers expeditions could not counteract the disgust the people took at Charles the Tenth's infatuation for priests and Jesuits. His reign had been peaceful and prosperous, but inglorious. Had he even provided sufficient force, and had sufficient determination to use it, he might in the first instance have crushed the insurrection; but he had not, and he fell. How nearly might the fall of his successor, eighteen years afterwards, be described in the same words!

It is not the scope of this work to trace the events of the reign of Louis Philippe during the eighteen years it lasted. Though borne to power by revolutionary passions, himself a prince of the blood though of a revolutionary race, he was constrained to repress those passions and to repudiate his origin. The hopes and the aspirations of the republicans who fought upon the barricades in 1830 were in no way gratified by his policy. The house of peers, without the hereditary principle, and nominated by the crown, was more an appearance than a reality; it had no independent position in the state. It was liable to be swamped at any moment by a fresh creation, and was thus totally dependent on the crown; while the deputies, elected by but three hundred thousand electors, among a population of thirty millions, were necessarily representatives of only one class in the community, that is to say, the burgesses of the towns. The landowners of France and the other classes were so inadequately represented, that, though able to make their voice heard, they were insufficient to form a party of parliamentary importance. The interests of the bourgeois class were alone thought

of importance enough to be considered both by the king and the chambers.

The lower orders brooded in sullen discontent over their wrongs, real and imaginary; their opinions and wishes had no legitimate mode of expression. The passions roused by previous revolutions indisposed them to submission; hence they combined in secret societies,* where revolutionary opinions and republican desires were fomented and spread, which broke out in occasional riots and attempts at assassination. But though the class in which were the rank and file of the republican forces was pretty much confined to the populace of the great towns—a class more noisy than numerous, more rabid than patriotic, and more formidable than respectable—they had leaders among them of a different calibre, men of education and talent, some moved by ambition, some by vanity, and some by a genuine though mistaken opinion that the *rabble* was the *people*—by a belief in the maxim, "Vox populi vox Dei," a belief in the perfectibility of the human race, and a faith in the virtues of a people, or of what they mistook for one, to few of whom in their individual capacity they would have intrusted a sixpence with any expectation of ever seeing it again.

After all, however, the secret political societies were not really so dangerous to the government as might have been expected. The police had in all of them some political agent, who was occasionally at their head, and every now and then pushed them beyond the line, so that the authorities could have a convenient excuse for arresting any of the members they considered dangerous. By this means the police were always perfectly aware of what was going forward in them, and, truth to tell, owing to the convivial tastes of their leaders, these ardent patriots met

* On the Continent they are called "clubs," a word that foreigners having adopted from us, apply as we do not.

fully as often at wine-shops for the legitimate purposes of such establishments as for revolutionary objects. Perhaps a little temporary courage and inebriated heroics might be the result; but as these fumes evaporated before morning, they were more fraught with headache than danger to the state. Nevertheless, they were always conspiring, as it seems with the perfect acquiescence of the powers that were, who every now and then arrested a few "pour encourager aux autres." There was always a sort of circulation of vinous patriots undergoing shorter or longer periods of imprisonment, which came to be a regular change, and was perhaps regarded by them as a periodic relaxation. But though these societies might have no very directly important effect, they could not be otherwise than hotbeds of sedition; and though their regular members were only the idle and dissipated in times of public prosperity, yet the revolutionary traditions of 1789 were necessarily kept alive; and in periods of distress, theories which promised so much were naturally adopted by the workman, unemployed and hungry, though when he was full and occupied he might occasionally recollect that they had proved miserably deficient in performance. Nor was it republicanism and democracy alone that were hatched in these nests; socialism and communism—in short, whatever ended in -ism, provided it were of a kind to overturn society, was equally acceptable.

There was one reason why the heads of the secret societies were anxious to keep up the number of conspirators. At all meetings collections were made for the purpose of purchasing arms, and for the benefit of the patriots in prison. Of the sums so collected very little was honestly disposed of; the greater part went to keep the committees and chiefs in riot and debauchery. If any obscure individual was unfortunate enough to be arrested, he never could extract a sous from them; but if any one of the

committees or their friends were in trouble, he lived on the best of everything till he came out again, so that there were some who knew how to draw a revenue for their own advantage from discontent and impatience. M. Caussidière was one of the members of the secret societies who came to more distinction than the greater part of his associates, becoming prefect of police after the revolution of forty-eight. His manner of life, as described by M. Chenu, who seems to have been his friend and to have quarrelled with him, appears to have been more ingenious and singular than reputable. Given to drinking and extravagant debauchery, he was in the habit of replenishing his funds by negotiating the bills of any worthless individual, to whom he would give a few francs for his signature, and passing them among his acquaintances of republican principles and easy circumstances, assuring them that the acceptor was good, and if the worst came to the worst they might come upon him; and being blessed with a manner which passed for honest bluntness, he by those and other similar means managed to make many of the republican chiefs bleed pretty freely, M. Ledru Rollin among the number. At the same time it is fair to say, that this accusation is made against him by M. Chenu, whom M. Caussidière accuses of having committed robbery, and who confesses to have deserted from his regiment; so that what he says may perhaps be taken *cum grano salis*. After all, very likely, he was no worse than his neighbours, who all of them seem to confess their sins in their memoirs without appearing anyway ashamed of them, or indeed to have the slightest notion of their being at all beyond what is quite usual and proper. It is very possible that both speak the truth, or both the reverse.

Another of the most active chiefs of the secret societies was M. Delahodde, a humorous scamp, who was at the same time in the pay of the secret police, and, as a matter

of course, one of the most rabid of republicans in appearance. MM. Barbes, Blanqui, and Martin Bernard, other chiefs, had endeavoured to overturn the throne in May 1839 by an insurrection. Barbes at the head of his rabblement had succeeded in getting possession of the Hôtel de Ville without fighting, and there repulsed some cavalry who attacked him; but Blanqui, who was to have captured the Prefecture of Police, would not march, saying that they were blockheads and were only going to get themselves exterminated. The insurrection being easily suppressed by the municipal guard, about fifty were killed, and some thirty patriots were imprisoned and convicted; the rest still continued in the *Société des Saisons*, which, though it lost some of its chiefs for a time by that event, and was somewhat injured and cut in pieces, yet the pieces re-united. In consequence possibly of this event, there was no particularly good understanding between Barbes and Blanqui; they were chiefs of opposed sections of the same party, who did their best to counteract each other's influence. Nor did much better understanding prevail among other chiefs. The number of police spies who were members and leaders caused many others who had no connexion with the police to be suspected; everything that was plotted was betrayed, and suspicion quite as often fell on the wrong person as on the right one. Thus a mutual distrust prevailed among them. It was highly unsatisfactory to be led to fight against government at the dictation of government itself, and to suit its convenience. Very few of them were free from suspicion; and even Albert, who called himself a workman, but who was, it is believed, a master, was not clear of suspicion. He, though not mixing with the riot and debauchery of the secret societies, took an active part in their organization, especially in taking auxiliaries from among the working-

people, who were not fully initiated into their mysteries. As to M. Cabet, who only desired the moderate reforms of abolishing property, money, debts, families, and marriage, and whose followers practised so far what they preached, and so far forgot the difference between "meum" and "tuum" that they occasionally took purses and broke into shops; he having gathered together a considerable sum for his Icarian scheme, left his deluded followers in the lurch, subsequently to die or live as they might in the swamps of America.

Enough has been said to show that these secret societies were in no way really formidable. Their numbers were about, *Société des Saisons*, 600; *Communistes d'Action* and *La Société Dissidente*, 500; and Icarians of M. Cabet, 400; making up the Parisian conspirators to the number of 1500, or thereabouts. It is perfectly clear that this insignificant set of ragamuffins, without order or discipline, had little or nothing to do with the revolution of February.

The journal most rabidly republican at this period was the *Réforme;* it had been started by two persons in conjunction with M. Flocon, a gentleman whose *forte* does not appear to have consisted in acting in concert with other people. After a short time he reigned supreme in the editorship. The paper started with about 2000 subscribers, but this number soon fell off to five or six hundred. Certain patriots had subscribed to start the paper. There was in hand enough to go on for six weeks. M. Louis Blanc was asked to assist in the editorship, but M. Flocon took to criticising his articles; on which, though he did not dispute the criticisms, he admitted that he could be of no help to a man of such powers as M. Flocon. Ill-natured persons said that some of M. Louis Blanc's writings had attracted the attention of the public, while they were provokingly indifferent to M. Flocon's pen; in consequence of

which the latter was by no means sorry to get rid of his assistance. Subsequently this paper was patriotically supported by an advertising pastry-cook; but his money and patriotism having come to an end, M. Ledru Rollin, who had lent money to start the paper, insisted on some one better qualified being put in conjunction with M. Flocon into the editorship. In consequence M. Godefroy Cavaignac, a brother of the general, was installed; but he dying soon afterwards, M. Flocon again became dictator. After three years, the paper circulated about 1200 copies. The want of money was deplorable; insomuch that of certain funds which had been deposited in their hands for other purposes, the managers appropriated some 15,000 f. to their own use, in a spirit truly patriotic and republican. "Ces messieurs, comme raison dernière, allégent, qu'après tout le peuple est leur amis, et entre amis on ne se gêne pas." But this money, being called for by the committee who had the management of it, had to be produced, and the patrons of the journal found themselves in a position to be obliged to repay it, or the matter would be known, much to their discredit. Upon this MM. F. Arago and Recurt thought proper to retire from patronizing it, as they disapproved of this sort of forced loan, and thought the morality of the transaction rather questionable. With this paper, too, M. Caussidière was connected, and at one time went about to collect funds for it. Altogether it was in as miserable a condition as ever newspaper was. The *National*, the other republican print, was at daggers-drawing with it. M. Ledru Rollin, the hero it worshipped, and who represented it in the Chamber, was but little attended to by any else. Many even of the other republican deputies turned their backs on him; and between M. Marrast, the editor of the National, and him there was scant courtesy. The republicans by profession were neither numerous nor united.

At a meeting held at the office of the *Réforme*, on the 21st of February 1848, it was decided that no attempt at insurrection should be made. M. Louis Blanc said, "After the deputies have agitated the country, they retreat. I feel the blood rising in my heart. If I listened to my indignation, I should say, Let us shout war, and let us march! but humanity restrains me. I ask if we have the right to dispose of the blood of the people without profit to the democracy? If the people turn out to-morrow, left in the lurch by those who have led them, they will infallibly be crushed, and the democracy drowned in blood! This is what will happen to-morrow. Don't flatter yourselves. The national guard, who have dragged their uniforms from banquet to banquet, will fire on you along with the army. Decide on insurrection if you will, but if you do, I shall retire home and put on mourning, and weep for the ruin of the democracy." M. Ledru Rollin said, "that they had neither arms, ammunition, nor preparations, and that to fight was a folly;" and of this opinion was the majority. The *Réforme*, then, prohibited the insurrection, but did not succeed in preventing it; nevertheless many of these men subsequently took credit for having taken the initiative in the revolution, when, in fact, whatever happened did so not because but in spite of them. There were not, according to the estimation of M. Delahodde, above 20,000 adherents of the republican cause all over France, and not above 5000 in Paris. The causes which led really to the outbreak were very different. The outburst which overthrew the throne was not a conspiracy—it was the natural result of similar causes acting on a great number of persons, which induced them to act in a similar manner without preconcerted combination or conspiracy. The French are easily excitable, and especially so when hungry; and hunger caused the revolution.

Without here going too minutely into the question, it

is sufficient to mention, that for some time previous to the outburst of 1848, Europe had undergone most serious financial embarrassment. These difficulties originated in England (for London is the commercial centre of the world), where one of the most fearful commercial panics on record had occurred, accompanied by a rise in the cost of food to a famine price; evils which aggravated each other. Numerous orders that had been sent out to America for corn were countermanded, the financial crash having annihilated credit and disabled the merchants from paying for it; because cash or bank-notes, the only medium of exchange in such times, could not be had. Owing to the failure of the potato-crop in Ireland, and the sudden demand for foreign food, a great quantity of gold had been exported to pay for it. The bullion had left the coffers of the Bank of England; the notes in circulation had been, according to the system of Sir Robert Peel, necessarily withdrawn; bills of the first class were waste paper. England was on the verge of bankruptcy. These difficulties had spread to the Continent. The natural consequence of monetary difficulties is want of work; the enormous railway-works were at a stand both here and abroad, and many of the labourers employed in their construction were thrown out of employ, and that too during a period of scarcity. Nor was this the case with the railway-interest alone; all other persons employing labour were embarrassed. It is true the severest period of the pressure had passed, but a chronic state of distress remained. There was a general deficiency of employment, and amongst the working classes a pretty generally diffused discomfort. The shopkeeping classes were far from prosperous; the destruction of credit and the want of money in the country injured their interest. They too were uncomfortable. When persons are uncomfortable, they rarely attribute the blame to the right person, but

are always ready to attribute it to any one who they are told has injured them. Thus all classes, from general discomfort, with which their own government had nothing whatever to do, were prepared to lay the whole blame on the French authorities. The political quacks of the day set up an outcry for reform. Had these causes not been in operation, no one would have listened to them; as it was, they did so. Our own reform bill was carried by precisely similar discomforts, arising from very similar causes. The subject of commercial panics will require separate investigation in another part of this work.

M. Thiers and M. Odillon-Barrot were the leaders of the opposition to the government in the chamber. M. Guizot was first minister of the crown. His political career had begun as most political careers do in France. His pen had won the first round of the ladder. Under the empire, he had gained a position and powerful friends. Anticipating the return of the Bourbons, he intrigued in their favour, and obtained office by that event, to preserve which he again changed on the return from Elba; but finding he was unable to accomplish his object, he withdrew to Ghent, and is said to have edited the royalist *Moniteur*, which was there published. On the return of the Bourbons M. Guizot returned with increased interest, and is said to have been the original framer of the laws on the press, which, when applied afterwards under Charles X., went far to produce the king's overthrow. In the mean time a change of ministry had thrown Guizot out of office. He went into opposition, was turned out of his professorship of history, intrigued with the house of Orleans, and, singularly enough, came into office with them, after a revolution which his own press-regulations had roused. He was long chief of a knot of French political red-tapists, who were called Doctrinaires. Their doctrine consisted in keeping themselves in posts, places, and profits. The

urban shopkeepers were his and his master's support, because they were bought; corruption was universal. Pompous, parliamentary, puritanical, and precise, he did not scruple to rule others by means which he despised. His weaknesses are said to have been amiable; his pretensions and exterior were statesmanlike; and his tergiversations were neither more numerous nor reprehensible than those of many respectable politicians.

M. Thiers was also a literary man, of considerable talent, but of a mischievous, waspish, and ambitious temper. Small men in great places are, as we have seen, at times not overconsistent. Republican or revolutionary under the Restoration, he became a minister and royalist under the House of Orleans. Originally the colleague, he soon became the rival of M. Guizot, and alternately with him was minister of Louis Philippe. Eventually, when his rival became so firm in his saddle, from the support of the bourgeois class, as to extinguish all hope of his being constitutionally overthrown, M. Thiers reverted to his first reformist if not revolutionary love. Ambitious and impetuous rather than patriotic or prudent, he was either warlike or peaceful as suited his own interest, without regard to the consequences to his country or to Europe. With M. Guizot he had divided the support of the purchased shopkeepers, "Defossa in loculis quos sportula fecit amicos." But the revolutionary or empirical inundation he helped to let in has swept away his and their exclusive influence. Talent without principle does not, on the whole, seem to operate for the tranquillity or permanency of states.

M. Guizot was the favourite minister of Louis Philippe, and his personal friend. He possessed the confidence of both houses of parliament. The deputies, however, chosen by a very small body of electors, only represented the interests and feelings of the upper shopkeeping classes. The working classes were totally without political influence.

This for an opposition was an excellent grievance. It does not appear that the interests or feelings of the rural inhabitants were much thought of by them, though equally unrepresented; but, according to the lights of modern political theory, this is a class that may always be oppressed and shorn with impunity. It would be of little political weight even if represented; and what weight it would have would be exerted in a direction opposed to liberalism. The landed occupiers, labourers, and peasantry are almost universally less revolutionary than the inhabitants of the towns, because their properties and occupations are of a more permanent character, because they are more under the influence of religion, and their morals, though far from perfect, are at any rate better than those of the urban population.

M. Thiers and M. Odillon-Barrot had been among some of the king's earliest ministerial advisers; but they had been supplanted by M. Guizot. The latter was supported by a majority in the chamber of deputies; by extending the franchise they hoped to obtain a majority against him. The Spanish marriages, too, had been made a handle against the king. When he refused to disturb Europe in order to gratify the love of his subjects for a fictitious glory, he cared nothing for the glory of France. When he endeavoured by intrigue, but a peaceable one, to marry a French prince to a Spanish princess regarded as the eventual heiress of the Spanish throne, and thus to increase the influence of France, it was charged upon him as mere personal ambition and family aggrandizement. It is not intended to defend his behaviour in the matter, which was not becoming in a gentleman, a king, or a diplomatist. But it was not his subjects who had most reason to complain of it.

Aided by the unpopularity of the minister, arising from distress, and by the unpopularity of the king, from the

abuse heaped on his ambitious designs on Spain, the leaders of the party out of power undertook to agitate France. Popular agitation by peaceable means is not a plant indigenous to the French soil; it is of British growth, and has never thriven properly except among the Anglo-Norman race; all the banquets and toasts are of English origin; they are an imitation, not a spontaneous product.

In this business of the Reform banquets they were assisted by another party more violent than themselves. It is true that M. Barrot refused to be present at the banquet at Lille if the health of the king was not drunk. Sometimes the two parties banqueted in company, sometimes apart. When together, the differences were smoothed down under vague generalities; when separate, they each talked their own opinions with less constraint; the parliamentary opposition contenting themselves with advocating moderate electoral reform, and an extension of the suffrage, the revolutionary party took the opportunity which the occasion afforded of spreading as much incendiary matter as they could, patriotically hoping it might some day explode for their advantage. In short, they sowed the dragon's teeth; they have reaped soldiers and a despotism, and that, too, elected by the almost unanimous voice of the people, who, after a short experience of democratic rule, were so weary of it as to accept, in preference, an absolute sovereign. In short, the reformers wanted to turn out the ministry, and they succeeded in overturning the monarchy. The demagogues hoped to rule France by a Paris mob, and they have got themselves a master.

The speech of the king at the opening of the chambers on the 28th of December 1847, contained a phrase which gave grave offence. He spoke of an agitation fomented by "blind and hostile passions." That the king upon this occasion spoke the truth is self-evident; but truth is

upon many occasions the more unpleasant in proportion to its force. Those who were agitating for reform were blind to the result, anarchy succeeded by a government of military force, and the republican party made no disguise of their hostility; but they did not like to be told so, and truth though it was, it was not particularly prudent to speak it. The imputation excited the wrath of the opposition. M. Thiers, M. de Lamartine, and M. Odillon-Barrot, stigmatized the policy of the government at home and abroad as everywhere opposed to the principles on which it originated in 1830—a charge probably true, since on these principles very little government if any could have been conducted.

Probably, as in most such cases, both parties were partly right and partly wrong. The ministry, who attributed the excitement to artificial agitation, did not choose to admit the existence of the physical distress which was really at the bottom of it and supplied the fuel which artificial agitation was fanning into a blaze.* Had it been the apparent as well as the real interest of either party to take this fact into its consideration, it is probable that the policy of the ministry would have been to have soothed rather than irritated; they might by financial arrangements have relieved the commercial stagnation and given employment to the people, and by removing their suffering have assuaged their discontent. Had this been the policy pursued, the Orleans family had been probably at this moment on the throne of France.

The address containing the echo to the obnoxious passage was, however, passed through the chamber of depu-

* Their blindness can scarce be blamed when M. de Lamartine equally ignores the fact of physical discomfort having anything to do with it, and attributed it to disgust at the general system of corruption (which no doubt existed), to obstinacy in a false system, dynastic ambition, and several other causes, excellent topics for demagogy, but for which working-men with full stomachs would not have cared a rush.

ties; the members of the opposition, being in a minority, abstained from voting. In the chamber of peers it passed by a majority of 144 to 23. The ministers maintained that these meetings were illegal; the party led by MM. Thiers and Odillon-Barrot protested that they were not so; so did M. de Lamartine, but he appears to have argued the point more as a poet than a lawyer, a process by which legal questions are not conveniently settled. It should have been left to French jurisconsults to determine a matter which falls within their province. About a hundred opposition deputies met and agreed to put the matter to the test. A reform banquet had been got up in the twelfth arrondissement of Paris; they arranged to attend it; a commissary of police was to be at the door to take down the names and warn the company that their meeting was illegal; the matter was then to go before the tribunals competent to deal with it. The banquet was several times postponed; some of the deputies hesitated about going to it. It was to have taken place on Sunday the 20th of February, but the committee put it off till the Tuesday, and invited the national guard to attend in their uniform to line the streets, but to come unarmed in order to prevent any breach of the peace.

This calling out of the national guard the government considered, as it no doubt was, an impudent assumption of a right on the part of the committee, which they highly resented, and therefore they prohibited the banquet altogether. They began to concentrate troops on Paris to suppress any outbreak that might occur. Artillery was ready to be brought up from Vincennes at the shortest notice; nearly a hundred thousand armed men were mustered in or near Paris. The decision not to allow the banquet was not known in the chamber of deputies till late on Monday evening, when an animated conversation took place between M. Odillon-Barrot and M. Duchatel

minister of the interior, in which the latter declared the banquet should not take place. The opposition members met after the chamber adjourned; the majority decided not to go to the banquet, and to impeach ministers; they had excited a storm they could not allay, and a collision had become inevitable. Though the fault, which had lost the cause of Charles X. in 1830, of not bringing up sufficient troops, was not repeated, their exertions were neutralized by the indecision of the king, who was suffering from influenza.

In the morning the walls of the city were found placarded with the orders of the day of General Jacqueminot to the national guard, requiring them to take no part in the demonstration; with the ordonnance of 1831 against riotous processions; and with a proclamation of the prefect of police, formally prohibiting both the meeting and the banquet. Round each placard a knot of persons gathered, and had done so during the night; but on the whole the city was tolerably quiet. The manifesto of the parliamentary opposition, declaring that since the government had determined to suppress the meeting by force they would not persevere, in order not to expose the people to the consequences of a struggle, had not any calming effect. The populace denounced them as traitors to their cause; they were cast aside, and the revolutionary flood rolled on. The news of the revolt of Sicily and Naples added to the excitement. On Tuesday the 24th, a crowd gathered in front of the chamber of deputies, but there was no strong feeling to be observed among them; they were unarmed, and appeared to be actuated more by curiosity than anything else. The youth of the schools, the precursors of foreign riots, had gathered together in knots; on the boulevards the gatherings increased, and the people thronged in from the faubourgs. About twelve o'clock a mob attacked the Hôtel des Affaires Etrangères, and

threatened to wreak summary vengeance on M. Guizot; but they were easily repulsed by the military on duty. About one, that minister appeared in the chamber, where a considerable number of deputies were present, who had met to discuss the Bordeaux Bank bill. M. Barrot delivered to the president a proposition for the impeachment of ministers; he handed it to M. Guizot, who having read it laughed immoderately. The discussion on the bank bill went on. At the close of the sitting the proposition for the impeachment was referred to a committee to meet on Thursday; but by that day there were neither king, ministers, peers, nor deputies.

On the Tuesday, however, things ended peaceably on the whole, and little or no blood was shed. The gathering in front of the chamber of deputies was dispersed by a mere demonstration of the troops in that building, and the crowd retired singing the Marseillaise. No arms were seen among them, and the mob appeared to be in perfect good humour, cheering the soldiers of the line, and only pelting and abusing the municipal guard, who were their usual masters and were of course more obnoxious to them. Nevertheless several gunsmiths' shops had been broken into and plundered, and the fowling-pieces distributed among the mob, who to their great inconvenience were obliged to cut the balls of their cartridges before they would go down the bore. About five in the evening the rappel was beaten to summon the national guard, and wherever they appeared they were greeted with cheers; but few answered the call.

It now occurred to some ingenious republicans to dress up some sham national guards as decoy-ducks to the others, a device which was eminently successful on the following day, for the troops of the line usually refuse to act against them in Parisian disturbances. The idea, however, was not quite new. The person known afterwards as *General*

Dubourg, who borrowed the uniform of a general officer from the property man at the opera and appeared in it on the barricades in 1830, had set the example of combining revolution with masquerade.

On the Wednesday things bore a much more threatening appearance; everything depended on the loyalty of the national guard. It was no longer a mere riot. Barricades sprang up over the district between the inner boulevards, the Rue St Martin, and the river—the hotbed of Parisian insurrection. Had the national guards stood firm by the government, or kept out of the way, the troops were fully competent to settle matters; but it was doubtful if they would act against the civic soldiers; and these interfered to prevent the soldiers doing their duty. The officers of the two corps would converse for a few moments, the soldiers would shoulder their muskets and march off, the mob would cheer, and the national guard cry, "Vive la Réforme!" "Down with Guizot!" "Down with the ministers!" These demonstrations were not without effect on the court. M. Guizot announced in the chambers that he only held office till his successor was appointed, and that Count Molé had received instructions from the king to construct a cabinet. The troops were weary with inaction. It appeared like weakness on the part of the court to have given way in the face of a riot, while very probably, if the troops of the line had received orders, they would have either disarmed the national guard, or compelled that force to assist them in restoring order.

However, the concession by the king of a new ministry was very nearly successful, and indeed would have been quite so had it not been for one of those unforeseen circumstances which seem like destiny, and on which great events so often turn.

The news of the change of ministry spread over the surging waves of the population of Paris like oil on the troubled

waters. The really republican party was in numbers, as has been shown, insignificant in the extreme. Hostilities ceased, prisoners were given up, the national guard stuck bunches of flowers on the muzzles of their muskets in the place of bayonets. But the defenders of the barricades between the Portes St Denis and St Martin were not inclined to accept a new ministry in satisfaction of all demands. Though the people were satisfied, the insurgents were not: of course they knew much better what was good for the people than did the people themselves. They must be again excited against the court. The *court* might hesitate in shedding the blood of the citizens in the streets of Paris; but what is blood to revolutionary patriots of the barricades?—the troops should be provoked to fire on the people.

A convict named Lagrange succeeded in so doing. M. Guizot's house, on the Boulevard des Capucins, was the only one not illuminated; in front of it were posted some soldiers. Every now and then there was a little endeavour on the part of the mob to make the inmates illuminate the house in honour of the change of ministry, but no one appeared to intend coming to blows,—indeed some cries of "Vive Louis Philippe!" were heard. Lagrange fired at the troops; his shot broke the legs of the horse of the officer in command; the troops, thinking they were attacked, levelled their muskets, and a storm of balls swept over the boulevard; a squadron of cuirassiers then charged on the crowd, who fled in all directions.

All that can be said of this affair is, that it was a very unfortunate mistake, and cost Louis Philippe his throne; but the mistake originated with the convict who fired the shot, and those who had instigated him to the deed—to them alone is this slaughter to be attributed. Who those persons were may be judged from the fact that waggons

for the killed and wounded had been brought to the office of the National before the shot was fired on the soldiers. The effect was beyond their utmost wishes; the news was spread with incredible rapidity over the whole of Paris; the populace were violently excited; they imagined that they had been traitorously attacked while celebrating the change of ministry by a demonstration of concord and joy; corpses were paraded through the city heaped on waggons. Then only began the determination on the part of the populace to overthrow the throne.

On Wednesday evening, when Count Molé had failed to form an administration, the king sent for M. Thiers, who agreed to undertake the task provided he were permitted to have M. Odillon-Barrot associated with him in it. But during the night barricades rose in all directions, and orators passed from one to another, exciting the populace to the coming combat. No resistance was made by the military, who were worn out with hunger and fatigue. Disorderly bands marched along under the red flag of revolution, demanding the arms of the national guard in the different houses, to the great terror of their families; and, on receiving them, wrote up, "*on a donné les armes*" on the house, to protect it from further requisitions. Thus the national guard refusing to fight to preserve order, supplied a very convenient arsenal from which the populace could arm themselves. The trees on the Boulevards, which appear to be destined never to come to maturity, were cut down; carts, omnibuses, and all sorts of materials, such as beams and stones from houses that were building, were collected and built into barricades. Paris awoke next morning in full insurrection.

The new ministers walked about eight o'clock in the morning down the boulevards, and though at first they were personally greeted with cheers, they met with cold-

ness as they approached towards the revolutionary quarters, and with the ominous cry of *Vive la Republique*, where the populace bivouacked, who had been brought out the previous evening by the sounding of the tocsin. Odillon-Barrot gave orders to a troop of dragoons and the 21st regiment of infantry to retire to their barracks. Again he heard cries of down with Louis Philippe; and placards announcing that orders had been given to stop firing, were pulled down nearly as fast as they were posted. The troops of the line had been unprovided with food except through the good-will of the people, and had fraternized with them, being so placed that they could conveniently communicate. They had gradually dispersed, and the mob had got possession of their muskets and ammunition; which were thus, owing to the folly and want of common foresight of the authorities, used against themselves. Had the soldiers been fed and kept out of the way, they would have kept the king on his throne, and saved France from anarchy, and the eventual loss of her liberties—such as they were.

In the history of this day, two facts are conspicuous—the sham national guards and the massacre of the Boulevard des Capucins. The credit of both of them belongs to the republican party; but this is all that belongs to them. In the subsequent events they had a very insignificant share. The revolution was really effected by different persons. No doubt the republicans deserved the credit of misleading the people, but they did not succeed in making them conspirators or republicans. They succeeded in impressing them with the idea that on the part of the court there was a treacherous wish to massacre them, and induced them to rise in sudden fury against it; but the mass once in motion, the republicans and conspirators for the last eighteen years were nowhere seen either at the barricades or wherever there was any danger: indeed,

from the smallness of their number, they could be of no account, however much some of them have subsequently boasted of their heroic feats. On the 24th of February, the populace fought on the barricades without their leaders, who, ensconced in the office of the Réforme and the National, waited till the fighting was done, and then came out to claim the victory.

The king, who at first had been far too confident and careless in making the necessary provisions for the troops, was much too timid when the magnitude of the disorder became apparent. On the Wednesday evening, the command-in-chief was given to Marshal Bugeaud; but the defection, supposed or real, of the national guard was a cause of much uneasiness. Orders were given to the marshal to begin the attack on the barricades at daybreak with six columns, if the announcement of the new ministry did not produce a calm.

Unfortunately, when these orders should have been acted on, indecision prevailed. The king, who had been raised to the throne by the bourgeoisie, who had consulted their interest and considered his own as identified with theirs, and thought that only on their support he could rely, again hesitated. Had the attack been ordered, there is little doubt that the soldiers would have obeyed their officers; that the well-disposed, that is, the greater part of the national guard, would have assisted them; and that the rest might have been beaten and disarmed. But the government lost its head; the troops were either withdrawn or left without orders, and after conversing with the mob gradually joined them, or gave up their arms and ammunition to them.

Early in the morning the greater part of the barricades were undefended. The populace was after all more agitated than hostile; and it appeared to the court inhuman to act with severity. On this ground the marshal was

recalled, as well as the other generals, and the folly was committed of leaving the matter to be arranged by the national guard; for the court was not aware that not a fourth of them were under arms; and that of these, a tenth (real or sham ones) led the rest into revolution by inciting them to cry out for reform. In short, the nationals were, very much like the rest of the people, deluded into assenting to a republic, rather than adopting it of their own deliberate intention. Had a battle been fought, they would have most of them retired from the revolutionary ranks the moment they felt that the monarchy or their own persons were in danger. True, they wished perhaps for some change of ministry, some political reforms; but that a republic was desired by the Parisian shopkeepers, when its most direct and obvious effect would put themselves within point-blank range of loaded muskets, and the indirect result must be to destroy their trade, is much more brilliant patriotism than the bourgeoisie have ever exhibited in that or in any other city. The combat would have been fought against the scum of the faubourgs, who, ever ready for any exploit where plunder was to be got, manned the barricades. They had to be beaten eventually, and Bugeaud might as well have done it in February as Cavaignac in June.

The king, however, still trusting to the fidelity of the national guard, confirmed the orders to the troops to retire. The republican faction saw the monarchy retreating before it without being attacked. The only generalship displayed was in losing the victory. Among the opposite side there was no strategy at all. The populace pressed on as the troops retired or dispersed; but they were not directed by any chiefs. Even the flood of people, who poured into the Tuileries, and put to flight the unarmed king, was directed there almost more accidentally than intentionally. By ten o'clock the insurgents had undisputed possession

of all Paris behind the Tuileries and the Palais Royal; not because they had conquered it, but because the troops were withdrawn.

The Palais Royal was entirely pillaged; the furniture was thrown out of the windows; and the troops, who had taken refuge in the Chateau d'Eau, were attacked by the mob, now mad with excitement. They made a desperate defence, holding that to give up their post was a breach of military duty; and a furious combat ensued. The soldiers fired with terrible effect from the windows upon the dense crowd below, who returned the fire ineffectually, for the troops were under cover. M. Chenu was despatched by the Réforme newspaper editors, sitting during the *émeute* in their office where there was no danger, to bring up two guns from the Hôtel de Ville which had fallen into the insurgents' hands. He found the populace in that part of the town intoxicated with success and alcohol, drawing the guns round the place, or mounted on them and even on the horses, and deaf to his entreaties to bring the guns up, or to allow him to take them to aid in the assault. In the meantime, some philanthropist in the crowd had suggested the idea of burning the soldiers alive. The royal stables were broken into; a pile of carriages, straw, hay, and other combustibles were heaped against the building, and set fire to. The fire of the soldiers was redoubled from the windows, but it was only their expiring effort; gradually it ceased as the building became enveloped in flames. The "most generous people in the universe" prevented the troops leaving the building, and, in fact, roasted them alive, because they were resolved to maintain the honour of their flag.*

* M. de Lamartine says, that they capitulated and were allowed to come out, but thinks that some wounded were unfortunately burnt who were left behind in the building. But eye-witnesses declare that not a man among them escaped.

This was almost the only instance in which any real fighting took place on this day, or indeed in the whole affair: a fact which shows that if the troops had been kept out of sight, separate from the populace and not dependant on the inhabitants for food and drink, they might have been depended on. It shows also that, in a fortified post, free from such influence, the instinct of military honour was stronger than that of self-preservation.

The last official act of M. Guizot had been the countersigning the appointment of Marshal Bugeaud to the command-in-chief. This officer was not popular, but he was courageous and would have acted. MM. Thiers and Odillon-Barrot hoped to succeed by conciliation alone; but success was not so to be attained. The king, from the belief that come what would he could rely on the national guard, had at first given way; and he afterwards fell into the equally erroneous opinion that they had all turned against him in a body, and were conspiring for a republic. There is no kind of doubt, as subsequent events show, that the middle class of Paris were not inclined to republicanism or democracy. The great majority of the national guard were attached to the cause of royalty; but they wanted support in their fidelity from soldiers of the line, whose proper business it was to fight. Even at the last moment, had the generals been authorized to repulse the multitude who were murdering the soldiers in the Chateau d'Eau, it is more than probable that France might have been saved from the convulsions that followed. But the indecision of the king, the want of courage of the princes of the House of Orleans, compelled the soldiers to witness the overthrow of the monarchy with their swords in the sheath. Bugeaud, Lamoricière, and other generals, did what they could in remonstrating with the populace, but were treated with small courtesy, were menaced and even fired on. To the discredit of the revolutionary rabble be it recorded, that

after all resistance had ceased, in cold blood, they cut the throats of some of the municipal guard whom they found in the Champs Elysées, amidst shouts of savage laughter; and many of those who surrendered at the prefecture of police, trusting to the word of M. Caussidière, were butchered on leaving it. Nor was the honesty of the people altogether so immaculate as some of their flattering historians would have us believe; in the sack both of the Palais Royal and the Tuileries, many articles of value disappeared—such as the jewels of the royal family, and valuable shawls of the Duchess of Orleans.*

That courage which was wanting in the male portion of the royal family appeared to have been transferred to the women. The queen urged the king to show himself to his troops and the national guard, while she would show herself on the balcony with her children to the people, that they might at least die worthily. The king reassured her, and came down to breakfast in his dressing-gown and slippers about eleven. Scarcely had the meal begun when MM. de Remusat and d'Hauranne entered and called aside the Duke de Montpensier. The king asked what was the matter, and learned that the populace and dragoons were engaged in a conflict within a few paces of the palace. The family rose from table; the king put on his uniform-coat and got on horseback, and, accompanied by the Dukes de Nemours and Montpensier, passed in review the troops and national guard (few in number) stationed in the Place du Carrousel and in the court of the Tuileries. His reception was not very encouraging. There were some cries of "*Vive le Roi!*" but these were mixed with others of "*Vive la Réforme!*" and "*A bas les Ministres!*" He returned in consternation. M. Thiers, finding that his name was not

* Of course the cellars were emptied: the mob is always thirsty.

sufficient to restore tranquillity, confessed his inability to perform the task he had undertaken, and recommended the king to intrust to M. Odillon-Barrot alone the construction of a cabinet. He, too, in vain endeavoured to grasp the helm.

It was a moment in which the formalities of a court were extinguished or overpowered. The king was listening to the advice of M. Thiers, General de Lamoricière, M. de Remusat, and the Duke de Montpensier, when the rattle of musketry from the Palais Royal announced the attack on the Chateau d'Eau. At this moment, M. de Girardin,* the editor of the Presse, opened the door and rushed towards the king, telling him that the hour was past for changes of ministers, and that an abdication was the only chance of saving the monarchy: he also placed before the king a proclamation to be placarded over the city, containing the words: Abdication of the King, Regency of the Duchess of Orleans, Dissolution of the Chamber, and a General Amnesty. The king hesitated. The Duke de Montpensier, with more vehemence than was considered becoming in a prince, a son, or a man of courage, urged him to adopt this course.

Generals Bugeaud and Lamoricière rushed to the Palais Royal to stop the slaughter, but in vain; the latter was wounded in the attempt, and returned to announce to the king that the troops were fatigued and dispirited, and that the people were too much excited to listen to reason. The

* M. de Girardin, owing, as he does everything, even the name he has adopted, to his own ingenuity, has naturally come to look on himself as a very important personage. Abandoned by his parents at an early age, with but a small provision, which he lost by speculation, he had recourse to journalism for his support; by which means, and by considerable foresight as to which party was likely to be uppermost, he accumulated money. He fought several duels, and gained notoriety as an editor: he has been of all politics, and has written, under a sort of transparent pseudonyme, a mythic biography of his early career.

king then wrote, "I abdicate in favour of my grandson the Count de Paris. I hope he may be more fortunate than I." But he did not declare who was to be regent. The question of the regency presented some difficulties. The natural guardian of the young king was his mother, the Duchess of Orleans; but the duchess was a foreigner and a protestant, and the king had previously contrived to have a law passed declaring, in case of his death during his grandson's minority, that the Duke de Nemours should be regent. Now the duke, though young, brave, and accomplished, was not popular. He was, or was supposed to be, devoted to the priests and entirely under their influence—an influence of which the greatest jealousy existed. Hence his name would have been of no avail in calming the people.

It is just possible that, had the Duchess of Orleans been presented to the people as lawful regent, calm might have been restored; for she was popular as the young and beloved widow of the gallant and regretted Duke of Orleans: the sentiment of gallantry might, perhaps, have exerted over the populace an influence which loyalty or common sense were incapable of; but such a result is very improbable. She was practically presented to the rabble afterwards in the chamber of deputies, and was practically rejected by them. The regency having been settled by law, the king did not like to disturb the question. By a strange inadvertence the act of abdication had not been signed when intrusted to Marshal Gérard, who in plain clothes sought to announce it to the people. The marshal recognising Colonel Dumulin in the crowd, asked him to help him to announce to the people the abdication of the king and the regency of the Duchess of Orleans, and to get them to accept it; but an honest patriot grasped the piece of paper, folded it up, and quietly put it in his pocket. Thus the

act did not become known to the populace: had it been made known, it might possibly have been accepted.

The king, after writing his abdication, took off his uniform and put on plain clothes. The carriages of the court were sent for; but these had been burned by the populace in their attack on the Chateau d'Eau. The Duchess of Orleans desired to accompany the king; but he would not allow her to do so, and the Duke de Nemours remained behind with her. At last, the king left the Tuileries by a private door opening on the gardens; the queen was on his arm, and he was accompanied by a few personal attendants and officers. The royal fugitives, after passing on foot through part of the crowd, took two hackcabs in the street; the Duchess de Nemours was placed in one, the king and queen got into the other, and, escorted by a few dragoons, they fled towards St Cloud. The position of the Duchess of Orleans and the Duke de Nemours was growing very critical; the mob showed evident designs of attacking the palace. The duke hoping that the national guard would less attract their hostility, withdrew the troops of the line, leaving the palace last, and escorting the duchess to the chamber of deputies; whither it was considered advisable for her to repair. It was possible, that though the abdication had been lost in the streets, the regency might be saved in the chamber. The duchess walked, holding by the hand the young Count of Paris; his brother, the Duke de Chartres, being carried in the arms of an aid-de-camp. Scarcely had the party crossed two-thirds of the Tuileries gardens, when the palace was inundated by the mob; who, after sacking and pillaging it, while pretending remarkable honesty and writing up "*Mort aux voleurs*," very shortly destroyed all traces of royalty. Having made but a short halt, the mob continued their march towards the chamber of deputies, whither the duchess and her children had very recently preceded them; for there was

to be enacted the last scene of expiring monarchy in France.

The chamber of deputies met at twelve o'clock. M. De Lamartine was, on his arrival, consulted by a knot of republicans as to the possibility of establishing a republic. They appear to have doubted whether France was ripe for such a form of government; a doubt which subsequent events show was not unfounded. There are not a few who consider republicanism as the ultimate form of government; that is, the form which will be adopted eventually all over the world, when the world is sufficiently advanced for it. This opinion, when investigated, appears to mean, that when mankind has become so perfect as to require very little government at all, then a republic is a very excellent form; but, under other conditions, it is too weak, as well as too versatile. If such be the case, it is not a government suited to any people the world is at present acquainted with; and, when any people becomes so perfect, it will be time enough to consider whether, under the circumstances, any other form of government is not as good. M. de Lamartine appears to have entertained no misgivings on the subject, but to have hoped that the danger of the overthrow of existing institutions was not so great as was imagined. He refused to contribute to the establishment of a regency; but would accept what now happened. M. de Lamartine had forsaken the pure fountain of the muses for the puddle of political life. Generous, extravagant, and improvident, he had the soul of a hero, the faith of a martyr, the eloquence of a Demosthenes; but the vanity of a child. Amid corruption, he was an honest man. Amid universal selfishness, his motives were pure. He believed his mission was to regenerate his country. He, however mistaken, honestly pursued what he believed to be his country's good. Richly endowed by nature with all that ennobles man, one fault destroyed this endowment in

the estimation of others—his over-approbation of himself. He was a poet, an orator, and a gentleman; but not a statesman.

About the same time, at the offices of the National and the Réforme newspapers, the editors, owners, and contributors to those journals had agreed on a list of a Provisional Government; and, having constituted themselves the Delegates of the French empire, volunteered to dispose of the victory of the mob and the destinies of France.

There were not many deputies in the chamber; but the galleries were full. The president took his place, and M. Laffitte moved that, under the critical circumstances then existing, the session should be declared in permanence; a declaration which does not seem to have prolonged its duration. The chamber was expecting the announcement of the abdication of the king. An officer entered, and whispered to the president that the Duchess of Orleans desired to be admitted. Chairs were placed for her at the foot of the rostrum facing the assembly, and she entered, leading her two children, the Count de Paris and the Duke de Chartres, in either hand. M. Dupin invited the assembly to accept the young king and the regency of the duchess. The monarchical party applauded; but as the president was about to declare their acceptance, a disorderly troop burst in and appeared to threaten the Duchess of Orleans and the Duke de Nemours. General Oudinot in vain endeavoured to obtain the help of the national guard to turn out the intruders; and the royal party retired from the floor to one of the back benches. M. Marie proposed that a provisional government should be proclaimed. M. Cremieux spoke to the same effect. M. Odillon-Barrot endeavoured to obtain the acceptance of the regency. But the only person who really spoke to the purpose, and who spoke the truth, showed that it was of very little consequence to any one what they voted, or accepted, or rejected. M. de Larochejaquelein, a son of the

old hero of La Vendée, rose and told the deputies that they were no longer anything at all. At these words of unparliamentary plain speaking, arose a howl of displeasure. He was adding some words explaining that as a chamber they had ceased to exist, when the populace outside concluded his sentence and fulfilled his soothsaying, by breaking down the door. The disorderly rabble occupied the places from which the deputies fled. All but the republican members left the chamber. The duchess, separated from her children, was hurried away. A democrat, of large dimensions, having grasped the poor boy-king by the throat, was about to treat the child with personal violence, if not to murder him; and was only prevented by a national guard, who, doubling his fist, knocked the bully to the floor. Rescuing the prince, he carried him to his mother; while the Duke de Chartres, falling under the feet of the throng, was lost for some hours.

Lagrange, who had seized the paper containing the abdication of the king from the hands of Marshal Gérard, got on a bench and read it to the band of armed ruffians who surrounded him; and who replied by shouts of "Neither royalty nor reign." These were some of the persons who had broken into and plundered the palace, together with some of the national guard, who ought to have defended it; the mob having, by the inconceivable fatuity of the officers and soldiers in charge of the bridges, been allowed to cross the river. Wave followed wave; the whole chamber was filled with men armed in all sorts of extraordinary ways: muskets, swords, pickaxes, butchers' cleavers, and all imaginable weapons were brandished.

M. de Lamartine was in the rostrum when the main part of the flood burst in. At his suggestion, M. Dupont de l'Eure was seated in the vacant place of the president. And at the suggestion of others, M. Ledru Rollin read the

names of a provisional government: they were Dupont de l'Eure, De Lamartine, Arago,* Marie, Garnier Pagès, Ledru Rollin, and Cremieux. Some names were universally applauded, some were received with mixed cries of yes and no; but M. Ledru Rollin, though he called on the populace to act gravely, named his men, and seemed to care very little whether his choice was approved of by the rabble he pretended to consult: indeed, he had as much right to elect a provisional government as they had. Some voices called out for M. Louis Blanc; but the orator, not exactly approving, hoped to turn the current of their ideas in another direction. He cried out that the provisional government were about to go to the Hôtel de Ville, and requested their escort; accordingly they left the chamber for that purpose; not, however, before a man had taken a shot at the picture of the ex-king, hanging behind the seat of the president. But a young workman interfered, and requested the populace to respect the monuments of art; and no further damage was done. If the members of the chamber had remained where they were, probably another government would have been installed at the Hôtel de Ville, and Paris have become divided between two hostile camps. At the Hôtel de Ville would be conglomerated all the elements of disorder; if this could be regulated, the rest of France would easily be managed. A provisional government is a sort of order rising out of disorder, and upon disorderly elements alone, perhaps, can its authority be established. M. de Lamartine appeared to be the only person whose eloquence had any control over the mob, and whose courage was great enough to induce him to face the danger of such a post. Already, he had nearly fallen a victim, in the rostrum;

*. Arago was the celebrated mathematician and astronomer. He had under all governments boldly professed the republican faith; but as his occupation and employment were astronomical rather than sublunary, he was allowed by all governments to profess any opinions he pleased, especially as his place would have been filled with some difficulty.

for a rioter was taking a cool aim at the most conspicuous person he observed, when some others struck up his gun, and turned him out. To rule by eloquence an audience composed of many such men with loaded muskets requires no ordinary nerve.

"Nunquam,
Sanguine causidici maduerunt rostra pusilli."

CHAPTER II.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT TO THE RESTORATION OF ORDER IN PARIS.

"THE people," says Lamartine, "out of respect to the white hairs of Dupont de l'Eure, brought him a one-horse cab;" he and some others got into it, and some of the other members of the provisional government got into another. The whole number of persons escorting them was not above six hundred. A company of infantry or a troop of cavalry might have overwhelmed them. Not a third of them were armed, and there were still military in the gardens of the Tuileries and in the Champs Elysées. All that was known was, that the palace had been sacked, and the chamber of deputies invaded; but the king was supposed to be waiting at St Cloud or Versailles, and the Duchess of Orleans might be at the Invalides or elsewhere, surrounded with the Orleans princes and generals. Nothing appeared more probable than that they would call up more troops, and in the meantime withdraw those in the city; guard all the exits of the fortifications, and, when sufficient troops were collected, chastise the rebellious capital. The fortress of Vincennes was considered impregnable; and, indeed, nothing but the want of all determination on the part of the royal family, the total want of head to guide

when the moment of disaster arrived, could have prevented their taking such a course: had this been done, the Count de Paris would probably have now been king of the French. If Paris had been surrounded and starved, or bombarded into a surrender, the rest of France would not have objected. The Departments would have supported any one who would have put down the Parisian rioters, when arrogating to themselves the right of disposing of the destinies of the country. The lesson had to be taught later, as such lessons always have; and, as always in such cases, it would have cost less blood had it been learnt under the tuition of the existing authorities, than after they had been overthrown. To spare blood until popular insurrection is defeated, is one of the cruelest errors: few are fraught with such dire consequences to mankind—no policy arising from amiable motives is so shortsighted; for though the sparing of bloodshed be the object, eventually much more must ensue than had been at first prevented.

M. de Lamartine marched on foot at the head of the column of insurgents. To arrive at the Hôtel de Ville was no easy task, for the crowd was dense, and the city in confusion. On the way there he succeeded in getting the populace into good humour with a station of dragoons, by asking for wine, and setting the example of compotations and fraternizations—an example subsequently followed on other occasions. In crossing the Pont Royal, a young woman, more remarkable for her costume than the modesty of it or of her behaviour (she having assumed the uniform of a municipal guard who had been killed), rushed forward to embrace M. de Lamartine; a delicate attention which he does not appear to have appreciated, as he repulsed her, saying that women had no occasion to fight, and had better look after the wounded; so she was fain to content herself with bestowing her chaste salute on a national guard who stood next, and who did not make so vigorous a resistance, his

taste being less fastidious than the poet's. At the Quai de la Megisserie the carriages were stopped by barricades, and the members of the provisional government were obliged to walk, picking their way among corpses, dead horses, and all kinds of impediments. When they reached the Place de Grêve (the open space in which the Hôtel de Ville stands), it was crammed with so dense a crowd that there appeared no possibility of forcing a passage. The populace there were much in the condition in which M. Chenu found them when he went to fetch cannons to batter the Chateau d'Eau. They turned their backs with contempt on the persons calling themselves a provisional government. The names of Dupont de l'Eure and Arago had, however, some influence at length; and, after forcing their way through a dense throng, the members with difficulty succeeded in getting through a forest of weapons, and reaching the Hôtel de Ville. But when they had got there, they were little better off. That building was also replete with the populace, some engaged in letting off their muskets out of the windows in reply to those who were firing in the place below—the usual manner of celebrating a revolution in France.* In addition to this, the provisional government nominated by the hangers on of the Réforme and National newspapers were already sitting there, and might dispute their authority; for to say the truth, there was very little difference between their respective titles to office.

The two rival governments were, however, fortunately amalgamated. They contained three names common to both, viz. Arago, De Lamartine, and Ledru Rollin; Marrast, Flocon, Louis Blanc, and Albert, were added, first in the character of secretaries, and afterwards as ordinary members. While the government was wandering about

* Whether the guns were loaded with ball does not appear; if they were, it must have been more exciting than safe to have looked on.

hap-hazard, looking first into one room where were a heap of corpses, into another where were a number of wounded, and into a third where a drunken orator was haranguing an admiring audience, they were taken pity on by M. Flottard, a member of the prefecture of Paris; who, by virtue of his good humour and strong arms, conducted them into a small room with a table, which was unoccupied. He advised them to place at the door a guard of persons whom they could depend on; and there they deliberated among the noise and disturbance on all sides of them, some of them sitting on chairs, some on the table.

Dupont de l'Eure was named president, De Lamartine minister of foreign affairs, Ledru Rollin minister of the interior, M. Cremieux was made minister of justice, M. Marie of public works, to M. Arago was given the ministry of the marine, while Etienne Arago received the charge of the post-office.* General Subervie was intrusted with the command-in-chief, Carnot was nominated minister of public instruction, M. Goudchaux, a banker, was made minister of finance, and Garnier Pagès mayor of Paris. M. de Courtois, a gentleman of Bourbonnais, had the command of the national guard of Paris—a post of great difficulty and of extreme importance, which he appears to have been scarcely competent to fill; while M. Caussidière was installed, or installed himself, prefect of police.† In restoring order, this last was for the moment the most important office of all.

It is not quite clear what form of polity the provisional government intended to adopt. M. Caussidière declares that Dupont de l'Eure and Arago protested vigor-

* Because some wag remarked, that, as a man of *letters*, he had a fair claim to it.

† Of his official career he has written two volumes of memoirs, duly chronicling the sabre he wore, the colour of his nether garments, and the condition of his purse and his boots on the auspicious occasion.

ously against a republic, wishing to proclaim the Count of Paris and a regency; that all those who had been members of the chamber of deputies, except Ledru Rollin, were of a similar opinion, and the proclamation of a republic was only a concession to the popular voice outside. But Arago's protest was only against the rabble of Paris daring to dictate to France.

The task which the provisional government had undertaken must have appeared almost hopeless. The capital was in an uproar, every thing was turned upside down. Their authority was disputed by the very persons who had just overthrown the previous authorities on the barricades; and who, flushed with their victory, naturally considered themselves as masters, and were extremely jealous of any other person who arrogated that title. Their first act, after arranging the departments they should severally take, was to issue a proclamation in the name of the French people. It declared that the former authorities had fled, leaving behind them a trace of blood; that the provisional government had taken the helm, from the urgency of the occasion and for the public safety, and that every citizen was bound to assist in restoring order; that they desired a republic, reserving always to the people of France the right to adopt or reject any form of government; and that liberty, fraternity, and equality, were its principles. Many copies of this proclamation were thrown out of the windows to the populace below, and in a few minutes there followed a proclamation addressed to the army, saying that the government to which they had sworn obedience had fled, that a provisional one had been established, and that to ensure unity between the army and the people, it became the soldiers' duty to swear fidelity to the people, who were their fathers and brothers, and to serve their country. Already, indeed, several generals had sought the Hôtel de Ville, and had offered their services to

support what now appeared the only practical form of government. Lamoricière, who had remained faithful to the crown as long as it existed, was among them though wounded that morning; so also were Generals Bedeau, Duvivier, and Piré. Officers and soldiers of the national guard, too, were thronging upon them for orders. The mayors of the different parts of Paris and the immediate neighbourhood were sending for instructions; everybody's business claimed attention first: the very chamber in which the government were sitting was invaded, and the members were nearly smothered in the crowd. Every moment fresh waves of human beings poured in from every corner of Paris to swell the flood in the Placé de Grêve. The mob brandishing their naked weapons, smashing the windows, and driving in the doors of the Hôtel de Ville with the butts of their muskets, threateningly demanded what the provisional government were doing, and who they were.

In such a state of confusion it was impossible to deliberate long. After a few moments of whispering across the table, some member wrote down any order required, signed it, and got one or two signatures of his next neighbours attached to it, or with his own only, delivered it to be carried to the point where it was needed. It was all that the secretary-general Pagnarre could accomplish to keep an account of what orders were issued. It was a duty, however, which he performed efficiently, and a post with which he was content.

Up to this point, the proclamations had been headed, "In the name of the French people," or "In the name of the nation," but cries began to be heard of "Vive la Republic." These cries induced the members of the government to consider what was to be done. They clearly had no legal or equitable right to proclaim a republic, or any other form of government. Yet no government was in existence but themselves: there was no legal authority except

in the Duke de Nemours, who was nowhere, and who would not have been obeyed. The population still manned the barricades, and everything was confusion. To say to the insurgents that the provisional government could not proclaim a republic was to tell them to continue the confusion, and to prevent the restoration of order. Indeed, the scruple which prevented their dictating a republic, was one which the Parisian rabble was nearly incapable of understanding or appreciating. In their doctrine Paris is France; where Paris goes, France is dragged after it.

Nothing could be worse than the present condition of affairs: which was anarchy. That is to say, the people having obtained the direct rule of the many by the many, without any intervention, the first necessity of mankind required somebody to dictate to the many what they should do, because the many could not tell for themselves. The provisional government would not proclaim the monarchy, for they would have probably been instantly annihilated. The only course that they could take with any propriety under the circumstances was, as M. de Lamartine observes, "to proclaim the republic, provisionally saving the ratification of the people." But they appear to have hung up a tricolor flag at one of the windows, and proclaimed the republic, without any saving clause, which, perhaps, was unnecessary, for if the French people did not like a republic they would not submit to it; and as they did not eventually like it, they ceased to submit to it. They have since elected an emperor—a result which the first artificers of the republic certainly had not in view. Still the members acted under compulsion, and had they not thrown out of the window such a proclamation, they ran a considerable chance of being thrown out themselves.

The proclamation of the republic was hailed by the populace with universal enthusiasm and clamour, and the

provisional government appeared to breathe more freely. Some, however, were anxious to hoist the red flag, to prepare the scaffold, and to declare war on property and the bourgeoisie; others wished a government to be chosen from among those who had fought on the barricades, and comprising the wildest dreamers of the socialist schools. Others desired that the government should act and deliberate only in presence of, and under the fear of, bayonets of delegates named by themselves; and it was proposed by some that the populace should vote itself in permanence at the Hôtel de Ville, and that measures should be carried by acclamation on the Place de Grêve, each man shouting for what he wished. Against all these very reasonable propositions, supported by loud voices, naked weapons, and loaded muskets, Lamartine had alone to depend on his fervid eloquence and his indomitable courage. Lagrange, who had voted himself governor of the Hôtel de Ville, was too popular a person either to be turned out or to be trusted; he was evidently half disposed to question the authority of the government altogether. Nevertheless he was of some service in restraining the fury of the mob, in conjunction with MM. Flocon, Louis Blanc, and Albert; all of whom had considerable weight with them. On one occasion Lamartine was called for, and met by cries of "Lamartine is a traitor," "Don't let us hear him," "He goes to sleep—down with him," "Hang him up to the lamp-post." "The head of Lamartine," cried the citizens. The orator stepped forward—"Citizens," said he, "you want my head; I only wish you had it on your shoulders, for you would be calmer, more reasonable, and the revolution would go on much better." Upon this the populace laughed and were appeased; only one of them observed that he went to sleep over the victory of the people, and told him that he was a poet, and had better go and sing "*Tu n'es qu'une lyre, va chanter.*" But the orator persisted in speaking to the multitude, and

restored them to rational conduct, changing their execrations into cheers and shaking of hands.

In the course of a few minutes the Salle St Jean became full of the populace, who began to deliberate, and the result of their deliberation appears to have been to drive out the government sitting above. They then rushed up stairs, along the passages, and began to batter the doors, which had been fastened. The members of the government barricaded the door, which stood a siege of blows of musket-butts and kicks. At length a parley being established between the parties, a capitulation was effected, on the terms that Lamartine should go down and talk to them in the great hall of St Jean which they had left. The door was half opened, the orator went out to the mob, they returned to the hall and he followed them, mounted a gallery, and was hailed with some cheers and some curses, and universal confusion. "Citizens," he cried at last, when an approximation to silence was obtained, "I am ready to answer you. Why have you called me?" "To know," they replied, "by what right you erect yourselves into a government of the people—to know whether we have to do with traitors, tyrants, or citizens worthy of the conscience of the revolution." He replied that they had no right; but they had been named by the voice of the people in the moment of victory; that the people required chiefs; that there was nothing to envy in it; and that to devote himself to the public good was the duty of every citizen. "Would they continue terrible convulsion in the midst of blood and fire?" he asked. "No," cried some; "Yes," cried others—"they have no right to govern us—they are not of the people (they meant rabble)—they don't come from the barricades, but from the corrupt and venal chamber of deputies." "But they protested against corruption," urged some; "They defended the cause of the people," pleaded others. "At any rate, let them declare

what government they propose giving us. We have upset the monarchy, let Lamartine tell us do they mean to give us the republic?" "Who said republic?" asked he. "All," cried they. "Do you know what you are asking?" said he; "do you know what a republic means?" "Tell us," cried they. "The republic, do you know that it is the government of the reason of all men? Do you think you are prepared to be rulers of yourselves, and to have no other masters than your own reason?" "Yes," cried the assemblage. "The republic, do you know that it is the government of justice? Are you just enough to do right even to your enemies?" "Yes," cried the people. "Are you virtuous enough to forbear vengeance, proscriptions, and blood, which dishonoured the former republic." "Yes, yes," cried the audience. "You will? you are? you swear it? you call Heaven to witness it?" A thunder of affirmation followed. "Well then," said he, "you shall be a republic, if you are as worthy to keep it as you have been to conquer it. (*Thunders of applause*). But understand, we must not begin the republic by injustice: we have no business to steal a republic, we can only declare our wish in the name of the people of Paris. It is a glorious initiative; but the thirty millions of men who compose the French people are not here: they have a right to be consulted. The forms of our institutions shall be decided by the universal suffrage of the French people: it is the only basis of a national republic." "Yes," cried the multitude, "it is just. Paris is the head, but it is not France? The head has no right to oppress the members. Vive la Republique! Vive Lamartine! Let the provisional government save us: it is worthy of its task. To choose another would be to divide the people, and to help tyrants to its return." Lamartine had won the confidence of the populace who surrounded the Hôtel de Ville. He descended from the gallery, established sentinels, and gave such orders as

seemed necessary for the occasion; then he returned to the other members of the government, confident in the truth of what the people had said for themselves. Both he and they seem to have been mistaken.

In the mean time orders had been despatched in every direction. Arago had sent his orders to the fleet, and, trusting to the patriotism of Admiral Baudin, had offered him the command without knowing whether he entertained any attachment to the expelled dynasty; orders were also sent to the various corps of the army in different quarters of France. The troops were withdrawn from Paris, where their presence might be a cause of distrust and possible bloodshed. Lamartine, too, suggested the formation of the garde mobile. In Paris there are always an enormous number of natural children without any protectors —gamins de Paris—ready to dash into danger for mere sport, the very elements of turbulence and disorder. It occurred to Lamartine that as their love of powder and noise, and not their political principles, was the cause of their fighting, it would be much more advantageous to society if they fought on the side of order rather than on that of disorder. This he hoped to accomplish, and it was effected by enrolling them in the garde mobile. Having disciplined them and drilled them, he had them under command either to repel urban revolt or external invasion; and, as a body, though much mistrusted and maligned, and of whom, in consequence of their high pay, much jealousy was felt, yet they proved very efficient for the purposes for which they were created.

About midnight, fatigued, hoarse, and with his clothes in rags, M. de Lamartine left the Hôtel de Ville without being observed, and returned home for a few hours' sleep. Overcome with bodily fatigue, he passed the barricades, where the popular guards were watching, and eventually reached home after a day more eventful than it is the lot

of most men to see in their lives. After taking three or four hours' sleep he returned to his post, about four o'clock the following morning, to relieve M. Marie, who waited for his return. He appears to have met with certain persons on his way decorated with red ribbons, doing their best to excite the populace to further violence; they were evidently not of the working classes, but writers and theorists, who were endeavouring to excite them. By virtue of their own election more than by any other title, MM. Caussidière and Sobrier had taken possession of the prefecture of police.*

Thus ended the 24th of February 1848, one of the most eventful days in the history of France. That which appears to have given it the turn it took was the invasion of the chamber of deputies by a few hundreds of the mob, who came with the intention of throwing the deputies out of the windows; probably, but for their arrival, the regency of the Duchess of Orleans would have been recognised by the chamber, ministers appointed by her, orders given to the troops, and gradually order restored. The mob do not appear to have had any particular intention of doing what they did: they came to throw the deputies out of the windows; but they prevented the reign of the

* The former is said to have greatly approved of his predecessor M. Delessart's cellar, which, by the advice of M. Chenu, M. Delessart's servant placed at his disposal. The brandy met with special approval, and indeed led the following night to the prefect of police being conducted by some national guards back to his office to ascertain if so lively a person could occupy so grave a post. The first care of these gentlemen was to look up the books and private papers in the office. They wanted the book containing political information, and the names of the informers of the late government; but in the first instance they found nothing but an account of the escapades of the ladies of the opera, except a book in cipher, which they were unable to make out. Of course they were anxious to discover who it was that had betrayed to the late government all the secrets of the conspiracies for the last eighteen years, in order to settle accounts with them. Almost their first act was to set the provisional government at defiance, and to disobey their orders; but in a few days Sobrier fell ill, and Caussidière was left alone in the dictatorship.

Count of Paris, and were made the scapegoats of the nomination of a provisional government. Thus some few hundreds of the rabble of Paris actually dictated to the whole of France, and France for a time was pusillanimous enough to submit to their dictation. The manufacture of patriots on the occasion was very much too rapid to be respectable. They were "converted in platoons, and baptized in battalions."

In the provisional government there were three distinct parties,—the Moderates, Lamartine, Arago, Marie, Marrast, Dupont de l'Eure, Garnier Pagès, Cremieux—Red Republicans, Ledru Rollin and Flocon—Socialists, Louis Blanc and Albert. So also in Paris there were three distinct parties who had effected the revolution—The National party, as it may be called, who had been in opposition to the court, and merely accepted the republic when it could not be helped, but looked on passively during the struggle; this was undoubtedly the political opinion of the majority of both the capital and France. Then came the Red Republicans, who are the successors of the savages of the first French revolution; their flags are red, their political engine is the guillotine, with terror and proscription for their enemies, and pillage for their friends; they could count for support on a mass of some twenty thousand vagabonds and thieves, always either coming out of or going into prison, whom they dignified by the name of "the people," though such were the only persons in the country having no title to be classed among the people at all, and forming, in short, the vicious rabble of the capital.

The Socialists were, some of them at least, more respectable, however unreasonable, impractical, and perverse. Though pacific in theory—at least those of the more decent sects, whose errors arose rather from an amiable view of human perfectibility than from any distinct

selfish passion—there were among them certain persons who greatly approximated to, if they did not altogether coincide with, the red republicans just mentioned.

The leaders of both were highly dissatisfied with the provisional government. M. de Lamartine was by birth a gentleman; that was one thing against him; he was certainly not a man disposed to humour the populace by allowing them to wreak their vengeance on those whom they regarded as their foes. He was known as a person of moderate opinions, and of an eloquence which made him a dangerous opponent. The leaders of the red republicans, the old conspirators, arrogated to themselves the credit of having fought on the barricades, and conquered a republic; and they were much annoyed to find that moderate men so greatly preponderated in a government which they flattered themselves they had made. Hence during the livelong night they went about to bring to pass the explosion which resulted on the morrow. Indeed this feeling led to the appointment by the mob of fifteen persons to be present at the deliberations of the provisional government. However, when these delegates from the sovereign people came to present their credentials, a rebellion on the part of the government was the result: the members refused to have anything to do with them. Arago, Ledru Rollin, Cremieux, and Marie harangued them, and Lamartine did his best to persuade them to reason. Eventually a compromise was effected, under which they remained in the Hôtel de Ville among the persons attending on the government, and were eventually employed by them, thus having become their servants instead of their masters.

At daylight on the morning of the 25th, people who had been brought together by the chiefs of the terrorist party during the night began to gather in knots in the streets leading to the Hôtel de Ville, and gradually drew together

into compact masses on the Place de Grêve and along the Quais as far as the Place de la Bastille. The groups appeared to form around a nucleus of persons better dressed than mere workmen, and one of these in each nucleus carried a red flag, made in haste for the occasion of whatever materials had first come to hand, while the others were decorated with a red sash, or at any rate with a bit of red ribbon in the button-hole; they were armed with all kinds of weapons, and they scattered about morsels of crimson rag for the people to adopt as their colour. During the same time groups of workmen from the distant quarters were arriving, who were not initiated into what was going forward, and came shouting, "Vive le Gouvernement Provisoire;" but on getting into the midst of the assembly of red republicans, they were surrounded, hustled, and insulted, and gradually induced to adopt the red colour.

Every now and then a fight would ensue between some of the more pugnacious; and the respective banners were pulled down and lifted up alternately, and sometimes torn in shreds by the excited throng; but the terrorists were generally successful, the tricolor was pulled down, and a red flag, the sign of blood and fear, was hoisted in its place in the hands of the statue of Henry IV. Some accomplices in the interior of the building showed some red colours out of one of the corner windows, the rabble below them shouted and fired guns loaded with ball as a salute, which broke the windows of the Hôtel de Ville and annoyed its occupants.

In vain did Lagrange (who since he had appointed himself governor of the Hôtel de Ville had also assumed the rank and uniform of a general officer) struggle with the mob; they forced the railings, and their leaders obtained admission to the apartment where the provisional government was sitting. Orders were sent to the mayors of the different

parts of Paris to send some of the well-disposed of the national guards to help the government, who were besieged by a multitude, demanding the instant adoption of the red flag. After a deputation had been admitted and addressed by the various members of the government, they were convinced of the impropriety of their request, and on returning to those outside who had sent them, they were of course regarded as traitors; others were then sent in to take their place, more loud, more rabid, more patriotic, more determined, and if any thing dirtier. Convincing these deputations appeared to be vain, so fast were they succeeded by others. To add to the confusion (by whose orders no one knew at the time), all the bodies of those killed were brought and deposited in the courts of the Hôtel;* and some of the populace taking the idea, dragged all the dead horses together, and piled them also there. Fortunately the season was winter.

The hoisting of the red flag was a signal of mob rule; the national guard were to be disarmed, and their muskets given to the populace; war was to be declared at once with all monarchies and aristocracies; all the ministers of the crown were to be arrested; the forfeiture of all royal property to the nation was to be declared: in short, the mob wanted blood, the blood of all the classes better or cleaner than themselves. Even Louis Blanc, though he did not think there was so much harm in the red flag as his colleagues supposed, did his best to persuade the mob to reason; though he also endeavoured to make the government give way, if only for a time, for he imagined that the adoption of red would be a signal of concord. One man, whom Lamartine describes as of a middle size, straight, strong, with a face dirty yet pale with emotion, his lips trembling with anger and his eye darting fire, and who

* Caussidière seems to have given such order.

pointed his eloquence at the end of each phrase by banging the butt of his musket on the ground, appears to have aroused that orator's indignation by his peculiarly unreasonable conduct. Lamartine advanced to the excited insurgent, and laid a hand on his arm; the man tried to shake him off; but the orator would not let him go, and talked to him till he brought him to tears.

Five times was Lamartine obliged to come down and harangue the assembled multitude. Menaced on his first appearance, he was applauded when he concluded; but scarcely were the nearest hearers pacified than their places were taken by others who had been out of hearing. Again and again he had to repeat the same exhortations. On one occasion, after they had called for him, he was greeted as traitor. "Traitor!" said he, "strike me if you believe it: but you do not. Before betraying you we must betray ourselves. We risk more than you in this matter. If the republic fails, it is not on you that will fall the vengeance of its enemies." Nor did the populace confine themselves to verbal threats alone; a band of armed men were making a rush at the orators to overturn them, when one of the crowd, clothed in rags and very dirty, who had been wounded by a bullet on the bridge of his nose, rushed forward and embraced Lamartine, calling him the saviour of the people. This formed a striking tableau, such as produces an effect on a French tumult; however ridiculous it would be to us cold-blooded islanders, who are not in the habit of embracing at all: at any rate not in public. This accident obtained Lamartine an audience, and he says that to this person he owes his life and France her flag. "Citizens," cried Lamartine, "the red flag you carry has only made the circuit of the Champ de Mars, draggled in the blood of the people. The tricolor has made the circuit of the globe, with the name, the glory, and the liberty of our country."

It was the last occasion this day on which he was called for. The citizens of the more respectable and reasonable sort had begun to arrive, outnumbering the rabble who had occupied the place in the first instance; and the tricolor flag, which had by this time been placed in the hands of the statue of Henry IV. was by them greeted with cheers. These cheers proclaimed their predominance in the crowd, and the reds finding themselves outnumbered retired, with threats to return on the morrow. The tricolor flags reappeared at the windows, and the Place became nearly empty; a few national guards in uniform, some of the pupils of the Ecoles Polytechnique and St Cyr, and some citizens well disposed to the government and ready to devote themselves to its service, and who had together with them sustained the pressure and dangers of the day, alone remaining. Lamartine, though he constantly speaks of the sublime behaviour of the "people," appears to have mistrusted them as cordially as any one, and to have done his best to prevent the arms at the arsenal at Vincennes from falling into their hands when that fortress submitted to government: an object which was fortunately accomplished.

The provisional government, alarmed at the threats of the Terrorists to return next day, having no regular forces to oppose to them, privately sent to citizens whom they could trust in the different quarters to come themselves and induce such of their neighbours as they could, to occupy the ground and serve the government as a guard, together with the young men of the Ecoles Polytechnique and St Cyr, as well as the students of law and medicine, who had a considerable influence over the Parisians. In the morning a crowd of five or six thousand citizens were assembled before the Hôtel de Ville, determined to uphold social order. When the bands carrying red flags arrived, they found the ground preoccupied, and the government sur-

rounded by a guard of its own friends, so that it was able to deliberate in secrecy and in safety.

The subject which first occupied the attention of the government was the attitude they should assume towards the ex-royal family, the late ministers, and the princes who still commanded in Algiers. Some there were who advocated harsh measures; such as the arrest of the ministers who yet lingered in Paris, the pursuit of the royal family on the roads to England (that general refuge of all exiles), and the seizure of the Duchess of Orleans, whose hiding-place was suspected by the government; but the greater part were unwilling to adopt any such measures: indeed M. Caussidière does not hesitate to accuse some of them of hoping to establish the duchess in the regency, and states that M. Garnier Pagès was in communication with her on the subject. It is very evident that had any of the royal family been caught by some over patriotic republican, they would have been a source of considerable inconvenience to the provisional government; who would have found it extremely difficult to let them go again. To punish them would have probably condemned the government to infamy, and to have done nothing to them would have been to keep open a constant source of irritation to the rabble. After such a victory there was no need to descend to vengeance. There were some who even went so far as to say that all the expelled dignitaries ought to be allowed to reside in France, only preventing them from holding the office of President for a certain number of years. It is clear from the last restriction, that they dared not trust the populace whom they bespatter with praises; despite the boast of Lamartine, that nations once on the throne do not abdicate their power to any family.

In order, however, to appease the many-headed, a proclamation was issued, decreeing the abolition of royalty in all the banished races; while Lamartine undertook,

privately, to send after the king and his ministers, and assist their escape. The minister of finance was authorized to place at his disposal a sum of 12,000 francs, as secret service-money, for this purpose; but circumstances rendered the step useless, for the royal fugitives took care of themselves, and escaped without assistance.* At the suggestion of Lamartine, too, a decree was issued abolishing the punishment of death: perhaps with the object of saving the ex-ministers, if any of them were taken. At the same time, these decisions of the government were not very accurately obeyed, as warrants were issued for the arrest of the Duchess of Orleans and the late ministers by the prefect of police. The abolition of the punishment of death caused some surprise in the surrounding people to whom it was proclaimed; but as the government had taken the precaution of packing the meeting with their own friends, they were pretty sure of the result. Had any great proportion of the terrorists been among them, they would scarcely have submitted to the destruction of their favourite excitement. Lamartine was recognised, on leaving the Hôtel de Ville, by a number of citizens, who insisted on escorting him, and desired to install him in a sort of popular dictatorship at the Tuileries; which he refused. They then conducted him home, when he was obliged to make them a speech from his door-steps.

Already, during the first few days, a certain degree of order had been restored in the streets. Under the direction of M. Caussidière, the barricades had been partially removed and circulation rendered possible. Attention

* When night came, M. Lamartine went to pay a visit to M. de Montalivet, a confidential friend of the ex-king's, and who was likely to know where the fugitives were. But he only knew that the king was wandering about on the coast of Normandy in disguise, and seeking a passage to England. He promised, however, to let M. Lamartine know what he could learn. All that could be done was to send off several persons in the direction of the coast, to ensure the king respectful treatment, in case of his being stopped.

had also been paid to the lighting of the town, which had been in darkness for some nights. The prefect of police had organized a police-force of persons devoted to republicanism, including many who had just been liberated from prison for political offences; they were formed into companies, of whom one portion were called montagnards, and another afterwards called the republican guard. Some of them were mounted on the horses of the old municipal guard; others were on foot. There were at one time as many as 2700 of them. M. Caussidière speaks highly of their conduct; although he confesses that one evening in getting through a crowd into the Hôtel de Ville, one of his pistols was stolen from him; but they were looked on with some suspicion; their red sashes were regarded with distrust, and they were rightly or wrongly suspected of fomenting underhand political disturbances.

In the morning of the next day, when the republic was to be solemnly proclaimed at the Place de la Bastille, the Hôtel de Ville was surrounded by a multitude of workmen, crying out for "the rights of labour," and "the organization of labour." The socialist ideas had made great progress in this class; who looked on Louis Blanc as their leader and guide. Finding him a secretary to the government, they came to require that he should be named "minister of progress," and that "the rights of labour" should be recognised. This class of persons included the respectable part of the working-classes, who got their living by the sweat of their brow, and also some skilled artisans approaching to the rank of the *bourgeoisie*. These are in all societies a class of the utmost importance to the welfare of a state; they are a class highly orderly and respectable, not given to aping their superiors, as is the case with the *bourgeois gentilhomme* in all nations: their manners are simple and not offensive, they are honest and industrious, and deserve much more attention than they

generally meet with from statesmen. True, in the present instance, they had got hold of a foolish crotchet; but in the long-run they were right enough. It has been, and still is, the policy of statesmen to protect the *bourgeois* or capitalist classes; and to oppress the labourers and workmen.

All the members of the provisional government resisted their demands. They sent in deputation after deputation. It was in vain that the different members of government reasoned with them: in vain they pointed out that if their wishes were complied with, the capital which gave them employment would disappear, and that wages would vanish after it; all objections to their wishes were drowned in shouts. The irritation went on increasing; and, as these clients waited with four loaded cannons and lighted matches, they were not in a condition to be trifled with. At last, a deputation came in louder and more peremptory than the rest, who interlarded their discourse with thumps upon the table, either with the fist or any arms they had hold of. Lamartine then rose and said, "Citizens, if you were to put me at the mouth of one of those pieces of cannon, I would not sign the two words 'organization' and 'labour' put together. I think I have neither more nor less sense than my neighbours, and after twenty years' reflection on the subject, I don't understand them: they have no meaning. I don't sign what I don't understand. The next is, that if we promised you 'organization of labour,' we should promise what is impracticable. I do not sign engagements with people that I know I cannot keep." And he continued to explain to them, that if what they wanted was, that the government should attend to their interests, educate their children, and by a law, such as the English poor law, provide for those who were out of work—such it was the hope of the government to accomplish; but that "organization of labour"

implied the confiscation of capital and the ruin of every one, themselves first of all. The name and eloquence of Lamartine had in those days effects than which eloquence has produced none greater, in guiding men and pacifying the multitudes. The work-people applauded, and said that this was what they wished. He then tore up the proclamation which the members of the government had been drawing up; and he and his colleagues left the Hôtel de Ville for the Place de la Bastille, to attend the proclamation of the republic and the review of the national guard.

For the purpose of overawing the terrorists this demonstration was eminently successful. It showed an immense mass ready to assist the government in preserving order. Lamartine, on his way home, was waylaid by the people and cheered; they insisted on accompanying him; but he escaped their vociferous attentions by going into a friend's house at the front-door and out at the back. M. de Lamartine well deserved not only their gratitude, but that of all Europe. For though it is possible that he might at an earlier period have succeeded in preventing the revolution, as he himself appears to imagine, yet that is very doubtful; at any rate, he had no direct reason to interfere. But when affairs had gone so far that there was imminent danger of utter destruction to the bulwarks of civilisation; when the conflict of passions had lashed to fury the souls of the combatants; when terror and bloodshed appeared, after half a century of intermission, about to reassume their sway in the capital of France, he then accomplished that which no other man in Europe could have effected. He restrained the infuriated populace by the charm of his wondrous eloquence. He calmed the turbulent by flattering their vanity, their ruling passion. He prevented massacre at home and aggression abroad.

That the peace of Europe was not broken by France; and that the world was not plunged into a war of a quarter

of a century's duration is to be greatly attributed to his prudence, his humanity, his eloquence, his courage, and his patriotism. Had it been otherwise; had France attacked Europe; had this country taken (as under the circumstances it would have done) the side against her, is it possible that there could have been now between the two countries the cordial understanding which has sent their troops and fleets together to fight for the maintenance of the peace of Europe? Without ignoring the faults of M. de Lamartine, had his course been then less prudent, this is what neither the will nor the policy of Louis Napoleon could have subsequently accomplished; and Europe owes him a deep debt of gratitude: which it will forget—nay, has probably already forgotten.

CHAPTER III.

THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE REPUBLIC BY THE PROVINCES, AND THE DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT.

MOMENTARY tranquillity was restored in Paris, and the republic had been adopted throughout France without hesitation. On the 4th of March were celebrated, at the Madeleine, the funeral rites of those killed on the streets. The system of centralisation, which renders Paris the political centre of the whole kingdom, gives any authority or person who gets possession of that centre, the power of commanding the whole army of civil and police functionaries from one end of France to the other. These posts are highly valued; though many of them afford, according to our ideas, but a very meagre subsistence. The idea of a sub-functionary questioning the authority of his superior never crosses his mind. Hence the moment the head is changed, all the body is just as ready to obey him as they were his predecessor. Louis Philippe was set aside almost as quietly as any "*chef de bureau.*" The government which intruded itself into his place, the moment it was there *de facto*, was at once recognised as the lawful government by every official throughout France; influenced by the love of posts, places, and profits, rather than

of country. There was no other influence to counteract this. There are no other independent leaders of public opinion, no resident aristocracy or gentry; thus the central authority had immediate command over all the machinery for the collection of taxes—a power which would be formidable in any country, and is in France overwhelming. The generals also offered their services; they, indeed, had the plea of patriotism, for, had France been attacked, their swords might have been wanted to defend her, and their services might be required in preserving order. But it would perhaps have been more delicate had they waited till the occasion required their services, rather than rush forward as they did to accept office under a republic, within twenty-four hours of the time when they might have treated their present masters as rebels.

Nevertheless, there was abundant cause for uneasiness on the part of the government. The finances were in a condition so dilapidated, that M. Goudechaux, in spite of the entreaties of his colleagues, resigned his post very shortly as minister of finance; a post which was occupied by Garnier Pagès. Europe, it was feared, was dubiously hostile: remembering the first revolution. The army was almost wholly dissolved, or demoralized, owing to its *quasi* defeat in Paris. It was nearly a week ere M. de Lamartine could take possession of the foreign office, so much was he occupied by domestic matters. His views on foreign affairs appear to be of a dreamy nature. France, stripped of her conquests by the treaties of 1815, could not exceed the limits there laid down for her without kindling a European conflagration. It was of no consequence that there was not a human being in France who would have been either happier or richer if this had been the case.

M. de Lamartine thinks it would have been better for France to have either allied herself with Germany against Russia and England, or with Russia against Austria and

England. He states that the Russian alliance is the cry of nature, and the revelation of geography; meaning thereby that these two powers between them might have conquered Germany and divided the spoil: a proceeding which does not appear to be either a cry of nature, or a revelation of any kind, but simply a case of illegal appropriation. England was to have been isolated diplomatically; a position which she might have endured with equanimity, except that it meant European war. Fortunately, M. de Lamartine did not carry out these philanthropic visions. He appears to have known, practically, that the most convenient plan was to let people mind their own business in their own way; and that to remain quiet as long as one is let alone, is a maxim of prudence, if not of morality. He is in this a curious exception to the general rule: it seems easier to him to *do* than to know what were good to do.

It was in favour of the new republic that the Orleans dynasty had been unpopular with every continental government of Europe, and had quarrelled with England on the subject of the Spanish marriages. There was no great probability of foreign aggression; no one very likely to wish to reinstate the Orleans family in power. But the populace were ready for war, and the soldiers were desirous of war. Some of the statesmen advised war: it would afford the excited populace a vent. But the ministers reasoned, and reasoned wisely, that if France took the initiative, she would sooner or later bring upon herself the united forces of all Europe, and that against such odds she could in the long run have no prospect of success; for the soldiers of Napoleon, even when commanded by Napoleon, had not succeeded in saving her from the consequences of such a coalition. Everything, in fact, depended on England. If England would have peace, no general continental war would result; but to retain the goodwill of England it was necessary to respect her neighbours.

Belgium and the Rhenish provinces must not be annexed or appropriated. It was not yet apparent that Europe was about to plunge into the abyss of revolutions; and foreign aggression was next to impossible against republican France.

M. de Lamartine had received, gradually, peaceable assurances from various foreign powers; and, on the 6th of March, he published a manifesto to Europe, offering to them the hand of friendship. He said that the French republic did not require to be recognised in order to exist; that it desired to enter into the family of nations regularly established. He requested his ministers in foreign countries to make known to the various courts to which they were accredited, the principles on which the republic would act in its foreign policy. The proclamation of a republic was not intended as an act of aggression against any other form. Some countries were fit for one form of government, some for another. War, then, was not the principle of the republic; it wished to continue at peace with the world. A great change had taken place in France since 1792. Now all were equal before the law, and no internal strife could take place. Fifty years of freedom of thought had produced their results. In addition, it was the interest of the republic to preserve peace; for a successful general was a dangerous servant to a republic. No doubt, the republic desired glory; but she did not wish it for a Cæsar or Napoleon, only for herself. It was not his object to induce foreign states to pardon the republic, but to give pledges to humanity. France would not begin war, but would accept it if offered. Denying the right of the treaties of 1815, he admitted them as defining the existing limits of France, and did not intend to infringe them. If other nations were oppressed by foreign interference in their endeavours to obtain liberty, she would give them assistance; but she was not about to begin incendiary propagandism abroad. The

only question on which war could be expected between France and England had been the Spanish marriages; this had been removed by the fall of the dynasty. Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, he added, was the motto of the new republic.

But, in order to maintain peace, it was necessary to be prepared for war. Spain had not explained its intentions, and was assembling troops beyond the Pyrenees, while the alliance of the royal family to the Duke de Montpensier might have led to hostilities, and to an attempt on its part to restore the fallen dynasty by foreign invasion; it therefore became necessary to bring up an army of observation of 15,000 or 20,000 men on that side. The events of Italy were so threatening, the war between Piedmont and Austria was so imminent, that it was thought necessary to place another of 60,000 men at the foot of the Alps. The government feared the landing of the Orleans princes from Algiers, accompanied by the troops under their command, with whom they were popular; and it was thought necessary that an army of 100,000 should guard the frontier of the Rhine. The generals had all given in their adhesion to the republic; even Bugeaud, to the time of his flight devoted to the king, had offered his sword if occasion required it. A committee of defence was formed of military men, including Lamoricière, Bedeau, and Oudinot.

Lamartine wished to bring over 50,000 men from Algiers, where there were 100,000; as that colony had but few inhabitants, and there was little to protect but deserts, while the want of troops might, in case of war, be severely felt at home, if England should by her fleet cut them off from the power of being recalled; but the African generals would not hear of it. The army, on the 1st of March, consisted of 336,000 men; but, deducting those necessary in Algiers, and in the fortresses, and along the coasts, there were not sufficient to supply the armies above mentioned. The

Garde Mobile were placed under the command of General Duvivier, who in an almost incredibly short space of time got battalion after battalion into order, and under arms, though often still in rags. Old troops were gradually brought over from Algiers, their place being taken by new levies; and the number of men was so rapidly increased, that by the 1st of June 400,000 men were under arms of the regular forces, and, of the Garde Mobile, there were in Paris 20,000. These latter did admirable service in preserving order: for the first three months, they were all the government had to rely on to repress insurrection; they defended the government on the 16th of April; they guarded the constituent assembly when it arrived; won the 15th of May, with the help of the National Guard; and led the van on the 23d of June. They did good service; but were eventually disbanded and forgotten.

The king and royal family, as we have seen, when they left Paris, had taken the road to St Cloud, under the escort of a regiment of cuirassiers, in two hack-cabriolets. At St Cloud the king took carriages belonging to the court, and went on to Dreux, where he intended to remain some hours for repose. At the château he was the messenger of his own misfortunes; but he was unaware of the proclamation of the Republic, and intended to wait to learn what residence should be assigned to him: it was only next morning that news arrived that the Republic was proclaimed. His attendants had allowed the king to continue to sleep, not desiring to disturb his rest, as they felt that he would want strength to bear the blow that was about to fall on him. When this was known, measures were taken to reach privately, and in less conspicuous vehicles, a country-house situated on the Cape of Honfleur, which was uninhabited but by a gardener; and by cross-roads and after much fatigue it was reached by the 26th. A steam-vessel had been sent by the English government to hang

about the coast, and to take up the king if he desired to come on board; but as his retreat was unknown the precaution accomplished nothing. At last, after much delay, he and the queen got on board of the packet from Rouen to Havre, and which arrived at night. There was only the width of the quay to cross to an English vessel. The king, attended by the English vice-consul at Havre, who had procured for him a passport in a feigned name, together with the queen, succeeded in getting on board the English boat. He was recognised by a woman as he was going down the ladder, who cried, "It is he: it is the king." An officer was about to go down to satisfy his curiosity whether it was the king or no, and he asked the vice-consul, who replied it was his uncle. Already the vessel was in motion, the ladder was withdrawn, the paddles splashed in the brine. No orders had been given to stop the king; and if any one had undertaken to do so, it would have been somewhat difficult then to have accomplished it: moreover it was a volunteer service, for which no one would have thanked the informer. Once on board an English ship with the paddles in motion, the king was free: though the winds howled and the elements strove, his anxieties were ended. Next morning he landed, as Mr William Smith, at Newhaven, and is said to have thanked God he was in England. He took up his quarters at the hotel, and wrote to the Queen of England to announce his arrival; he then proceeded to Claremont, which had been placed at his disposal by his son-in-law King Leopold.

The Duchess of Orleans and her children had left France by way of Lille, and arriving on the Rhine had taken refuge with her mother at Ems. The other members of the royal family, with more or less difficulty, had arrived in England before the king, and were waiting to receive him at the Croydon station. They arrived, however, in great poverty; for the republicans on the other

side of the channel, if, as M. de Lamartine professed, they did not intend to appropriate the private property of the royal fugitives, at any rate borrowed it for the present without asking leave, and it appeared very doubtful if they had any intention of returning it. M. de Lamartine states that the Republic only intended to keep the property till it was clear that there was no intention on the part of the Orleans family to stir up civil war.

The Duke d'Aumale was in command in Algiers, and the government having some fears lest he should land at the head of his army and raise a revolt, had bestowed that command on General Cavaignac. But the duke made no remonstrance; he at once gave up his post, left orders that General Changarnier should hold the chief command till the arrival of Cavaignac, and addressing a proclamation to his army, he departed. Thus was the Republic fully established and generally acknowledged. None of the ex-royal family plotted against it, although proscribed by it and rendered incapable of holding any office or of being returned to the national assembly. Surely it did not become the provisional government to assume that popular election and universal suffrage could err in its choice—that the real desires of the great mass of the population were not republican, and that the arrival of one of the expelled family among them would have endangered the state. If so, what right had they to dictate a republic? Their notion seems to have been a sort of "congé d'élire:" choose what you like, but only like to choose a republic.

There were among the decrees some sufficiently absurd. All titles were abolished, and coats-of-arms on all carriages were covered with a tin-plate.* Both decrees soon became obsolete, without being actually repealed. The royal family were not the only persons expelled from

* It was observed that the tin-plate was nowhere so conspicuous as on the carriages of those who had no arms to conceal.

France. A great number of English and Irish labourers at the time of the outbreak were employed in the construction of the railways. The contractors for these works were in many instances English, and having English notions on the subject of a day's work, they were willing to pay very considerably higher wages to men who would work regularly than to persons who would only work when they thought fit; and as the English labourers received higher pay, and displaced French ones, they were, in a time of distress such as preceded February, looked on by them with jealousy. This jealousy was so great, that when the revolution had relaxed the bonds of discipline, all the English workmen were at once expelled, and in many instances the rails were torn up by enraged bands. Those workmen who were driven out of France were unable to obtain their arrears of wages from the companies who employed them. Other workmen, too, engaged in other businesses, were driven home without their pay. Whether any of them ever recovered any of it, I am unable to say. This was the first practical exemplification of the new doctrines of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, as understood by the populace. Not that the government was in any way to blame in the matter; it was not the government who expelled the English workmen, but the populace.

It was, as we have seen, financial embarrassment that had in the first instance thrown the work-people out of employment; and that financial embarrassment was certainly not removed by the revolution: on the contrary, all capitalists were more or less panic-stricken: the funds fell, more work-people were thrown out of employment, and though the provisional government had, as we have seen, refused to appoint M. Louis Blanc minister of progress, and to declare for the organization of labour, they had as a compromise instituted him as the head of a commission to sit at the Luxembourg to consider the question of

labour. His scheme was, that government should found workshops, factories, &c., and gradually become the sole employer of labour, and abolish competition; that all persons should receive equal wages, without regard to skill, and that all profits on capital beyond legal interest should be abolished: forgetting that no capital could be employed under such circumstances. The commission assumed to legislate on the amount of wages to be paid in the several trades, and to abolish sub-contractors or agents who were engaged in seeking the work-people out of employ for the employers who wanted them.

The result of this theoretic legislation was to put a stop to all legitimate employment; and such was the host of labourers lacking the necessaries of life, that M. Marie, the minister of public works, established the "*ateliers nationaux*," or national workshops, where work was supposed to be found for those without it. In point of fact, it was pay that was found, with nothing to do: some were set to throw dirt out of a hole, which they were as frequently employed in throwing in again. The "*ateliers nationaux*" were established on the plan of M. Emile Thomas. The workmen were enrolled in squads of ten each, with a *chef d'escouade;* five squads formed a brigade, four brigades a company, and four companies a battalion, commanded by a *chef de bataillon;* three battalions constituted a "*service*," commanded by a *chef de service;* and at the head of each of the twelve arrondissements was a field-officer in command of all the *services* of his arrondissement. The consequence was, that these workmen became an enrolled army of insurgents, ready to mutiny on all occasions, receiving pay for the purpose; and so ill was the manner of paying them organized, that many of the dishonest drew pay in two or three different squads: indeed there was room for the embezzlement of indefinite sums. Many of these men were criminals of the worst class, who speedily obtained an

ascendency over the others. There was never any real employment for above 2000 men; 8000 were nominally employed at fourteen francs a-week, and the rest, amounting to about 100,000, received eight francs a-week, only for the trouble of calling for it. In this manner enormous sums were squandered to no purpose. It is said that, had government lent to the commercial classes one-half of what they lost in this profitless experiment, regular employment might have been found in legitimate trade, order might have been preserved, and confidence would have much sooner returned than it did. As it was, an army of organized mutineers was kept in pay in Paris, by the government itself, for the purpose of overturning government; for in the 150 clubs that sprang up after the revolution, they were ever hatching conspiracies. Had the workmen been employed in works of public utilty, such as effecting the general arterial drainage of the country, and dispersed among the Departments, they would have been of some use, and less dangerous.

The enormous payments that the government had to make soon brought them to the verge of bankruptcy. To become bankrupt would be to continue distress; to render the return of confidence slower; to continue the public ferment; and to render probable an outbreak which might any day overwhelm the public authorities, plunge the capital into a new revolution, and expose it to pillage, massacre, and conflagration, threatening France with the terrors of the red republican rule: it would be to erect the scaffold in the midst of the land. Nor was it easy to find means to avoid such a catastrophe. The money was expended regularly, and though the direct taxes continued to be paid, the indirect were, in consequence of the general distress, much diminished. The decrease of commerce, causing as it did the diminution of private incomes, was the cause also of a falling of the public revenue. It was

not that there was no money in France, but there was no credit. Commerce could not go on for want of a medium of exchange; private bills would not circulate; gold and silver were hoarded; the bullion was leaving the coffers of the bank of France. Lafitte and Co. and other bankers stopped payment.

Fortunately for France, M. Garnier Pagès, though not a financier, possessed honesty and common sense. These showed him a way out of the difficulty; and as he had no theories of his own, he took that way without hesitation. There was but one course to adopt, and that was to suspend cash-payments—a course which saved the bank and the country. The notes of the Bank of France were made a legal tender; and that establishment was thus enabled to lend to the government a sum of 130,000,000 of francs on the security of the forests of the state. Thereupon an English newspaper wrote thus: "The credit of the bank of France, by far the greatest and most solid establishment in that country, was already shaken before this decree gave the finishing stroke to it. To suppose that the decree of the provisional government can restore that confidence, or, in other words, the nominal value of the notes, is ridiculous." The same authority, within a year afterwards, called it a "masterly financial operation," and added, that "it was in fact the only passage in the history of the year of which the French had reason to be proud."

The assets of the bank were really sufficient for all purposes. It recovered its bullion, restored credit, rescued the state from the jaws of bankruptcy, and saved the republic. Means were found of reorganizing the army and paying the workpeople; while to restore the finances permanently, and to meet extra expenses, forty-five per cent. was added to the direct taxes—a policy which was productive but much abused. Indeed, how a republican government

dare impose taxes without the authority of a parliament is a question difficult to answer. It was no doubt very disagreeable, but it was a necessary consequence of the last revolution, and was a much cheaper price than had been paid for the first.

This operation allowed commerce to revive; it gave the commercial interests, what they required, a medium of exchange; for without a medium of exchange, men are reduced to barter, which is ruinous and inconvenient:* all trade is necessarily at a stand. Trade is carried on by credit; very little cash passes; but it wants accommodation.† The making of the notes of the Bank of France a legal tender gave this accommodation; it supplied a medium of exchange, of the eventual value of which there was no doubt. Bank notes were receivable in taxes, and the property of the bank was sufficient to meet these notes eventually. There was no danger of their leaving the country; private bills could be ex-

* When one is reduced, like M. Bonnichon, to purchase beef in exchange for the cooking utensils, it is very awkward to go to market; and without money, one might be reduced to complain with him, "Je n'ai trouvé que ça pour aller chez le boucher acheter de la culotte de bœuf; j'avais bien un vieux pantalon, j'aurais pu acheter pour un pantalon de culotte, mais je n'en aurais pas eu assez, ainsi donc me voila propriétaire d'une maison; quand je dit propriétaire je suis qu'un fat; mon dernier locataire m'a payé ses trois termes arrières avec un crocodile empaillé. Qu'est qui aurait dit qu'on se librerait en crocodiles." The consequences, though not always so ridiculous, are always as inconvenient.

† In times of panic, money is hoarded; the banks are forced to withdraw their notes; there is no money to be got, and it rises enormously in value: that is to say, all other property falls in price. Those who have money gain enormously; the rest of society suffer proportionably. Jews and money-dealers make their fortunes; every one else is brought to the verge of ruin. Money must be had to meet outstanding engagements at every sacrifice. Goods are sold at enormous losses; those whose assets a few months before were worth double their debts, may be sold up, and not pay a shilling in the pound. And yet were these men given time, and allowed a reasonable period to realize; could they obtain accommodation and so not be forced into the market at a ruinous sacrifice, no one would lose: but the Jews and money-brokers would not gain.

changed in them: in fact, they enabled the governor and manager of the Bank of France "to float their establishment like an ark above the waters of discord, and to rescue their country from the jaws of bankruptcy, and society itself from dissolution. This measure restored trade; re-established credit, and for the time it did that which no other human means could have done, it saved the republic."

It is not to be supposed that in a government of such heterogeneous materials the most perfect unanimity could prevail. The rival newspapers, the *Nationale* and the *Réforme*, could not pull in one team. One of the first acts of the minister of the interior, M. Ledru Rollin, was to send to the various provinces commissaries, who were selected with culpable negligence and invested with unlimited powers. They were charged to prevent the election to the Constituent Assembly of any but those who had previously expressed republican opinions; thus excluding the great bulk of the people. This attempt at dictation was universally resisted, and gave general offence. The persons whom he appointed to this duty, without inquiry into their character, appear to have shown that democratic fervour is not always a guarantee of respectability. Their conduct was such as to excite the most violent disgust; they swaggered over the rustics with reckless insolence. The commissary sent to Havre was a criminal who had served his time at the galleys. The commissary for Nantes, M. Roux, after distributing his list of candidates for the Constituent Assembly, prohibited the printing of any other on the very eve of the elections. The next day his conduct was such, that the good folks of Nantes, with their mayor at their head, drove him out of the city. He repaired to the next town, and having, in the name of the government, obtained a guard of horse and foot, returned; but the people again rose against his intrusion,

and the National Guard explained to the soldiers his delinquencies; upon which they fell off from him, and he was compelled to hide his diminished head. M. Hauriac, another of these worthies, happening to travel in the diligence in company of a gentleman, became more communicative than prudent, and mentioned with great frankness the views of himself and his party. "If," said he, "the banks fail, if commerce perishes, so much the better; we shall only arrive the sooner at our end: as long as there are rich men, look you, we must work their ruin!* There are," quoth he, "no republicans but those of the eve, (those previous to the revolution of public opinions, or conspirators.) We will have none else in the National Assembly. If the provinces elect republicans of the morrow (persons who accepted but had not made the republic), they will never arrive at the Chamber! There is a bridge, and under the bridge the Seine! Paris decides everything, as it does everything. Paris wills, the provinces have only to obey. Paris can resist all France. If the provinces besiege us, we will first drive them off, and then carry the war to their own homes." The gentleman, who listened to this exposition of republican doctrine, published the whole of it for the enlightenment of others; whereupon the worthy commissary pretended that the whole affair had been a joke.

These were the sort of persons whom the minister of the interior invested with absolute power; but the people of France—whom Lamartine himself admits to have lived since 1814 under a constitutional freedom which they have since forfeited—would not submit to them. The pretence of the Parisian rabble to dictate to the whole French people was too absurd to be endured: the agents were laughed at, set at nought, and expelled, and the Minister

* "It was never a merry time since gentle-folks came up; the nobility think scorn to go in leather aprons,"—he might have quoted, had he known it.

of the Interior was covered with reproaches.* The indignation excited was so great that M. Ledru Rollin was very nearly forced to retire. Certain of the National Guard, called Grenadiers and Voltigeurs, who were distinguished by bearskin caps and yellow epaulets, pretended to the right of deciding upon the admission or rejection of members of their corps; they being composed of some of the better class of shopkeepers: and, along with their bearskin and worsted assumption, they raised the Minister of the Interior and his literary productions. The first of their pretensions being clearly very unrepublican, that minister would not listen to them. This was on the 15th of March: they threatened, if Ledru Rollin did not yield, that they would come there armed the next day, which they did; but their democratic comrades having heard of the affair, forestalled them; and when they arrived they found themselves outnumbered and jeered on all sides. The resistance of the minister to the absurd demands of the grenadiers, overcame the indignation which his circulars had excited; especially as these persons had mixed up the two questions together.

Nor was this the only military difficulty the government had to repress. The Invalides rose in mutiny about the end of March, and there were no military to act against them. They took General Petit, their commander, prisoner, late at night, and would have, it is thought, thrown him into the

* It is one of the gravest faults of M. de Lamartine's history of these events, that he slurs over without mentioning distinctly any of the deeds that tell against the republican party. He deals in flattery to the mob; which, though it may be necessary to the orator, is unbecoming in the historian. M. de Lamartine's ideas may be very vivid, but it is not probable that he quite mistakes them for facts. He has, it is true, mentioned this subject, but without detail; it is something he regrets. Some of the atrocious circulars published in the name of the minister of the interior were it seems written by what he calls that "exceptional woman," George Sand, and M. Jules Favre: that minister, it appears, was too careless to look over them and see they contained nothing objectionable.

Seine, had he not been rescued by General Courtais and the national guards. The government were obliged to get together a levy of workmen to arrest the ringleaders of the mutiny. The rabble who had occupied the palace of the Tuileries after the departure of the king and the royal family, finding the apartments much to their mind, had remained there ever since, much to the discomfort of the neighbourhood. They had slept on the sofas, obtained provisions, and the cellars being very well provided, their supplies lasted some time. They refused to leave such comfortable quarters, and, when summoned to do so, replied, "they should reign eighteen years and then abdicate;" and attempted to make conditions that they should receive pensions of 1200 francs a-piece. These terms not being considered acceptable, they were, by Caussidière's orders, attacked by a band of 50 Montagnards and 200 of the pupils of the Ecole St Cyr; who having, on the evening of the 6th March, gained admittance into the court, compelled the ragged garrison to evacuate the building next morning. This operation was fortunately conducted without bloodshed; the intruders walked out, arm in arm, having well filled their pockets with what they had found there in the shape of cash. Most of them were very questionable characters: some entered into the service of the police, but they proved too great rogues; though M. Caussidière appears to have looked on them with regret, not unmixed with tenderness, when he was obliged to dismiss them. One of the popular amusements of the day was to plant trees of liberty. A dry sapling poplar was usually selected; it was decked with flags, bands played, drums were beaten, the priests were called on to bless, and the populace danced and shouted: but neither trees nor liberty lived long.

One of M. Caussidière's first objects on taking possession of the prefecture of police, was to discover those per-

sons who, being members of secret societies, had betrayed their counsels to the authorities. He stumbled, among others, on a very thick bundle of reports, signed Pierre; the handwriting bore a great likeness to that of M. Delahodde. The prefect of police had already made up his mind on the subject, when he discovered a letter in the same hand, fully signed Lucien Delahodde, offering his services as a member of the secret police. Delahodde was in daily correspondence with him, and was in the habit of dining every day at his table at the prefecture. Caussidière, a few evenings after this discovery, on the 14th of March, asked him at dinner to accompany him to Albert's apartments at the Luxembourg; having previously invited a number of colleagues and old conspirators to meet him there: M. Chenu among the number. Delahodde, however, either himself having been a spy of the former government, as Caussidière asserts, or knowing, as he says, that he had been denounced, thought mischief was intended to himself; and, accordingly, took two brace of pistols under his coat, and got fifty of his friends in the company which he commanded to wait outside: his signal to them, if he found himself in danger, was to be the report of a pistol. When he got there he judged, from the absence of the prudent M. Flocon, who sent word he was indisposed, that something serious was intended. The meeting put M. Grandmesnil in the chair. Caussidière declared there was a traitor among them, and that it was Lucien Delahodde. He tried to escape, but Caussidière prevented him. He then attempted to deny the matter, but his letter offering his services confounded him. He confessed his fault and implored pity of his judges. Caussidière offered him a pistol, saying it was his only resource to commit suicide. He hesitated. One of those present seized the pistol, and was about to commit murder. Albert seemed to think that, as a member of the government, he ought not to permit it, and seized

the weapon before it exploded, crying that it would give the alarm. Had M. Chenu fired, the guard would very likely have broken in and made an end of the tribunal. The disappointed patriot then suggested poison. Caussidière had brought it: he put it into a glass of water, considerately adding sugar, and offered it to Delahodde, who stood the most horrid picture of terror and agony. The miserable wretch refused to drink. "Drink!" cried Caussidière. "I won't," said Delahodde; "I'll have my revenge." "Will you?" cried he of the pistol; "you shall never leave the room," and he presented the weapon, which he had again got hold of. Albert again interposed; some of the company interfered, and eventually Delahodde was carried off in a cab, and put in prison. He was suspected also, with some reason, since the declaration of the republic, of having betrayed its counsels to his former employers.

At the prefecture of police M. Caussidière and his second in command, M. Pornin, occupied themselves alternately with private debauchery and public disturbances.* The manifestation of the bearskin caps and yellow worsted had excited their wrath. As accident would have it, Lamartine on the same day, when the would-be aristocracy of the National Guard had slunk away, proposed to the Government the repudiation of the principles which had been announced by the circulars of M. Ledru Rollin to his commissaries. After a somewhat angry discussion his proclamation was agreed to and published, acknowledging the full right of the provinces to elect whom they pleased: an announcement which was hailed with delight from one end of France to the other. It was any thing but satisfactory to M. Ledru Rollin, whose arrogance

* Peace was fortunately at last established between them and the old sergents de ville, with whom they had waged war, by Pornin's discovering that they would treat him with something to drink, of which he was always avid; and they fraternized over the bottle.

carried him so far during the discussion that the rumour ran that M. Marrast was provoked to strike him: a *coup de main* which reduced that republican to reason; for he had the sense to know that it would not do to appear to the public to differ with his colleagues.

The proclamation was not pleasing to the clubs or to M. Caussidière. Coupled with the yellow worsted and bearskin business of the previous day, it became an excuse for a popular demonstration by all of that order of republicans who imagine that a republic consists of the domination of the most worthless class in the community over all the rest. The people of Paris, always ready to gaze or assist at any spectacle, gathered together in the Place de la Concorde and in the Champs Elysées; and the clubs having placed themselves at the head of the columns, they advanced in enormous masses on the Hôtel de Ville, where they waited for an hour or so before the Government would admit them. Some sang the Marseillaise, some shouted one thing, some another; but the greater part did not know why they had come together.

After a time, about a hundred of the self-appointed deputies from the people were admitted. They made a demand for a postponement of the elections of the members of the Constituent Assembly, and of the officers of the National Guard, and that the army should be removed from Paris; in other words, they desired anarchy: they hoped for the continuance of the Provisional Government, which they themselves would thus be able to control. The National Guard might, if organized, resist, and the troops, if allowed to be present, might interfere. Whatever tended to shorten the tyranny of the Parisian mob over the rest of France, was reactionary and anti-democratic. The expediency of these demands was unfortunately not appreciated; the Provisional Government was indignant at this attempt to dictate; some cries were heard of "Vive

la Minorité," "A bas Lamartine." Both Ledru Rollin and Louis Blanc remonstrated with the deputation, and said that the army ought as soon as possible to be reconciled with the populace. "Those are very fine words," said one of the clubbists, "but we shall not stir till you have deliberated before us: we want acts, not words." "Have you not traitors among you? Lamartine for example: let him explain," cried some. "No, no," cried others. "We trust them all," cried some. "Not at all," said others. Lamartine thus appealed to, spoke to them.

He said, that in consideration of the fact that many citizens had not had time to enrol themselves in the National Guard, the election of the officers had been postponed for a fortnight; that as to the troops, there were none in Paris, and but few near it: that after the late power had seen 80,000 melt in the streets of Paris, they would be mad to attempt to constrain the people by military force; but that the soldier was also a citizen, and he would hear of no invidious distinctions. As to the postponement of the elections for the Constituent Assembly, he would never consent to the dictature of Paris over the nation; that liberty was conquered for the people, and that Paris had no right to monopolize it. The people outside, who were not aware of the precise objects of their self-appointed deputation, were crying "Vive le Gouvernement Provisoire;" which rather discouraged any resort to violence on the part of the clubs, if they had intended it.

This popular demonstration, though really made by a knot of unscrupulous persons intent on disorder, the Government thought it necessary to regard as a highly favourable symptom; and congratulated the people on their orderly conduct, hoping by describing them as what they ought to be, to flatter them into really becoming so. Before the elections the more conservative classes had taken

heart by degrees, and made more use of the delay than their opponents. France was essentially non-republican, as subsequent events have shown. Liberty is not what the French really require. What they want are social equality and external power. To have the former they willingly submit to the most violent interference with their personal freedom—such as the compulsory equal division of property at death; and this without any idea that it is any interference with the rights of property.

In the meantime, the French Republic was universally recognised by the European courts; coldly by some, more cordially by others. Indeed, news soon poured in showing that most of the other powers had quite enough to do at home, and, in hourly danger of becoming republican themselves, were in no case to interfere. The Minister of Foreign Affairs felt that the English alliance was of the most vital importance to him. Lord Palmerston at once acknowledged the right of nations to govern themselves, and to choose what form of government they thought best—a maxim which some *liberal* statesmen would seem to conform to only when such a form is chosen as the said liberal statesmen approve of. We have seen those of that opinion who have not sparingly vituperated both the man and the measures of a people's choice, when they tended to imperial rather than republican rule: though surely they have as much right to adopt one form as another.

The determination of the Provisional Government to respect the institutions of their neighbours, was very displeasing to the louder democrats. Belgium lay conveniently near to them. Towards the end of March, certain persons in Paris, who either were or called themselves Belgians, desired to re-enter Belgium and raise the revolutionary standard. It may be doubted whether they were Belgians at all, because in Belgium the king, having been elected as a constitutional monarch, has, like

a gentleman, observed the oath that he swore to his people; and that republicanism was not very rife in that country may be gathered from there being but thirteen voices in its favour when the question of the form of government was submitted to it in 1830.. However, these persons calling themselves Belgians, and a considerable number of French volunteers, proceeded to the frontiers. They had asked help of the Minister of the Interior and the Prefect of Police. Those two persons, privately approving of the object, but knowing in their public capacity that it was against the policy of the Provisional Government to attempt any such matter, thought it not inconsistent to help them underhand. Arms, it is true, were not *furnished*, but were sent ostensibly to arm the National Guard at the frontier. Those in charge of the arms were to make a show of resistance; but they were to be at a lonely place within the French frontier, near the Belgian village of Risquonstous, in the middle of the night, where the column of 1100 propagandists was to meet them, take possession of the arms, and use them in committing an act of war on a neighbouring state. But Belgium had no revolutionary sympathies. It was satisfied with the government it enjoyed, and the practical freedom it had gained. Partly of Flemish descent, the Belgians had too much cool sense to desire disturbance for disturbance' sake. They had only been roused in 1830 by great aggravation. The Walloons, though more allied in language to their French neighbours, had no desire to be united with them, and were too sensible of the real advantages of the absence of police spies, and the freedom of locomotion in their own country, to wish to change masters. For the propagandist column there was no sympathy, and they were ignominiously expelled. Nobody in Belgium thought they had met with anything but what they deserved; so they returned to Paris crest-fallen.

Nor was this affair on the Belgian frontier the only instance in which the Provisional Government were powerless to prevent corps of armed propagandists collecting on the borders of France, and discharging themselves on neighbouring states. MM. Struvè and Hecker were allowed to collect one at Strasbourg for the purpose of revolutionizing Germany. They too were, however, expelled. Their attempt was made in the lake-district of Baden, and on the borders of the Black Forest; but troops of Hessians were waiting for them, and smote and slew them. The remainder retired to the confines of Switzerland in confusion, and were not in safety till they had crossed that frontier; which very few of them succeeded in doing.

A corps of Poles, too, was formed for the purpose of helping that unfortunate country; for the King of Prussia had made an appearance of reviving its nationality in the duchy of Posen. This corps was in great part composed of Frenchmen, with the addition of "ski" to the end of their names. They were allowed at first to pass in small bodies, and were fêted by the populace; but being divided, they could do no mischief. In the meantime, the German and Polish inhabitants of the duchy came to blows; the friends of Poland began to be looked on with a jealous eye by the German population among whom they had to pass; and they eventually returned to France without having effected anything. A body of men out of work at Lyons made a military onslaught on Savoy, and having surprised Chambery, made themselves masters of it. But the population of Savoy, not appreciating their fraternal intentions, rose in arms and expelled them from their territory.

CHAPTER IV.

FROM THE ELECTIONS OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY TO THE INSURRECTION OF JUNE.

THE manifestation of the 17th of March had shown that the leaders of the clubs of Paris desired to assume the dictatorship of France. There were two modes of treating them—by force and conciliation. Many of them were sincere in their views. They thought that the realization of their visionary ideas was necessary to the well-being of mankind, and considered themselves justified in using any means to compel their adoption for the benefit of the community.* It was thought prudent by Lamartine to provide an armed force within a reasonable distance of Paris, by means of which, were it to happen that the elements of disorder should prevail, the provisional government be overwhelmed and its members executed, that the army might restore tranquillity to Paris and to France, by reconquering the streets of the capital from the rabid minority of red republicans. General Negrier commanded the army of the north on the confines of Belgium. He was beloved by his troops, who amounted to 26,000

* This is the precise principle on which the despot attempts to ameliorate the condition of his subjects. It is curious to observe throughout the identity of principles and of practices existing between the purest despotism and the purest democracy—two forms of government usually considered diametrically opposed to each other.

men. Orders were given him to be ready either to receive the government at Lille, in case they should be driven from Paris, or to march on the capital on the first summons. These orders were of course preserved an inviolable secret; and they demonstrate conclusively that the republican provisional government were not, like Louis Philippe, inclined to give up their authority without a struggle, for humanity's sake. This office Negrier undertook to perform if need were. He could also have called to his aid the army of the Rhine of 20,000; and there were 500,000 national guards in the northern provinces, from whom he would have been able to receive some assistance. These forces were sufficient to have enabled him to rescue France from Paris. But though anxious to provide forces to reconquer order if it was disturbed, Lamartine hoped to be able, by conciliating the chiefs of the party of disorder, to avoid the necessity. These men were, as has been said, many of them honest and enthusiastic.

With these chiefs Lamartine opened communications. He had had the power and the good fortune to have been of service to some of them; and he contrived, partly by flattery, partly by his own enthusiasm, to conciliate them; to impress upon them the necessity of order; and to convince them that he himself was sincere in his profession of the republican faith, and that he had no desire to recall the exiled royal family, as some of them seem to have suspected. By these means he succeeded in a great measure in preventing political demonstrations. On a small scale, there were outbursts of discontent; but mainly between rival trades: as, for instance, between the tailors and slopsellers; on which occasion an attempt was made by the tailors to break into and ravage the shops of their opponents: the journeymen bakers, too, were on the point of striking work and quarrelling with their masters.

These matters fell within the cognizance of the prefect of police. He had established a republican guard, both foot and horse, the latter mounted on the horses of the municipal guard. He had, too, with the consent of the minister of the interior, in place of the old sergents de ville, established a body of policemen, more resembling the police of London; and also had accepted the services of the detectives of the former government. By these means tranquillity had been gradually restored in the streets; the barricades had been removed; the gas was again lighted; and, upon ordinary occasions, Paris had very much resumed its wonted appearance. M. Sobrier, too, who had been originally appointed a colleague of Caussidière, but who had fallen sick, had, on his recovery, set himself up, nominally under his colleague's orders, but really independent; had hired a house in the Rue de Rivoli, which he converted into a barrack for a guard of Montagnards, and was in fact the head of the police in that quarter. Eventually, by his vagaries, he frightened that fashionable neighbourhood till it became too hot for him, and he was compelled to beat a retreat. In the meantime, these disorderly guards prevented disorder in others, and were, Lamartine says, of a certain use.

The Poles, not content with the innumerable evils which turbulence and corruption have brought upon their own country ever since the democracy obtained the power of selling its throne to the highest bidder, in whatever state they are in exile, are always, it seems, ready to join in any disturbance. In Paris, they were members of all the democratic clubs. Among them there are all complexions of opinion; all degrees of reasonableness, down to its vanishing point. It was a question of interest to them to know whether the new Republic was prepared to help them to regain their country. It was the pretence of each of the many parties among them that they, and they

only, represented their country. One evening a deputation of them found M. de Lamartine at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and requested an audience. They were divided into two groups; one tolerably reasonable in their requests and language, the other much the reverse in both respects. An orator of the latter class addressed the Minister, telling him that the Poles were more masters of Paris than the Ministry was; that they had 40,000 men in the *Ateliers Nationaux* ready to join them on the morrow, to march on the Hôtel de Ville; and that, if the Government would not yield to them, they were strong enough to upset and change it.

Lamartine defied them to do anything of the sort, and the moderate party interfered. It was agreed that on the morrow they should have an audience at the Hôtel de Ville; but that they were not to bring a body of Frenchmen with them, or they would be treated not as guests but as disturbers of the peace. On the morrow, accordingly, they arrived in a numerous body on the Place de Grêve. The reply of Lamartine was an important state paper to Europe. After paying them certain compliments, softening his refusal by judicious flattery, speaking of the interest that France felt in Poland, and stating that the principle of the Republic was to provoke war with none, he observed, that those nations, who occupied what had been Poland, appeared to be in the convulsions of dissolution; that already the Duchy of Posen had been restored to them by Prussia; and that the course of events appeared to be more favourable to them than the gaining of ten battles would have been. In point of fact, he made it evident that France was not going to plunge herself into war with the rest of Europe on their account—a decision which was regarded by other nations with considerable satisfaction; for though the example of France had set the domestic states of half Europe in a blaze, yet a general war must

have greatly increased the evil; and it was not without reason feared that democratic ambition would push France into such a position as should involve that necessity.

The Irish, too, were about to follow the example. Newspapers had been established in Ireland for the avowed object of preaching treason; massacre and assassination were lauded as patriotic virtues, and instructions were given for loading soda-water bottles with nails and gunpowder, for the purpose of destroying the soldiers. Mr Smith O'Brien headed a deputation from Dublin to the revolutionary authorities in Paris, asking for arms and help to throw off the English yoke. Their cause was aided by the old grudge between France and England (which, it is to be hoped, has now died away), and by religious sympathy. Fortunately for all parties the two causes of sympathy were not strong enough to make Lamartine fear popular indignation, and he rejected their suit; but being much inconvenienced by their presence, he told them that he was happy to see them, thanked them for their sentiments, and made a few flourishes about French liberty, which meant nothing. He added, that he had already announced to Switzerland, Germany, and Belgium, that any nation which had internal disputes to arrange must settle them without French interference. He hoped justice might be done them (as indeed it very shortly was), but that France was at peace with the United Kingdom, and the Republic considered this peace so important to the whole human race, that France would do no act to break it; and that to give up the cordial alliance between the entire countries for one with a party only in the country would be disadvantageous policy. He rendered it apparent to them that they had nothing to hope from French help; and, in short, that they had committed high-treason to no purpose whatever. The crowd that were standing about cheered his speech, impressing on the Irish deputation that they

agreed in the sentiments of the orator, and they were fain to be content. To make up for the disappointment, Lamartine asked them to dinner on the following day; but no conversation passed on the subject of their visit. How the Irish rebellion exploded and was ignominiously extinguished in a widow's cabbage-garden by fifty policemen, will be recounted subsequently. While Europe was witnessing a tragedy, Ireland was legitimately content with a farce.

For some weeks Paris remained tolerably tranquil. The idle workpeople and children amused themselves with planting trees of liberty and other puerilities; only occasionally attempting any grosser breach of decorum. Nevertheless, on one occasion, on the reception of some news unfavourable for Austria, Lamartine with difficulty prevented them from going to insult the ambassador of that power.*

France remained tranquil and expecting the coming elections. It was necessary that before the National Assembly met, the National Guard should have elected their officers, and should be equipped and disciplined enough to protect the Assembly from the violence which the clubs threatened, in case France should return men of anti-revolutionary tendencies.

* A subject which excited some mirth at the time, was the correspondence between Lord Brougham and M. Cremieux, the minister of justice. Lord Brougham fearing that democratic appropriativeness might interfere with his property at Cannes, applied to M. Cremieux for naturalization. That minister warned him, that in becoming a citizen of the French republic, he would cease to be an English peer. He replied, that he was aware he should lose the rights of a British subject in France. M. Cremieux answered, that he would lose them in England too, if he were naturalized in France; for France accepted no half service. Lord Brougham was right and M. Cremieux was wrong; the question was one of English law, not of French. No British subject can by law put off his allegiance. His acceptance of French citizenship could have no effect of any sort in this country. However, Lord Brougham was laughed at: it was said that he wanted to make a figure in the New France. He, however, came over to England, and in the House of Peers vented his annoyance with considerable acrimony.

The elections had been fixed originally for the beginning of April, but had been on this account put off till the 27th. The Government dared not as yet call up the regular troops, for fear that the National Guard, whose political opinions were not yet declared, should side against the soldiers and with the populace. The nearer the elections came, the more turbulent became the rabble of the purlieus of Paris: they execrated whoever should depose them from their usurped sovereignty. The postponement of the elections really was an advantage to the reactionary party; for those who were not in principle anarchical—that is, the greater part of the French people—had thereby time to recover themselves from the astonishment into which the revolution of February had thrown them. Had the elections occurred earlier, and before this reaction had taken place, it is probable that the National Assembly would have been of a more republican character. The object sought by the clubs was what they called a democratic republic.

It wanted still some weeks to the day fixed for the elections. Day by day rumours more or less alarming reached the authorities in Paris. There were two camps in the Government itself, more or less hostile. With the moderate party Lamartine was the hero of the hour: he was applauded and almost worshipped in the streets; while the clubs trusted in Louis Blanc, Albert, and Ledru Rollin. On the 14th of April, intelligence reached the Government that a manifestation of work-people from the *Ateliers Nationaux* would take place on the 16th, to enforce the postponement of the elections, and the continuance of the dictatorship of the Provisional Government. The National Guard had in the meantime been re-organized, but had not been called out; and it was doubtful what might be its political predilections. Albert and Louis Blanc, at the sitting of the Government on that day, admitted that the manifestation would take place. It was known that it

was intended to expel Lamartine and the other moderates; to instal Louis Blanc, Albert, and Ledru Rollin, with an addition from the leaders of the clubs as a committee of public safety. Lamartine endeavoured to persuade his colleagues of the extreme impolicy of such a course, and did his best to induce them to prevent the manifestation by their personal influence; but, he says, that though his colleagues appeared sorry for the mischief, it seemed that they were either powerless or unwilling to prevent it.

The only course that remained was to prepare for its reception. It was resolved to occupy the Hôtel de Ville with what defenders could be found, and to stand a siege. Lamartine burned all the papers in his office which might, in case of his defeat, have compromised any one. He learned on the night of the 15th, that the clubs were sitting in permanence, and that the other clubs, after purging the Provisional Government, were decided on extinguishing Blanqui and his club, of whom they entertained great jealousy; nevertheless, Blanqui appeared to join in the conspiracy against the government. In the morning masses began to assemble in the Champs de Mars. Lamartine was waiting for more precise information, when M. Ledru Rollin came to see him, who had learned that the clubs had placed his name on the list of their intended committee of public safety, though he repudiated all connexion with them.

It was agreed that Lamartine should throw himself into the Hôtel de Ville with such battalions of the Garde Mobile as he could get, while Ledru Rollin should cause the rappel to be beaten in the streets for the National Guard; if they answered to the call, the insurgents would be between their fire and that of the Hôtel de Ville; if they had not, Lamartine must have perished at his post. The resolution was at once acted on. Lamartine went in search of General Duvivier, whom he found without cartridges;

which had to be procured from the Tuileries. General Changarnier, who had been named ambassador at Berlin, also offered his services at the Hôtel de Ville, and withdrew the battalions of the Garde Mobile within the rails and into the chateau. Lamartine said if he would engage to hold the building for three hours, that he would answer for the arrival of the National Guard. Changarnier replied he would pledge himself to hold it for seven hours. But the rappel was not heard. It is said that after Lamartine had left the Tuileries, counter orders were given by some one. However, M. Marrast, who had occupied the post of mayor of Paris since the acceptance of the ministry of finances by Garnier Pagès, ordered the rappel to be beaten; and beaten it was from one end of Paris to the other. A column of National Guards volunteering to defend the government arrived, with Chateau Renaud at its head. Lamartine harangued them on the present position of affairs, and spoke confidently of the unity of the Provisional Government—a unity which existed more in his own imagination than in reality.

After finishing his speech, he looked out of a window and perceived in the distance the head of the column of insurgents from the Champs de Mars, advancing down the quays. On the way, they had exchanged insults with a body of National Guards under General de Courtais, beneath the walls of the Louvre, who followed them; but without coming to blows. They were on the point of arriving at the Hôtel de Ville, when a mass of 30,000 or 40,000 National Guards from the other side of the Seine appeared at the end of the Pont St Michel, and, seeing the danger, rushed across the bridge, which was too narrow to allow them to cross with sufficient rapidity. They debouched on the quay, and rushing on, filled the Place de Grêve, shouting "Vive la Republique," "Vive le Gouvernement:" they occupied the whole place,

so that the column of insurgents were unable to enter it. The whole respectable part of the inhabitants of Paris flew also to the rescue, and a forest of bayonets defended the government. The example of the 10th of April in London had influenced Paris: the defeat of the projected chartist demonstration by a union of all classes, who were enrolled together to preserve order, and the magical effect of the batons of the special constables, had taught Europe the lesson that the people can wholly defeat the rabble if they have the sense and the courage to try.

The insurrection thus taken in a trap, and enclosed between two opposing forces, was extinguished without any hostile collision. After a time a deputation was admitted from the insurgents, who made some pretence of bringing a contribution collected for the benefit of their country.* While Lamartine was busied in writing, the deputation from the insurgents was received by some of the underlings of the office; who, being no longer in fear of them, and not then finding it their interest to flatter them, expressed their own opinions in language more curt than courteous. At this moment, MM. Louis Blanc and Albert, who had been mysteriously absent all day, and who are not unreasonably suspected of having themselves instigated the insurrection, came in and spoke bitterly of the unpleasant truths that had been told to what they chose to miscall "the people;" they murmured against the beating of the rappel, and the repression of a popular manifestation by armed force. Lamartine, who overheard the nature of their griefs, rose, threw down his pen, and

* The pretence on which the meeting in the Champs de Mars had been originally got together, had been to elect officers for the National Guard; and as it was altogether unsuccessful in its attempt to overturn the government, certain of the friends of conspiracy and political tumult, M. Caussidière the prefect of police among them, have seen fit to deny the intention altogether. No doubt he had the fullest opportunity of knowing their designs, which appear to have had his approval.

delivered a lecture to them, which no doubt made them wonder how one who had so lately had nought but honied words for the turbulent, could, now that he felt secure in the known disposition of the armed citizens, administer such bitter though well-deserved reproof.

Paris was on the following day divided into two camps —the party of order and the party of disorder; or in other words, the revolutionary party and the reactionary party: the one intent on the "democratic and social republic," another form of expression for anarchy; the other intent on keeping their property. There had been hitherto, since February, only one party, that of disorder, which had ever dared to show its head; but the classes who had everything to lose and nothing to gain by disturbance, had discovered that they were not only more numerous but better organized, better disciplined, and altogether more powerful than those who had on the 24th of February won anarchy on the barricades; and though no serious disorder menaced public tranquillity, mutual insults passed between the parties in the streets.

It is only wonderful that the insurgents ever ventured to make the demonstration they did. Butchers, bakers, grocers, and shoemakers do not follow trades which give military tastes or experience: haberdashers and saddlers are awkward in harness; and muskets are disagreeable weapons either in one's own hands or in an opponent's. The conduct and tyranny of the rabble must have been unbearable indeed, before the *bourgeoisie* could have been induced to dispute their authority; but now that it could be done with impunity, it would be much more convenient to bring up regular soldiers whose business was fighting, to keep the disorderly quiet. Hence the National Guard made no objection, but rather were glad, when the government resolved to call up some troops. By way of an excuse, however, it was thought necessary to have a grand

review; and also, for the purpose of encouraging the National Guard, it was thought good to present them with their colours. Accordingly, on the 20th, the members of the government placed themselves on a platform erected at the triumphal arch at the Barrière de l'Etoile. The military procession began at eight o'clock in the morning, and it was calculated that 400,000 men had passed in review before night; and there were some who had to be reviewed on the following day in the Place Vendôme.

All the regiments of the line, infantry, artillery, and cavalry in the neighbourhood of Paris were present; and having been re-admitted into the capital as French citizens, they remained there to protect it as soldiers. Having been called up to take part in a show of military, their presence does not appear to have given any umbrage to the populace, or else the turbulent were for the present so far cowed as not to dare to give vent to their ill humour; but it is not improbable that the military spectacle occupied their minds with visions of foreign conquest and glory, and that thus amused, their natural levity caused them for the moment to forget or to lay aside the annoyance which the defeat of the insurrection of the 16th had caused.

Easter day had been fixed for the elections: it fell on the 23d day of April. The suffrage was universal, and the votes were taken by ballot. Lamartine was elected for ten different places, and he was at the head of the poll in the department of the Seine, in which Paris it situated. He was at that moment one of the most popular persons not only in France but in Europe. It was thought, and thought justly, that it was he who had prevented both internal tumult and external aggression. He was treated by the people with more than royal honour, and had he desired to possess himself of dictatorship, there is very little doubt he might have done so; and perhaps with advantage to his country: but for himself he has certainly taken the

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wiser part, preferring private life to public exaltation. When recognised at the opera, he was greeted as if he were a monarch, and when met in the streets, the people bestowed on him extempore ovations. They have since very ungratefully forgotten the enormous services he really rendered to his country, and have covered him with undeserved obloquy. Yet the flattery which he at one time lavished on the populace for virtues which they had not, was not unaptly rewarded by oblivion of the virtues which he had. His position on the poll in Paris was indicative of the opinions of the country; which returned a majority of representatives of moderate and even reactionary views. There was no doubt of the disgust of the people for the humiliating dictatorship which had been exercised over them by the most worthless and turbulent. The clubs, on their side, threatened to throw the reactionary chamber of national representatives into the Seine; but being, even in Paris, clearly in a minority, the threat was not accomplished.

When the results of the elections became known, the mob flew to arms in Nantes, Amiens, Marseilles, and Rouen. In the latter place the insurrection was not quelled under two days hard fighting, and a liberal use of grape shot and musketry by the national guard and the troops. The clubs of Paris were greatly incensed by the news; and great fears were entertained of an outbreak, as they declared that it was treachery on the part of the *bourgeoisie* to murder the people. What they thought it would be for the rabble to murder the *bourgeoisie* and upset the results of their pet nostrum universal suffrage and vote by ballot, does not appear: nevertheless, the lesson they had been taught on the 16th prevented them from stirring.

Meanwhile the provisional government sought, by abolishing the octroi at the gates and reducing the duty on salt, to show that as it was the duty, so it was the intention of

the government to watch over the work-people and attend to their interests, without paying any attention to their behaviour. Notwithstanding threats of violence and tumult, the Assembly met, as had been previously arranged, on the 4th of May. Universal suffrage had had a very different effect from what its advocates had hoped. The greater part of the population of France is agricultural; and agricultural populations are, for some reason, almost invariably conservative in their tendencies; the consequence was that, excluded from the franchise, their influence had been but little felt under the monarchy, but was now powerful under the republic. The mad theories of the communists and socialists, the schemes for abolishing property and family, and other vagaries (which were subsequently extinguished amidst universal laughter at the Théâtre du Vaudeville, by that very humorous though somewhat indelicate and profane production, "*La propriété c'est le vol*)," had frightened the bourgeois class into conservatism or reaction; for when their own interests and properties are obviously touched, probably no other class is so selfish. Besides, to these elements may be added the common sense of the country, which the threats and behaviour of the sovereign rabble had brought to the side of order and restraint. These causes, together with the parties of the several pretenders to the throne, more or less in the background, Legitimist, Orleanist, and Napoleonist, had, even in the capital and the great towns, returned a majority of very moderate men.

The laughter of Europe had been excited by some very absurd regulations as to the costume to be adopted by the deputies: they were to appear in some wonderful white waistcoat turned up with blue. This was the doing of the Minister of the Interior; but the subject had been made too ridiculous in the eyes of all men, and no republican waistcoats were to be seen: even the Government were

ashamed of theirs, and buttoned their coats, so that no one knew whether they had followed their own ordinance or not: M. Caussidière declares he had; but *de non apparentibus et non existentibus eadem est ratio.* On the other hand, the cross of the legion of honour—a decoration which, in common with all others, had been proscribed by the republican sages—was everywhere visible.*

Only about two-thirds of the returns to the Assembly had been received, but nevertheless it was opened. The Provisional Government had arranged beforehand the seat that each deputy was to occupy. Caussidière desired to have placed a hundred of the republican guard at the Chamber for its defence; but General Courtais refused, saying, that the National Guard had claimed the honour exclusively. It is not impossible that the prefect of police, whose hankering after conspiracies was well known, was not altogether trusted by the moderate part of the government.

* This disregard of a public ordinance by the members of the assembly because of its folly, and the independent exercise of private judgment in the colour of their waistcoats, was perhaps one of the most favourable symptoms that had yet appeared. Most continental nations are so used to ridiculous regulations and interference, that they obey almost mechanically any orders of this minute nature. Generally speaking, if an inhabitant of the continent is required not to smoke in the streets, it never occurs to him that it is an interference with his personal liberty; if he is not allowed to go into the water without first arraying himself in curious nether garments of unbleached linen, if he is not allowed to carry out of the sea a bucket of salt water, or if he is obliged to apply to the police for permission to go twenty miles, it never seems to him any restraint on his freedom of action. He has got some wonderfully complete constitution on a piece of paper or parchment somewhere, and he is quite satisfied that he is a free man. Of course this state of things is of no consequence to any one else as long as he is happy under the delusion; but so long as the delusion lasts, he has no idea of freedom. Hence the rebellion of the common sense of the deputies against the ridiculous orders of M. Ledru Rollin, may be looked on as a symptom that at least they among their countrymen were able to look on such fooleries with contempt. Parliament is in this country omnipotent, it is said; but it may be much doubted whether it would prescribe any particular dress to any class of civilians with any chance of being obeyed. Certainly it abolished hair-powder, though unintentionally; but it has not succeeded in converting the highlandmen to breeches, which it did once upon a time attempt to do.

As the members of the Provisional Government walked in a body to the chamber, they were saluted with cries of "Vive la République," "Vive Lamartine," and a few of "Vive le Gouvernement Provisoire." The eldest person present was put in the chair: Dupont de l'Eure mounted the tribune, and was hailed by cries of "Vive la République." He spoke shortly, but to the point. "Citizens," said he, "the Provisional Government bows down before the nation, and renders homage to sovereign power, with which you alone are invested. At length the moment has come for Government to deposit in your hands the unlimited power with which the revolution clothed it. You know whether with us this dictatorship has been aught else than a moral power, exercised in the midst of the difficult circumstances through which the nation has passed. Vive la République," the old man concluded. The Assembly took up the cry, and cheered the speaker; and for the next three days they were occupied with verifying the returns, and in electing a president: their choice fell on M. Buchez.

On the 7th the Chamber was opened for discussion. At the request of Dupont de l'Eure, Lamartine addressed them. He recapitulated the events of the revolution, the difficulties of the Government. They had passed through two months of crisis, without proscription or imprisonments, and without a drop of blood being shed in Paris for which they were to blame; they could descend from their power without any one being able to say, "What have you done with a single citizen?" They had secured the independence of the Assembly by organizing and arming the national guard. The work of the Provisional Government was done, that of the Assembly was beginning. To the Assembly the Government restored the powers which had been confided to them, and only desired to descend again into the rank of private citizens.

The orator was applauded, and each minister in turn

rendered an account of his charge. Lamartine was again called on to address them on foreign affairs. He described the isolated condition in which he imagined France to have existed under the Monarchy. The Republic had only two courses: either to explode against all thrones and all the countries of the continent, to tear up the map of Europe, and deluge the world with blood; or else to declare peace and fraternity to all peoples, to respect their institutions and their possessions, and to establish the triumph of democracy by example. This last had been the policy adopted, and it had been eminently successful. "Italy was moved; Sicily insurgent; at Naples a constitution had been granted; the Pope had become the great reformer; Tuscany, Parma, and Modena were following the example." (But he omitted to mention that most of these events preceded the revolution of February.) "Lombardy had driven out the Austrians, and Piedmont was ruled by a liberal king on the other side of the Alps; revolution had broken out at Vienna on the 14th of March; Bohemia and Hungary were in commotion; the democratic reign had been a few days later established at Berlin; the Polish nationality had been recognised in Posen; liberty of the press had been granted in Wurtemberg and in Baden; the king of Bavaria had abdicated; all the smaller states of Germany were more or less revolutionized, and a German parliament was about to be called at Frankfort. He wished for no clearer proof of the divine origin of democracy, and of its triumph in Europe being as rapid as in Paris, than that the Republic had at once understood and accepted this pacific policy. France in her system of allies included Switzerland, Italy, and the emancipated people of Germany, and would march at the head of eighty-eight millions of confederates and friends. What victory could have been worth such a confederation to the Republic, which has been won without having cost the life of a man, and

cemented by the conviction of their disinterestedness? France, on the fall of Royalty, had risen from its abasement, as an overloaded vessel is at once relieved when she is lightened. Such was the actual exterior situation of France: its happiness, its glory, belonged alone to the Republic; the Government accepted only the responsibility, and should ever congratulate itself that it had appeared before the representatives of the country, offering it peace, assuring it of greatness, of hands full of alliances, and pure of human blood." A speech which, though not altogether true, was pacific, and was accepted as such by the Assembly.

Between the resignation of the Provisional Government and the appointment of a permanent one, a period of interregnum necessarily elapsed; and during this period it was essential that there should be some established executive authority. Of the Assembly of nine hundred which had been returned, between five and six hundred were decidedly moderates, the rest approaching to ultra opinions; the latter were in a minority, but a minority sufficiently great to be very troublesome if offended: especially if backed by the turbulent spirits of the capital. The moderates were anxious to invest M. de Lamartine with a dictatorial authority; a trust to which his conduct of the revolution had fairly entitled him. But he saw difficulties in his way; perhaps more than really existed. He considered that if, at the dictation of the majority of the Assembly, he accepted office, he would have either to reject or retain the elements, more revolutionary than himself, that had hitherto formed part of the Government. If at the desire of the majority he rejected them, it would be a direct insult to the turbulent of the metropolis, and to the fifty thousand workmen of the *ateliers nationaux*, who had been wrought up to visions of madness by the impracticable theories which had emanated from the Luxembourg; and

these would at once rise up in hostility to him and to the Assembly. True, the provinces, and even the capital, on a poll of the adult male inhabitants, had returned a conservative majority; true, the people had shown themselves conservative; but they were clearly not republican: the republicans were not conservative but disorderly, and in a minority. In causing them to rebel, it was clear that the majority would put them down, and punish them; and thus certainly make an end of the Republic. It was only by tempering the one party with the other, by mixing with conservative prudence a little democratic ardour, by controlling the passions of the latter with the weight of the former, by conciliating and compromising, that he hoped to bring about a unity of purpose—the common purpose being true patriotism—and that the passions of party strife and the struggles of interests and classes should be swallowed up in the one absorbing passion, the love of country. On the other hand, if he retained as ministers the ultras of the Provisional Government, on the implied exclusion of whom he had been alone intrusted with power, he would forfeit the confidence of the majority of the French people and of the Assembly, who were desirous of confiding their welfare to his hands. He thought that M. Ledru Rollin, though rash in his words, was not so in his acts; and he knew him to be trusted by the Reds. He hoped, that if Ledru Rollin was in the Government, it would be a sufficient guarantee of its republican dispositions to prevent the forfeiture of the confidence of the extremes, while the majority would retain that of the moderates.

He seems to have regarded the Republic as a kind of divinity that on no account should be destroyed; as a *summum bonum*, the benefit of which the people would appreciate in time; and that even though the majority of them were averse to a Republic, it were better to coax them into it than to allow them to choose a form of government

they liked better. Now if there be one republican principle more clear than another, it is the absolute dominion of a majority of a people; and yet here was the head of republican Europe conspiring to cheat the majority out of their deliberately expressed opinion, while the rabble of Paris, the fag-end of republican Europe, was prepared to oppose that opinion by force. It is curious to mark the inconsistencies to which prejudice will lead men, in other respects of the highest talents. The Assembly was with difficulty brought over to this view. The representatives from the provinces did not, Lamartine thinks, sufficiently consider the opinions of the mob of the capital.

Eventually an executive commission of five was appointed. Lamartine had refused to hold office in any government of which Ledru Rollin was not a member, for the above reasons: a declaration which produced a sudden decline in his popularity; and he was named only fourth on the list. The commission consisted of Arago, Garnier Pagès, Marie, Lamartine, and Ledru Rollin. Lamartine says that he felt that his popularity would be lost in the gulf: but that it was necessary to preserve the Republic. He was quite mistaken. Had he accepted, as a true citizen ought, the duty which his country required of him—a responsibility from which it is a sort of cowardice to shrink—the Republic could not have perished more completely than it has done. The representatives of the people were obliged to resort to arms for the purpose of destroying the factions in the streets of Paris, within six weeks of his declining the dictatorship. Even if he had led the people to victory against the rabble, had he been intrusted with the sovereign power, it was a duty from which he had no right to shrink. Himself he knew, but his successor he knew not. Some head to the majority was eventually necessary. He knew that he himself was not disposed to misuse the trust; if he refused to accept

the task, another must be found who would, and who might use it not for the people's advantage but for his own. At the same time, though it was a mistake on M. de Lamartine's part as to what was his duty, it was a mistake which arose from motives the most amiable; and few men would have had philosophy enough to have refused power under whatever difficulties: for power has to most minds a mysterious charm. Most men know that they lead very much happier lives in a private than in a public sphere, yet there are few who do not desire eminence and power, though their greatness brings but anxieties and trouble.

This conciliatory executive commission was elected by the Assembly on the 10th of May. On the 15th, the "conciliated" mob broke into the chamber, insulted the deputies, turned them out, proclaimed a provisional government, and then marched to the Hôtel de Ville, where they were installed with due revolutionary solemnity. On the 10th of May, the representative Wolowski presented a petition to the Assembly from the Poles, requesting the help of the French republic. The discussion upon this subject was postponed to the 15th. On the same day, M. Daragon asked the Government to give him a day to call the attention of the house to the subject of Italy, a subject which was also put off till the 15th; Lamartine meanwhile protesting against any immediate intervention. Poland was always a popular cry in Paris. On this peg it is easy for the discontented to hang an insurrection; and the discontented were numerous. There had been a fête intended for Sunday the 14th: a review of military and of the populace; but the deputies of the workmen to the commission at the Luxembourg announced their intention of absenting themselves, because, on the 10th of May, the Assembly had refused to appoint Louis Blanc minister of work and progress. The committee of the political prisoners also declined to attend, lest it should be considered

as an adhesion to whatever had been done politically or socially since February. On the 13th, a meeting was held on the Place de la Bastille, to sign a petition in favour of Poland. There were there clubs, Poles, workmen delegates from the Luxembourg, pupils of the Ecole Polytechnique, and National Guards. The whole body marched with a petition to the chamber, and very nearly came to blows with the first legion of National Guards.

The aspect of Paris was so menacing that it was thought fit to postpone the fête from the morrow (the 14th) to the following Sunday (the 21st); which was accordingly done by an order of the day addressed by General Courtais to the National Guard. This postponement of the fête was also resented by the populace, who assembled at the Ministry of the Interior. M. Recurt, the new Minister, offered four gratuitous performances at the great theatres instead; but they were not content with the suggestion: they even maltreated M. Flocon; for, under such circumstances, their wrath is not discriminating. He then offered them a review for Tuesday, to be followed by a general fraternization. This was not at all satisfactory; and on that evening another manifestation in favour of Poland was arranged for the morrow. A good many persons imagined it was only intended for what it professed to be; many joined it because they had nothing better to do; many because it gave a chance of a disturbance, and they, not being satisfied with the representatives that France had returned, hoped to dictate to them. But a *conspiracy* to overturn the Government and dismiss the Assembly was confined to a few of the old conspirators; who took care to be present, and to give a direction to the proceedings.

The President of the Assembly applied to M. Caussidière to provide that the procession should not reach the Assembly; but that functionary—either because he was implicated in the plot or that he had really sprained his leg and

was unable to move—made a pretext of illness and would not do anything.

General Courtais was then charged with the task of guarding the Assembly, with orders not to allow the crowd to cross the bridge or to approach the Chamber. It is utterly unintelligible why he did not obey this order; for no suspicion of complicity attaches to him. The sitting of the Assembly began at midday. Lamartine and Ledru Rollin were present; the other members of the executive commission were in permanence at the Luxembourg. General Courtais, who seems to have lost his head, instead of preventing the disorderly mass from crossing the river, opened them a path to defile between his troops, and they got close to the rails of the building where the Assembly were sitting. By accident, a musket belonging to one of the Garde Mobile, who were inside the rails, went off. The populace then cried that they were about to be assassinated. General Courtais made the Garde Mobile drop their ramrods into their muskets to show that they were not generally loaded; whereupon the mob climbed over the rails, opened the gate, rushed in in a body, expelled the deputies, and proclaimed a Provisional Government, at the instigation of Barbés; meanwhile Louis Blanc and Albert had shown themselves on a balcony to the rabble, with their arms twined round each other, and with a flag thrown over them: to the admiration of all beholders. The populace, it is fair to say, put Louis Blanc into the government, and carried him off against his will; they also put Ledru Rollin's name in their list without any consent of his. They declared the Assembly dissolved, and extorted, under the threat of instant death, an order from the President to prevent the beating of the rappel. Orders to beat it were, nevertheless, sent by trusty persons.

Meanwhile, Lamartine and Ledru Rollin, separated from each other, were forced into hiding-places; and General

Courtais, much ashamed of himself, was wandering about separated from his soldiers. It was an anxious moment. If the Provisional Government got fairly established at the Hôtel de Ville, whither they had gone, all would be at sea again. Meanwhile, the National Guards in the neighbourhood resolved to act without orders; and, meeting Courtais, tore off his epaulets and threw them in his face, and arrested him as an accomplice in the insurrection. They then cleared the Chamber, and kept the populace out; with the assistance of the Garde Mobile, who again ran to arms, as soon as there appeared a chance of a fight. At the suggestion of Lamartine, the deputies reassembled, and resolved that the Government should march on the Hôtel de Ville, and arrest the pseudo-provisional government before it could fortify itself. Lamartine and Ledru Rollin, the only members present, put themselves at the head of the troops; sending orders to Bedeau to take command of all the troops in Paris. When they got to the corner of the Place de Grêve, they found the Hôtel de Ville already occupied by the insurgents; who, however, were utterly unprepared for this prompt action on the part of the Assembly, which they had two hours before declared dissolved. They found and arrested the pseudo-government, consisting of Barbés, an old conspirator, lately elected colonel of the national guard in one of the democratic quarters of the capital; Louis Blanc and Albert, members of the former Provisional Government; Blanqui, the great competitor of Barbés in mob favour (they mutually hated and execrated each other), Raspail, Huber, Sobrier, Proudhon, Pierre Leroux, and Cabet: most of them orators of the clubs, or visionary speculators and propounders of Utopian impossibilities. All of those present were, by the orders of Lamartine and Ledru Rollin, arrested and carried to Vincennes to prison. Their triumph and dictatorship had lasted two hours: it was the result of an insurrection

of the *rabble* of Paris against the people. The people had learned their powers and refused to submit to this tyranny, and, without difficulty or bloodshed, at once put it down.

The conduct of the prefect of police was such as to give rise to grave suspicions that he was implicated in the conspiracy; and he does not deny that he thinks that reactionaries ought to be intimidated by the urban populace. This opinion, unreasonable in a citizen, was intolerable in the head of the police; and it was resolved to require him to resign, which he did. His republican guard was dissolved, but was re-established as the Parisian guard. With the Montagnards there was more difficulty: they fortified themselves in the prefecture of police, and threatened resistance to General Bedeau, who demanded their surrender. The National Guard were greatly angered because of their supposed complicity in the insurrection, and threatened an instant onslaught; but MM. Lamartine and Caüssidière managed to soothe their ruffled tempers; and on the morrow the montagnards were relieved as the guard of the prefecture, as a matter of course, by a corps of the National Guard, and were dismissed with a small gratuity each. This dismissal was a fault of the Government. These men were very disorderly rogues; but while in power they had kept Paris clear of rogues in an admirable manner. When they were turned off, they must have recourse to their only means of living, robbery and theft; and many of them led the mob, in the following month, against the troops. The most disorderly of them should have been drafted in small bodies into the different armies at a distance from the capital, and the best of them have been engaged as policemen. Had they been thus employed, they would have been kept out of the necessity of disturbance on their own account, and would have proved, as they had shown themselves to be, one of the most efficient bodies for the legitimate duties of police.

Eleven vacancies in the Assembly had to be filled in the department of the Seine, on account of double returns. These elections produced fresh uneasiness in Paris. Eighth on the list, stood Louis Napoleon Bonaparte; and among the names mentioned as candidates was that of Prince de Joinville, the most popular of the Orleans princes. The executive commission appears to have been more afraid of the latter than of the former; and to prevent the disagreeable circumstance of France returning him to the Assembly as one of her representatives, they thought themselves justified in declaring the whole Orleans family incapable of serving France in any capacity. Really one does not see on what republican principle they had any right to prevent France choosing whom she liked.

Louis Napoleon, on the first proclamation of the Republic, had at once offered his services; but was by the Provisional Government requested to withdraw, as his great name might trouble the republic. On the 10th of April, he was in London, and served in St James's churchyard as a special constable, under the orders of Lord de Grey. Two Bonapartes had been elected members for Corsica, and three sat in the Assembly; but, as the next heir of the Emperor, Louis Napoleon caused them much uneasiness. The name of the first Napoleon was still dear to France. His glories were the pride, though his ambition had been the bane of the country; but the glories were remembered, and the bane was forgotten. The internal administration was carried on upon his system, and the laws were administered under his code, almost in his name. It had come to pass that he was the last great monarch of France. The evils he had caused were forgotten, the good and the glory were remembered. His nephew represented to the bulk of France the principle of legitimacy. The hereditary principle appears so strongly implanted in man's nature, that it cannot have been put there but for good purpose. The Bourbon

race were forgotten as the descendants of heroes; but the glories of the Bonapartes were fresh in the recollection of all. It was precisely the feeling which for ages produced loyalty to the one that was now the cause of danger from the other. Already mobs had gone about the Boulevard crying *Vive l'Empereur.* The name of Bonaparte was not unpopular with the *bourgeoisie;* it was a guarantee of united and strong government to all. On his election, Louis Napoleon wrote to the President of the Assembly: a phrase in his letter gave considerable offence. Some days before, Lamartine had proposed his exclusion from the Assembly and the country; but, as it appeared he was no way implicated in the seditious cries, they voted his admission by a large majority. The phrase which gave umbrage was: "If the country imposes duties upon me, I shall know how to fulfil them." It was received on the 15th of June, and in their indignation the Aasembly very nearly expelled him. However, by a subsequent letter, dated the 15th, he restored confidence, by saying he would resign rather than be a cause of tumult.

But the real difficulties of the government arose from a different cause. The National Assembly bore with impatience the expense of the *Ateliers Nationaux:* it was enough to submit to the factious spirit of those bodies; but it was too much to pay them for keeping on foot an organized insurrection, ever ready to break out and deluge the capital in blood. The executive commission had been desirous of finding means gradually to lessen the numbers receiving wages; and on the 12th of May, it was resolved to close the lists. The commission foresaw that if the *Ateliers* were at once abolished, it would produce a rebellion in Paris; and they hoped, first, by preventing any more being inscribed, and then by setting them to task-work, that they should gradually get the numbers reduced. Unfortunately the work was paid at so a high a rate that a

workman could live in riot for a week on a single day's gain. The Assembly, weary of seeing the public purse drained by these idle and riotous profligates, were impatient of the slow degrees by which the Government thought it prudent to act; so they set them, and Emile Thomas their chief, at defiance. They sent him off on some excuse to Bordeaux, and had him arrested and kept out of the way.

A severe enactment was passed by a great majority of the Assembly against riotous assemblages. The heats and tumults, however, continued increasing; but the final outbreak was not expected before the 14th of July, the anniversary of the taking of the Bastille; on which day it was intended to hold a meeting of the *Ateliers Nationaux* and begin the fight. But the Assembly would not wait; they ordered all the workmen between eighteen and twenty-five years old, and unmarried, to be drafted into the army, or to be discharged; and they were breaking them up so rapidly, that if the workmen wanted to fight it was evident that it must be done at once or not at all. Louis Blanc shared the hostility of the Assembly, for to him and his workman's commission were attributed the *Ateliers Nationaux;* though, in truth, he had had no hand in them: no doubt, however, his visions had added to their intractability. General Cavaignac, who had been sent for from Africa, was on his arrival in Paris named Minister at War, and had command of the troops. He had held a council of war with Generals Lamoricière, Bedeau, and Foucher, and propounded to them his plan of action (which, by the way, Lamartine, not content with civil success, claims as his). This was not to treat, as hitherto, the insurrection as a street riot, but as a pitched battle, with a regular line of operations; so that wherever the troops were brought into action they might be in such force as to make success certain: for in such affairs a check appears fatal to discipline. The insurgents had in consequence

full time to occupy their ground, raise their barricades, and fortify themselves in their position. Their line ran in a direction nearly north and south, through the centre of the old city of Paris; all the east side was occupied by them, while the troops were mainly drawn up in the gardens of the Tuileries and in the Champs Elysées. Preparations for the conflict commenced on Thursday the 22d of June; but it was noon of the following day ere the first shot was fired. It is said, that had the executive commission known what they were about, the heads of the insurrection might have been all arrested in the mean time, for they were walking about all day, and at one time met in the Jardin des Plantes.

The fighting on the 23d continued all day, with much slaughter, and little practical result. The Garde Mobile were sent in to lead the attack; but as their loyalty was doubted, soldiers were behind them with loaded muskets, to fire on them, in case they attempted to go over to the enemy. It appeared, however, they had no predilections as to which side they fought on, and attacked the barricades with the utmost gallantry. But the extent of the insurgent lines swallowed up the troops, so that, though *great numbers* were in Paris, there appeared to be a deficiency of them, and loud complaints were made against the inefficiency of the executive commission.

During the night the fighting ceased, and both parties were occupied in strengthening their positions. The Assembly was sitting in permanence; they were highly incensed against the executive commission, and wished them to send in their resignations; but the latter refused, saying it was cowardly to do so in the face of insurrection. The Assembly then formally deposed the commission, and appointed Cavaignac dictator; to which arrangement the executive commission at once assented. The General instantly ordered the National Guards to prevent assemblages

in the streets, and that no one should go out without a pass: any one going about, out of uniform, without permission, was walked home. In this manner many persons carrying ammunition to the insurgents were arrested. At noon, he sent a flag of truce with a proclamation, offering an amnesty to the rebels, at the suggestion of the ex-prefect Caussidière; but it was unhesitatingly rejected. This latter personage, though he was not among the barricades, was by many thought to be the head of the insurrection. The troops of the insurgents were managed with great military skill, showing that persons of military knowledge must have had the command; though no one knew who were their leaders. The objects they had in view were simple: "*Incendie et Pillage*" were inscribed at least on one flag.* During the early part of the day, the fighting was mainly on the southern side of the river. The church of St Gervais and the bridges were carried with great slaughter, as well as the church of St Severin, and their great head-quarters the Pantheon; and by four o'clock, the troops had conquered the whole of the south bank of the Seine. On the other side, a hot engagement was going on in the Faubourgs Poissonnière and St Denis: these were carried with great loss at a late hour, whence the insurrection was forced back to its great stronghold, the Clos St Lazare; which defied every effort of General Lamoricière to take it on Saturday.

An unfinished hospital served as a citadel, and several churches and public buildings as out-posts; while the old city wall, which they had loop-holed, enabled them to fire on the troops in comparative security; but the buildings were

* The workmen of the *Ateliers Nationaux*, after being demoralized by four months profuse pay and no work, desired to continue to help themselves out of other people's pockets. In principle, it was precisely similar to a domestic rebellion in the establishment of a certain celebrated author, "more wages, less work, and the key of the ale-cellar." The objects were very intelligible to the mob, who were universally enthusiastic, and fought like demons.

breached with cannon, and the insurgents by four o'clock on Sunday were dispersed. Another column of troops had, in the mean while, been forcing its way along the quays to the Place de la Bastille, where they now effected a junction with Lamoricière; this they were enabled to do by the sappers and miners, who had cut their way from house to house, driving the insurgents before them, and thus turning the barricades in the streets. A desperate struggle was going on at a late hour in the Faubourg du Temple; and on the Monday morning the insurgents made a stand behind the Canal St Martin, where they sent to treat on condition of retaining their arms. But Cavaignac would hear of no terms. It was thought, at one time, that they had surrendered; when some soldiers, going within the lines, were surprised and murdered. Hostilities at once began again, and the insurgents were finally subdued by one o'clock on Monday the 26th. The victory was dearly bought: 8000 were ascertained to have been killed or wounded; and, as many bodies were thrown into the Seine unrecognised, this is much under the number. Nearly 14,000 prisoners were taken, and 3000 of these died of gaol fever. Of eleven Generals who commanded, one, General Brea, was murdered in cold blood by the insurgents, with whom he had gone to treat under a flag of truce. General Negrier was killed, Generals Duvivier, Dameine, Korte, Lafontaine, and Fouché, were wounded mortally; Lamoricière, Lebreton, and Perrot, alone escaped unhurt; Bedeau, who was wounded, recovered.

Nor was it military men alone who fell. M. Bixio, a member of the Assembly, who had endeavoured to bring the insurgents to reason by expostulation, was severely wounded; and two others died of the wounds they received in the same service. The excellent Archbishop of Paris, Denis Auguste Affre, fell a sacrifice to his Christian benevolence. Horrified at the slaughter, he, attended by two

of his vicars carrying the olive-branch of peace, passed between the combatants. The firing ceased at his appearance; but, from the discharge of a single musket, it began again: he, nevertheless, mounted the barricade and descended into the midst of the insurgents, and was in the act of addressing them, when some patriot, fearing the effect of his exhortations, shot him from a window. The shot must have been aimed at him and not at the troops, for he was on the inside of the barricade. The ball struck him in the groin. The two vicars escaped unhurt; but his servant was killed on the same barricade. The Archbishop lingered till the 27th, when he expired. It is seldom that the historian has the task of recording such courage, benevolence, and self-sacrifice. Europe, execrating his murderers, deplored his loss.

The most ferocious cruelties were practised by the insurgents. The boys of the Garde Mobile were the special objects of their rage; and the mutilated corpses of those whom they had taken prisoners were found after the victory. The women had taken the lead in savagery: one boasted she had cut off with a knife the heads of five officers of the Garde Mobile; others threw vitriol from the windows upon the troops. After carrying a barricade in the Faubourg St Antoine, the 48th regiment made a number of prisoners; one of them was resisting, and they were about to put him to death. Colonel Reynault came forward and saved him, when the wretch, saying "Thank you, colonel," drew a pistol and shot him dead on the spot. Such conduct, on the part of the rebels, enraged the Garde Mobile and the National Guard to such an extent that they were with difficulty persuaded to give quarter: in many instances, they shot their prisoners by a dozen at a time. Sentinels were posted, within hail, along the streets, over the whole of Paris; many of whom were assassinated at their posts; others were killed by poisoned wine.

The French people were again acknowledged masters of their own country; and aware of their strength, they refused to submit to the mob. There were many among the populace who, misled by the crude follies of the Luxembourg and Louis Blanc, fancied they were fighting for undoubted rights; but they were led, disciplined, and slaughtered, for the chance of success of some designing demagogues who had the prudence to keep out of sight. None of the monarchical parties could be traced as having had any hand in the matter; but it contributed more to reaction than any other event. Thus did democratic license, as usual, end in military despotism: an urban revolt had extended as a revolution over the whole of France. The pusillanimity of the Orleans government had given the military every temptation to treason. The mob of the capital had got the upper hand; it was but natural they should hope to keep it. The men who came into power on this event were not experienced statesmen. Perhaps it was fortunate they were not: for in such exceptional circumstances, there is need of men devoid of official prejudices. The position they occupied was one of the greatest difficulty. They hoped to avoid the collision between the French people and the Parisian rabble, who had usurped and desired to retain that title.

The conflict was inevitable: it was but postponed till the people had wakened from the stupor into which the events of February had thrown them, and they had become sufficiently powerful to vanquish their opponents, and to teach them a lesson so severe as to make them remember that individuals cannot with impunity revolt against society. Had the struggle come earlier, so that its result had been the least doubtful, it could but have prolonged the torture of the country. Still, in postponing the contest, the government were obliged to affect to comply with extravagant follies, and to flatter the vanity of the mob,

so that unfortunately both parties were strengthening at the same time; for the communist visions of the Luxembourg, circulating among the workmen of the *Ateliers Nationaux*, who were idle and at the same time fully paid, had given them the mistaken opinion that this was their just condition. The vision that all the blessings of Heaven were the property of man, and that certain individuals and classes, in appropriating some of these good things and holding them as property, thus excluded them from their enjoyment (which appears to have been the hallucination of M. Proudhon), was eminently calculated to render them discontented; and it was not the uneducated, hard-fisted workman who was likely to reflect that if property was abolished his *work* would be only for the benefit of his country, not for his own. "Patriotism may induce a man to die for his country; but scarce to plough, to reap, to delve and to gather, to spin and to weave, to forge and to grind, for his country's sake; although he will willingly do so for his own and his family's. That society without work is the most miserable to be conceived. Man is bountifully endowed by Providence with faculties; but till he has the inducement of private advantage to bring him to exercise them, he will not do so; and till he does so he is the most miserable of beings." M. Proudhon himself was a man honest, obstinate, crotchety, and confident; he would destroy in the public the virtues he practises in private. In his individual capacity he applies for his own happiness none of the doctrines he inculcates for the happiness of others. Professing to believe the Deity to be the origin of evil, he was married in church; and has his children baptized. A good son and faithful husband, his social theories would lead to the destruction of both relations. Theoretically, he is a sort of ogre; actually, he is not an unamiable person: he is rather perverse than ill-conditioned. Born of humble parents, he has thriven and accumulated prop-

erty, which he denounces as robbery. He is industrious, punctual, and trusty: a singular compound of contradictions; with this peculiarity, that his practice is better than his principles, his example superior to his precepts.

CHAPTER V.

THE DICTATORSHIP OF CAVAIGNAC AND THE ELECTION OF LOUIS NAPOLEON, TO THE ADJOURNMENT OF THE ASSEMBLY, AUGUST 1850.

General Cavaignac, immediately after the pacification of Paris, laid down the temporary dictatorship with which he had been invested by the Assembly; but their gratitude for the salvation of society led them to appoint him President of the Council, with the power to name his own Ministry. He at once sent adrift all the red republican party, and chose a Ministry from among the moderate class of republicans; to which he afterwards added some members of the old opposition, though of more monarchical principles. His form of government was called a republic, but it was in fact a provisional monarchy; as all other republics are that are not disorderly and anarchical. In order to have practical efficiency in a government, unity in the executive appears necessary to enable it to act with speed and decision. There is nothing new or advantageous in an elective monarchy; and whether a monarch who is a tenant for years be better than one who is so for life, is a problem yet to be solved. The United States of America, where the executive is too weak to prevent piratical expeditions against neighbouring states, cannot be

quoted as an example to the contrary. A Cromwell may do very well; but to an Oliver succeeds a Richard. No man could either conduct his household or sail a ship on democratic principles. Monarchy in the executive is essential, by the universal consent of mankind, both in the household and the state.

The temper of the Assembly had become strongly conservative, and the parties of the various aspirants to the throne began to exhibit themselves with scarce any disguise. But Cavaignac, who was a true republican, held the balance with firmness. While he was ready to crush any insurrection on the part of the rabble, as he had done before, he was equally ready to suppress any intrigues of the monarchists; of which he warned them very distinctly, declaring that he had his eye upon them, and was acquainted with their machinations. He suppressed altogether the *Ateliers Nationaux*, maintained the garrison of Paris on a war footing, expelled from the National Guard all who had refused to take arms for the cause of order in June, dissolved and disarmed the legion belonging to the worse quarters of the town, and prolonged the state of siege till October. A commission was appointed under the presidency of M. Odillon-Barrot, to investigate the causes of the insurrections of May and June. It ended in its being resolved, after hearing their defence, to prosecute Louis Blanc and Caussidière for their share in those events; but those persons thought it prudent to retire: for which ample time was given them. Their residence in England, where all refugees are equally welcome and harmless, has been obscure and uninteresting.

During the first months of the Republic, newspapers had sprung up like mushrooms: they had become what they are rather fond of calling themselves, a fourth estate. They were compelled to find a considerable amount of caution-money for good behaviour, while some were suspended.

Of the prisoners taken in the affair of June, the greater part were set at liberty, a few were sent to Algeria, and the most hardened offenders to Senegal.

Prince Louis Napoleon was again thrust upon the Assembly, by being elected for Corsica; but he wrote a letter on the 8th of July, saying, that though he did not renounce the honour of one day sitting as a representative of the people, he would wait till the time when his return to France could not in any way serve as a pretext to the enemies of the republic; and he repudiated any personal ambition. His name was thus kept constantly before the public. It is very doubtful if this attempt at exclusion did not give him the popularity of a persecuted person. Three vacancies occurred in the representation for the department of the Seine. He was in the third week of September again returned, and this time for the capital, at the head of the poll by an overwhelming majority, as well as for several departments; and in spite of the government efforts to procure the return of their own men. Singularly enough, Raspail, a prisoner in Vincennes for the insurrection of June, was returned for the department of the Seine at the same time.

For several days Paris was in a state of excitement. It had been resolved by the assembly to "accept the situation," and to admit the prince as a representative. Some of the regiments were suspected of Bonapartism, and were sent out of Paris. On Tuesday, the 26th of September, shortly after the president had taken his seat, Louis Napoleon appeared quietly in the chamber, and placed himself on one of the back benches. His first appearance in Paris was of the most republican simplicity; which much astonished the inhabitants, who expected a theatrical or martial appearance, but were disappointed. Shortly afterwards, taking his place in the rostrum, he said:—

"Citizen Representatives—It is impossible that I can

keep silence after the calumnies of which I have been the object. I must express frankly, and at the earliest moment of my taking my seat amongst you, the real sentiments which animate, and which have ever animated me. After thirty-three years of proscription and exile, I am at last entitled to resume my rights as a citizen. The Republic has bestowed on me happiness; to the Republic I tender my oath of gratitude, my oath of devotion; and my generous countrymen who have returned me to this place, may be assured that I will endeavour to justify their choice by exerting myself with you to maintain tranquillity, the first necessity of the country, and the development of democratic institutions, which the people have the right to demand. For a long time I have been unable to consecrate to France anything but the meditations of exile and captivity. At last the career which you pursue is open to me. Receive me, then, my dear colleagues, into your ranks, with the same sense of affectionate confidence which I bring there. My conduct—always inspired by duty, always animated by respect for the law—my conduct will prove the falsehood of those who have attempted to blacken me for the purpose of still keeping me proscribed, and will demonstrate that no one is more firmly resolved than myself to establish and defend the republic."

The speech was received by the Assembly with approbation. When Louis Napoleon descended from the tribune, several members surrounded him, offering him their congratulations. In the Salle des Pas Perdus the observation was made, "C'est un discours de la couronne!"*

* This was the first appearance on the stage of a man who has since shown himself so able a statesman. How it happened that as a private man he was looked on as little better than a fool, is a matter for curious speculation. In this country he never passed for a man of abilities. Is it possible that he feigned to be a sort of Brutus? Or was it that the last government of France had succeeded in slandering him and rendering him ridiculous while it was in

In the meantime, the red republicans and socialists, highly incensed with the reactionary tendencies of the assembly, began holding all over the provinces a series of banquets, with the hope that the measure would be as efficient for revolutionary purposes as it had been in February. At Toulouse one was held where a "bonnet rouge" was hoisted among other emblems, and the assembled guests, among similar sentiments, cried, "*Vive Marat —Mort aux Riches, Mort aux Prêtres—A bas l'Assemblée Nationale—Vive Barbes—Vive la Guillotine.*" In the Chamber the behaviour of the extreme left was scarcely less violent. It was with difficulty they could be induced to listen to any moderate member. On one occasion, after attempting to put down the speaker opposed to them, two honourable members attempted to get into the rostrum at once, one on each side, and *sacreing* at the top of their voices, were held by the coat-tails by the doorkeepers.

The discussion of the constitution, which had been referred to a committee, was the only subject of interest, except the important question of how the president should be elected. It was proposed by some that the assembly itself should elect a president, a proposition which was eventually negatived by a large majority. The real object was to exclude Louis Napoleon, whose great name gave him every chance of success, if an appeal were made to the universal suffrage of the nation, which the republicans distrusted. Another amendment was moved to exclude all pretenders to the throne; on which, allusion being made

power? Be this as it may be, he was both then and since befouled with the vilest and most unmerited abuse. He rose to eminence despite the avowed hostility of the press. It may perhaps be safely said that though the name of Bonaparte was his passport to power, yet, having that vantage-ground, he has shown himself more thoroughly master of his position than any man in France, or in Europe; that though he may have gratified his own ambition by the acceptance of power, yet that power was conferred upon him by the almost unanimous vote of the people of France, and he has used it for the advantage of Europe, for the advancement of civilisation, and for the peace of the world.

to Louis Napoleon, he mounted the rostrum, and denied that he was a pretender; but becoming confused by his position, he retreated, much to the astonishment of the assembly. The mover, in a tone of contempt, said that after the few words they had heard, he was sure the danger of a pretender was overrated, and therefore withdrew his motion: but he appears to have been mistaken. The republic was so much beloved by the assembly, that it was with difficulty she was allowed to make her own choice, lest she should choose imprudently. They then thought of excepting certain persons who were ineligible: she was to be quite free to choose, but must not choose such and such persons. Any show of Bonapartist spirit or intrigue would have given them an excuse. Louis Napoleon, however, was too prudent to give them any opportunity of the kind; and with much unwillingness and distrust, France was not only to be allowed to choose for herself, but to choose freely. But the assembly only came to the resolution of allowing her to do so when they found out that their own differences of opinion in the assembly might let in the very person whom they desired to exclude.

The red republicans were desirous of having no president, and that the constituent assembly itself should name the ministers. It was not the only constitutional point in dispute: for weeks and months the debate on the constitution dragged its weary length along; amendments were discussed, and the work when turned out was, as might have been expected, a botch after all. In the course of the threescore years preceding, France had had a score of constitutions at least. They were waste paper; this became so too. The executive was to be so entirely powerless as to be incapable of doing any thing; while the assembly was to be so all-powerful as to be practically the executive. There was to be but one chamber. The scheme was

full of inconsistencies, was incomplete, and was avowedly only a temporary expedient. The chief argument in favour of one chamber was, that if necessity arose to name a dictator, and if there were two chambers who disagreed, it would be impossible to name one at all; a reason which appears to be the greatest condemnation that could be passed on the republican form of government. What is the use of a government that has to change its form to an autocracy when a difficulty occurs? Governments are not required to compel the willing but the rebellious to submit to their rule. The best government is that which does so most effectually; and the appointment of a dictator is at once a confession of the inefficiency of republican institutions.

The state of siege was continued till October. In this month some difficulties arose in General Cavaignac's cabinet; he therefore changed it by the admission of three persons of still more reactionary views. The prefect of police retired in disgust at the anti-revolutionary ministry which had been completed. General Cavaignac said in the rostrum, that the votes of the assembly had been so uncertain as to weaken his government, and that he was compelled to place his administration on a broader basis; that there was much talk of conciliation, but that it was a policy of conciliation which he had adopted, and there was no doubt it was the majority of the chamber who were reactionary, and that it was not likely they could agree with a ministry of a different complexion. The immediate question on which the previous ministry had been defeated, and which resulted in their retirement, was the mode of electing the president. It was eventually agreed, that to give validity to the election of a president it should be necessary that he should have more than a half of all the votes given; that is to say, more votes than all the other candidates put together; if not, the assembly was to choose

between the highest candidate on the list and his competitors, by which means they hoped to be able to get rid of Bonaparte. But the precaution was of no avail; had it been exercised against the popular candidate, it must have given rise to civil war. What possible claim to dictate had the assembly which the person at the head of the poll would not have had, since he would be as much the elected of the people as they?

The constitution was proclaimed on the 10th of November, in a snow-storm, and by the sound of the guns of the Invalides; it was inaugurated with ceremonies half pagan half popish in the Place de la Concorde, where a statue of the republic presided over an altar, at which a military mass was chanted by numerous ecclesiastics.

The legitimist and Orleanist parties refused to start a candidate for fear of weakening Bonaparte, and thus throwing the choice into the hands of the assembly, who would choose General Cavaignac. Both these parties gave the former at least a negative support; and as M. Thiers declared that nine-tenths of the country were opposed to the General as too revolutionary, it was clear that in the country itself reaction was going on faster than in the assembly: in fact the revolution of February had settled nothing. Under the republican regime Paris had been for four months under martial law, and direct taxes had been increased by forty-five per cent. Lamartine's flash of popularity had gone out; the great services he had rendered to his country and to Europe were already forgotten. Cavaignac was fast falling into oblivion. Napoleon was rising; his name represented order, glory, and security.* The royalists supported him, as a reprisal on the republi-

* It is said that one day, as Louis Napoleon was walking across the Place Vendôme, he pointed to the column of his uncle, cast from the guns he took in battle, and embossed with sculptures of his victories, and said, "That is the great Elector."

cans, who had overcome them; the shopkeepers supported him, because they wanted quiet to trade in, and because they disliked taxes; and the peasants remembered the legendary glories of the first Napoleon. Of the prince himself they knew little or nothing: they were assured he was a fool; his attempts at Strasbourg and Boulogne were held up to ridicule; but they did not care: their faith and that of the military in the name of Bonaparte could not be shaken.*

Even the women had made a claim to the rights of suffrage: and why, under universal suffrage, they have not as good a right to it as men, is hard to prove; for universal suffrage repudiates the only maxim on which their exclusion can be reasonably maintained: viz. that people ought to mind their own business, and leave government to those who understand it.† Be this as it may, the idea appeared extravagant to all but the extreme socialists; and it was to the dread of such extravagancies that Louis Napoleon owed much of his support. At the same time Cavaignac lost ground from the accusation, which was entirely untrue, that he had allowed the insurrection of June time to gather strength in order to have the opportunity of inflicting a bloody revenge. He was supported by the sincere and moderate republicans; but the reds and socialists weakened

* In his Boulogne attempt, which sounded ridiculous because it failed, it was a mere toss-up which way it went. It was owing to the firmness of a single officer that the soldiers did not join him; and it was owing to an English coal-merchant that he did not get possession of the Chateau, with the arms and ammunition; in either of which cases, had he been able to make head for a few hours, it is very probable he might have been Emperor many years ago. As for the eagle in a cage, which sounded so ridiculous, even this showed a very intimate knowledge of the people with whom he had to deal. Louis Napoleon was not voted for in this instance as president of the republic, but as the heir of the emperor; he represented the principle of legitimate monarchy, and a restoration of the usual forms of government.

† Indeed the women may fairly point to the bright example of Pitcairn's Island, where their right to the franchise is acknowledged, as a model republic in all other respects.

the republican forces by setting up candidates of their own, without a chance of success. It was only at the last that Lamartine allowed himself to be named as a candidate. Why he did so at all, unless to exhibit to the world the ingratitude of his country, it is hard to understand.

The result depended, it was thought, a good deal on the weather. Louis Napoleon's chief support was from the inhabitants of the country districts, the peasantry; and it was calculated that, if the weather was fine, it might make in his favour a difference of a million of votes. The day came at last. On the 10th of December, 5,534,520 votes were recorded for Louis Napoleon. General Cavaignac had 1,448,302. Then came Ledru Rollin; then Raspail. Lamartine got 17,914. 23,219 were disallowed, as being given for some of the banished royal family. The total number of voters was 7,449,471. About a fourth of the whole population of France, and probably more than three-fourths of the adult male population recorded their votes on the occasion. The peasantry being informed that their voting-papers would be changed, and Napoleon's name obliterated and Cavaignac's inserted, came down from the country armed, and watched all night around the ballot boxes. Those who could not read counted the twenty-two letters in the name of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte; they folded up their tickets in a three-cornered shape, to represent the cocked hat of the old emperor. He had a majority of nearly four to one over his next rival, and nearly two to one over the whole of his competitors together; and in addition to this it should be considered that both he and all the other candidates, except Raspail (a quack doctor), and Ledru Rollin, represented the principle of reaction and moderation. There were, after many months' anarchy, in the whole of France but about 400,000 real genuine republi-

cans; a fact which demonstrates their numerical insignificance as a party, and with what safety they might be disregarded: it also shows how utterly Louis Philippe had misunderstood his position and their influence.

The conclusion to be drawn from this enormous majority is, that France was decidedly monarchical. The country was dissatisfied with the republic, and voted for Bonaparte. What mainly exasperated the people was the addition of forty-five per cent. to the taxes by the provisional government during the first week of the revolution.

The President was proclaimed, as the revolution of February and the constitution had been, by surprise. The government had heard rumours of Bonapartist plots to seize the president-elect on his way to the assembly, and to carry him to the Tuileries with shouts of "Vive l'Empereur!" To avoid so sudden a termination of the republic, a report was spread that the installation would not take place for some days, and Paris was only informed by the cannon of the Invalides that the ceremony was completed. On Wednesday, the 20th of December, to the wonder of every one, troops blocked up the avenue to the assembly; and the terrified citizens expected a revolution, but it was only the installation of the president.

The reporter of the electoral commission of the assembly having mounted the rostrum, declared the state of the poll; he mentioned that several protests had been made against Louis Napoleon, because he had by naturalization in Switzerland forfeited his title of French citizen; but that the commission had refused to entertain the question, and decided that he was the elect of the people. General Cavaignac said, that all his ministers had that morning resigned, and that he was there to return to the assembly the office of president of the council, with which he had been invested by them; and he thanked them for their kindness to him during his tenure of office. He was

loudly cheered, and quitting the rostrum he took his place as a private member among the moderate republicans. The president of the assembly put the question that the report of the commission be adopted; which was carried by acclamation. He then called on the new President of the Republic to take the oath, "In the presence of God, and before the French people, I swear to remain faithful to the democratic republic, and to fulfil all the duties imposed on me by the constitution." The prince raised his right hand (as is the habit among continental nations as well as in Scotland, instead of swearing on the gospels as with us), and took the oath, and remaining in the rostrum, spoke to the assembly shortly a few appropriate words. As he came down he passed the bench where General Cavaignac was sitting, whom he shook warmly by the hand, amid great cheers; he was then conducted from the assembly to the Elysée Bourbon, which was to be his residence during his four years' continuance in office. In the evening the new ministry was gazetted, of whom Odillon-Barrot was the chief. Drouyn de l'Huys had the foreign affairs; Leon de Maleville the interior; Leon Faucher public works. To General Changarnier was given the command of all the troops, garde mobile, and national guard in and near Paris. On Sunday the 24th a grand military spectacle was prepared to delight the citizens, and the national guard was mustered to give brilliancy to the scene. The President appeared in the uniform of a general of the national guard, and wore the star of the legion of honour; an order which the republic had resolved not to abolish. He was greeted with cries of "Vive Napoleon!" In passing before the statue in the Place Vendôme he reined up his horse, and inclined his head before the column. The crowd rent the air with its shout of applause, for not a human creature there was silent. The President's reception was

enthusiastic. Jerome Bonaparte, the ex-king of Westphalia, witnessed the review from a window of the minister of marine, while his son Napoleon took a part in it as a common soldier of the fourth legion of the national guard.

The president of the republic had scarcely been a month in office when a ministerial difficulty occurred. He complained that certain telegraphic despatches had been withheld from him. He had requested M. de Maleville to send him the proceedings relative to his Boulogne and Strasbourg attempts, who made some difficulty, and was accused of having himself purloined the papers. The consequence was, that he withdrew from the ministry, and expostulated in the chambers. The president had also required that notes and documents he intended to publish in the Moniteur should go direct to the editor, and not through the minister of the interior, showing very clearly that he did not intend to be a puppet. In short, there is no doubt that he was elected as the representative of the emperor for the very purpose of acting himself; because the French people had confidence in his name; and he seemed resolved to fulfil their wishes. He appointed his uncle Jerome to be governor of the Invalides, and placed several of his relatives in advantageous positions; he took the royal box at the opera and Théâtre Français for the season; his servants were dressed in the old imperial liveries; on new year's day he was congratulated amongst others by a number of veterans in the old imperial uniforms; and when he went abroad, he was frequently greeted with cries of "Vive l'Empereur!"

Meanwhile the question of the dissolution of the assembly was discussed with some heat. On the one side it was urged, that it had lost the confidence of the country, as the election of the president showed. On the other, the assembly was unwilling to abdicate before it had passed

the organic laws, although petitions continued to pour in requesting an appeal to the country.

The clubs of the capital had again become a nuisance to society; the doctrines they inculcated were subversive of all order and property. By their means a handful of desperadoes were able to keep the whole capital and state in turmoil, and to prevent any revival of trade. Trade it was the main object of Louis Napoleon to encourage, for he knew that, however much he might owe his popularity and elevation to his ancestor, he must owe its continuance to himself, and to the solid benefit he could confer on the state. The government therefore suppressed the clubs, and applied to the assembly to legalize and perpetuate the measure. This, however, the chamber refused.

The garde mobile had shown lately several symptoms of discontent. It was looked on with jealousy both by the line and the national guard, in consequence of its receiving double the ordinary pay. Members of the extreme left had fomented this turbulent spirit, and had, it is said, endeavoured to induce the corps to resort to barricades. It sent several deputations to Changarnier, but without success, to prevent the carrying out of the ministerial intention of reducing its number and pay one-half. At one interview the colonel was so excited as to break his sword and throw it down at the feet of the general, who was obliged to order him into arrest, and dismissed the rest with the caution that any outbreak could only end in their own destruction. Eighty thousand troops were in Paris, and tens of thousands of national guards were under arms, so that all mutiny was impossible. There was great exasperation on the part of the more determined republicans in the chamber; for several arrests were made, and judicial proceedings were instituted against the prisoners. These precautions prevented the explosion of an extensive

conspiracy, which was to have broken out on the 29th; but though in Paris it had been prevented, at Dijon and Strasbourg the prefects were obliged to call out the military to suppress the revolt.

A few weeks later M. Drouyn de l'Huys refused to recognise the constituent assembly sitting at Rome, and by no means countenanced its acts; for France looked on with anxiety, desiring to restore a normal state of things in the papal dominions. M. Ledru Rollin said, that the Roman assembly was elected by universal suffrage, and was just as respectable as the one he was addressing, —whereupon the assembly laughed, but did not show any disposition to agree with him.* But what was the astonishment of Europe when, on the motion of M. Odillon-Barrot, the chamber, after a stormy discussion, decided on sending to Rome an expeditionary corps for the purpose of upsetting the Roman republic, and restoring the pope. Reaction had indeed set in with an irresistible tide: this was an event which a year before no one certainly would have anticipated.

* A curious incident occurred at one of the theatres in the middle of March, during the performance of "Les Grenouilles qui demandent un Roi." A song, of course alluding to the present state of things, ended,

"Le mal que la France gagna
Est epidémique,
V'là qu'les Romains viennent d'ttra-
Per la république."

This sally was loudly applauded, save by a few voices that called out, "Non non." In the midst of the counter-cries a gentleman rose in the boxes, and quietly cried, "Mais pourquoi pas? Y aurait il par hasard des republicains ici,"—an observation which was received with a roar of laughter. The song was encored, and it made the fortune of the piece. The incident showed clearly enough the reactionary tendency of the public mind; indeed, every one made it his business to laugh at the existing order of things. Even the republican coin was made a joke of. The inscription ran, "Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité." Under the female head representing the republic was the maker's name, Oudinet—over it was a star—each full stop they read as "point"; and the legend then ran thus: Liberté point, Egalité point, Fraternité point. Où diner? Sous la belle étoile,—that is to say, with Duke Humphrey.

Great was the displeasure of the assembly when they learned that General Oudinot had been defeated before Rome, and that the Roman republic was not inclined to recognise the fraternal intentions of the French; and it was eventually agreed that M. Ferdinand Lesseps should be sent on a mission to endeavour to arrange matters with Rome.

During the month of May the constituent assembly got more and more refractory, and not unfrequently left the ministers in a considerable minority. Meanwhile the country was engaged in electing the members of the new legislative assembly, which was to consist of 750 members instead of 900, at which the constituent had been fixed. One curious feature of the new chamber was the absence of Lamartine. He had been unsuccessful even in his own province. The reason was that he had lost the confidence of the people, because he had persisted in refusing to act without Ledru Rollin, and to fight at once the battle of order against disorder. Ledru Rollin was looked on as, if not implicated in the insurrection, yet as being of very much the same political opinions as the insurgents, and it was from contact with him that Lamartine had so entirely lost caste.

The new assembly met on the 28th of May, and proceeded to verify its returns; during which several discussions took place, showing the weakness as well as the consequent acrimony of the republicans. At last they grew so loud and disorderly that the oldest member, who acted as president till another was chosen, put on his hat and suspended the sitting; which exasperated that party to such a pitch, that they were on the point of quitting the house in a body, when some of the more moderate persuaded them of the impropriety of that course, and they remained. The President's message to the assembly was presented on the 1st of June; and at the same time he

had, to suit its temper, made an alteration in his cabinet, which now consisted of men of all shades of political opinion save the republican: it contained legitimists, Orleanists, and Bonapartists. But though it represented well enough the temper of the chambers and of the country, it gave no great promise of permanency, and it was next to impossible for such a team to pull together long. Coalition ministries can only be kept together by a strong external pressure, or by strong common interest.

M. Ledru Rollin proposed to impeach the ministers and the president for having violated the constitution in their interference at Rome, and declared that he and his friends would appeal to arms. This attack consolidated the ministry. Great uproar was the result, first in the chamber and then in the streets. General Bedeau in the former announced his determination in that case to defend the majority of the assembly and uphold its decision. M. Thiers declaring that the appeal to arms had rendered all discussion impossible, pressed for a division, which was carried by a majority for ministers of 361 to 203. The house passed to the order of the day amidst the yellings and hootings of the defeated: indeed some of them were lost to all sense of decency—in the previous assembly M. Pierre Leroux was actually obliged to be voted out of the rostrum, after having been twice in vain called to order by the chair.

On Wednesday the 13th of June the excitement passed from the assembly to the streets. The republicans determined to go in a procession to the national assembly to petition it on the breach of the constitution by the Roman expedition. About 15,000 persons, of whom many were in the uniform of the national guard, went in marching order, but unarmed, to the assembly, with M. Etienne Arago at their head. The shops on the line of march were instantly closed; but the government had become

aware of the intention of some republicans to convert this movement into an insurrection. They had kept the troops in barrack till wanted, and at the proper moment brought them out in overwhelming numbers, while cavalry under Changarnier scoured the Boulevards. The general met the procession in the Rue de la Paix, and ordered it to disperse; which it did after but slight hesitation. At the demand of the minister of the interior Paris was declared in a state of siege, and several persons were arrested. In the provinces, too, there were attempts at disturbance, which had, it seems, been preconcerted; but they came to nothing, except at Lyons. The weather prevented the telegraphic account of the failure of the Paris attempt from reaching Lyons, and a crowd of insurgents attacked a guard of soldiers, and requested them to give up their arms; the soldiers resisted, and fired on their opponents, who retired with a cry of "To arms!" barricades were erected, and quiet was not restored till next day, many lives being lost in the affray. It was clear from these simultaneous risings that they were preconcerted. It was suspected that M. Ledru Rollin and his friends intended to establish themselves as a convention in the Conservatoire des Arts, and it was thought that they had only been prevented from doing so by the promptness of the military movements. On an attempt being made in the assembly to remove the state of siege, these suspicions and fears induced them to reject the proposal by a great majority, and to pass a resolution to suppress the clubs, which were supposed to be the origin of the mischief. Many persons were arrested, and M. Ledru Rollin found it convenient to remove to England, where he occupied himself in compiling a singular account of the decline of that country. Among the events of the day should be mentioned the death of Marshal Bugeaud from cholera, which was ravaging the capital at the time. He was

decreed a public funeral at the Invalides, which was attended by the president of the republic among many others.

The attention of France was, however, at this period mainly fixed on the events at Rome; of which an account will be found in the part of this work relative to Italy. At home, tranquillity was restored by the decisive measures of the assembly, and the determination of the president and his ministers. The supplementary elections which went on were almost without exception in favour of the ministers; and the republican candidates were almost always unsuccessful. Lamartine was returned in one election by an immense majority over a violent republican, and thus obtained a seat in the assembly. So strong was its reactionary character, that, during a discussion which took place towards the end of July in the chamber on a law for the regulation of the press, the majority were taunted by the left with hating the republic, which the majority at once acknowledged that they did. M. Thiers retorted in a speech in which he gave the left a severe lecture, and directly attacked the principles of the revolution; he hinted that though monarchies had been overthrown, republics had been so also, and that if the excellence of a government was to be measured by its duration, the advantage certainly did not belong to the republics. Certainly it was pretty clear in what direction the popular wishes were tending.

The President of the Republic about this time paid a visit to Ham, the scene of his former imprisonment, where he pointed out to his friends the manner of his escape. In a speech to the mayor he seemed to have changed his opinion as to the propriety of the Boulogne and Strasbourg attempts, wondering at his audacity in taking on himself to overturn the existing government, when it appeared at what great cost revolutions were made; and he proposed a toast to those who, in spite of their convictions, were resolved

to support the institutions of their country. Shortly afterwards he made a tour of the provinces, whereupon it was said that he meditated a *coup d'état*, and making himself emperor. If he intended such a thing at this time, his reception was not such as to encourage him to accomplish it,—for he met with quite as many cries of Vive la République as Vive Napoleon. On the 3d of August the minister of finance made a financial statement, from which may be seen what revolutions cost a country.

He reviewed the different budgets during the last ten years, and showed the deficit to be annually increasing. The revolution of February had, moreover, augmented the expenditure of 1848 by 265,000,000 francs, and occasioned a diminution in the produce of the indirect taxes of 150,000,000 francs. The proceeds of the extraordinary tax of 45 centimes had not sufficed to cover the difference. The final deficit for 1849 had been estimated at 91,000,000 francs; but he did not hesitate to extend it to 184,000,000 francs. The whole deficit on the 1st of January 1850 would exceed 550,000,000 francs. As not more than 350,000,000 francs of this amount could be conveniently left in the shape of floating debt, he proposed to ask a loan of 200,000,000 francs. The expenditure for the year 1850 he calculated, including the sinking fund, at 1,591,332,077 francs; and as he calculated the receipts, including the duty on potable liquors, at only 1,270,953,849 francs, the deficiency would not be less than 320,378,228 francs. To provide in future for an equilibrium of receipts and expenses, he proposed—1. The creation of new imposts and taxes to the amount of the sum which the treasury needed. 2. A new arrangement of the sinking fund, so as to make it applicable solely to rentes actually annulled. 3. The constitution of obligations for special services, applicable solely to the expenditure on extraordinary public works. The new taxes and the new ar-

rangement of the sinking fund were not specified, but M. Passy hoped by the latter to save 7,000,000 francs per annum. The obligations for expenditure on public works would be of 500 francs each, and would be issued every year according as they might be required. They would be reimbursed by lot, and by means of a sinking fund of two per cent., to be set aside for each series; and the interest on them would be regulated at a rate which must not in any case exceed the medium rate of the rentes during the previous month. He considered the financial position of the country a very grave one, and it was a cause of considerable anxiety.

A few days later M. Arnaud (de l'Ariège) questioned the foreign minister, M. de Toqueville, on the affairs of Italy. In reply, M. de Toqueville took up the affair at the point when he forwarded to M. D'Harcourt, on the 6th June last, a despatch instructing him on the objects which the government had in view in the intervention. That object was to maintain for France her just influence, "to restore the pope to his former place," to prevent the effects of a violent reaction, and to insure the just reforms requisite for the Roman people. No one could deny that the first point had been attained. It was easy now to criticise what had been done, but let any one consider what had been the position of Italy when the expedition was undertaken: Lombardy overrun, Piedmont conquered, the duchies in the power of foreigners, every part of the country out of its normal condition.

A voice on the left—"Why did you let it occur, then?"

The minister—In such a state of things there were only two modes of acting—war, or intervention such as had taken place. But war was not possible when the constituent assembly, on the discussion of the budget, had insisted on the necessity of a reduction in the army. (*Interruption on the left.*) Nothing remained but the inter-

vention which had been decided on. Then what had been the result? The French army now were masters of Rome, and beyond any doubt occupied a most lofty position in the minds of the world. He passed a high eulogium on the conduct of the French expeditionary army for their forbearance and humanity, and for the high example of civilisation which they had given in their treatment of Rome and its immortal monuments. As to the restoration of the pope, he avowed that the pontiff ought to be in a position of independence; and that such a position could only be insured when the temporal power was secured to him. (*Disapprobation on the left.*) He had strong reasons for believing that this was also the wish of the Roman people. He read a letter from M. Bixio to that effect, and despatches from M. Lesseps, stating that the people were opposed to the movement entered on, and attributing that movement principally to the counsels of the foreigners in Rome. "The population of Rome, when the French troops entered their city, presented the singular spectacle of being much more in favour of the conqueror than the conquered;" and he believed that the French government, in rescuing the people of Rome from the bondage to which they had been subjected, had done a good work for humanity. (*Loud applause on the right.*) But when he spoke of the restoration of the pope, did he mean that the old abuses were to be maintained?—Certainly not. Whatever reforms ought to be carried out in the administrative and judicial institutions of the country ought to be strenuously insisted on, as by means of them only could the head of the catholic church attain his real grandeur. He had the greatest possible admiration for that most excellent institution of morality, the catholic church. He believed that the nations which cherished it best were most likely to hold a high position in the minds of men; and it was with a view to restore that establishment to its legitimate

grandeur that the expedition to Rome had been decided on. As to the reforms which ought to be carried out at Rome, he did not intend then to touch on that question. (*Ironical cheers on the left.*) He could, however, declare two things on the point; the first, that he had every reason to think and to know that the pope was fully of opinion that these reforms should take place; and the second, that the expedition to Rome ought not to end in a sterile and useless result.

The President continued to make tours in the provinces for the purpose of being present at the opening of various lines of railway. He was welcomed with various degrees of enthusiasm, but on the whole his popularity appeared gradually to be on the increase. Nothing remarkable occupied the attention of France till the meeting of the Peace Congress in Paris on the 22d of August.* The

* An assembly of persons who appeared to be mainly intent on speaking bad French and making themselves generally ridiculous. It appears that their object is to abolish all war, but owing to their political predilections, they would only abolish war when waged by sovereigns against rebels, and not when the case was reversed. As to the rest of their scheme, it appears to be altogether useless. For a court of arbitration would be of no avail unbacked by an armed force—pretended power without gunpowder is a mere farce—and assuming the court could compel, it merely comes to this, that countries should endeavour to settle their disputes peaceably before they resort to arms—a proposition which lacks novelty, inasmuch as the diplomatic body is employed usually for this purpose. And with regard to their theory that countries are forced into war only by the ambition of princes and ministers, it may not be thought irrelevant to recall to their mind the French intervention at Rome, authorized by an assembly elected by the universal suffrage of France; the piratical attack on Cuba by a body of Yankee adventurers, and the war with Russia in which we are now engaged; which, much against their desires, a ministry of whom some were Russian by inclination and some by connexion, were forced into by the outcry of an indignant people. Upon one subject, however, they appear to have perceived a glimmering of truth. They declared that they did not see why England and France were to be considered as natural enemies: that they were much more naturally friends; that they were the two most civilized nations in the world, and that they had much more reason to agree than to differ. Whether the doctrines they then preached have in any degree contributed to the present friendly feeling between the countries, may be perhaps open to doubt. How "Perfide Albion" has been changed into "Mon cher John," is

President alluded to this meeting in a speech at the Exposition of French industry; which, he said, was the real Peace congress. Indeed he himself, by taking every occasion to promote commerce and foster the material welfare of France, was doing his best not only to consolidate his own power and increase his own popularity, but to maintain the peace of France and the tranquillity of Europe.

There was in this autumn a gathering of the partisans of Henry V. at Ems, and subsequently the police discovered or invented a legitimist plot in Paris; but neither event appears to be of any political importance. During the recess of the assembly, the President made several tours in the provinces, where he was in general well received. Indeed, when the chamber met again, some of the extreme left complained that there were more cries of "Vive Napoleon!" than "Vive la République!" To their great indignation M. Leon Faucher, in a speech in the provinces, had described the revolution of 1848 as an event of which France had no reason to be proud; saying that the corruption under the monarchy was much less than it had grown under the republic; that the latter had done more harm in eighteen months than the former in as many years; that the public posts had been filled by hosts of incompetent persons, very few of whom he had retained; in which course he had not been actuated by any party motives, but had simply turned them out because they were not fit for the posts they occupied.* But the event producing the most serious political consequences was the following letter written by the President to M. Edgar Ney in Italy, on the Italian settlement question.

rather a difficult question—possibly railways, steam, and frequent intercourse have something to do in it. We are excellent friends at present; it is for the interest of both parties to remain so.

* A hint to anti-aristocratic administrative reformers.

"*Elysée National*, 18*th August* 1849.

"My dear Ney—The French Republic has not sent an army to Rome to strangle Italian liberty, but, on the contrary, to regulate it, and preserve it from excesses, and on a solid basis to restore to the pontifical throne the prince who at the first placed himself boldly at the head of all useful reforms.

"I learn with pain that the benevolent intentions of the Holy Father, and our own deeds, remain unfruitful in consequence of the influence of passion and hostile feelings. It is wished to have as the basis of the Pope's return, proscription and tyranny. Say, on my part, to General Rostolan, that it cannot be permitted, under the shadow of the tricolor flag, to commit an act derogatory to the character of our abnegation.

"I sum up thus the re-establishment of the temporal power of the Pope,—a general amnesty, the secularization of the administration, the Code Napoleon, and a liberal government.

"I have been personally hurt, on reading the proclamation of the three Cardinals, to see that it has not even made mention of the name of France, or of the sufferings of our brave soldiers. Every insult offered to our flag or to our uniform goes right to my heart; and I beg you to make known to them, that if France does not sell her services, she requires at least that she may have gratitude for her sacrifices and self-denial.

"At the time when our armies made the tour of Europe, they left everywhere, as the traces of their passage, the germs of liberty, and the destruction of the abuses of the feudal system. It shall not be said that in 1849 a French army has acted in a different manner and brought about a different result.

"Desire the General to thank the army in my name for its noble conduct. I have learned with pain that even

physically it has not been treated as it deserved to be. Nothing should be neglected to make our troops comfortable.

"Receive, my dear Ney, the assurance of my sincere friendship. LOUIS NAPOLEON BONAPARTE."

The publication of this letter produced a storm. M. Falloux thought he ought to have seen it before it was sent. It seemed, however, that the president considered it only as a private note to M. Ney: as the expression of his own opinions. The discussion in the public papers was all the more excited, because at the moment they had nothing else to discuss. Some, agreeing with the principle of the letter, thought it rather too imperial; some regretted that the writer had acted on his own inspiration, and had not had more regard to constitutional forms; some declared it altogether unconstitutional, and refused to consider its substance; others said it compromised the peace of Europe, as attempting to impose a code which would destroy the state of property in Italy, as rendering necessary an immense augmentation to the army of Italy, as alienating the clergy, and as engaging France in a labyrinth out of which she could only escape by war or make herself ridiculous, while the effect of the letter in Italy was greatly to reconcile the Italians to the French intervention. On the whole, leaving out of the question the constitution—and even then it is not very clear why the President had not as good a right to express his opinion privately as any other person—the letter itself does not appear to contain unreasonable views. The French had interfered, either really or nominally, to prevent Austria restoring the Pope unconditionally; they had endeavoured to make terms with the Pope before taking Rome; he had refused on the ground that it would look like compulsion. When they were once masters of the city, he evaded their

request, and not only restored things to the state they were in before his flight, but overthrew all the reforms he himself had introduced; brought back all kinds of abuses, put the whole of the affairs of state in the hands of the priests, whose scandalous misgovernment had been one of the main causes that led to the revolution; set up clerical courts of justice, presided over by persons ignorant of law, where no final judgments were ever to be obtained, and where the delays were unknown even to chancery. The President's suggestion, if it had been followed, would have been a great improvement—the Code Napoleon may be far from perfect, but its imperfections might be removed. A settled code of some sort is better than no code at all, and the Roman states to this day have none. The only pity is, that the French assembly were less resolved on a reasonable course when they met than the President, and that the settlement of Rome was an unconditional return of the Pope, and the old despotic rule of the priestly caste.

The ill-health or ill-humour of M. Falloux had compelled him to retire from office. He was not present at the discussion on Roman affairs, which had been referred to a committee shortly after the assembly met in the beginning of October. M. Thiers had been intrusted with the preparation of their report. It was of a highly papist and conservative tone—it defended the "*motu proprio*" which the Pope had published on his return, and which, like all the rest of Pio Nono's literary compositions, was evasive and unintelligible. M. Thiers described the state of Italy. "Its regeneration had been rendered impossible by the conduct of a disorderly faction; who, instead of joining together under moderate institutions and fighting their common enemy, had turned their weapons against their own governments. Austria, making an incontestible use of her own rights, had re-conquered Lombardy, invaded Piedmont and the duchies, and was threatening

Rome. Could France permit Austria to push her invasion to Rome, and thus morally and materially obtain dominion over the whole of Italy? That the intervention was for the interest of Italian freedom, to preserve it from the consequences of Austrian visitation. The intervention, wisely resolved, was resolutely executed. True, the French had marched against a republic; but they were friends or enemies of a government not because of its form but of its conduct, and that the constitution was defective on that point in declaring it would not attack the liberties of others. When once present in Rome, France must restore the holy father to full liberty.* She had no right to constrain, but had a right to advise and to supplicate; her advice had been for measures to appease the legitimate discontent of the people, and reforms which would obviate the necessity of France returning or allowing Austria to go to alternatives, equally to be regretted by all the world; and the Pope understood the matter perfectly." During the reading of the report M. Thiers was every now and then interrupted by exclamations of surprise at its very conservative tendency. M. Victor Hugo called out to him, "You are no longer a liberal, M. Thiers!" on which that statesman replied that he was not. The report brought the affair into a worse tangle than before. The President was offended that no notice was taken of his note to M. Edgar Ney, and expressed his feeling by complaining of the very reactionary tone of M. Thiers' report. The latter refused either to modify or to retract anything, and a serious breach was the consequence: an alteration in the cabinet even was talked of.

But the speech which produced more effect than any other, from its bitter sarcasm and the very unpleasant truths which it contained, was that of M. de Montalembert. After giving a back-handed stroke to M. Victor

* They might have considered this before they went there.

Hugo, which almost drove that insane author into the temporary possession of his senses, he delivered a very well-deserved philippic on the conduct and ingratitude of the rabble. This, as does all that falls from that gentleman, stung to the quick the persons to whom it was addressed, by the bitterness of its invective and the keenness of its sarcasm. He concluded thus:—"You say that the Pope has changed. No, he has not changed; but he has seen, he has profited by the terrible lesson which God has given him; and I add, that he would be inexcusable if that were not the case. And, gentlemen, if he had changed, would he have been the only one who has done so? Yesterday, allusion was made to the apostasy of the great liberal party. Do you suppose that in this world liberty and progress are now looked on as formerly? Do you imagine that a bloody light has not risen for many? (*Sensation.*) Go search obscure depths; penetrate into the most isolated homesteads; ask those persons who have not meddled with public affairs; probe their consciences, and ask them if they love progress and liberty as they loved it once? (*Fresh movement.*) Ask them if their faith in them is not shaken? (*Exclamations on the left.*) I can conceive the affliction this truth causes you—I also feel it. Well, then, out of a thousand liberals you will not find a single one at present who has not a hundred times less ardour than he had formerly! . . . . My friends and I hailed with joy the forward march of Pio Nono; but we have met with cruel diappointment. Yes, the tide has turned; not against Pio Nono, but against liberty. (*Applause.*) Ah! how I should like to have these demagogues, these anarchists, here before me, to tell them, once for all, the truths which they ought to hear. (*Murmurs on the left.*) I would say to them—'The greatest of your crimes is not to have shed blood: which, however cries out against you; it is not to have scattered ruin

over all Europe; it is to have disenchanted the world of its ideas of liberty, and to have forced back towards its source the current of human truths.'"

M. de Montalembert retired greeted by rapturous applause. M. Victor Hugo rushed to the tribune and strove to gain a hearing, but in vain. The assembly closed its sitting for that day in great emotion.

A number of amendments were made to the original motion, which was to vote the supplies for the expedition and to adopt the report. Among others, Victor Hugo moved, that the National Assembly, adopting the principles contained in the letter of the President of the Republic, invites the government to maintain and to preserve the rights and liberties of the Roman people. After long discussion, the assembly rejected this and other amendments, voted supplies, and passed on to the other business of the day; thus, in point of fact, replacing the Pope in his full authority, re-establishing the clergy in their despotic power, and restoring all the vices of Roman misgovernment, in opposition to the expressed wishes of Louis Napoleon. This difference of opinion, and the conduct of the ministers in the matter, led to their dismissal from office. The President of the Republic notified the fact to the assembly by letter, which was read to them on the thirty-first of October.*

* "Monsieur le President—Under the grave circumstances in which we find ourselves, the accord which ought to reign amongst the different powers of the state cannot be maintained, unless, animated by a mutual confidence, they frankly explain themselves face to face with each other.

"In order to give an example of that sincerity, I come forward now to state the reasons which have determined me to change the ministry, and to separate myself from men whose eminent services I am well pleased to proclaim, and to whom I have offered friendship and gratitude.

"In order to strengthen the republic, menaced by anarchy from so many sides—to insure order more efficiently than has been done up to this day—to maintain abroad the name of France at the height of her renown—men are needed, who, animated by a patriotic devotedness, comprehend the necessity of a direction single and firm, and of a clearly defined policy, which does not

On the following day, a new ministry was gazetted. One of their first acts was to release many of the insurgents of June of the previous year, who were imprisoned

compromise power by any irresolution; men whose minds are as much filled with the conviction of my peculiar responsibility as of their own, men of action as well as words.

"For nearly a year, I have given many proofs of self-denial, in order that there might be no misunderstanding with regard to my real sentiments. Without rancour against any individual or against any party, I have allowed men of the most contrary opinions to arrive at power; but without obtaining the happy result which I expected from that coalition. In place of effecting a fusion of different shades of opinion, I only arrived at a neutralization of forces.

"The unity of views and intentions was interfered with, and the spirit of conciliation taken for weakness. Scarcely had the dangers of the street been got over when the old parties were seen again to elevate their colours, revive their rivalries, and alarm the country by disseminating disquietude.

"In the midst of this confusion, France, uneasy because she sees no guidance, seeks the hand, the will of the 10th of December. But that will cannot be felt unless there be entire community of ideas, of views, and of convictions between the president and his ministers; and unless the assembly itself join in the thought of the nation as expressed in the election of the executive power.

"A whole system triumphed on the 10th of December; for the name of Napoleon is a complete programme in itself. It means at home, order, authority, religion, and the welfare of the people; abroad, national dignity. It is this policy, inaugurated by my election, that I wish to cause to triumph, with the support of the assembly and that of the people. I wish to merit the confidence of the people by maintaining the constitution to which I have sworn. I wish to inspire in the country, by my loyalty, my perseverance, and my firmness, a confidence, such that affairs may resume their course, and that faith may be had in the future.

"The letter of a constitution has certainly a great influence on the destiny of the country, but the manner in which it is executed has perhaps even more. The longer or shorter duration of power contributes powerfully to the stability of things; but it is also by displaying ideas and principles that a government can succeed in persuading society to reassure itself.

"Let us, therefore, again raise up authority without disturbing true liberty. Let us calm apprehensions by boldly mastering bad passions, and by giving to all noble instincts a useful direction. Let us strengthen religious feeling, without abandoning the conquests of the revolution; and we shall save the country in spite of the parties, the ambitions, and even the imperfections, which our institutions may comprise.

"LOUIS NAPOLEON BONAPARTE."

The sensation created by this letter waxed greater as it proceeded; and the assembly rose in great agitation.

at Belleisle, an act which was said to have given dissatisfaction to all parties: to the left, because the whole were not released; to the right, because any of the disturbers of society were liberated. Meanwhile, the trials for the disturbance on the 13th of June, in the current year, went on. One of the advocates pleaded that the constitution was committed to the safeguard of the people, and that it included the right of insurrection.* The judges naturally refused to acknowledge the right to rebel: and, after hearing the counsel, delivered an elaborate judgment to that effect, the gist of which was, that no clause of the constitution authorized a fraction of the people, tumultuously convoked in a public square, to judge on constitutional questions, and to execute their own judgments. They then called on the advocate to proceed with the defence; but he declined to do so: the rest of the advocates for the prisoners followed his example. The court then appointed other counsel to defend the prisoners; but the accused repudiated them: the counsel refused to act for them (as they, one would think, had good right to do), upon which they were reprimanded by the court. In this manner is justice administered in France.

The year 1849 concluded without being disturbed by any unusual events. M. Pierre Bonaparte succeeded for some time in making himself the object of conversation, by exhibiting his pugnacious disposition on several occasions. Having been recalled in disgrace from Madrid, he had been appointed to a command in Algeria; but he left that country without leave, at the moment of action, to attend in his place in the assembly. He was reprimanded by the President, his cousin, and stoutly defended himself in the chamber. He shortly afterwards fought a duel with a gentleman in the Champs Elysées. His return

* The fact was, that this phrase was a mere ornamental excrescence on that document, and not intended to have any effect whatever.

appears to have been rather unnecessary, for the debates were generally uninteresting; insomuch that, on the first day, some fifty members applied for leave of absence, which was granted. The government of the President, on the whole, may be said to have been characterized by prudence and moderation. He steered a middle course between the reactionary and anarchical parties, occupying himself with attending to practical reforms, and encouraging commerce; for which purpose, banks for mutual assistance were established, and attention was paid to the wants of the working-classes. A return of commercial prosperity had set in; confidence was gradually recovering from the shock of the revolution, and the finances were improving.* The army, too, was reduced from 500,000, to which it had been raised by the provisional government, to the peace establishment of 350,000.

The wise policy which had been adopted by the provisional government, with respect to the bank of France, had produced its results; and the masterly financial operations of that corporation had, early in the year, restored it to the highest position of commercial credit. This credit gradually told on the commerce of the country, while the firm hands in which the reins of the state were held, supported by a large majority in the chamber, by the army, and nearly the whole of the national guard, and the prudent manner in which the power of the state was exercised, had produced the natural result. Persons began to wonder how a man previously so little thought of could manage so well; and invented all sorts of reasons: some said that he had the knack of knowing whose advice to

* He promised to abolish the vexatious system of passports; but because of his limited authority, and the host of functionaries interested in maintaining it, he was unable to accomplish that measure. It is to be hoped that, now he has the power, he will effect a reform which will give more practical freedom than a score of constitutions.

follow; others that he was guided by Count d'Orsay, who was much with him; it was observed, "With what little wisdom may a great nation be governed." However, it soon began to be suspected that the French President thoroughly understood the French people, and the interests of France, and was, in short, a better statesman than had been previously supposed.

At his election, the President had been almost compelled to select his ministers from the different shades of conservatism. All the parties of order hoped to make use of him as a stop-gap to anarchy, and as a means to their own ends; but, agreeing only in repressing broils in the streets, they differed widely in their views on almost every other subject. The conservative party were disunited; their opponents, the reds and socialists, were compact. It was the President himself, rather than the ministry or the assembly, who represented the compact and united will of the French people. The Assembly itself, although nominally elected by universal suffrage, did not altogether fairly represent what it pretended; for, in one province, a man had the right of electing a score of representatives; in another, he could only elect three or four: an inequality that threw a preponderance into the hands of the great towns, which were thus able to elect not only their own deputies, but those for the surrounding country populations; consequently the President, who was elected by the universal suffrage of the whole of France, was more the representative of that principle than the Assembly itself.

It is true, that the socialist and anarchical party was powerless in the streets and in arms; but being small and compact, though discontented and turbulent, they turned their attention to peaceable means. With these they were more successful than they had been in arms; they had in places gained ground in the elections: a gain very distaste-

ful to the reputable part of society, who dreaded lest it should betoken an eventual majority; and it became an object of consequence to find means to prevent the occurrence of so calamitous a catastrophe. It seemed, upon consideration, that socialism itself was an effect produced by false teaching; for from teaching of one sort or another do most speculations flow, since "the number of persons who undergo the fatigue of thinking for themselves is prodigiously few." The three great sources of all teaching in France were the church, the university, and the public press. The first held that philosophy explained nothing; the second that it explained everything; and the latter flattered the prejudices and passions of the different parties. Of these three, the university and the church were in perpetual hostility. The church exercised its influence on childhood, the university on youth, and the education of the man was happily concluded by the newspapers; which disseminated opinions because they sold, concealed the truth if it would not sell, and being without individual responsibility, were perfectly careless of the consequences.

The new ministry consisted mainly of men previously unknown. M. Falloux, the predecessor of M. Parieu, in the educational department, had prepared a scheme on the subject, which his successor adopted; he being actuated both by religious principles and by previous political associations to do an ill turn to the university. A provisional law, to last for six months, was first carried, to curb the political wanderings of some of the persons who had been appointed primary instructors. It was passed with some difficulty. The discussion on the permanent law, which began on the 15th of January, ran principally on the vices and dangers of society in the present day. One party depicted the university as the fruitful mother of modern light, intelligence, reason, and well-being; the other as

the impure source of all cotemporary corruptions, and guilty of spreading scepticism, of demoralizing youth, making science to retrograde, and lowering the level of studies. On the other hand, some said of the church that it was the enemy of truth, of modern advancement, of light, and of freedom; while among the defenders of the university some desired to see the victory of rationalism over theology, there were others who merely hated the church without any particular love or practice of rationality. Among the champions of the church, there were some of devoted faith, such as M. Montalembert, who only accepted the proposed law to add some clerical influence to the councils of education as an instalment. But there were others, such as M. Thiers, who had become dissatisfied with the results of philosophy, which had not contributed to the peace of the country, and thought to temper it by the judicious mixture of a little Christianity—or what passed for such. In this it appears they have made a great mistake; for while true Christianity has its strongest ally in science and knowledge, yet knowledge and science are the everlasting opponents of priestly influence on other than religious subjects: and as priestly influence, and not human conduct, is the chief aim and object of the popish religion, it follows that education (properly so called, which consists in teaching the mind to inquire after truth, and to think independently, and not to believe what the world believes because the world believes it) is essentially hostile to it; and to give the one a power of controlling the other, is to render it of no use—to nullify it, and to destroy it. No union of two opposing powers is possible: one or the other may at last vanquish, but they cannot co-operate.*

* The real object of education was equally misunderstood by both. Instead of desiring to educate men to use the wits God has given them to the best ad-

The law was passed on the 15th of March: it provided that the old council of public instruction should be preserved, but considerably modified by the addition of several bishops, archbishops, two protestant clergymen, and a Jew. There were also established in the provinces provincial councils, in which the ecclesiastical authorities had considerable influence; in addition to which, education was set free: that is to say, what the French call free. It was not permitted to any person, wherever educated and whether he was fit or not, to set up a school and take pupils, leaving it to the discretion of the parents to see whether he was fit or not—a system which answers, or at least leads to no mischief, in this country; but all that was done was to make it no longer necessary for a person to pass at the normal school to be qualified for the office of a teacher: the degree of bachelor, or a certificate of capacity, was to be sufficient. This was a further advantage to the priesthood; for thus the clergy were able to enter into competition with the university, and as they generally gave their teaching at a lower rate than the university, the competition was seldom to its advantage: these, together with a system of government inspection, were its principal provisions.

vantage, in looking after their own and their country's business, they hoped, by controlling educational systems, to cram them with ready-made prejudices, which should in both cases equally prevent their using their own wits at all: for the philosopher is not unfrequently as dogmatic and illiberal as the ecclesiastic. Men uneducated have some mother-wit; cram them with other men's opinions, and this, which was given them for some good purpose, is smothered. To teach men a quantity of questionable theology, no more instructs them in the knowledge of their duty than do the stereotyped doctrines of a dogmatic philosophy. To give men merely the knowledge of reading and writing, without teaching them to reflect and investigate, only increases their power for mischief; it is not teaching them to use their wits, but to abuse them. Generally speaking, the great cry for education in most countries is the voice of some party who hope thereby to force their own opinions down the throats of the young, in order that they may be hoodwinked and led by the nose the more easily when they come to be men. Real education is the greatest benefit which can be given to a man; that which often passes for it one of the greatest pests to society.

Considerable agitation had been going on in the south. The government had thought it necessary to strengthen their military positions, and to place the troops under the command of officers whom they could trust. In the elections which took place for the vacancies in Paris on the 10th of March, the socialists met with a signal and unexpected success; and though, at the same time, in the provinces the conservatives gained, yet this success appeared a very disagreeable feature, and society was filled with vague alarms. The President having called together a number of the leaders of every shade of conservatism, it was resolved by them that no other course was open save to restrict the use of universal suffrage. To do this directly, by requiring a property qualification, was too great a reaction: they effected their object by a very ingenious device. Without nominally abolishing universal suffrage, they greatly restricted its exercise; for, under pretence of ascertaining the proper domicile, and of excluding only vagrants and the fluctuating population, they decided that the length of residence required should be three years; but they added, with some ingenuity, that the actual domicile should not count, except in the case of householders, domestic servants, sons living with their fathers, and workmen living in the house of their masters: soldiers in active service, and civil servants of the state, were to have a vote where they were on duty; and, under all other circumstances, they adopted, as a means of ascertaining the domicile, the payment of direct taxes.

This law disfranchised the working classes in the great towns indirectly, as in them no one who did not pay 200 francs rent was subject to direct taxes, for they paid their share of the taxes by the indirect means of the octroi.*

* There was a real great principle of honesty in the measure which does not appear to have been perceived. The burden of taxation ought to be borne in proportion to political power. No person has a right to put his hands in

The law was supported by all the conservatives, except a few legitimists, whose strength in the west and south lay among the peasantry. It was, however, opposed violently by the radicals; one of whom, M. de Flotte, asked if they thought that the country, from mere whim, were likely to rush into the doctrines which they held impracticable and absurd; and said that they were frightened into what they would not have done of themselves. "Gentlemen," cried he, "they say we are seeking power by all means—What could we do with it?—Good God! what could we do with it if we got it?" An avowal of weakness which was very unexpected from that quarter, for fear was entertained of some explosion on the passing of the law. Nevertheless, this declaration of impotence did not prevent the government from carrying out other laws for the repression of the anarchists.

They passed another, authorizing the transportation of offenders to the Marquesas, although they were beaten in attempting to give the law a retrospective operation. It was, nevertheless, with difficulty that a vote could be obtained for the payment of the President's necessary expenses. He had found that the salary of 240,000 francs a-year, which had been provided for him, was quite inadequate to keep up his court in the imperial style that was expected of him; and, on the assembly having shown a disposition to allow him no more, he had cut down his establishment, and, to his great annoyance, had been obliged to sell many of his horses.

The third great law which was directed against the party of anarchy, and which again split the conservatives into fractions, was the law on the Press, which had been under very little control since February 1848. If the

another man's pocket. To permit a person who does not pay taxes to vote in their imposition and distribution, is to legislate on principles which we punish in the pickpocket.

papers could preach sedition with impunity, it was in vain that powers had been given to close the clubs, and even to prevent electoral assemblages if they appeared dangerous to the public peace. It was also necessary, for the increase of the revenue, to reimpose the stamp, which was to cover the postage. The assembly had previously, in 1848 and 1849, voted that there should be a deposit of caution-money; it was now proposed to increase it, and to require newspapers, as well as pamphlets under three sheets, to be stamped. It was hoped by this policy to retain a monopoly of the metropolitan press in a few hands, which would render it more manageable.

But that part of the law which provoked the most discussion and vituperation, especially in England, was proposed by two independent members, who were anxious to make the press more becoming in conduct through the same means by which private persons of disorderly predilections are kept in a sort of decency, that is, by personal responsibility; and they resolved, in consequence, that every article should be signed with the name of the writer: of course, this would detract from the prestige of the press, but add much to its honesty. A man is not willing to be guilty of misrepresentation in his own name: he feels a responsibility for what he writes. A man who writes anonymously is apt to be careless what he says or whom he attacks. There is no one who will write in the same manner, when he writes in his own name, as he will if he is screened behind the shield of the editorial "we." The question is, whether it is for public advantage to have the opinions of obscure persons passing current for more than their intrinsic value. In their own names they would be more careful as to accuracy and more cautious in their opinions; but the public would respect neither their accuracy nor opinions so much. By the change, the value of their produce would be depreciated in the market, but the

public would be able to put a juster value on the article they were buying. The result would be that, comparatively, the opinions of men of known character and judgment would be more valued, and the opinions of persons not known to possess either would be less so than at present. The proposition was carried by the independent parties in the house without support from the government, after a very violent discussion, and greatly by the influence of the legitimists.

While, on the one hand, the government and the Assembly were labouring to destroy the means of propagating socialism and anarchy, they were not idle in endeavouring to extirpate discontent, the soil best adapted for such plants, by measures directed to the material welfare of the poor and the working-classes. Attention was paid to the unhealthy condition of their habitations, especially in some of the manufacturing towns. Means were given to the authorities to oblige the owner to construct drains, &c. necessary to make the lodging healthy, before he let it; if the case were of such a nature as to require public co-operation, means were supplied for effecting the improvement of the general sanitary condition of the district; and in the meantime the letting of the lodgings could be prohibited. An act was passed for enabling government to sell small annuities, to be purchased by gradual savings, as a provision for old age; and another establishing societies for mutual help, for the purpose of insuring against sickness, accident, or old age. A law was passed to secure the operatives against fraud in payment for their work; and another affecting combinations, and putting the workman on a level with his master in this respect. Nor was it alone in acts actually passed that the government showed their intention of attending to this most important subject, for several bills were brought forward for the purpose of ameliorating the condition of the operatives, but were post-

poned because of the determined and factious opposition of the socialists. The policy of the Assembly may be summed up in few words: it was to prevent political mischief and disturbance, and render the tranquillity permanent, by making the people comfortable, by attending to their material wants, and promoting commerce.

CHAPTER VI.

THE COUP D'ETAT.

THE Assembly adjourned, on the 8th of August, till the 11th of November: scarcely had it done so, when the various sections of the conservative party began to show, even more clearly than before, the divergence of their opinions and objects. There had for some time appeared, on the part of the whole conservative body, a desire to increase the power of the President, and to prolong the term of his office, because he was at the moment the only barrier between them and anarchy; but the monarchical parties hoped, almost undisguisedly, to restore that form of government. The increase and prolongation of the power of the President, however, could not be legally effected without having recourse to a Constituent instead of a Legislative Assembly to alter the constitution; which assembly, instead of 750, would consist of 900 members. Some idea was perhaps entertained of having recourse to it; but, towards the end of the session, the Assembly was more disunited than previously. In the mean time, the radicals and socialists had betaken themselves to their pens as offensive weapons, especially after their last check on the 13th of June; and though they frequently abused each

other very heartily, yet, from their safe retreats in Leicester Square, they contrived to keep up a half-suppressed ferment. There is no doubt, however, that the President had a considerable personal following, which gradually increased. He occupied the recess in journeys through the provinces, where he was received with varying cordiality. In some places, as in Lyons, where the socialists had organized a demonstration, their groans were drowned in the shouts of the people: on the whole, the cries of "*Vive Napoleon*" predominated over the more legitimate cry of "*Vive la République*," or "*Vive le Président.*"

At Strasbourg, where the municipal council had refused to vote any expenses for his reception, the people were cold, but respectful; and the mayor's address was more republican than complimentary. A similar tone of feeling appeared to pervade the greater part of the eastern provinces; but the President's presence and denial of any wish to usurp more power than was confided to him by the people, had doubtless an effect in tranquillizing men's minds: the object he probably had in view. In the western provinces, and in Normandy, his progress was a continued triumph; particularly at Cherbourg, where, in September, he reviewed the fleet—a spectacle which drew many visiters, even from the opposite shores of England—and where he spoke of the permanent services rendered by the emperor to the country, and particularly to that city.

It was, too, during the parliamentary recess, that the Councils-general were held in the provinces. The greater part of them pronounced in favour of a revision of the constitution; but they had not declared what was the reform they desired. There were some of the old Orleanists who were preaching a fusion of the two branches of the Bourbons, which has since been partially accomplished. But though neither of these parties were conspiring to effect their objects immediately, there is no doubt that the ma-

jority of the French people disliked the republican form of government: they wanted a permanent head. The question was, who he was to be?—There were three courses: one to admit the hereditary claims of the Count de Chambord; but these were worn out and forgotten:—the next, to restore the Orleans branch, in the person of the Count of Paris, and under his mother's guardianship; but, after all, his claims were small enough: he was neither the representative of legitimacy, nor of popularity, nor was he, a mere child, distinguished by personal ability. Against these competitors, there was the President, the representative of legitimacy or the hereditary principle, as the heir of the first Napoleon. Their great emperor's name made the people forget the badness of his title to the throne; which, after all, was quite as good as that of the ancestors of every sovereign in Europe: Charles Martel, for instance.*

The hereditary principle became combined with Louis Napoleon's growing personal popularity, and a growing appreciation of his capacity. But it was from the people that the initiative should come, not from him. He was the servant of the popular will: his duty was to give it effect, but not to set it in motion.

The cries of "*Vive l'Empereur*" at some of the reviews, which displeased the republicanism and ideas of military discipline of General Changarnier and General Neumayer, led to a difference of opinion, and to the retirement of the minister of war, General Hautpoul. The conduct of the *Société du dix Décembre*, by their somewhat imprudent behaviour, and the excessive zeal of a police agent, who imagined or invented a plot to assassinate the commandant of the army in Paris and the president of the Assembly, had aroused the suspicions of

* Who would now object to the title of Queen Victoria because she inherits from William the Conqueror, who was not the legitimate king of these islands?

the permanent committee of the Assembly, which sat during the recess; and a *coup d'état* was generally anticipated.

When the session opened on the 11th of November, in the message addressed by the President to the House he alluded to this report. He said "that he, as the first magistrate of the republic, was the only person in France who could not attempt the bringing about the revision of the constitution; the councils-general in the provinces had expressed a wish for its revision, which the Assembly would have to consider: if they decided for it, it would be the part of the executive to give effect to their resolutions; if they voted for this, it would be for them to call a Constituent Assembly into existence; if they did not, it would be for the people, in 1852, to express solemnly their new choice. That which occupied him was not to know who would then govern France, but to employ the mean time, so that whatever change should then be made should be made without agitation or trouble. The most noble object for men in power was not to seek to perpetuate it, but without ceasing to watch over the means to consolidate, for the advantage of all, the principles of authority and morality which counteracted the passions of men and the instability of the laws."

The more settled became the political atmosphere, the less the anarchists were to be dreaded; the more the different sections of the conservative party were naturally at leisure to quarrel among each other. Between the legitimists who had visited Wisbaden, the Orleanists who had gone to Clermont, and the Bonapartists who, at the review at Satory, had cried "*Vive l'Empereur*," there was not likely to be much sympathy. Forced into a compulsory alliance by outward danger, when that danger was removed, their inherent repulsion at once removed the disagreeable necessity of peace among each other. The po-

sition of General Changarnier, as commander of the army and national guard in Paris, gave the opportunity for differences of opinion, which were alone waiting for a pretext to display themselves. The republicanism of that distinguished officer, and the unusual union of powers in his hands, committed to him under exceptional circumstances and for special purposes, placed him in a position which he could not continue to hold without exciting the jealousy and interfering with the functions of the minister of war.

The removal of General Hautpoul and the appointment of General Schram had only for a time evaded, not removed, the difficulty. The President, too, appears not to have been pleased at Changarnier's thinking it his duty to interfere with the soldiery if they chose to cry "*Vive l'Empereur.*" Legally speaking, there was no doubt of the President's right to appoint to or remove from the command of the army. The legitimist and Orleanist parties, too, had done Changarnier the disservice to attribute to him the part played by General Monk in the restoration of Charles II., and expressed doubts whether the character of a Washington was possible in France,—a suggestion which at once avowed the distrust of the executive and of the Chamber. An instruction to the officers of the garrison in Paris, attributed to General Changarnier, was published by the "Patrie," which appeared to deny to the Assembly the right to require the troops necessary for its own protection. Upon this M. Napoleon Bonaparte, supported by the radicals, inquired of General Schram if such were the case; that minister required time and consideration for reply; but General Changarnier at once rose and repudiated utterly the intention attributed to him; declaring that no such instructions existed, and that the right of the Assembly had never been in any degree called in question. The whole affair appeared to have been a myth, and to have ended in smoke; for the majority were satisfied, and after

so emphatic a denial the radicals did not think fit to continue the debate. These circumstances occurred on the 3d of January 1851.

This decision of the Assembly in favour of Changarnier, whom they now regarded as their champion, did not, however, change the determination of the President to rid himself of a power which seemed independent of him. He had certainly the legal right to depose the General from his command; but the greater part of his ministers disapproved of this course, and retired. After a crisis which lasted six days, new ministers were appointed in their place, and the same day* a decree appeared repealing the decrees of the 20th of December 1848 and the 11th of June 1849, which conferred the command of the national guard and the troops in the department of the Seine upon the same person. The majority of the conservative party had not expected so rapid a blow, and were highly incensed. M. Remusat, after a vehement attack on the minister who had countersigned the decree, moved for a committee to inquire into the circumstances. No question as to the legality of the act could be made; for the constitution in the 64th article expressly states, "Il nomme et revoque.....les commandants en chef des armées de terre et de mer," &c. The ministry defended the executive on the ground of their legal right, but the majority did not happen to care about legal rights. A committee was appointed, on a division of 330 against 273, of persons hostile to the ministry. The committee reported on the 14th, and cast blame on the ministry. On the succeeding day, the discussion began: it was proposed to vote the following resolution: "The National Assembly, recognising the incontestable right of the executive power to dispose of military commands, blames the use the ministers have made of their right, and

* On the 9th of January.

declares that the old General-in-chief of the armies of Paris continues to hold all his titles, as a testimony of the confidence which the Assembly had decreed to him on the 3d of January." It appears to have occurred to them that if the executive had the right to appoint and revoke military commanders, they themselves had not, and that the two ends of the sentence were inconsistent or incompatible; for, after an animated debate, they carried an amendment, simply expressing a want of confidence in ministers, who accordingly retired: and for some months ministerial difficulties followed each other in rapid succession.

Nevertheless the Assembly was in ill humour, and vented it by refusing a vote for the expenses of the President; while M. de Montalembert declared, that whatever might be the faults of the President, he represented the only authority possible at present, and he only recognised as legitimate that which was possible.

The ministers, who, after an interregnum, were appointed on the 10th of April, declared it to be their wish to unite the various factions of the conservative party, which had already done so much to defend the country from the dangers that threatened it. M. Sainte Beuve, however, who had previously contributed to the fall of the former ministers, proposed afresh a vote of want of confidence. The ministers remonstrated, that it was unreasonable to condemn them without giving them an opportunity of showing whether they deserved condemnation, and protested their adhesion to parliamentary principles. The proposal was rejected in the Assembly by a majority of 52 votes. They thus obtained toleration rather than an active confidence; but this toleration enabled legislation to go on, and the attention of the House was again occupied by domestic reforms, which had for a time been overlaid by political disputes. Yet, there was rather a truce

between the opposing parties than a cordial understanding. The real differences remained as great, and the desires of the different parties as far apart and incompatible as ever.

The great subject which agitated the whole of France was the competition between the legislative and executive powers. The question of revising a constitution made the dead-lock inevitable and continuous, involving as it did the more important question of what was to happen when the President—who after all was the most direct emanation from the united suffrage of the French people—ended his term, and by virtue of the 45th article of the constitution became ineligible for office. There was no doubt that the majority of the French regarded Louis Napoleon as the most fit man, and that if they had their own way they would re-elect him; but then came this article of the constitution. It was argued, that this ought to be repealed, necessarily, in the manner pointed out by the constitution. But the Constituent Assembly, in enacting that their laws should not be repealed except by three-fourths of the Legislative Assembly agreeing to call a Constituent Assembly, went beyond the power of any human authority.*

The required majority, in the divided and distracted state of parties, could not be obtained. Petitions from the country poured in without number before the adjournment. But the republican party was hostile to any project of a revision; for many of them placed the principle of republicanism far above that of universal suffrage or popular will. Besides, their hopes lay in the convulsions of society,

* An attempt to make laws irrevocable, either altogether or in part, has so frequently been shown to be futile, that it is not worth discussing. That an assembly of men at one period of the world's existence should have attempted to bind themselves and their descendants to remote ages, could have arisen only from presumptuous ignorance: the most powerful body in a state sooner or later always gets its way—in point of fact it make its way law.

which the difficulty between the executive and the legislative power continually threatened. The President was a man who appeared to have more the power and the will to keep them in order than any one else. On his leaving office in 1852, they hoped for a fresh revolution: a hope which was certainly not shared by the respectable part of the people. They became, when the revision was discussed, very violent in their expressions, and by means of the clandestine press distributed incendiary placards, handbills, and pamphlets; in one of which they threatened the life of any deputy who should vote for the revision. Such was their notion of liberty of opinion. Some of their views coincided with a few of the legitimist and Orleanist factions; and this rendered the calling a Constituent Assembly impossible according to the terms of the Constitution.

The President, who appears to have been much nettled by the distrust of the conservative majority, gave vent to his displeasure at the opening of the railway at Dijon. He said, "the Assembly had supported him in all the measures of repression that had been necessary, but had failed him in beneficial measures conceived for the benefit of the people." This was too true to be agreeable, and therefore the ministers suppressed it in the Moniteur; but the Assembly heard of the rebuke rather more than if it had been published. However, the minister having declared he knew, and could recognise, nothing of the speech except what appeared in the Moniteur, the Assembly declared itself satisfied, and passed to the order of the day: but although nothing resulted directly from this speech, it contributed to widen the breach, and render accommodation more difficult.

It was argued by M. de Tocqueville, who had been charged to draw up the report of the committee appointed to consider in what form the question should be submitted to the Chamber,—that, necessary as was the re-

vision of the Constitution to the peace of the country, yet that, should it happen to be impossible to comply with the prescribed terms of the 110th article of the Constitution, the only course was to undergo all the risks that might ensue; for that the only legality for the moment was the Constitution as it was, and everything beyond was revolution and anarchy: he forgot the maxim, "Salus populi suprema lex," and that the majority of a Chamber elected by universal suffrage had just as good a right to repeal the Constitution as another Chamber elected by the same means had to enact it; and a much better right than the previous Chamber had to attempt to make it irrevocable.

The struggle began on the 14th of July. The faction of the Orleanist party, who had an idea of putting the Prince Joinville forward as a candidate for the Presidency, and a faction of the legitimists, who disliked the continuance of the Presidency—and who, not being able to put forward the Count de Chambord, whom they regarded as legally king, for the office of President, had thought of General Changarnier in the meantime—joined the republicans, and thus rendered the legal majority of three-fourths impossible. The debate was concluded by M. Odillon-Barrot, who, after a speech in which he exposed the vices of the Constitution, asked, "If, when a whole country had recognised them, the Assembly were to be held in check because it might happen that the actual President might be re-elected? There were some," he said, "who asked for the revision on personal grounds, in the interest of one man against another; he asked it in the interest of the country, that it might from new institutions win all that was obtainable of security and grandeur." The revision, which was carried by a large majority, was not carried by a sufficient majority to make the calling of the Constituent Assembly legal according to the 110th article: the numbers were 446 against 278. It is possible that, had the Chamber

followed the desires of the majority in France, Louis Napoleon would have been now President, not Emperor.

The radicals, socialists, and republicans were intent only on celebrating the victory which their minority in the Chamber had gained over the majority in the country. Encouraged by it, they preached pretty openly a new revolution in 1852, declaring that they should vote with arms in their hands. The provincial councils, struck by the dangers which thus menaced society, almost unanimously petitioned for the revision of the Constitution during the recess; which lasted from the 10th of August till the 4th of November.

Since the new law of domicile in connexion with the franchise, the elections had run almost invariably in favour of the conservatives. The President had not originated this law, and had only acquiesced in it. It appeared that, weary of the everlasting jealousies of the royalist and conservative factions, he had wished to try what could be done with their opponents. He felt, doubtless, that his own strength mainly lay in the masses, little disturbed by political storms. The law had also disfranchised in the western and southern provinces a multitude of royalist peasants: the President declared that it had excluded many more than was intended. When this was communicated to the ministry they retired. He then constructed a cabinet, without regard to the conservative majority, of men personally devoted to himself; three only of whom were members of the Assembly; and M. de Casabianca, minister of commerce. M. Giraud became minister of public instruction, and General St Arnaud minister of war; the department of foreign affairs was given to M. Turgot, and of the interior to M. Therigny.

The first symptom of the hostility of the new ministry to the conservative majority was a circular of General St

Arnaud's to the officers of the army, inculcating the duty of obedience to orders, and the removal, by his command, from all the barracks where it had been posted, of the decree giving the Assembly the right to require military force for its own safeguard. But this was thrown into the shade by the message of the President to the Assembly on its meeting. He said in effect that the question of the revision of the Constitution still remained; that a distinct act of national sovereignty was required to recast that which was itself an emanation from that basis; that the principle of universal suffrage, on which it had been founded, had been taken away by the laws of May, which had excluded three millions of votes; that he had never ceased to believe that this law required revision, as this immense exclusion had served as a pretext for the anarchists; that, unable to gain the helm of society legally, they hoped to throw the country into confusion during the general emotion and the paralyzation of powers; independently of which the restriction of the suffrage by three million votes, when the election of the President arrived, would cause another difficulty. Originally, with ten million of electors, it had been agreed that at least two million votes should be necessary to make the election valid; now that the number of electors was reduced to seven millions, that which had been a fifth came to be near a third of the entire voters on the list: this was to make a positive change in the eligibility of the President. Again, it had been objected, when the revision of the Constitution was in question, that the Constitution had been the work of an Assembly arising from universal suffrage, and that it ought not to be revised by an Assembly issuing from restricted suffrage; that whether this was a real reason or a pretext, all pretexts should be removed: the law of May had its imperfections, but if it were perfect, it ought not to stand in the way of the revision, which was the manifest desire of the country. It

was objected to him, that he was personally interested. His conduct during three years was an answer: the good of the country would alone still be his object, and he thought it his duty to propose all the means of conciliation, and to use all his efforts to bring about a pacific, legal, and regular solution of the difficulty. To re-establish universal suffrage would take from civil war its flag, and permit France to give itself institutions which would assure its repose.

This message was received by the greater part with palpable marks of displeasure, and was immediately followed by the proposal of a law for the re-establishment of universal suffrage after a six months' domicile. The republican party was much divided: their own principles required them to accept this boon at the hands of an executive they distrusted; and the conservatives were not more united. Thus the manœuvre of the President succeeded in breaking up the two parliamentary parties; both of which he had found equally unmanageable.

The consequences of this policy were soon apparent; for the Assembly, getting anxious about its own protection, desired to claim, under the 32d article of the Constitution, the command of troops and the appointment of the officers commanding them: a right which General St Arnaud, the new minister of war, seemed inclined to question. But the republicans declared they did not wish to arm the law against universal suffrage, and consequently voted with the government against the conservatives and royalists; the vote thus came to be rejected by a majority of 408 to 300: a result which struck the Assembly with consternation. They endeavoured, but failed, to repair the mischief, by a proposition with respect to the responsibility of the President and the executive. In the meantime the President, who had gained greatly with the army since the defeat of the conservatives in the Assembly, had addressed them in

one of his short pithy speeches;* he concluded by saying, that he was sure that they would not fail him, because they knew that he would ask nothing of them but what was in accordance with his right, with military honour and the interests of the country; because he had placed at their head men in whom he had entire confidence, and who deserved theirs; and because, if the hour of danger arrived, he should not do as the preceding governments had done, say to them, "March, and I will follow;" but he would say to them, "I march, follow me." No wonder that a *coup d'état* was looked for; everything was at a stand, and there did not seem any other way out of the difficulty.

There existed, or were supposed, two vast conspiracies against the authority of the executive: the one on the part of the rabble, the other on the part of the conservative majority in the Chamber. It is said that by virtue of the abominable system of spies, which is usual if not universal on the continent of Europe, the executive was perfectly aware of what was going on. The threads of the anarchical conspiracy were held by the chiefs of the clubs and the secret societies. It was their intention to subject France, or at any rate the capital, to pillage and conflagration in the following year, when the opportunity occurred from the probable excitement during the election of a new President; which scheme for the bettering of their country they were to be ready in the meantime to put in practice, should opportunity sooner occur. On the other hand, there is said to have existed, on the part of the ancient monarchical parties (who were about this time talking of a fusion of their differences) and the conservative republicans, a plot to overthrow the executive power, to

* These showed indubitable talent; and were by some veracious newspapers in this country declared to be put in the *Moniteur* and never spoken at all; while some said they were written for the speaker.

seize on the reins of government, and to place the Legislative Assembly in the position of a dictator,—a scheme as contrary to the Constitution as the former. The names of the conspirators and the particulars were published in the *Constitutionnelle* of the 24th November: the facts do not appear to have been repudiated by the persons who were so noticed, nor do subsequent events appear to render such a plot improbable. The President, on the other hand, elected by nearly six million votes, eminently represented the opinions and wishes of the entire French people, with the above exceptions. Under such circumstances what could he do? If the Assembly obtained the dictatorship, they would do so in manifest opposition to the opinions and wishes of the people; if the anarchists pillaged Paris and ravaged France, was that likely to forward the civilisation of Europe and the freedom of man?

On the other hand, he had sworn to maintain the democratic republic, and to fulfil the duties imposed on him by the constitution: any attempt to prorogue the Assembly was visited with the pains of high treason. But what did the oath really mean? What is a "democratic republic?" What a republic is we all know: it is another word for a state. All states are republic, properly so called. Some states are kingdoms, some are empires; some are neither one nor the other, and for the lack of any other term, they have been called, indifferently, republics or states.* The word "democratic," as a qualification of republic, signifies that the people are to be governed as they like, and not as any body else likes. Now, the meaning of the oath to remain faithful to the democratic republic, if it meant anything at all, was to remain faithful to the state in which the people had their own way. To suppose that

* As, for example, "The Roman Republic," to which the name was originally applied, and "The United States of America."

the President meant to swear, or the Assembly to impose, fidelity to the state in which the rabble was uppermost, is sheer nonsense. The question then was, how could this oath be kept if the Assembly and the anarchists were allowed to bring their plots to maturity? If they were to be permitted to assume the dictatorship, the people of France would cease to have their own way at all, but would be at the disposal of a self-elected oligarchy. By how much less would they have their own way if they were the victims of a state of anarchy? Consequently, to remain faithful to the "democratic republic," and at the same time to fulfil the duties imposed on him by the Constitution, had, by the conduct of the different factions, become incompatible. He must violate, or allow to be violated one condition or the other: of two evils, the least should always be chosen. It was wiser to break the letter of the Constitution for the benefit of the people, and in accordance with their almost unanimous wish, than it would be from devotion to its letter to permit others to overturn it, and to trample at the same time on the "democratic republic"—that is, to prevent the inhabitants or people of the country from having their own way in its government. It seems, then, that in breaking the letter of the law the President would keep the spirit of his oath.

General St Arnaud, who had lately distinguished himself in an expedition in Algiers, M. de Morny, and M. Maupas, the prefect of police, were the only persons to whom the President confided his intentions: and they, together with him, during a fortnight, prepared the *coup d'état* which was effected on the 2d of December. So secretly were their preparations made, and with such admirable foresight were the details arranged, that not even the agents themselves who were to be employed had the remotest suspicion of the impending blow till the arrival of the very hour of action. The consequence was that

all the arrests were made without difficulty or serious resistance.

On the evening of Monday the 1st of December, according to weekly custom, the President received the head functionaries and other distinguished persons at the Elysée National: many were present who were arrested before morning.* The persons to be arrested were eighteen members of the Assembly, and sixty of the leaders of the socialists and clubs. All these had been for a fortnight previously watched by the police, on one pretext or another; but the police themselves were altogether ignorant of the real object. The arrests were intended to take place as nearly simultaneously as possible: a quarter-past six was to be the hour. For this purpose the agents of the police were summoned at half-past three; by half-past four they had all reached the prefecture. The leaders of each party, one by one, received instructions from the prefect; and then for the first time was the fact of the *coup d'état* communicated to any one. Each had been selected according to his capabilities for the work he had to do. A number of carriages had been prepared beforehand, and were stationed near the prefecture in groups. It was intended that the arrests should precede by a quarter of an hour the arrival of the troops; and such was the punctuality and the efficiency of the officers, that the whole of the arrests had been effected, and the prisoners sent in carriages to prison, in the course of twenty minutes from five minutes past six, when the first door was knocked at.†

* Indeed it was said that the President himself provided for the security of some by walking them separately into private cabinets and locking them in. If it were so, they were the only persons who had any previous warning of the *coup d'état* which was to happen on the next day.

† The only serious obstacle the police seem to have encountered was the sleepiness of the porters, and their dislike of being disturbed at unreasonable hours, which produced some unwillingness to open the doors; but as soon as it became clear that the persons outside would continue knocking till they were

By daylight all the principal points of the town in the neighbourhood of the Assembly and the bridges were occupied by troops, and a decree — which had been printed during the night while the office was surrounded by troops, so that no one could let out the secret of what it contained till it came properly before the world—was posted. The decree ran in the name of the French people. "The President of the Republic decrees, 1. That the National Assembly is dissolved; 2. Universal suffrage is re-established, and the law of the 31st of May is repealed; 3. The French people are convoked in their comitia on the 21st of the month; 4. The state of siege is proclaimed in the first military division; 5. The Council of State is dissolved; 6. The minister of the interior is charged with the execution of the present decree. Dated at the Elysée, December 2, 1851. Signed, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte. Countersigned, Morny, minister of the interior."

An address to the French people was placarded, in which, after explaining the difficulties of his position, the President proposed to them a sketch of a new Constitution —a responsible head for ten years—ministers dependent on the executive alone—a council of state formed of the most distinguished men, to prepare laws and to explain them to the legislative body—a legislative body voting the laws named by universal suffrage, "*sans scrutin de liste qui fausse l'élection*"—a second Assembly formed of all the illustrious persons in the country, as a balancing power, and a guardian of the fundamental principles and the public liberties. Such had been the system created by the

let in, the porter, out of regard to his own rest and the cold, opened the door, and turned over again while they walked upstairs to make the arrest. The conspirators were all found either in bed or just disturbed: M. Thiers very sleepy, in a cotton nightcap and rubbing his eyes. Generals Changarnier, Cavaignac, Lamoricière, Bedeau, and Leflo were arrested without much difficulty. Some of them endeavoured to put their heads out of the windows of their respective cabs and harangue the soldiers, but the police prevented them.

first Consul, which had already given France rest and prosperity, and would guarantee it again. Such was his conviction. If, however, he did not obtain a majority of their suffrages, he would convoke anew the National Assembly, and return to them the power with which he had been intrusted. At the same time he addressed the soldiers, telling them that though they were bound to obey the executive implicitly, as soldiers, yet he hoped they would vote freely as citizens.

These events took Paris altogether unawares; but neither the socialist nor the parliamentary conspirators were to be put down without a struggle. The leaders of both parties were in prison, but there were many other persons of considerable obscurity, who were quite sufficient to make a serious resistance. By ten o'clock some forty or fifty deputies managed to make their way by a side door into the Chamber, and sent for M. Dupin to preside; but he arrived only in time to meet an officer who was charged to expel them. M. Dupin said that they had right on their side, but they were not the stronger party; so, recommending them to retire, he had the honour of wishing them a very good morning. He was an excellent lawyer, an intrepid advocate, and had been a sort of perpetual president of assemblies; but he was an indifferent politician, and a maker of jokes. Another meeting, under the presidence of M. Cremieux, was dispersed; and some who had made the attempt, headed by a M. Daru, to get into the Chamber, retired to his house, but were pursued and not allowed to stay there; then they adjourned to the Mairie of the tenth Arondissement, where they expected to find more sympathy than elsewhere. They next proceeded to vote the President guilty of high treason, because of his preventing the meeting of the Assembly. The members of the High Court of Justice were, on pain of forfeiture, summoned without delay to proceed to judgment against the President and his accomplices. The deputies there

assembled required the services of the tenth legion of national guards to protect them, and were proceeding to vote that the arrested deputies should be set at liberty, when they were interrupted by the arrival of the police. They voted that the army was charged to watch over the safety of the Assembly, and General Magnan was ordered, under pain of forfeiture, to put his troops at their disposition. They then appointed General Oudinot to the command; but, after some further parley, the room was cleared, and several of the most obstreperous, including General Oudinot, were arrested, and the Mairie was occupied by the troops, so that no further meeting could take place there.

The number of representatives arrested altogether amounted to 217. Guards were, with the consent of the Archbishop of Paris, placed in the belfries of the churches or in the towers, to prevent the tocsin being sounded. The High Court of Justice, which had met, were proceeding to pass judgment of forfeiture against the President as guilty of high treason; but their judgment was not signed before it was reversed in error by a court of extempore jurisdiction, for a battalion of municipal guards entered the court and showed orders to arrest the judges if they did not immediately disperse. They preferred the latter alternative, leaving behind them their papers, among which was the decree against the President. There is no doubt that in point of law, which is all that judges have to consider, they were perfectly in the right.

In the first instance, the *coup d'état* produced more surprise than anger; but a decree, which was dated on the 2d and appeared on the 3d of December, was used as a means of exciting disturbances. The French people was convoked in its comitia to accept or reject the following plebiscitum: "The French people desire the maintenance of the authority of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, and dele-

gate to him the powers necessary to establish a Constitution on the basis proposed in his proclamation of the 2d December." What gave uneasiness to some and a handle to others, was, that the mayors were to open lists for the objectors and acceptors of the vote, on which the people were to inscribe their names, or get them inscribed if they could not write. The army of Paris, indeed, in great enthusiasm went at once to the vote; but the socialists determined on resistance and an appeal to arms. In this they appear somewhat inconsistently to have been supported by the conservative factions of the Assembly. The forces at hand were overwhelming, and there was no doubt either of their obedience or of the determination to act decisively. Towards evening, on the 3d, a few barricades were thrown up in the faubourg St Antoine and elsewhere; but they were carried with little loss. During the day the greater part of the troops were in their barracks; and not half of those who were out were actually employed. It was the policy of the insurgents to weary out the troops by a long desultory combat; hence it was the policy of the generals to keep them fresh by giving them rest in turn. The consequence was, that the insurgents were first weary: the fight lasted some days, and the troops were relieved, but the insurgents were not. The severest conflict was on the 4th. Preparations had been made during the night, and numerous barricades were thrown up at the Porte St Martin and the streets of St Martin, St Denis, Petit Carreau Rambuteau, and the Faubourg St Martin.

In consequence of the slight defence made at the barricades on the previous day, the commander-in-chief formed the opinion that it was the intention of the insurgents, by shifting their ground and prolonging a desultory conflict, to weary the troops; he therefore allowed the insurrection time to get to a head, so that he might be able to

crush it. It was two o'clock before he began the attack, and with such vigour was it conducted, that by six o'clock the insurgents were defeated and the battle ended. The troops bivouacked in the positions they had won. They were voluntarily supplied by the inhabitants with wine, coffee and other refreshments, and the houses were illuminated. The cause that won was either popular or became so on winning. An isolated attempt to resist was made, however, as late as nine o'clock in the Rue Montorgueil. There were on the part of the troops 25 killed and 184 wounded; on the part of the insurgents it is difficult to ascertain the numbers slain. It happened, as it always does, that many innocent persons shared the fate of the guilty; for guilty they were: however illegal the act of the President,—an insurrection was certainly not the remedy. Even if they had been in a majority, they had full liberty to express their opinions by vote; and there is no good reason to believe that their votes would not have been acquiesced in.*

During the night a few attempts were made to erect barricades, but these were not defended, and were immediately demolished. Paris was traversed in all directions by the troops, who were everywhere in undisputed possession of the town. The insurgents, however, flying from Paris, made a last stand at the Chapelle St Denis, where a few were slain, and thirty-three prisoners taken. The troops in part again bivouacked in the streets, and on the following day Paris resumed its ordinary ap-

* The work which proceeds from M. Victor Hugo, entitled "Napoleon the Little," which is meant for a very virulent attack on the President, is, in fact, the best defence of his conduct. It appears to be intended as an account of this insurrection; but as the facts are questionable, and the book is evidently the worst that he could say—and as that worst is indefinite, and contains no plain charges of any sort or kind, and its party insinuations are wholly unsupported by evidence—it seems altogether unworthy of credit.

pearance. Indeed, the revolt was made through mere recklessness: it had no reasonable hopes of success from the beginning; it was only the explosion of impotent anger on the part of those who knew they were in a minority, and it really strengthened the person against whom it was made.

However, the President, or as he may now be called, the dictator, resolved to remove all stumbling-blocks, and decreed that the vote should be taken by ballot—a custom which had grown in favour with the French.* On the 6th, Paris had become tranquil, and the public funds rose four per cent. When the bodies of the defenders of the barricades came to be carried away for burial, a considerable number appeared to belong to the wealthier classes: in short, they consisted chiefly of two classes; thieves, and fashionable young men called "yellow gloves." It was a curious alliance: extremes meet; but who would have expected to have found royalists and socialists fighting side by side on the same barricade? The working population of Paris, who had been readmitted to the franchise by the decree of the President, took no part in the affray.

In the provinces events ran nearly the same course as in Paris. With the greater part the *coup d'état* was popular, as it appeared to secure a powerful and regular government for the wealthy, and restore the franchise to the poor; but in some, where the secret societies had a hold, especially in

* The advantages and disadvantages of the ballot are a rather more nearly balanced question than rabid politicians are apt to imagine. It cannot cure corruption: property, if denied its legitimate influence, will gain it illegitimately; but it will make it less visible, and perhaps less scandalous: which may be an advantage or not. It may prevent intimidation, but at the cost of honesty; for a man might easily be intimidated to promise, and none but the dishonest would break their word. It would be a curious experiment to try it in some of our boroughs, or in priest-ridden Ireland. At any rate, the ballot would prevent public scandal; for with such a system it would be difficult to make out a charge of corruption.

the large towns, insurrections broke out, which were for the most part easily suppressed. The entire department of the Lower Alps, however, was subjected to revolt, and delivered over to insurrection, massacre, and pillage. These unsuccessful outbreaks strengthened materially the hands of the government; for people said if the anarchists taken unawares can rebel in so many provinces, in what a case would France be if they had been combined and prepared for the event, as they intended to be in 1852.

At the same time the state of siege had been declared, and the too violent political newspapers were suppressed, —a course which naturally incensed the whole tribe of literary men, because it took the bread out of their mouths.

The President had decreed the establishment of a consultative commission to supply the place of the Assembly and the Council of State for the time. As the *coup d'état* had remained a secret till the last moment, the names of many persons appeared without their consent having been previously obtained—a course stigmatized as dishonest on the one side, as pretending to have the support of those who were opposed to him; while on the other it might well be that they were really nominated from the moderate men of all parties for the legitimate purpose of a provisional council; and as those named might have certainly accepted instead of repudiating the office, it is clear that the President might have found many persons there who could have made themselves inconvenient if they chose. The fraud, if fraud was intended, must have been discovered in the course of a week, so that it was without any reasonable motive; and despite the prejudiced and virulent attacks of the public press, Louis Napoleon is not a man who generally commits himself without.

The vote of the 20th and 21st December was, 7,439,216 in his favour, 640,736 against, and 36,000 votes were

declared null. Probably a more unanimous approval of political conduct was never given to any man by a nation. M. de Montalembert and the popish party gave him their support; separating themselves from the legitimists, with whom they were usually allied.

The result of the vote was officially announced to the President by M. Baroche, the vice-president of the consultative commission, on the last day of the year: he, in fact, became dictator or absolute monarch from that day. The President in his reply, said that "He understood the grandeur of his new mission, and did not deceive himself on its grave difficulties; but with the heart right, with the concurrence of all men of worth—who, as well as the commission, would enlighten him with their knowledge, and support him by their patriotism; with the well-tried devotion of the brave army; and, in conclusion, with that protection which to-morrow he should solemnly beseech Heaven to continue, he hoped to render himself worthy of the confidence which the people continued to put in him. He hoped to assure the destinies of France by founding institutions which should answer at once to the democratic instincts of the nation, and the desire universally expressed to have a power strong and respected. In short, to satisfy the wants of the moment by creating a system which reconstituted authority without hurting equality, and which, without shutting out any road to improvement, was the only means to lay the foundations of an edifice capable of supporting a wise and beneficial liberty for the future."

The enthusiasm of the mayors of the capitals of the different departments, who had been summoned to Paris for the inauguration of the new regime, formed a striking contrast to the coldness of the upper ranks in Paris. The symbols of the empire—the eagles on the flags and on the cross of the legion of honour—and the President's removal to the Tuileries, were adopted amid general applause

and congratulations. The President declared plainly that English and American constitutions had been tried and failed because they were not fitted to the French people, or to the administrative forms to which they were accustomed; that he should be guided in what he established by Consular and Imperial precedents, which were both national, and had been found more suited to them than any others, and constituted the only system that could put an end to the agitations of the country. This system is called the representative, as contradistinguished from the parliamentary system: a phrase which appears to be without any meaning.

His Legislative Assembly was to consist of 261 members, who had the right of voting taxes, but could originate nothing, nor move amendments; and if they refused taxes, it was not clear how they were to prevent their collection. They were to vote laws; but the debates were not to be published except officially, under the superintendence of the President. Hence, as they were only to vote on laws submitted to them by the government, and as no amendments could be made without government authority; and as the speeches were not published unless the government pleased, their right came to be a simple veto: which, if given, it would have been very difficult to carry into effect. The whole of the other authorities in the state originated with the President; the Senate and the Council of State were named by him for life, and were irremovable. The function of the former was to be the depositary of the Constitution, and to make, in conjunction with the government, such alterations as were not fundamental. That of the latter was to prepare projects of laws: or, as we should say, bills for the Legislative Assembly; but upon all fundamental changes an appeal was to be made to the people itself.

This, in fact, left the whole power of the state in the

hands of the President. He might just as well have been called emperor at first, but for the name of the thing.

The greater part of the deputies who had been arrested were set free a few days later; but some of them, it is said, who feared the explosion that was expected, preferred to remain in custody to be out of harm's way. A decree had appeared, denouncing the penalty of transportation against the persons who had been engaged in the conspiracies against the President, and in the insurrection. A considerable number were transported to Cayenne. Sixty-six members of the extreme left were expelled from France and the colonies, and eighteen were ordered to withdraw for a time: among them, MM. Changarnier and Thiers. But a decree, which produced considerable excitement among the upper classes, and which appears to have been wholly unjustifiable, was the confiscation of a considerable part of the property of the Orleans princes, and an order to sell off the rest. Of course, it might be necessary to the quiet of the country that their connexion with it should cease, therefore to order them to sell their property was not perhaps a stretch of authority. Their position was their misfortune more than their fault; and, in providing for the public good, private interests should have been as little as possible interfered with. Indeed, if the government had even offered to take the property at a fair valuation, they would have no way exceeded their duty; but the confiscation was upon a wholly insufficient plea.

The conduct of the Orleans princes had, since the revolution of 1848, not been such as to give any colour to harsh treatment.*

* There had been a law passed in 1814, that the property of any prince who might come to the French throne should fall into and merge in the property of the nation, and be inseparable from it; but many of the highest legal authorities in France were of opinion that the law was not applicable.

The elections of 29th February were pretty generally favourable to the government candidates. In the mean time, the President was occupied with domestic reforms: the national guard was remodelled, the officers were nominated by him, and the men who were thought doubtful were drafted out. The press was placed under a very severe discipline; and the eccentricity of some of the professors of the Collége de France, who were accused of teaching the youth insubordination, was curbed by a decree. But the most generally important question which came before the President was that of the centralization, which by bringing everything together in Paris was a great hardship on the provinces, for it had complicated the simplest cases, increased expenses, and in other respects produced unsatisfactory results.

On this ground, without weakening the central authority, the President directed the prefects still to communicate with the ministers when they had to decide on matters of general interest; but in matters belonging to their district alone, they were to decide without any reference, thus making the administration more local; this was not

The property had, after the Revolution of 1830, on the 7th of August, been made over by Louis Philippe to the princes. But first he did not succeed in the ordinary course of law, nor was he ever really King of France; these were not the circumstances at which the law was aimed—its scope was different. That a man who was virtually elected to fill the most important office in a state should, by complying with the election, forfeit the whole of his property, was manifestly so contrary to equity, that, on that ground, it could not be justified. If Henry V. had come to the throne, he might have well held the property forfeited by treason to the elder branch of the Bourbons; but this reason did not lie in the mouth of a Bonaparte: in short, the confiscation seems unnecessary, unjust, and of very doubtful legality. And so much was this felt to be the case, that M. de Morny and M. Dupin the procureur-general at once resigned; the executors of the will of Louis Philippe, who was in the mean time dead, protested; eminent lawyers offered their assistance to try the case at law. It is much to be regretted, that Louis Napoleon, who has, in other respects, shown himself so able a statesman, should, by feelings of personal pique and private animosity, in this instance, have been betrayed into conduct inconsistent with his character, and which sooner or later he will regret.

adopting the real principle of decentralization (which is to let people manage their own local affairs), it was only providing that the representative of the central power, who was at hand, and best acquainted with the locality and the circumstances, should decide in such matters.*

Of the financial measures during the dictatorship, the two most important were the reduction of the interest on the five per cents., which were constantly above par, to four and a half; and the establishment of banks, for the purpose of lending money, on landed security, at a reasonable rate of interest. For, owing to the forced division of the landed property on the death of the holder, the land is held in very small lots: when these lots get too small to be subdivided, one of the children usually borrows money to purchase the paternal estate, and to pay his brothers' and sisters' shares; this he has to borrow on the security of the land: as it is but a small sum, he has to pay very heavily for it, often as much as eight per cent. This renders it impossible for the industrious peasant whose little estate is so burdened, to obtain more than the barest pittance, and thus the measure in question was calculated to be of the greatest possible relief to one of the most valuable classes in the state. Nor were the interests of France alone considered, for numerous decrees were issued affecting the colonial interests. Between the 2d of December and the 29th of March, on which day the senate and

* Still this partial decentralization was a step in the right direction. Even in England, a suspicion springing out of late events seems to be rising that the tapism of a metropolitan bureau cannot advantageously exercise all the complex functions of a great government. Fortunately in England, however, its local affairs are carried on by local authorities;—either the municipalities of its boroughs, or the magistracy at quarter-sessions. Now, though the magistrates, both of the country and of the towns, are appointed by the executive, yet from their social position and number, the magistrates are practically independent in the execution of their office. Perhaps some similar system might be beneficially introduced into France; unless indeed the infinite subdivision of landed property should constitute a difficulty.

legislative body were assembled, the President had rearranged nearly the whole internal system of the state on the model of the consulate and the empire; and in so doing he did wisely, for it was to the remembrance of the consulate and the empire that he owed his election. On the 29th of March, he opened the sitting of the chambers at the Tuileries by a speech, recounting the circumstances of the dictatorship, and the causes which had led him to adopt that course: and said, that if at that period, as might be supposed, he had desired to establish the empire, there was no doubt he might have done so, for the seven millions of votes were given him as its representative; but that he was content with the title he had. Nevertheless, few doubted that sooner or later, despite this "*nolo episcopari*," the empire would be established.

The session of three months of the Legislative Assembly was not marked by any remarkable events—the only difference of opinion of any consequence arose on the budget, which the reporters of the commission appointed to examine it, considered to show too great a deficit; and they proposed various reductions and amendments, which the government rejected, intimating that the function of the Assembly was to vote or reject what was put before them, and not to move amendments. Upon a division the budget was carried by a large majority, and the session ended in June, with a message from the President. The main part of their labours had been directed to practical legislation, and the President promised that, during the recess, other similar measures should be prepared for their consideration. He announced to them that the eagle—the imperial emblem—was about to be restored to the standards, a ceremony which took place in the Champ de Mars on the 10th of May, for which great preparations had been made. A chapel had been erected for

an altar, from which the archbishop was to bless them, and to celebrate a military mass for the assembled troops. The ceremony began by a speech from the President appropriate to the occasion. He was warmly greeted with cries of "Vive Napoléon,"—"Vive l'Empereur." But it was not his wish to receive the purple from the shouts of the Gallic legions in the Campus Martius, when it was about to be bestowed by the united desire of a whole people.

The *régime* established by the events of the 2d of December was more popular in the country than in the capital. The Parisians were practically interfered with in their newspapers—the shopkeepers had lost that which had long been considered their private property—the command of the State; and the upper classes were mostly Orleanist or Legitimist. Hence it was to the country districts more than to the towns that Louis Napoleon looked for support; and it was from the country districts that the cry arose which lifted him to the throne. His journey to Strasbourg, for the opening of the railway from Paris, was a continued triumph, and shouts of welcome greeted him—though the cry of "Vive l'Empereur" was as yet but rare. On his return he distributed to the reconstituted National Guard, then assembled for the first time, their eagles; and his reception, though not enthusiastic, had no appearance of opposition.

It was in September, on the journey to the south of France, that the first great cry for the empire was heard. At Lyons, where an equestrian statue of the first Napoleon was inaugurated, and the working-people of that great manufacturing capital saluted him as Cæsar, and desired the immediate restoration of the empire—and in the course of a speech he delivered on the occasion, he said that, if the modest title of President could facilitate the mission confided to him, it was not he who, from per-

sonal interest, would desire to change it to that of Emperor.

The initiative thus offered to the people was at once accepted. It was equivalent to saying that, if they wished him to be emperor, he had no objection; but if they wished him to continue president, he had no intention of making himself emperor; and as, in the one position, he had all the real power of the other, the change was, after all, little more than a matter of imagination. However, the people did wish for the empire, and wherever he went, through all the cities of the south, he was rapturously received, and addresses poured in from all sides for its re-establishment. Abd el Kader, who had been confined, to the disgrace of the former governments of France, against their promises, and whom the President set free, expressed his wish to be allowed to place his vote in the ballot-box for the new form of government. At Bordeaux Napoleon spoke of the universal desire shown by the country; and though Paris had not originated the movement, he was welcomed, on his return, with triumphal arches and cheers. It may be said that much of this enthusiasm was forced. But the great fact remains, that he who left London "a melancholy adventurer in a common cab," was, by the French people, elected president, dictator, and emperor, on each occasion by increasing majorities. The inference fairly to be drawn is, that his policy and conduct are, on the whole, those of which the French people approve. The restoration of the empire was now no longer doubtful. A decree, in the *Moniteur* on the 10th of October, convoked the senate to an extraordinary meeting on the 4th of November. The question was that day laid before them by a message from the President. A committee of the senate were directed to report on it. The report was drawn up by M. Troplong, who thought it necessary to argue the question of mon-

archy against democracy, and reported that his title was to be Napoleon the Third—a title to which, it was thought, history would make a difficulty, for Europe had never recognised the second of the name, whose reign appears somewhat mythical. England, particularly, had never even recognised the first Napoleon. It was arranged that the question should be proposed to the nation for universal suffrage. The people was convoked on the 21st and 22d of November, and the legislative body was convoked to verify the votes on the 25th. Of the 8,157,752 persons who voted, only 254,501 voted against the proposition. Never had greater unanimity been displayed. The result of the vote was officially declared to him on the 1st of December, and the following day, the anniversary of the *coup d'état*, Napoleon the Third was proclaimed, by the grace of God and the national will, Emperor of the French—so ran the title—before the National Guard and army of Paris. The diplomatic difficulty, as to the recognition by the other states of Europe, passed off, and the recognition was made cordially by some—sulkily by others.

The letter of the Czar, on the occasion, omitted the usual form of "Monsieur mon Frère;" but it does not appear that the omission has done Louis Napoleon any harm. After all, the difficulty might have been wholly avoided by assuming the title of Charles Louis Napoleon the First; or, Louis the First, Emperor of the French; for, after all, he had a full right to stand on his own ground, and not to come in merely under the shadow of the first emperor. The imperial dignity was made hereditary in the male line of the Bonapartes. The public had been busy about the emperor's marriage ever since it was known he would become emperor, and the Princess Carola Vasa was talked of; and, indeed, some negotiations were, it is said, entered into, and very nearly concluded; but the lady was

not eventually to be won. He very shortly after, January 30, 1853, married Eugenia di Montijo Contesse de Theba, a Spaniard of the House of Guzman—the noblest blood of Spain by the father's side, and of the Scotch family of Kirkpatrick by the mother's—a lady who had, for some time, been conspicuous for her beauty in the society of London and Paris. The dagger of Kirkpatrick has long supported the Scottish crown. It is a curious fortune that should have introduced it into the imperial blazonry of France. "I mak sicker," is a motto that we may hope is prophetic.

THE

EUROPEAN REVOLUTIONS OF 1848.

ITALY.

Altera jam teritur bellis civilibus ætas,
  Suis et ipsa Roma viribus ruit.
Quam neque finitimi valuerunt perdere Marsi,
  Minacis aut Etrusca Porsenæ manus,
Æmula nec virtus Capuæ, nec Spartacus acer,
  Novisque rebus infidelis Allobrox;
Nec fera cærulea domuit Germania pube,
  Parentibusque abominatus Hannibal:
Impia perdemus devoti sanguinis ætas;
  Ferisque rursus occupabitur solum.
HORACE, lib. v. c. 10.

Non his juventus orta parentibus
Infecit æquor sanguine Punico,
  Pyrrhumque et ingentem cecidit
    Antiochum, Hannibalemque dirum:
Sed rusticorum mascula militum
Proles, Sabellis docta ligonibus
  Versare glebas.
IBID. lib. iii. c. 6.

CHAPTER I.

SKETCH OF ITALIAN POLITICS FROM THE PEACE TO THE ELECTION OF PIUS THE NINTH.

THE spirit of freedom and nationality which had been roused in Italy, as elsewhere, by the European sovereigns, in order to accomplish the overthrow of Napoleon, was in Italy as elsewhere doomed to disappointment. Lombardy and Venice fell to the share of Austria, without

being given any choice in the matter. Her influence was paramount in Parma and Modena, and great in Tuscany. In the north of Italy Piedmont alone was in a position of independence and in consequence of covert hostility. The states of the Church, again, fell under clerical misgovernment, and Naples and Sicily under a Bourbon sovereign whose sway was absolute. Of these states Piedmont alone was governed by a prince of Italian race. Not a vestige of freedom remained on the peninsula or islands. Sicily, occupied by the British at the end of the war, had been accustomed to the representative institutions which they had remodelled; but on the union with Naples these were suppressed. Hence in that island the ardent desire of a repeal of the union of the two countries, an object to which every outbreak since that period has been aimed.

Austrian influence was great at Naples, and the only remonstrance made to her sway proceeded from the Pope, who protested loudly that his territories were not restored in perfect integrity. But his spiritual thunder had not that effect on the minds of men or emperors that it was wont to have. The people of Rome, however, were very indifferent on the subject. They had been trampled on by strangers of every race for a quarter of a century, and only wished for rest. But the dominant caste "had learned nothing and forgotten nothing" during their exile. Everything was restored to its former state and structure. In spite of the Pope all that was ancient and clumsy was reinstated; there were promises of civil and criminal codes, but in fact there was nothing done. The clerical caste, like a huge blister on the state, had sucked up everything to itself: it governed the country, and administered justice (or injustice) with delays which would appear fabulous even in Chancery. Every civil office of any consequence was occupied by it; a source of perpetual ill feeling and jealousy to the laity, even if they had carried

on affairs advantageously to the public, which they did not. Justice was administered by those ignorant of the law, with shrewd suspicion of partiality, peculation, and corruption; while "cooked" accounts left the public finances in a very unsatisfactory condition.

The natural consequences of despotic government are, secret conspiracies and private combinations. Man was not created to be ruled by police; the object of language is not to conceal the thoughts; nor was the tongue formed for the purpose of deglutition alone. It is a great safety-valve. If man is allowed to talk pretty freely, the action of the brain is exhausted in that manner; if not, he joins a secret society or conspiracy, where he can at least vent his thoughts to a small set, and meet with sympathy. Now, as these secret societies are mainly joined by the imprudent and disreputable, it is a necessary consequence that their aggregate resolutions are neither distinguished by wisdom nor practicability; the schemes approved of are wild and visionary, and because the schemes can never be carried out, the members become savage, morose, and fierce; all men differing from them are traitors; to destroy them becomes a virtue. Hence political assassinations—the deepest plague-spot which can infect a state. Thus arose the secret political societies of Italy. The Carbonari, a political club, though originally intended to counteract the French influence in the Neapolitan territories, were nevertheless made use of by Murat after the fall of Napoleon to forward his scheme of establishing a great Italian kingdom, independent of foreign influence. As such was the desire of many Italians, this secret society came to include many more distinguished and respectable persons than are usually found so engaged; especially in the urban districts: their objects were free institutions and Italian nationality.

Rome, which did not favour this object, hurled at the Car-

bonari anathemas, and allowed the Austrian police to hunt down in the Papal States the authors who had written in favour of their views: thus calling in the aid of Austrian detectives to effect what anathemas had failed to accomplish. And the clergy encouraged the formation of a hostile political society. This was the society of the Sanfedists; their avowed object was to uphold the Latin church, and the authority of the court of Rome, with the temporal dominion and prerogatives of the papacy, an object not restricted to Italy. The members of the society were of the highest rank, both lay and clerical. Both the two antagonistic clubs were respectable in their origin, and not execrable in their intentions; but they deteriorated sadly in their subsequent existence, and their practice noway coincided with their professed objects. Great numbers became members of each; the one came to hold principles of a very democratic tendency, and the other those of extreme absolutism. In establishing the Sanfedist society the government made a great mistake. Instead of leading their friends, this club machinery gave their supporters a means of dragging them through the mire. Hence though the government frequently was aware of the danger and mischief of exasperating the liberals, they were forced into harsh measures by the imprudent zeal of their allies; and the club acting with violence and cruelty in the name of Christianity which it outraged, brought the Christian religion itself into disrepute. In consequence of the pressure of the Sanfedists, the Roman government was in 1817 obliged to begin the persecution of the Carbonari, whom they condemned to fines and imprisonments inflicted by secret tribunals.

In 1820 the Carbonari in the kingdom of Naples, stimulated by the example of Spain, were much excited. The officers of the army were many of them members of the society; and insurrections began by a priest and a

lieutenant, who at the head of his soldiers raised the cry, "God save the King and the Constitution;" the troops fraternized with the national guard; the insurrection spread. General Pepe put himself at the head of the troops; the king put his authority in the hands of his son, who at once agreed to accept the Spanish constitution of 1812, and this was immediately sworn to; but no one knew its provisions, and they were obliged afterwards to send for a copy of it to discover what sort of obligations the people had undertaken, and which the king and all the authorities had with every solemnity sworn to observe. The constitution in question was founded on a one-sided democracy, and it is needless to say it was not long observed. Meanwhile Sicily was in a ferment,—not only the unknown delights of an unknown constitution were craved, but the practical object of a separation from the continent. The populace got the better; the troops were massacred; frightful cruelties were committed, and the island was declared independent. But the republicans of Naples were in no mind to allow of this; they attacked the Sicilians and beat them, and they found to their cost that their change of masters was no way to their advantage; the Neapolitan rabble were quite as tyrannical, their rule as despotic, as that of any single despot, and the number of their masters was increased.

At Rome the insurrection was confined to the galley slaves, and was soon suppressed: in Piedmont it led to the withdrawal of the king, who would remain firm to his engagements to his brother sovereigns, and the proclamation of a regency (under the heir-presumptive of the throne who had been at the head of the popular party, and the Spanish constitution,)—and the people shouted without knowing any more of the constitution than their brethren in Naples had done. But the so-called liberty, quickly achieved, was as quickly lost. Few traces re-

mained in Italy, but Piedmont continued the best governed of the Italian states. Austria interfered, and occupied Piedmont, Naples, and the States of the Church, and was ready to put down popular outbreaks wherever they should occur. Their arrival was welcomed by the Sanfedists with festivities, and celebrated by taunts and insults to the Carbonari, already sufficiently excited by their hatred of foreign intervention. The Austrians acted according to their lights by espionage, and severe punishments were inflicted on all who were of adverse political opinions. The papal government might if it had chosen have gained a character for moderation, which might have been of essential advantage to it. For though both the north and south of Italy had been revolutionized, their state had been comparatively free from outbreaks; but whether of their proper motion, or bullied by Austria, or coerced by the Sanfedists, they adopted a contrary course, and thus shared the hatred toward the foreigner by acting in concert with him and appearing to be his tool.

Pope Leo the Twelfth, who was elected in 1823, had a perfect aversion to all that was modern, and admiration of everything mediæval, and entered on a course of retrogression that would have won admiration even of some at Oxford. He bought off thieves and brigands by giving them pensions, while he proceeded against the political societies opposed to him by the most stringent measures, in which he was backed by the Sanfedists; he condemned numerous persons to perpetual imprisonment and minor punishments, and threatened death on summary conviction of belonging to any of the societies in opposition to him; he preached up a crusade against what were called liberal opinions. The consequence of the dangerous state of mind in which both parties were kept was, that numerous political assassinations happened on both sides: the knife has been ever, with the Italians, a favourite political argument. The

people were watched and dogged by the police, their houses entered, their affairs intermeddled with, and even those disposed to obey were worried into resistance. The government, by mixing up the informer, the priest, and the judge in one person, by aiding and abetting the Sanfedist faction, gained for itself the character of the accomplice of private assassins, and when any one was punished for murdering a Sanfedist or a supporter of the government, he was regarded in the light of a martyr, as must ever be the case where a government, forgetful of its duty, does not administer justice with impartiality. Such a government cannot be respected; it brings itself into contempt, and from the position of supreme judge and arbiter between rivals, reduces itself to the position of a mere partisan. The clerical government rendered itself in every way odious to the laity, who showed their hatred by heartily abusing all of the clergy they could with impunity, often confounding the religion they neglected with the abuses they practised.

The States of the Church were rendered the more discontented, in consequence of the milder conduct of the Tuscan government, their next neighbour, with whom they were disadvantageously compared; and when Leo died, in 1829, he left his people in a much more discontented frame of mind than when he was elected to the papal chair—parties mutually incensed against each other, the people divided against itself, and a large part of it much inclined to resist all authority. Under Pius the Eighth, who succeeded him, the policy of Rome sunk altogether under Austrian influence, and he allowed the Sanfedists to govern in his name. The year 1830, however, overthrew, in France, the throne of the elder Bourbons, and excited the democrats throughout the continent of Europe. In Italy they took to plotting secretly. It is a habit—and a very mistaken one—of that party in Italy,

to rely on French aid. French revolutionists have constantly urged them on to rebel against their rulers, but France has never assisted them, or even promised to do so, in establishing their nationality or freedom, because it is not, and never has been, the interest of France so to do. It would be fatal to French interests and influence in Italy to establish a first-rate independent power, capable of taking care of herself, beyond the Alps, and reaching up to the French frontier. French democrats, when out of power, have frequently promised help to the Italians, but they have never, when in it, been ready to carry out their promises. Pius died in November 1830.

Gregory the Sixteenth was not elected before the plots had spread in all directions, in which the two Bonapartes, sons of the ex-king of Holland, were implicated, the elder of whom falling ill died shortly after. The police having got wind of the affair, prevented the outbreak in Rome. But the Duke of Modena having arrested some conspirators, the flame broke out in the neighbouring city of Bologna—the papal troops fraternized with the people—the conflagration spread in all directions, nowhere meeting with any serious opposition. A Provisional Government was established at Bologna, together with a civic guard; and the Duke of Modena, panic-struck, retired from the scene. The president of the Provisional Government, Vicini, declared the temporal dominion of the Pope for ever at an end both *de jure* and *de facto*. The whole business was conducted in a very bloodless and peaceable manner. There was an abundance of speeches, processions, and acclamations: in fact, it looked more like a stage revolution than a reality. The papal troops, legates, and governors, gave way everywhere almost without a struggle. The revolutionists had in view the separation of the civil from the religious authority, and the placing of civil government in the hands of the laity. Meanwhile,

Rome received offers of intervention from Austria, which she accepted: not but that Austria would have interfered whether or no.

The malcontents complained of the delays in the administration of justice—of the insecurity of matters settled before the legal tribunals, in consequence of their always being ready to rejudge any matters already many times judged before—of the maladministration of the finances, and of political persecutions; but professed veneration and respect for the church and religion. The vicar of Christ was no way desirous of remedying any of their grievances, but stirred up the force of arms against them—denounced them as rebels, and confuted their opinions by Austrian bayonets. The European powers, at that time, suggested the propriety of making some reasonable reforms, and of admitting the laity to a share of the government; but Rome, unwilling to comply, made promises, but did nothing. The Austrians had scarce withdrawn, when the people, relieved from external pressure, relapsed into open discontent; but the court of Rome would not yield. The Austrians again interfered, and such had been the disorderly conduct of the Papal troops, that the Bolognese actually opened their gates to the Austrians, and welcomed them as deliverers; meanwhile the French occupied Ancona, to the great annoyance of the Pope.

He established a body of soldiery called centurions, who became, in fact, a set of licensed assassins in the profaned name of religion, at the instigation of the Sanfedist party; while the Carbonari followed the same profession in the outraged name of liberty. The Austrians rather encouraged these disorders, in order to demonstrate to Europe that the people were unfit to rule themselves, that the Pope was incapable of controlling them, and that Austrian bayonets were the sole solution of the difficulty. The French, who were fresh from the Parisian revolution, had

been welcomed by the people as their friends, but they looked on and did nothing to put a stop to these disorders, and eventually sided with the Pope. The police came to be more dreaded than banditti. They insulted whom they pleased, and pried into families. There was perfect impunity for the crimes of one faction—most odious severity against the discontent of the other. The judges were directed, in case of the trial of a liberal, invariably to inflict the highest legal punishment—an order which their own passions, and occasionally venality, induced them to comply with. The finances were mismanaged—no clear accounts were rendered—ruinous loans were contracted—ruinous leases of the public revenue were given. Trade, instruction, and industry, were neglected and discouraged, and the condition of the people, during the first years of Gregory, was wretched in the extreme—the government was incapable, and the people depraved. It is the curse of despotism that, while it renders the people discontented, it unfits them for the enjoyment of freedom.

In the year 1831, Giuseppe Mazzini, a young Genoese, had dedicated a book to Charles Albert, the new king of Piedmont, calling on him to regenerate Italy, and to expel the Austrians. But falling under the suspicion of plotting, he was obliged to take refuge in exile. Previously, it had been the habit of the exiles to keep up a correspondence with their friends in Italy, with a view to co-operate with them in any measures that might be adopted there, rather than to frame plots, and send them back to Italy, cut and dried, and ready for application. Mazzini conceived the idea of being the centre of plots himself while safe in exile, and sending them over to Italy for execution. The refugees were to be the soul of his plots. He formed a new political club, which was to have its centre out of Italy, of which he was himself to be

the head, and which was to absorb and correspond with all the liberal sects in Italy itself. To this society he gave the name of "Giovine Italia." Young Italy was a mixture of Germanism, mysticism, Romanism, and Christianity. Politically, its aspirations were to be directed to Italian unity, and a Republican government of the purest democratical form. Such a plant was well adapted for the soil prepared by Papal misgovernment and Austrian oppression. It spread rapidly, and even those not nominally enlisted in its number became infected with its opinions. It enlisted Polish and other refugees, and exacted from its members implicit obedience to its orders. It conspired with the Republicans of France, and despatched agitators and conspirators to Italy; and, in order more clearly to announce its objects, printed a journal, in which they were frankly set forth. In 1834, Mazzini considered his plans sufficiently matured to attempt the conquest of Italy. Accordingly, having collected about a thousand men, and some arms, in Switzerland, he made a swoop at Savoy with his motley troop of German, Polish, and Italian exiles. His forces, commanded by General Ramorino, who had been distinguished in the Polish rebellion of 1831, moved forward and took possession of Annecy and the Piedmontese custom-house there, and called on the people to rise, but they would not stir. They retreated on the approach of a body of horse. The affair ended in smoke, and the leaders cast the blame on each other. Ramorino was accused of embezzling the money of the society, and he and Mazzini abused each other. Little was heard of the matter in the centre of Italy, but it served to excite the governments to fresh severities. The political societies became more divided in opinion. The Republicans differed from the Constitutionalists, and their squabbles produced disrepute, divis-

ions, and feuds, among the liberal party. These were the first fruits of Young Italy.

Then followed a short lull in the plots of central Italy, but there came abundant news of them from Naples and Sicily, which were reported to be on the very point of eruption. Things were so quiet in the Papal States, that the Pope made a progress through his provinces, and the emissaries of Young Italy, who attempted to rouse his subjects, met with very trifling successes. The people of Romagna had suffered too severely, and too lately, to be again easily led into plots. However, rumours of approaching revolution in Naples grew stronger; and as Mazzini declared the day of rising fixed, and that he would assist them with experienced commanders, men of considerable credit were induced to join in the conspiracy, only on the condition that the Neapolitan rising should be successful, and that the succours should arrive. There existed, however, in Bologna, a small number of Mazzini's adherents, who were resolved, at all cost, to get up a revolution on a small scale rather than none; and pretending that they had notice of the Neapolitan movement, but really following their instructions from London and Malta, they hoped to drag with them the wavering, by bringing, on all alike, the indiscriminating suspicion of a thick-witted government. They made common cause with smugglers, assassins, and all the rogues, thieves, and rascals of every description. Still there was no news of any rising in Naples—and the certainty that there would be none—then the Papal government awoke to the fact of the existence of the conspiracy—(for with all its watchings and pryings, it is but purblind at best)—and put itself in a horrible state of alarm, and, by harsh measures, drew those who, if let alone, would have subsided into quiet, into treasonable practices. Some young men, who had got together for mutual protection, formed a guerilla

band, who, having met a company of Papal carbineers, routed them and took prisoners their captain, whom they afterwards assassinated; and subsequently, despite of the police and troops, escaped into Tuscany, whence their leader took refuge in France. One insurgent chief, at the head of a band of two hundred, very nearly took prisoners several cardinals and other ecclesiastical dignitaries, who were staying at a villa and with difficulty succeeded in escaping him. His men were, however, disbanded, and some taken, and the rest made their way across the mountains, but their leader got clear off through the middle of the police and troops, and lurked about, putting the whole government in fear, for they knew he was somewhere at hand, but could not find him. The people were police-ridden—families were spied into—and general exasperation of everybody was the unprofitable result.

Notwithstanding the habit of plotting and assassinating, which had become to the Italians a second nature, there were some few men in the country who were aware that these practices could not lead to advantageous results. Mazzini's whims and vagaries were not adopted by the respectable part even of the exiles. There were those who, on the other side, recommended moderate language, and gentle means, and counselled their countrymen not to entangle themselves in the meshes of a set of egotistical and turbulent charlatans. Of this school of politicians were Mamiani, Silvio Pellico, Gioberti, and Cæsare Balbo. Of these Gioberti had published a work on the Civil and Moral Primacy of the Italians, and Balbo one on the Hope of Italy. Their views, to a considerable extent, coincided. Both were Piedmontese. They aimed at independence, and sought to reconcile the people and their princes, on the ground that, by such a union, real amelioration could be secured, and pointing out that nothing but ill-will was to be got by partial insurrections,

which could only retard the advance of Italy. Religion they said was in no way opposed to freedom, and that Italians ought to seek for freedom alone by means not in themselves wrong, and that the end did not justify the means. Concord was more likely to produce unity than discord, and the concord of the people with their princes was as essential as that of the people among themselves. They urged that this might be gained if the liberals would give up their absurd and useless habits of plotting against kings and princes, and their attacks on the church; and if the princes would, as time and seasons served, reform their civil and political systems, and effect real improvements when practicable. That when peace was thus established between the people and their rulers, an Italian league might be brought about, securing the much-wished object of Italian independence.

Young Italy bristled up and abused both the books and their authors. On the minds of men of common sense, they had a considerable influence; and though they did not extinguish the political clubs and secret societies, they tended to soften their asperities. A practicable object had been suggested, and practical means had been pointed out, by which it might be come at. Reformers then became more numerous than revolutionists. A league among the small Italian states would have enabled them to be independent of Austrian influence, even if she continued to hold the Lombardo-Venetian provinces; and eventually they doubtless hoped to drive the strangers from Italian soil. The Pope was old, and must soon be changed, and the European powers had agreed to recommend reform in the Papal States. Under a new Pontiff, there was hope that it might be effected. The king of Naples, though autocratically disposed, had increased his army and navy, and improved their discipline, which would be of some advantage to the league. Tuscany had given

for some years an example of a mild government, anxious for improvement and civilisation; and the people were in concert with their prince. Charles Albert the king of Piedmont, though he had not, of late years, given signs of the liberal opinions he had once professed, had done his best, under the circumstances, to improve the country committed to his care. He had established schools—given it a reasonable code of laws—he had encouraged the formation of an agricultural society—had got his finances into respectable order—had increased his army and fleet—and had obtained the cordial ill-will of Austria, which is liable to be provoked by nothing so much as good government in a neighbouring state. It was expected that, as he got firmer in his seat, he would proceed to greater advances. He had lately allowed the publication of the books of Gioberti and Balbo, and their circulation in his dominions, and was considered to favour the doctrines of their school in contradistinction to the wild vagaries of Young Italy. Conspiracies, however, still continued. During the years 1844–45, there were several small disturbances. The rebels gathered together at Malta and in the Ionian Isles, and kept the governments on the watch, and the people, in consequence, uncomfortable. Considerable sympathy was excited by the execution of two brothers of the name of Bandiera, who, despite the entreaties of their friends, and even of Mazzini himself—despite of the government watchfulness, and the absence of any important rising, set forth from Corfu with twenty men, with an idea of conquering the kings and potentates of Italy. Wiser governments would not have dealt so harshly with so foolish a prank. But it is the habit of some to exaggerate such undergraduate wrenching off of knockers, breaking lamps, and similar escapades, into high treason; partly that the police, if there be no real conspiracies, invent them to exaggerate their own im-

portance—a policy weak and unforeseeing, because others, having the idea of conspiracy ever familiar, are much more easily led away into dangerous practices. There is a fashion in all things—and this is a very inconvenient one. It would be much wiser in governments to set fashions less destructive of their peace and quietness. If there are suspicious characters, let them keep an eye on them till they do some overt act that is too gross to be overlooked; and if they must, from long habit, use espionage, at any rate do not let any one feel it. But it is perfectly useless. It only sets people on evading justice from irritation; and the constant escape of political criminals on the Continent through the fangs of the police, shows how inefficient all this troublesome system is when the whole population of the country is opposed to them; while, on the contrary, a criminal of any sort, once known, is almost invariably caught in England, despite the want of passports and secret police.

During 1845 an insurrection took place at Rimini, headed by Pietro Renzi, which had less unreasonable objects than some of the former ones. The insurgents demanded that, if the Pope was to remain their temporal sovereign—(for they acknowledged him as their spiritual head)—he should give them a civil and criminal code, such as was enjoyed by the rest of civilized Europe, and that the punishment of death should be abolished in political crimes (a request rather unreasonable, for these crimes are the most dangerous and inconvenient to a community at large, and therefore deserve the highest punishment). They required that ecclesiastics should not have authority in their courts over laymen—that justice should be administered by laymen—trial by jury, and open courts—and a mitigated censorship of the press. But these were very much more rational ideas than Young Italy professed, and were, in fact, very much what the

European powers had previously recommended Rome to adopt. The insurgents did very little violence, but, being overpowered by numbers, retreated into Tuscany, and their leader escaped to France, and subsequently acted traitor to the cause he had adopted. Of course, these events produced fresh severities on the part of the government. Probably they were the more incensed, as the demands made were the more capable of being complied with, and that considerable sympathy with the reformers, and considerable antipathy to the Roman policy, were expressed in the French papers.

About this time, Massimo d'Azeglio, who had, in travelling through Italy, previously endeavoured to influence the discontented to a more patient mode of obtaining redress, published a work, in which he censured their mischievous attempts as more preventive than promotive of reform. He led the way in a literary warfare—very unpleasant to Rome and Austria especially, as he spoke respectfully of Charles Albert: indeed, he damaged them much more than the former plots, as the works circulated freely in Piedmont, and probably clandestinely elsewhere, and appeared to look to the royal house of Savoy for the future head of an Italian nationality. Austria exhibited ill-humour by a hostile import duty on Piedmontese produce.

Great was the delight of the Sardinians when this hostility on the part of Austria was met by a counter manifesto on the part of Charles Albert. It was the first instance of an Italian prince daring to brave Austrian anger. It excited hopes that he would eventually take the lead in the Italian cause. The Court of Rome continued uneasy and disunited. M. Thiers, in France, had insisted on putting in execution the laws against the Jesuits, and had sent to Rome Pelligrino Rossi (a Roman by birth—exiled for liberal opinions, but then a peer of France), as

ambassador, to negotiate for this object, as well as for other political purposes. Rome was ill enough pleased at the arrival of a person so thoroughly aware of Roman politics and intrigues, and of such political tendencies. It is said that he was charged, too, to communicate with men of prudence as to the means of getting justice done to the popular demands. Russia was acting harshly to its subjects of the Latin church, against which Rome loudly protested. Affairs stood thus at the death of Gregory the Sixteenth. Though his conduct of temporal government was but bad, it is said that his conduct was more conciliatory, as well as firm, in his spiritual charge. He had recommended the dissolution of the company of Jesuits in France, and had courageously resisted the oppression of the Latin church by Russia.

The Roman finances were in a state of scandalous confusion, but the Pontiff had succeeded to them in the same condition. The expenditure regularly exceeded the revenue, which was let out to farm at an enormous expense to the state, and was thus oppressive to the people, without being remunerative to the treasury. Commerce was restricted by a host of prohibitory duties, which brought in little or no revenue, and threw the whole legitimate trade of the country into the hands of the smuggler. Strict entails hampered the transfer of real property—the department of war was managed by a cardinal—there were few good officers—and the men, picked up anywhere, were ill disciplined, disorderly, and ragged. The Papal soldiers had become a byword of reproach. Education, as might be expected, was entirely in the hands of the clergy—mainly Jesuits. The administration of justice was defective in the extreme. In criminal matters the executive had a right to preside and influence the decision of the judges. The chief court was composed of churchmen, often destitute of legal knowledge, and each

of whom kept an assistant, at small wages, who drew up his judgment. Hence, the mere apprentices in law became in fact the judges. They had no code of laws, and the decision was given only according to the conscience of the judge. It is easy to conceive the conflict of judgments, and the uncertainty of law, under such a system. In criminal cases, the accused might not know the names of the witnesses against him, and was not confronted with them. Of the Court of Inquisition nothing need be said, as all the world is aware of its nature and habits.

At the time of the death of Gregory, even the more respectable of the Pope's adherents admitted the necessity of reforms. The native troops, ill paid, disciplined, and clothed, were envious of the foreign mercenaries, with whom their condition was, in these respects, disadvantageously contrasted. The military career was closed to the youth of talent—there was neither honour, glory, nor advancement to be won. Commerce was limited, and its only channel, under such government, smuggling, though stronger than fiscal authority, was still neither secure, nor respectable. The police, severe to political offenders, or to such as they suspected to be so, took care to avoid the thieves, ruffians, and gangs of desperadoes, who infested town and country. There were no statistics or accounts—no railways—no legal codes. Citizens were not equal before the law, but exemptions and privileges abounded. The administration of justice was slow, costly, and uncertain. In finance there was an annual deficit of half-a-million of crowns. From diplomatic and civil employments, the monopoly of the clerical caste excluded the laity. The censorship of the press, both on foreign and domestic publications, was harsh, pedantic, ignorant, and ridiculous. Thousands of citizens were, as it was called, under warning, and were excluded from all manner of posts and places. Exiles were numer-

ous. Even the higher nobility were but lukewarm in their support of the Papal temporal misgovernment. The small nobility of the provinces were decidedly hostile to it. The burgher class in Rome were not loyal. The populace of Rome and the great towns was turbulent and uncivilized. The country people, though peaceful and devoted to the church, were ignorant. There were plenty of hangers-on, of court lackeys, and rogues and vagabonds without end. Such is a brief sketch of the state of Rome in the year 1846.

During the early centuries of the Christian era, the Pope was elected, as all other bishops were elected, by the clergy and the people; that is, by the church properly so called, meaning thereby the "ecclesia," or "assembly" of the faithful. It is historically certain that, during this period, he had not any territorial jurisdiction whatever, and that the grant by Constantine is a myth. The Franks, who made the first grant of territory, made it not to the Pope alone, but "to the church, the blessed Peter, and the Roman Republic." The Popes had been, up to that period, as indeed they continued subsequently, subjects of the Emperor; and the Emperor's sanction appears to have been essential in order to give validity to their election. Indeed the Emperor Henry the Third, finding the Papacy in a very scandalous position, namely, that three different Anti-popes were in possession of three different parts of Rome (each having obtained his election by infamous simony), and were occupied in anathematizing each other with good orthodox hatred, settled the matter by abolishing all three of them, forced the citizens to renounce the right of election, which they had so shamefully abused, and filled the chair of St Peter* at his own presentation; and by naming three consecutive Pon-

* If it be a chair of St Peter's, on which is said to exist the remarkable inscription—"In the name of God and Mahomet his Prophet."

tiffs, he succeeded in effecting considerable reforms, and reducing the previous abuses to something like order. The first of these Popes conceded to him, for the future, the distinct right to present to the papal chair, as the only path by which the church could escape from the scandalous state into which it had fallen. The date of this event is about the year 1050. The pre-eminence of the priesthood took its rise from the monk Hildebrand, the celebrated Gregory the Seventh; but the emperors still continued to exercise undisputed imperial authority at Rome, and to nominate imperial vicars to rule in their name. Afterwards the popes obtained leave to nominate them, but they continued to receive investiture from the Emperor. The election of the popes was, by the constitution of Nicholas II., vested in the college of the cardinals; and frequent disturbance arose between the popes and the people, and they frequently prevented him from interfering in the affairs of the commune. Some popes were massacred; others fled. Some were obliged to be consecrated out of Rome, because they durst not come into the city. The Roman States consisted of separate provinces, which, though united together under one head, were in fact governed each separately by its own laws or customs. It was not till their return from Avignon, that the sovereignty of the Pope came, from a mere acknowledgment, to be a reality. At length, in the fifteenth century, at the election of Martin the Fifth, the college of cardinals (who had been originally the parish priests of Rome) constituted itself the sole check on the papal authority, and gave itself the sole power of introducing reforms; and, for an infallible church, a very remarkable history it is.

Gregory the Sixteenth died on the 1st of June 1846. To influence the election of a new Pope, numerous intrigues took place. The miseries of the former reign, deeply felt,

had produced a hope that the next Pontiff would be of a milder temperament. When the votes of the Cardinals are not decisive, the papers are burned, and the smoke ascending from the chimney of the conclave announces to the expectant "plebs" that they have not yet come to a decision. On the first scrutiny, Cardinal Lambruschini had the most votes, but on the 16th of June the absence of smoke from the chimney proclaimed the election of a Pope. What persons of moderate capacity wish for they are in the habit of assuming as true: the people made up their mind that Cardinal Gizzi was elected. He was a popular person, and the supposed news caused great joy, and his relations were actually congratulated on his election; but the people were rather taken aback by the news next morning that Cardinal Mastai Ferretti was the new Pope, under the name of Pius the Ninth, a person of whom little was previously known. He was elected owing to his being considered as a nonentity. The object was to keep the election open: all who desired this voted for the Cardinal they thought no one else would vote for: by accident all had pitched on the same person, much to his astonishment and theirs.

In his youth he was subject to epileptic fits; but having been refused on that account a commission in the papal troops, he betook himself to theology, and after passing through various grades, had been appointed Cardinal in 1840. The new Pope gave great satisfaction by at once curtailing the expenses of his household. The first public act of his reign was to put a stop to political prosecutions. After a month's consideration, he granted a general amnesty to all political offenders who should choose to take advantage of it, and promise not to offend in like manner for the future, an act of grace intended to usher in many gradual improvements, and to be the precursor of a milder system of government. Pius the Ninth was everywhere

hailed as a deliverer, the people flocked to the Quirinal to receive his blessing; the news spread to every corner of the state; the political prisoners at once accepted the conditions and were set at large; numerous refugees returned, many indeed without signing the requisite promise of future obedience; some of them, Mamiani amongst them, though promising future allegiance, refused to admit prior guilt. At the same time, these acts of mercy deeply annoyed the Sanfedists and centurions, who conceived they had a prescriptive right from long use and wont to bully their fellow-citizens; they assumed the name of Gregorians from the name of the late Pope; the liberals called themselves Pians from the name of the present; and Europe was startled with the astounding intelligence that a liberal and reforming Pope was the head of the Latin Church.

Cardinal Gizzi was named secretary of state to the great satisfaction of the public, for he was known to be favourable to reforms, and to be attached to the Pope. It was the policy of the papal government not to proceed with too rash a hand in the introduction of changes, but rather by showing a disposition to reform abuses to conciliate the liberals without disgusting their opponents; added to which, Pius the Ninth was not a man of very firm character, and was naturally given to hesitation and indecision, and middle courses. Commissions were nominated to deliberate and report on various subjects and abuses; general satisfaction was given by several eminent laymen being appointed along with some of the more popular churchmen. In consequence of more talking than doing, the liberals were animated with extravagant hopes, and the retrogradists were haunted with unnecessary alarms: the government had on the one hand to moderate the former, and on the other to soothe the latter. It might have been more prudent, instead of encouraging the idea of general change, to have proceeded at once to

practical improvements where they were abundantly necessary, as in the introduction of some fixed code of laws, and commercial and fiscal regulations. If reforms properly digested, before being made public, had been at once carried into effect, there could have been very much less dispute and popular excitement about them; for in states long subject to despotic rule, popular excitement and discussion invariably lead to extravagancies, and if the government is disposed to reform, it is much more prudent to do so quietly, so that the people may gradually acquire the habit of self-control.

The disposition of the papal government was, however, on all sides a subject of enthusiastic congratulation. Wherever Pius appeared, he was enthusiastically cheered. Odes and songs without end celebrated his praise. Louis Philippe sent his son Prince Joinville to congratulate him on his accession, and all Europe rung his praise. The English ministers in Italy wrote home word that there was an evident desire on the part of Rome to carry out large reforms. Amidst the general rejoicings, an idea was spread that Rome was not indisposed to assist in getting rid of the Austrian rule in Lombardy, and the cry, "Away with the stranger," ran through the land; and when, on the 8th of September, on the feast of the nativity of the Virgin, the Pope repaired to the church dedicated to her on the Piazza del Popolo, the whole Corso was decorated in his honour with his portraits, (or what the inhabitants meant to represent them, for they are said to represent any popular person at the shortest notice by the simple expedient of writing that popular person's name under whatever ancestor, male or female, they happen to possess in oil-colours,) and a popular ovation was bestowed on him, which was managed and got up by Angelio Bruneli, better known afterwards as Ciceruacchio, a leader of the lower orders, of whom he was one, and over whom he had

obtained considerable influence. These demonstrations were apparently satisfactory to Pius, for he frequently came among the people, and, smiling, bestowed on them his benediction, and in paying visits to the hospitals and other charities, sought everywhere opportunity of being cheered by a vociferous crowd.

CHAPTER II.

FROM THE ACCESSION OF PIUS IX. TO THE PUBLICATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL STATUTE.

POPULAR favour, as popular indignation, is fleeting and inconsistent. Processions and cheers are soon converted into riots and hooting. Among a people hot-blooded and unaccustomed to self-government, riots and hooting run into sedition and bullets. But popular favour is intoxicating; foresight is not the virtue either of the cloister or the street. Decision and firmness were not qualities of the Pontiff. The popular enthusiasm that the hand of a Miltiades or a Hannibal, an Alexander or a Napoleon, might have guided to permanent results, soon brushed aside the empty toy with which it had sported, and the flood swept on, submerging him who had first set open the sluices.

A scientific meeting took place this year at Genoa. It was understood that it was to enjoy an unusual degree of freedom of speech. The good-will of Charles Albert, his differences with Austria, and the idea of a reformation with the Pope at its head, had inspired men's minds with hopes long dormant of Italian nationality and independence of Austria. When the meeting took place, nothing

was talked of but civil progress, reforms, and independence. The prince of Canino (a Bonaparte by birth), not content with science, went about everywhere singing the praises of Pius the Ninth and Charles Albert, and abusing the Austrians and Metternich. He was a man of great incapacity, and afterwards played a conspicuously disreputable part in the years of revolution. Just a century previous to this meeting, the Austrians had been expelled from Genoa. The assemblage of all Italy in that city naturally revived the recollection. The idea occurred of celebrating the centenary of the event throughout Italy. Austria took great umbrage, and complained to the various Italian courts, who, though they ordered some arrests, yet did not go into the matter either with alacrity or good-will.

A deficient harvest and an inundation of the Tiber brought about considerable popular discomfort and consequent discontent. The blame was cast on the late Pope without any very obvious reason. But Pius was everywhere abundantly popular. The year 1847 was ushered in with general rejoicings and frequent popular demonstrations. The few prudent persons, who, perceiving the danger of them in such a state of society, had the honesty and courage to point out their tendency, were looked on as croakers. The churchmen themselves, unused to popular favour, were all the more readily intoxicated, and could not be led to perceive that, should the temper of the mob change, the habit they had acquired of processions and cheers might very rapidly degenerate into groans and projectiles. Among other remarkable felicitations, the Grand Turk sent to congratulate the Pope on his reforms and clemency, and expressed his intention to take the Christians in his dominions under his special protection.

A relaxation was allowed in the censorship of the press,

and an attempt was made, by giving an author a right to appeal to the general board (composed of four laymen and one ecclesiastic), to bring the decision of the censor into something like uniformity. A censor who refused the publication of a work was bound to give his reasons in writing. Any person was entitled to comment freely on extemporary politics, provided he did not attempt to bring the acts of government directly or indirectly into odium. The moderate party hailed this as a great improvement, and as safer than the immediate jump to perfectly unrestricted publication, but the extremes attacked it. The objects of the two parties now became more distinctly defined. The moderates desired by quiet means, and by a union of all Italians, princes as well as people, to obtain practical reforms, and gradually to draw into a league offensive and defensive all the states of Italy; by these means to check Austrian interference in Italian affairs, and eventually, when they should be strong enough, and when occasion should serve, to drive the Germans home over the Alps.

The extreme party, on the other hand, if they accepted reform at all, did so as leading them to a republic, which they hoped to establish over the whole of Italy, to destroy all existing institutions, kings, princes, popes, and potentates, at once; by popular enthusiasm to defeat and expel the Austrians from the peninsula, neither waiting for opportunity nor possibility. The moderates, who openly avowed most of their projects, were not by the clergy looked on with a particularly favourable eye, as being self-constituted and troublesome advisers. A number of newspapers under the new law of censorship rapidly arose—among others the "Contemporaneo," partly written by Sterbini, a man imaginative, inaccurate, and but scantily informed, who subsequently played a prominent part in the revolutions of '48 and '49. At the same time, the clan-

destine press poured forth every now and then violent abuse of the government for its slowness; and even some of the moderate party were led away into acts which resulted in much more than they anticipated. There was a secret party who afterwards boasted that they had stirred up the people in such a manner as to render government difficult or impossible, in order that in the confusion that followed their own schemes might find an opportunity for being adopted.

A year had elapsed since the accession of Pius. Much had been talked about; little or nothing had been done: the old system had been thrown into discredit in consequence of the promise of a new one, but no new one had been established in its place. The government was hesitating, the people anxious and excited. Constant processions, spectacles, and celebrations were beginning to frighten the government, yet they dared not give signs of their uneasiness. The anniversary of the accession of the Pontiff was celebrated with the usual acclamations, banners, drums, and disorder. A few days after, Cardinal Gizzi promulgated an edict against popular assemblages, not on the real ground that they were dangerous to public tranquillity, but that they took the youth from their studies, and wasted the time of the workmen very unprofitably. It was immediately whispered about that the edict was the act of the ministers, in defiance of the wishes of the Pope; and the rabble * in consequence made up their minds to

* By the words rabble, and populace, wherever they occur in this work, is meant the dirty, dissolute, idle rogues, thieves, and vagabonds infesting great towns. By the word people is meant all the inhabitants of a country except the above. By a constitution is meant the form of government existing in any state. By constitutional is meant that which is in accordance with it: by unconstitutional is meant that which is the reverse. Thus, what may be constitutional in Russia may be much the contrary in England. The author states this for the purpose of avoiding misunderstanding; for the words are often used very loosely. Whence arises a confusion of ideas, and the populace passes with the unwary for the people.

disobey, and in the meantime vented their dissatisfaction in abuse of the retrograde faction, who certainly had ridiculed the Pope and his newfangled ideas,—ideas which, though they delighted the free governments of the world, and even drew a congratulatory address from the United States of America, were eminently disagreeable to the absolute princes.

Rumours at last became rife that there was an intention on the part of the Pope himself to request the intervention of Austria; and it is clear that, whether the Pope requested her assistance or not, Austria had resolved to interfere. Every here and there, conflicts took place between the mob and the Swiss troops in the papal pay, or some of the regiments of Carabineers, who were most of them of the Sanfedist party, and from old habit accustomed to bully. These disorders stimulated the people to press the Pope for the formation of a civic guard which might assist in repressing them. He had several times received with favour deputations making this request, but Cardinal Gizzi opposed its being granted; indeed so strongly that when the Pope complied, he resigned office, nominally on the ground of ill health, but he said in private that it was impossible for any man of sense to work harmoniously with a person like Pius the Ninth. He was in fact, though willing to concede civil and administrative reforms, very unwilling to concede political ones, lest he should weaken clerical influence: possibly, too, he was aware that civic soldiers are seldom capable of suppressing civil tumult.

Great was the popular exultation at this concession, and the resignation of Gizzi was popular rather than otherwise, for it was understood that he had been opposed to it. Cardinal Ferretti was appointed his successor in office. He was a man at that time in popular favour. The anniversary of the amnesty was at hand: the liberal party wished

to celebrate it with the usual festivities, but were for a while resisted by the government. At last it gave way; but while the show was in preparation, rumours spread that the Sanfedists were intending to take advantage of it to depose and imprison the Pope and massacre the people. That any such plot ever actually existed has never been proved; though the inclinations of the party in question rendered it not altogether impossible that there did; but these rumours caused the postponement of the fête, and consequent ill-humour among the populace. Lists were posted up with the names of the leaders of the supposed plot; the rabble muttered "Death;" next day the mob set about hunting down the persons so denounced; many of them fled, and the persons they caught were no way implicated, as was probable, considering that it is very dubious whether there ever was any plot at all. The people and the civic guard were recommended to have patience, and to show Europe that they would manage for themselves. Nothing, however, very important occurred at that moment in the provinces: there were similar suspicions and rumours: lists were stuck up of the betrayers of their country, containing the names often of respectable persons against whom the bill-sticker might have some private pique. Here and there a skirmish with the troops took place.

In the midst of this ferment the Austrian troops marched into and occupied the town of Ferrara, which confirmed the suspicion that the Sanfedists were in league with them. This occupation gave the liberals additional credit: it was a direct violation of the papal territory. The liberals were looked on as supporters of the Pope, and the Sanfedists as rebels and supporters of the Austrians. The civic guard was enrolled throughout the states, and altogether the political ocean bore the appearance of gradually surging into a storm.

At Ferrara, General Auersperg replied to papal protests, that he was no way accountable, but was only obeying the orders of his superiors. In consequence of some disturbances he announced his intention of traversing the city with patrols, and of occupying the gates of the town: the Cardinal Legate protested, but produced no result. Austria had been startled by the spread of national ideas, the encouragement given them by the Pope, and fear of their endangering the Lombard provinces, she therefore took advantage of a doubtful clause in the treaty of Vienna, and occupied the town as well as the *citadel* of Ferrara.* A diplomatic correspondence on the subject was carried on between Rome and Vienna, and Count Usedom, who interposed his good offices, does not appear to have given satisfaction, and was rather snappishly treated. The Pope thought of his spiritual thunder, but it was not used, having become unserviceable; but he had at his command that which in these days supplies its place, as well as the place of truth, justice, and common sense: in this cause he could profit by the newspaper press. Forthwith such a storm of vituperative eloquence was discharged on the unlucky Austrians, that, unused to the freedom of public discussion, unaware that newspaper invective is often the greatest compliment that can be paid to a statesman, and finding themselves in a position the merits of which they were unable to appreciate, and to the enjoyment of which they were perfectly unaccustomed, appear to have taken it really much to heart. The consequence was, that there were scuffles and mutual insults in the streets, and mutual aggravation: the negotiations were kept on foot, with protests on one side and protests on the

* It is not easy to understand the exact nature of the advantage, for the command of the citadel must have practically given the command of the town. Possibly, however, a greater number of troops were wanted at that point than the citadel could contain.

other, and for a long while they led to no result, during which irritation increased.

In Tuscany, the paternal government had been carried on in a milder form, and the prince and the people were on terms of better mutual understanding than in the neighbouring states. Tuscany, too, had been a refuge for the exiles from other states. The political factions which had rent the rest of the peninsula had produced here but little comparative effect. They had, it is true, taken some root in Leghorn. But when the Tuscans had heard of the reforms talked of and encouraged by the new Pope, they too became bitten with the idea, and ran wild in praise; while the clandestine press teemed with uncomplimentary remarks on their own government. A public petition was presented to the sovereign for reforms, and a law was published regulating the censorship of the press and giving it more freedom—a cause of general rejoicing. The Grand Duke issued a commission for the preparation of a civil and criminal code, and for the regulation of the police. Hence arose in Tuscany the two parties, progressive and retrogressive, who were both far from prudent in their opposition to each other. The police and officials were naturally jealous of losing any part of their power, and the general ferment was increased when the news came of the Austrian occupation of Ferrara. The Tuscans, though long unused to arms, petitioned for the formation of a civic guard; the Austrians threatened to interfere if it were established; but at last the Duke conceded, and requested his council to report on the petition. They reported in its favour, and it was forthwith granted.

These changes did not take place without here and there a riot between the friends of change and its enemies. On the concession of the civic guard, all the neighbouring cities poured their inhabitants into Florence, and they crowded round the palace. The Grand Duke came out

on the balcony and returned the salutations of the people. Tricolor flags were hoisted—cheers were given not only for the Pope and the Grand Duke, but also for other popular characters—and shouts were heard for war with Austria.

The Duke of Lucca, frightened by the demonstrations in his state, and who was always in want of money, drove a bargain with Tuscany, and sold his duchy to that state, much to the delight of its inhabitants. Charles Albert, who was, as we have seen, on indifferent terms with Austria, when he heard of the occupation of Ferrara, and how deeply the Pope felt it, offered to be his champion in the cause and fight his battles, and he received with scorn the Austrian complaints against the Italian reforms that were taking place. Towards the end of 1847, he relaxed the censorship of the press in Piedmont, and improved the arrangements for the administration of justice. He deprived the police of the uncontrolled exercise of their power, and enlarged and amended the council of state.

The kingdom of the Two Sicilies was more autocratically governed than even the rest of the peninsula. The king was in strict alliance and sympathy with the Austrian rule: and while the tendency of the other Italian princes to advance became more manifest, in Naples the king refused to stir, and the more were his people under the hands of police, tax-gatherers, and spies. But they shouted for Pius the Ninth, Charles Albert, and regeneration. Certain outbreaks took place in Calabria, where the names of Pius the Ninth and Italy were coupled together; but the government put them down by military force: whereupon the innovators took to forcing their way by writing rather than fighting, and by civil rather than military compulsion, shouting in the streets for Pius the Ninth and the other reforming sovereigns. To their demonstration a reply was made in ball-cartridge.

In Lombardy and Venetia the Austrians were in a state of uneasiness. In Milan, the police, it appears, unnecessarily fell on a crowd who were cheering their new archbishop—he was an Italian who had succeeded a German prelate,—surely a harmless amusement enough. The people rose and thrashed the police, which they seem to have deserved, for some gendarmes who were on the spot recommended to them more prudent behaviour and would not help them. Next day a great military demonstration was made. The people gathered in crowds to look at the spectacle: guns were loaded and matches burning. It does not appear that there was any disturbance till the police and the military charged down on the crowd—a scene which was re-enacted on the next evening, to the indignation of the Milanese. Persons are not, in civilized states, stabbed by the police for cheering archbishops, nor are they chopped down by military for looking at soldiers.

In the autumn of 1847, Lord Minto had been on his celebrated tour in Italy, not having the character of an ambassador, but with private instructions to inform the Italian governments of the disposition of England, which was favourable to moderate reforms, and inclined to prevent any foreign power interfering to prevent them. With regard to Rome, the English government looked favourably on the Pope's wish to improve, and suggested that as a combination of the European powers, and Austria among them, had, in 1831-32, recommended to the then Pope extensive reforms, and that, as the reforms now proposed did not exceed those unanimously recommended to the late Pope, those who were parties to that recommendation were bound to assist and encourage the present Pope in carrying into effect their own advice: that they themselves were prepared to pursue that course, and would not see with indifference any aggression committed on the Roman territories with a view to compel the Pope to

desist from such measures. Rossi, the French ambassador, too, had orders from his government to encourage the Pope in his proposed measures of reform, and to do so in such a manner as might not make it appear as if they had been forced from him.

There had long existed, not for political purposes, a club or reading-room in Rome, called the "Circolo Romano," where the citizens met to read the papers and talk. In times like the present, the talk naturally ran on politics, but there were then no very violent opinions broached. Some, however, were not satisfied because they could not have a monopoly of political opinion, and the extreme liberals, with the consent of the minister of police, set up a club called the "Circolo Populare:" indeed it is said that the police minister hoped to lead this club by his own agents, and for his own purposes, in upsetting the influence of the "Circolo Romano," which, it is said, was too moderate to give reasonable cause of complaint, and was thus eminently disagreeable to him.

Considerable feeling existed against the Jesuits; and when, in the disputes which were taking place in Switzerland between the Federation and the Sonderbund, the latter, which was on the side of the Jesuits, were worsted, the Roman populace rejoiced with noisy demonstrations in the streets, and proceeded to the residence of the Swiss minister, cheering on account of the victory. In the meantime, the Roman and Austrian governments had come to an understanding as to the occupation of Ferrara.

The year 1847 concluded with a "motu proprio" on the subject of the council of ministers, and a law with respect to the press. The duties and offices of each minister were more accurately separated than hitherto, but the door still appeared to be shut against the laity. With regard to the press, the number of censors was increased:

journals were to avoid notices or discussions that might be injurious to state policy: journals were bound to continue the names, titles, and objects for which they were originally started and licensed; and those not originated for political purposes were forbidden to touch on politics: and when a manuscript had been approved of by the censors, not a word, not a letter, could be altered in the press: not even was the addition of a comma, or a mark of interrogation or admiration, to be added or altered; nay, not even was a word or a mark to be omitted. If this was an advance towards the liberty of the press, what must the previous condition have been? No doubt the practice that newspapers have of publishing the truth or concealing it, as happens to suit their policy or convenience, is very improper. It ought to be punished by the people themselves not buying such journals. But sometimes the most dishonest of journals are the most popular, even in countries where the people ought to know better—those who flatter their follies and passions, have often a greater sale than those who venture to speak the truth. The censorship of the press, if useful in any case, should be confined to preventing the publication of untruth, or the misrepresentation of truth. In countries where the small value of newspaper squibs is not known from long experience, these misrepresentations might be occasionally dangerous.

Eighteen months had elapsed since the elevation of Pius IX. to the papal chair, and although during that period a great spread of liberal ideas had taken place, nothing very practical had, as we have seen, been effected. The judicial system, finances, education, and the army, were managed, or mismanaged, very much as they had been before, and by the same persons or class of persons. Altogether, there had been more promise than performance, and the public taste was excited without being

gratified; and though there was nominally a censorship of the press, it was somewhat lax, and the press used and abused its unaccustomed liberty; and the clandestine press was if anything wilder. Political assassinations were perpetrated in numbers. The government in the provinces was even more powerless than it was at the capital. Suspicions began to be entertained of the sincerity of the Pope. It was rumoured that he had obtained the agreement with Austria on the subject of Ferrara by promising to abandon his reforms: and Mazzini was plotting in London in favour of Young Italy.

On the first of January, preparations were making for one of the usual popular demonstrations. The court and the Pope took alarm. It was suspected that some project of sedition was entertained, which might or might not have been the case. Cardinal Ferretti made a disposition of the troops, and ordered them to resist. The populace grew wild with alarm, and began to curse ministers, police, and Jesuits. Prince Corsini, the senator of Rome, succeeded in calming the tumult. He then went to the Quirinal, and returned saying that the Pope had full confidence in the dispositions of the people; whence it was immediately whispered that the ministers had given the order to resist against the wish of the Pope, and the shout was raised of "Long live Pius IX. *alone;*" nevertheless the order came from the Pope himself, of which his minister bore the odium.

The next day, to show his confidence, the Pope gave it to be understood that he would pass through the city. Thereupon the Corso was decked with flags and decorations, and the populace assembled. The coach containing the Pope was hailed with frantic cheers. Ciceruacchio got up behind with a large placard, on which was written in large characters, "Holy Father, rely on the people." The Pope gesticulated his assent.

" Quippe tenet sudans hanc publicus, et sibi Consul
Ne placeat curru servus portatur eodem.—
Illinc cornicines, hinc præcedentia longi
Agminis officii, et nivios ad frœna Quirites."

Thus the mob triumphed in the streets of Rome.

Meanwhile, in Milan, it had occurred to the people that if they could annoy the Austrians no other way, they might injure their revenue by giving up tobacco. The idea was at once acted on, and while the soldiers, on the one hand, showed their loyalty and gratified their taste by an unusual consumption, the Italians, on the other, repudiated smoke, and any one they found smoking in the streets stood a good chance of being mobbed. The soldiers and the Austrians generally insulted all not smoking, so that it must have been a difficult matter to please all parties. The mayor of Milan remonstrated with the soldiery and police on their conduct. The Austrian troops, after having been by the authorities supplied with brandy and tobacco, were turned loose to massacre the people wherever they found them. Orders were sent to the hospital to make preparations to receive the wounded. A sham plot was concocted by the police to inflame the minds of the soldiery against the inhabitants. An offensive handbill was circulated, of which the authorities themselves were the authors. (Gentlemen are not in the habit of lying, and civilized governments do not turn drunken soldiers on mobs because they will not smoke.) Stimulated by these means, the drunken and infuriated military fell on all they met, and sixty-one persons severely wounded, and some mortally, were carried to the hospitals. In order to aggravate their sufferings, the prisoners' wounds are said to have remained undressed, and some are reported to have died in consequence.

One of the parish priests, a man of eighty-five years of age, waited on the viceroy at the head of the clergy, and

said that though he had seen Milan in the hands of the French and the Russians, he had never witnessed such deliberate murder. A few days after, the Austrian troops killed some students who were attending a funeral procession.* Martial law was everywhere proclaimed, and the police were indefatigable to discover the authors of the plot they were sure existed from the unanimity of the people, forgetting that external pressure may produce unanimity as well as internal combination. Particular colours were prohibited—particular gestures and looks—particular modes of applauding at the theatre—particular hats, and particular hat-bands and buckles—and after the news of the outbreak at Naples, the Austrians were deeply offended because the rabble would consume maccaroni in commemoration of the event. Everything was interfered with: if a man was too studious, he was imprisoned; if too popular and extravagant, he was exiled. Two people could not talk in the streets without the police or the soldiery inquiring their business. Taxation was burdensome—commerce restricted by ridiculous monopolies. Espionage and corruption were the system of government, and all persons were obliged to send their children to be educated at government schools. The news of these events were so much fuel added to the fire in Rome. Prayers in the churches were offered for the Austrian victims. It was rumoured that Radetzki had advised an immediate attack on Central Italy. Ideas were afloat of attacking him with a multitude armed with what weapons they could obtain.

The council of state—which the Pope had established—which, though only capable of advising, yet, containing many popular persons, had a large share of public confi-

* Some even of themselves appear to have been ashamed of executing the orders they received, and General Walmoden told his soldiers that if they had insults to avenge, first to arm the citizens and then fight them, but not to turn murderers.

dence, wished to have its sittings public—rather a strange thing for a privy council. They hoped to assume the position of a representative institution; and even if they had been so, the admission of the public to the assembly is, in dangerous times, subversive of all independence in such a body. In fact, if ever present, they should be only present on sufferance on any occasion. To this body the people carried a petition on the subject of the insufficiency of the public forces, representing that they were menaced by a powerful state, whose designs on Italy were a secret to no one: that Modena was already invaded, and Parma menaced: that Naples was in league with it: and that fresh regiments were being constantly sent across the Alps from Vienna. The public prints of Germany were openly speaking of war: Tuscany was forming a civic guard: Piedmont increasing its army: and yet Rome, the chief object of animosity, was making no preparations. They desired the immediate training of the civic guard through the states, and the better organization of the papal army. The council recommended that something should be done in that direction, and advised that some general officer should be joined to the war minister, who would be capable of knowing practically what was necessary; and they suggested that Piedmont was more likely to be able and willing to furnish such a person than any other Italian state; and they concluded by expressing a wish that a better military organization should be forthwith accomplished; and government applied to the King of Piedmont for such an officer. About this time, Cardinal Massimo having died, Rusconi, minister of war, became minister of public works in his stead; and Prince Gabrieli, formerly a soldier, was appointed minister at war. He was the first layman who sat in the Pope's cabinet.

The King of Naples had made hitherto a more determined resistance to the popular desires than any of the

other Italian princes: ever since November his states had been in a ferment, and signs of discontent were daily given. While the citizens were excited by seeing and hearing what was passing in the neighbouring states, the King spoke scornfully of concessions. Sicily had been long disaffected, and only waited her opportunity to proclaim her insular independence. Petitions poured in from that island, together with complaints; and at length the Sicilians declared, that if no heed were given to their requests before the 12th of January, they would take the matter into their own hands, expel the Neapolitan troops, and make themselves independent: in the mean time they shouted and sang hymns in honour of Pius the Ninth, the reforming Pope. At last the day arrived. Whether the government had not thought them in earnest, and in consequence had made no sufficient preparations, it does not appear; but on that day, at Palermo and all the great towns of the island, they rose in mass, laid hold on what arms they could, and falling on the troops, broke and expelled them. When this news came to Naples, that court, hitherto so obstructive, sent over concessions by the armful, and edicts in cart-loads; but it was too late to pacify: the success of the first onslaught had made the Sicilians imagine that they were invincible; and what a week before would have been hailed with enthusiasm was now spurned with contempt.

Sicily was revolutionized, not reformed. In point of time the European revolutionary fever first broke out there. Hitherto reform, not revolution, had been the popular cry; and if there were those who desired revolution, they were mere rabble, whose hand was against every man, who had nothing to lose and everything to gain. But the revolution having once broken out, soon spread to the continent. Palermo began it; Naples took it up: the court hesitated, and finally gave way: the concessions had been longer

delayed than in the neigbouring states: when they came, they were larger than in the others.

The minister Del Carretto was dismissed; a representative constitution was promised by the new minister, and that the constitution should be complete in twelve days. The king showed himself on the balcony of the palace, and was cheered by the crowd: he opened his palace gates, and was seen conversing familiarly with men but a few days before in fetters. Thus by obstinacy in the first instance, and by entire concession in the next, he converted the train of parliamentary reform into a revolutionary express, and excited in the neighbouring states the concussion he had created in his own.

When the news of these events reached Rome, that city went into ecstasies of delight, merry-makings, and illuminations. The municipality invited the townspeople to celebrate the event. The populace disported itself in the streets with banners, torches, and music. Angry cries were heard against Austria and the Jesuits: amongst other disorders the civic guard in a body marched to the jail, and by force liberated one of their body, whom the Cardinal Vicar had imprisoned. Cardinal Ferretti, who had been for some time anxious to resign his ministry, at length was allowed to do so. A report was spread that the council of state had recommended a levy of troops, a measure of which the cabinet had disapproved: the cry of traitors was raised. The senator again succeeded in partly appeasing it. The Pope consented to change his ministers. The mob cried, they would have no more clergy in the cabinet, shouted death to the Jesuits, and demanded immediate military preparations against Austria. The incapable and distracted government of Rome was fast drifting into revolution.

In the midst of this turmoil the Pope published a proclamation, and as his proclamations and other literary per-

formances are always verbose, saying the least possible in the greatest possible number of words, it is useless to give any of them at length. This one was to the effect that he was incessantly occupied in considering what was best for the people; that he was engaged in reorganizing the army; that he was about to have more laymen in his cabinet; that he hoped to preserve peace, but that if obliged to fight he would fight; and in the meantime they had better be quiet and avoid plots and disturbances; and concluded with general words of pious aspiration. The proclamation was considered a triumph, and the mob celebrated it in the streets, and crowded to the Quirinal, where the Pope having come out on the balcony, beckoned with his hand as though he would speak. There was a great silence and he said,—before blessing them he besought them to be of one mind, and to keep the faith they had sworn to him the Pontiff. They cried out, "We swear." He warned them against raising certain cries, which were not those of the people, but of certain discontented individuals, which the sanctity of the Church forbad him to comply with. A new ministry was shortly formed, containing more laymen than the previous one, and a commission was appointed to consider the best mode of fitting the desired measures of reform to the peculiarities of the papal government, which had been exclusively composed of ecclesiastics. Many schemes were in discussion. Rossi the French ambassador was consulted; and a few petitions for a representative constitution came in from the municipalities, which were not pleasing to the court, who wished to appear to grant what they did unasked. The long-continued agitation had produced the evils that invariably result from it: a cessation of ordinary occupations had produced considerable distress in the lower classes. The provinces of Romagna were more than ever infected with the curse of political assassinations,

insomuch that the secretary of state admonished the presidents of the respective provinces to be more diligent in their suppression; and in order to stimulate the civic guard in its zeal for the cause of order, on the 20th of February the Pope reviewed it in person.

The exhausted state of the finances had to be met by a loan, which was negotiated with the bank of La Hante at Paris for a million crowns, and arrangements were made for permitting the redemption of feu-rents and rent-charges to supply the coffers of the state; and to appease the public anticipation of war, the reserve of the civic guard was embodied. Matters stood thus when news arrived from Paris which threw everything into the most violent commotion. The agitation in Italy had there no doubt stimulated and excited the populace in their outcry for reform. The throne of the barricades had fallen by the same means by which it had arisen. Tumult in the streets of Paris had given it and taken it away. Louis Philippe had abdicated and absconded; the republic had been proclaimed; Lamartine was haranguing the mob, and the mob was planting wizzened sticks called trees of liberty all over the town, and not having regard either to historical or vegetable precedents, expected both to flourish. In Rome there began an explosion of popular sympathy; the crowd insisted on the removal of the royal arms from the French ambassador's, applauded the new republic, and prayed for the souls of those who had died in fighting for it. Such was the excitement, that had not the Italian princes given way previously, it is highly probable the populace would not have been content with representative constitutions, and that their thrones would have fallen as did the throne of France. On the 10th of March a new ministry was installed, composed chiefly of laymen. Cardinal Antonelli was president, Sturbenetti minister of grace and justice, and Galleti minister of police. Of these Galleti

was the most violent politician; his appointment was intended as a sop to the extreme liberals.

At the same time the College of Cardinals was debating and settling the terms of the fundamental statute of the Roman constitution. After two days' discussion it was agreed to, and published on the 14th of March. It established two chambers, the one nominated for life by the Pope from among persons of distinction and wealth, the other elective; and the elective franchise was made dependent on the payment of a certain amount of direct taxes and a property qualification. The judges were to be irremovable after three years' tenure of office. All persons were to be tried before the ordinary tribunals, and all persons were to be equal in the eye of the law. Personal freedom was to be secured, and no person was to be arrested unless by a warrant from the proper authorities, except in the case of his being taken *flagrante delicto;* no exemptions were allowed from taxation; copyright in literary productions was acknowledged. Political censorship of the press was abolished, but people were to be responsible for what they published. A censorship was still to be exercised in ecclesiastical matters, and in theatrical performances and other spectacles. The two chambers were to deliberate in public, and were unpaid; the members were free from arrest during the session of the chambers, and a month before and after it, and were not to be responsible for what they said there. They were not to meddle with ecclesiastical matters, nor to be able to alter the fundamental statute, or to interfere in the religio-diplomatic relations of the court of Rome. Projects of laws were only to be proposed by ministers, but the Houses were to have charge of the finances, and the lower chamber was to have the initiative in the voting of the annual estimates and the imposition of taxes. Direct taxes were only to be voted for a year, indirect might be voted for a longer

period; ministers might be impeached by the chamber of deputies before the upper chamber; all persons had a right to petition. The ministers had a right of sitting in both chambers, but had a vote only in case they were members. The sitting of both chambers was suspended during a vacancy of the see, but they were to be convoked within a month after the election of the new pope; they were to meet annually, and their ordinary session was not to exceed three months. The consent of the College of Cardinals was requisite for the appointment of new ministers. At the time of the death of a pope, if the necessary supplies had not been voted, the ministers would levy them in the manner they had been voted the previous year. During the vacancy the supreme temporal authority was vested in the College of Cardinals. There was to be a council of state, charged with the framing of bills, &c.

Such were some of the chief provisions of this celebrated document, which might, if it had been calmly carried out, have secured the means of gradual advancement and national liberty; but it was otherwise ordained. The violent passions which the outbreak in Paris had aroused from one end of Europe to the other having torn in shreds all the orders of society, and obliterated all reforms, has retarded if not altogether stopped the march of civilisation in Italy. The fundamental statute, however, was far from perfect, and the College of Cardinals were to exercise an influence which in fact gave it a right of veto as well as the Pope, a power which would probably have led to serious misunderstandings had it been worked for a length of time. Such as it was, however, it was hailed by the reformers with the liveliest satisfaction. Practical difficulties are seldom thought of in periods of excitement; the mob is not gifted with foresight, and in such periods it is the mob alone who guide the state. The usual processions and blessings followed. The municipality sent a

deputation to the Pope with thanks, who were graciously received; but the excesses which had been committed against the Jesuits made him uneasy, and he issued a proclamation in remonstrance. The new ministry issued an address, stating that they were in earnest in endeavouring to carry out the spirit of the fundamental statute, and desired to intrust the administration of public business to persons of approved fidelity, and to organize means of public defence. They hoped to re-establish the finances, and they expressed a wish for firm union with the constitutional thrones of Italy. A balance-sheet of the bank of Rome was published, in order to re-establish the credit and value of its notes; the ministers commenced the redemption of feu-duties, removed from office some of the most obnoxious of the judges, called on General Durando, a Piedmontese officer who was in Rome, for advice, and sent to Naples in search of arms and ammunition, and decorated the papal banners with pennons of the Italian tricolor.

CHAPTER III.

FROM OUTBREAK OF THE EUROPEAN REVOLUTIONS AND THE LOMBARD INSURRECTION TO THE INCORPORATION OF LOMBARDY AND VENICE WITH PIEDMONT.

HOUR by hour the news of the terrific political storm which was rending every continental state of Europe kept flowing into Rome. First came the news that the canton of Neufchatel had thrown off the Prussian yoke; then that liberty of the press was established, that Bavaria had obtained reforms, that all Germany was in commotion; and, to crown all, came the stunning intelligence that Vienna had risen, that the emperor had fled, with an exaggerated rumour that a republic was established, and that democracy was all-powerful in the capital of the empire. Every church bell rang out the joy of the people; it was felt that it was then the time, if ever, to strike the blow and rid the land of foreign oppressors. In Rome the Austrian arms at their ambassador's were torn down by an excited rabble, who celebrated their triumph in the streets and in the churches. The Pope was entreated to give aid to the work of establishing an Italian nation, by convoking a diet at Rome to consult on terms for a federation. Durando was put at the head of a corps of operation, as it was called; volunteers were enrolled, at the head of whom was placed Ferrari, a Neapolitan officer.

When the news of the Vienna revolution reached Milan on the 18th of March, a band of youths, who had been for some time previously preparing as best they could for a struggle which was looked on as inevitable, and to which the massacres in the streets had incited them, came down from the hills into the town, shouting the names of Italy and Pius the Ninth. A crowd was soon collected; they found the mayor in his dressing-gown and slippers, and in that guise they insisted on carrying him along with them to the governor to make their complaints. The mayor had taken the lead in the previous system of legal resistance on the part of the people. That morning the Austrian General O'Donnel had promised that the free institutions which Vienna had won for the empire should be extended to Lombardy. The mayor's prudent words fell on ears deafened with excitement: remonstrance was in vain. They proceeded to the government house. The soldiers on duty fired a volley over the heads of the mob; they wavered and were on the point of giving way, when a boy of sixteen drew a pistol and fired it at the soldiers, shouting *Viva l'Italia*. The effect was electrical; the mob charged, overcame the guard, made a prisoner of General O'Donnel, and planted the tricolor banner on the palace. Afterwards some Croat soldiers fired and killed some persons; a general rising took place; Radetzki hesitated, and withdrew his men. He might have to answer for his acts to a revolutionary government at home. The archbishop tried to appease and restrain the populace, but was unable. By the time Radetzki had made up his mind to act, barricades had arisen; the city was in the hands of insurgents, and required a bombardment to retake it. He therefore endeavoured to gain time and to communicate with Vienna. The Austrians kept possession of the citadel, the streets it commanded, and the gates and walls, so as to prevent the insurgents, who held all the crooked

alleys and lanes which form the bulk of the city, receiving succours from without. The citizens, however, summoned their neighbours to their help by despatching messages fastened to small balloons to rouse the country. The conflict was kept up by day and night till the 23d. The object of the inhabitants was to get possession of one of the gates, so as to be able to communicate with their friends outside. At last, by rolling fascines before them, and firing from under the shelter they afforded, they succeeded by making a dash at the Porta Posa. Radetzki, thinking his position no longer tenable, began his retreat in the direction of Verona. Nor was it in Milan only that similar events occurred; most of the other cities of Lombardy followed the example: but by persuading the popular authorities that he only wished to pass through Verona, Radetzki contrived to throw himself into that fortress, and he also succeeded in holding possession of Mantua.

At Venice the Common Council met to consider what concessions should be required of the Austrian governor. They deputed one of their number to say, that the people would not rest till they had obtained command of their own fortifications and their own arms. Meanwhile, the insurrection had begun. Manin single-handed took possession of the keys of the arsenal. The arsenal workmen barbarously murdered Colonel Marinovich. Fresh messengers were sent to the governor, but he would not listen to complaints. The arsenal was in the hands of the insurgents —the governor gave over his authority to the military commander of the place, who said he should regret to destroy the city, but he would put down revolt. When, however, he found the citizens firm, he began to give way; and eventually he left Venice, leaving behind him all the munitions of war and a considerable sum of money. The troops, it was agreed, were to evacuate the place immediately, and the civil functionaries were allowed time

and leave to depart. When they were gone, the cry was raised of "Saint Mark" and "Italy." A Provisional Government was proclaimed, consisting of respectable citizens. Similar events occurred in the other Venetian cities. The news was received in Rome with popular demonstrations of joy.

About this time, so much dissatisfaction was expressed at the existence and conduct of the Jesuits, that it was thought advisable by the Pope to close their establishments, on the ground that their existence, in the present uncontrolled state of public feeling, might lead to violence: in point of fact, it was done under intimidation. The consequence of it was, that being disbanded and dispersed, and wandering up and down, it is very probable they did the liberal cause more harm than if they had been let alone. Mischievous as they usually make themselves in states, at any rate, they are less dangerous in open hostility than in disguise. The Pope issued a proclamation respecting the expulsion of the Austrians, recommending the people to use their victory prudently. At the same time Charles Albert, king of Sardinia, who had an ancient grudge to avenge, entered Lombardy with his troops, and Rome listened to the long unwonted clang of arms as her army marched to the northern frontier. Charles Albert's proclamation was addressed to the people of Lombardy and Venetia, declaring that he was come to help them to establish Italian nationality. There was really great cause for sympathy with a people who had exerted themselves as the Lombards and Venetians had done to drive out a foreign oppressor.

The king is charged by the extreme republicans with having been forced, against his own wish, to invade Lombardy by the excitement of his own people, who would have driven him from his throne had he done otherwise: in short, that he became a patriot against his will;

while, in the same breath, they charge him with invading Lombardy from criminal personal ambition, and a desire for an acquisition of territory. Now, one charge or the other may be true, but both appear somewhat inconsistent. There is little doubt that he might be very unwilling to disturb the peace of Europe, which his invading Lombardy might probably lead to; for, after all, sovereigns have sometimes more desire to save the expenditure of their people's blood than their people themselves have. But popular excitement became stronger than he could control. Self-preservation is the first law of nature. He had an ancient grudge against Austria, and he had some desire for Italian independence. He must have known practically that a Republic could not be permanently established in northern Italy; and both to preserve his own throne from convulsion, and to deliver the north of Italy from the yoke of foreigners, he invaded Lombardy, taking the lead in the insurrection. He might very probably have succeeded in expelling the Austrians, had he not been embarrassed by the factious conduct of the rabble, and the lukewarmness, treachery, or shuffling conduct of the other Italian princes. On the whole, the course he adopted was the only prudent one open to him—"Out of the nettle danger we pluck the flower safety." His proclamation was immediately reprinted, and spread all over Rome.

Contributions flowed in—the women gave their ornaments, and it is recorded that one girl, having no trinkets, sold her long hair to assist in the patriotic enterprize; and for a while it appeared as if the ardent wish of Italy was about to be accomplished. Austria was paralyzed and unable to resist. Italy, on the other hand, was enthusiastic, and appeared to be united. Within a few days twelve thousand volunteers, from the Papal States, departed with the papal blessing to defend their confines

under the national colours of Italy surrounded by the papal ensign.

In Naples the transition from absolute rule to mob license was immediate. The people were uneasy and mistrusting; riots and uproar were the order or disorder of the day; nor could the cringing and flattery of the king to the mob appease them. They shouted for war with Austria, and for making common cause with the rest of Italy. The ministry was dismissed. With some difficulty another was formed. The king declared that "he had despatched his fleet and some troops towards the seat of war, and that he was about to send more; that he would make common cause with the rest of Italy, and that Naples should not fail her brethren in the field of honour —in the war of independence; that he trusted to the Civic Guard and the admirable spirit of the people to preserve order." Whether he meant what he said, or said more than he intended, the sequel will show.

In Sicily the parliament of the island met at Palermo on the 26th of March, but negotiations failed to bring about a reconciliation with the continent. Lord Minto, who at the request of the King of Naples endeavoured to procure an accommodation, failed. Rugero Settimo was declared regent. The fall of the Bourbon dynasty from the Sicilian throne was proclaimed, and all the energies of the island were applied to obtaining insular independence, and were more or less lost to the general Italian cause, though a few volunteers sailed to the seat of war. Such was their exasperation, that the Neapolitan fleet, then supposed to be bound to the Adriatic against the Austrians, was fired at from the shores of Messina in passing.

In Tuscany, though generally the people are tranquil, considerable excitement prevailed. The populace of Leghorn committed excesses. The rest of Tuscany furnished a few volunteers for the War of Independence; and the

Grand Duke reviewed them before they marched to the frontier under the Tuscan banner decorated with the colours of Italy. At Modena, the Duke, who was in the Austrian interest, having been propelled by his people to granting popular demands, had absconded and taken refuge with the Austrians, when a Provisional Republican Government was established. The Duke of Parma, who having become a convert to nationality and representative governments, in a manner as remarkable and expeditious, placed himself and his fortunes at the disposal of Charles Albert and the Pope, and expressed his approval of fundamental statutes and representative governments. But he first took refuge at Bologna, and then not thinking himself secure, fled to a distance.

When the news of the revolt of Lombardy reached Frankfort, where there was sitting a German parliament for the purpose of effecting a German nationality, it was to them not only a source of wonder, but the extremest indignation. That any portion of the world should venture to cast off the yoke of the godlike German race, and the unquestionable blessings of police, pedantry, professors and functionaries, was an impudence, an audacity which they were utterly at a loss to comprehend. They indignantly repudiated a sympathy with any nationality that threatened any disadvantage to any German state; and in condemning their neighbours to slavery, behaved in the manner quite *en règle* among demagogues. Such is democracy—such has it been in all ages and in all races. The most intense selfishness is its one single motive power. It means the arrogation of all power to a single class in the community: in Germany, the class of educated dawdlers; in most other countries, the urban populace; in all the most worthless in the commonwealth. The rule of the mob has ever been the most oppressive of any tyranny whatever—the most shortsighted and improvident. It was

the Neapolitan mob who destroyed the independence of Sicily in 1820: it was the Athenian rabble who poisoned Socrates and banished Aristides—the Roman plebs who surrendered Roman liberty to the Cæsars—it was the populace of Carthage who, from jealousy of their General, prevented Hannibal at the gates of Rome from destroying that city, and caused eventually their own destruction—it is to the tyranny of the mob and their leaders that are to be attributed the horrors of the first French revolution—and, finally, it is to mob-favour that the existence of every autocratic government in the world, unsupported by foreign bayonets, is to be in the long-run attributed. The rule of the one or of the many is in fact alike the rule of force; and it is the mob, the urban populace, who, in all ages and in all states, have shown themselves most corrupt, servile, riotous, and improvident, and most unfit to be the rulers of the state; and not content with mischief at home, they must lord it over every other state in the neighbourhood. As the Athenians, professing the wildest democracy, indulged their own citizens in tyranny at the expense of the subject provinces; so the Frankfort demagogues hoped to secure a visionary freedom to the German race, and an unlimited power to oppress every other. This is the real meaning of "*liberty, equality, and fraternity.*" This age is given, perhaps more than any other, to admiring its own beauties and proportions in the glass, and wondering at its advancement and perfections. This act is not a favourable sample of its progress.

Charles Albert entered Lombardy at Pavia, and marched on to Cremona, and, without any opposition, approached the river Mincio, which he resolved to cross, and the Austrians to defend. He made his attack on the 8th of April at the village of Goito. The battle lasted four hours, when the Austrians were worsted and driven from their intrenchments, with the loss of a gun and a hundred killed,

and many of the Italian soldiers in the Austrian service deserted and came over to the other side. The Austrians were, after a day or two's struggle, forced over the river, and retired, having cut some of the bridges, but leaving the Piedmontese in possession of others, over which they crossed, and after fighting several actions and skirmishes, with varying success, gradually advanced, having forced the line of the Mincio. They had fought well and bravely: their forces were gradually augmenting, both in men and guns. Meantime a full corps, of some five or six hundred volunteers, who were at Salo, on the Lago di Garda, were ordered to make a demonstration in the rear of the Austrian position. They marched towards Peschiera, and having captured some powder magazines belonging to the fortress, they were emboldened to push on, and drove the Austrians from Castel Nuovo, where they were hailed by the inhabitants with joy. This village lay on the road to Verona, whence the Austrian garrison, issuing next day, repulsed the volunteers, and killed the villagers for their reception of them to the number of some hundreds, burning the houses and committing other barbarities. The volunteers had imprudently pushed forward, and gone to sleep quietly in a situation exposed to attack. These corps were in general formed of young men of effeminate habits, and unaccustomed to athletic exercises—artists and inhabitants of the towns; while the peasantry, more slow to move, were not among them in considerable numbers. Perfectly ignorant of the art of war, they constantly exposed themselves in positions where they were slaughtered or taken prisoners. The Austrians occasionally hung or shot such of them as they caught, as rebels or banditti; and their disasters became so frequent, that they were shortly after withdrawn, and not again exposed. They were, too, ill officered. There had been in Italy no school for military acquirements, and the

Italian officers in the service of foreign powers, although they returned as fast as possible to help their country in the hour of need, were not in time. There were few of that class who formed the staple of the Spanish guerillas —carriers, bandits, smugglers—all accustomed to the use of arms, and who knew the country. Italians will fight, and that well, but they are disciplined with difficulty. Under Austrian discipline they make excellent soldiers. Many of the Italian regiments distinguished themselves both in Italy and in Hungary. The regiments who, at the first outbreak, came over to the national side, to the number of some thousands, were, after they lost their German officers, so unruly, that they were obliged to be disbanded, and for lack of officers were lost to the cause, and became, as vagabonds, very inconvenient to the country.

As yet the siege artillery had not come up, but an idea was prevalent that the Austrians, cowed by the first blows that had been struck and the unexpected nature of the insurrection, were ready to yield the fortresses on the first demonstration. Peschiera was important, as giving the command of the Lago di Garda, on which could be transported forage and supplies for the army. The king, therefore, made a demonstration against that fortress, and summoned the governor to surrender; but he replied, that he had orders to defend it, and hoped for relief: and finding that the defences were strong and the garrison determined, the enterprize was given up. After firing a few rounds with his field-pieces, and dismounting a few guns, he left a brigade to begin a regular siege, and retreated without loss. The king, understanding that his appearance before Mantua would be a signal for a general rising of the inhabitants against the garrison, appeared before that city; but no rising followed, and he was compelled to retire, not being in force to undertake the siege. During these events the whole army that Piedmont could furnish

came up, amounting to 55,000 men, and new troops were being raised. The Tuscans and Neapolitans, too, arrived with five or six thousand men, regulars and volunteers. Charles Albert was but ill supplied with artillery and horse, though what he had of both were good and serviceable; his army, though willing to fight, was deficient in organization, and the staff had unfortunately but little knowledge or experience. The Sardinian fleet, under Admiral Albini, had been sent into the Adriatic to assist the operations on shore.

It has been said that all the inhabitants of Lombardy would have risen and volunteered to fight for the liberty of their country, but that Charles Albert, jealous lest any one but himself should deliver them from the Austrian yoke, declined their aid; that those who volunteered were treated with indignity; and that the few who had been enrolled on the first outbreak of the insurrection, were placed in positions where they could not be of any use. It is not easy to find how this charge can be substantiated; nothing is more probable than that the unsuccessful should be vituperated; and that Italian democrats are not scrupulous as to truth under any circumstances, we learn from experience: their outcry unsupported by evidence is of no value whatever. It is very probable that volunteers without discipline would be very inconvenient allies, and it is not improbable that those who had been enrolled in the first instance might have considered themselves very ill used whenever brought within cannon-range, and this idiosyncracy might account for his not wishing to enroll more of them; and, indeed, if they were unusually troublesome, they might be set occasionally in the front of the battle, in order to learn that there were such things as hard knocks; in addition to which, they were uninured to, and would naturally complain of, military hardships; and that no such jealousy existed in the king's

mind, may be perhaps inferred from his orders to General Durando and the papal forces to cross the Po, and fall upon the enemy. Charles Albert has been peculiarly unfortunate. Obliged to consider and conciliate the rabid and self-inflated politicians whom the removal of the Austrian pressure had liberated from all control, and whom there is reason to suspect of having been all along in communication with the enemy; hampered in his military manœuvres by political objects, and expected risings, which frequently failed him; and eventually beaten, he has been abused by one party for attacking the Austrians, and by another for want of skill in not beating them. A man so equally abused by both parties, was probably neither a bad general, a coward, nor a traitor.

Meanwhile, in Rome on the 1st of April the ministers published an order for the election of deputies to parliament. They also wished to appoint some lay governors of the provinces on whom they could rely, but the clerical party, and all the ecclesiastical governors, and legates, and delegates, were in the height of wrath, and everything was thrown into an uproar. By the 10th of April, only three lay governors had been appointed: Ravenna remained for some time without any, Cardinal Ferretti having left it on the first news of the Paris revolution. The confusion of the finances increased; the loan contracted for by La Hante's firm was not paid, owing to the revolution; a deficit of a million was anticipated, and the government went a begging to the bank of Rome, and to different wealthy citizens; but this was not found an efficient remedy. They were obliged to suspend cash payments, make the bank-notes a legal tender, secured on treasury bonds, bearing interest, and on the church lands, with a power of sale in case of non-payment, and they passed into circulation, without falling below par, to the amount of 800,000 crowns. This relieved commerce

to a considerable extent, which had suffered much inconvenience in consequence of the absence of a circulating medium. They also issued treasury bonds, bearing interest at the rate of $3\frac{5}{8}$ per cent., and payable in quarterly instalments in the course of the next three years, to the extent of $2\frac{1}{2}$ millions of crowns.

General Durando and the troops who left Rome on the 23d of March, had a march of 400 miles to perform before they could come up to their enemy. They were reinforced on their way by numerous volunteers, and the generals in charge of them did their best to organize them during the march, and when they halted. Some contributed clothes, arms, and horses. Some of the priests and monks had gone with the army as chaplains, Father Gavazzi among them, and set up their pulpits in the market-places, exhorting the faithful to contribute to the liberation of Italy. About 1000 Bolognese marched on Ferrara, and shut up the Austrian soldiers in the fortress, after driving them from the barricades: but though they threatened the citadel, they could not persuade the governor to give it up. The people of Ferrara were unwilling that things should go to extremities, for fear of the buildings of the town being battered; and General Durando thought it was impossible to take it without a battering-train, which they had not: but some of the leaders of the volunteers were disappointed that enthusiasm would not do as a substitute.

When the war had broken out in Lombardy, the Pope sent a distinguished prelate, as legate extraordinary to Charles Albert, to be present at the camp, to negotiate terms for the Italian league, and to request a loan of money to pay the papal troops. But though the Pope asked "for gold to pay his legions," it does not appear that he seriously contemplated fighting. Rumours reached him that the Germans were highly enraged at

his interfering, and threatened schism. Consequently, procrastination became the tactics of Rome. It was known from General Durando, that the ardent wish of the volunteers was to be led across the Po, and against the enemy; but the ministry would not order the general to attack without the express orders of the Pope; and the Pope would not give express orders for anything, or to anybody. But on his saying, that at any rate and at any time he could recall the troops if he should decide on not taking part in the war, in presence of the war minister, he hearing this repeated several times, gave General Durando orders to do what he judged necessary. The General thereupon issued a proclamation, calling on his soldiers to march to a holy war, decorated with the holy cross; in short, preached up a crusade against Austria. This step put his Holiness in a violent *pucker*, though it encouraged the troops, for it attributed to him that he had blessed their arms, and had in fact given orders for the war. He could not remain silent under the affront of any one daring to preach a crusade but himself, and consequently he published a protest, adding, that when he spoke, he did so himself, and not through any subordinate person. At Rome itself, the jealousy between the clerical party and the laity kept on increasing, and the latter were perpetually abusing the College of Cardinals. The host of idle rogues, of whom there are great plenty in Rome, many of whom are supported by government wages, for which they condescend to appear to be doing something, made disturbances in the streets, now for one thing, now for another. On the 11th of April, a crowd began to riot for cheap bread:—

> "Jampridem ex quo suffragia nulli
> Vendimus effundit curas, nam qui dabat olim
> Imperium fasces, legiones, omnia, nunc se
> Continet atque duas tantum res anxius optat
> Panem et circenses."

The civic guard arrested forty of them, and they confessed that they had been paid for making an outcry, and by whom; but as it implicated some in authority, the minister of police managed to hush up the matter. The mob had now had it all their own way for some time, and they were wholly led by orators, presidents of clubs, and other demagogues. The police ministers had courted them, and others had not dared to meddle with them; and of this sort Sterbini, the editor of the *Contemporaneo*, "loquacious, loud, and turbulent of tongue," was the head.

The liberals, or rather the revolutionists, had very much too great a contempt for the enemy; not sufficiently considering that military discipline and organization must be met by strategic skill, and that popular enthusiasm, though explosive, is not a substitute for gunpowder. Much blame was cast on the generals engaged, for not sweeping the Austrians out of the country; and such was the abuse of Charles Albert published in Milan, that he spoke of leaving Lombardy to fight its own battles. General Durando, however, always said the work was much more difficult than was generally imagined. On the 20th of April, he crossed the Po at the orders of the king, carried the papal banner beyond the confines of the present Papal States, and was ordered to march to the Piave, where General Nugent was laying waste the country with from 15,000 to 20,000 men. The papal forces under Durando consisted of 7000 regulars, and 10,000 volunteers; and 14,000 Neapolitan troops had entered the Roman states, and were marching to the seat of war to co-operate with him. On the 29th, the Piedmontese army having crossed the Mincio at Goito, defeated the Austrians after a severe conflict at Pastrengo, and drove them across the Adige; but sufficient use was not, it is said, made of the victory, as

the enemy was allowed to cross the river and cut the bridges without molestation. A corps of volunteers had been sent into the Tyrol; but not using sufficient precautions, they were surprised and defeated by the Austrians. The Neapolitan fleet was expected in the Adriatic, where, combined with the Sardinian fleet, they could outmatch anything the Austrians could oppose to them, especially since the insurrection of Venice.

But the Pope had become very uneasy as to the part he was taking in the war; the threatened schism in Germany was a cause of great anxiety. He feared that the establishment of an Italian league might have put him under the power of a temporal prince. His ministers protested against any course but an explicit declaration of war, and especially against any appearance of double-dealing, but it produced no result. An allocution was addressed to the cardinals, saying that he would not engage in war with the Austrians, and that it was not his fault if he could not restrain the ardour of his people,—a declaration which, of course, put his army, now engaged, in the position of marauders and "hostes humani generis,"—a position of which the Austrians took advantage by hanging such of his subjects in arms as fell into their hands, as by the laws of war they had a good right to do. He also repudiated the idea of being the president of an Italian league. The ministers resigned, and Rome was in a state of frightful commotion at a most critical moment. For some time no men could be found bold enough to undertake the formation of a ministry, and the former ministry held office "ad interim."

The Pope thought of going in person to Milan to negotiate a peace, and of sending a minister to Charles Albert to treat for giving him the command of the troops beyond the Po,—a mission which was eventually intrusted to M. Farini the historian; and he hoped to tranquillize Rome by

a proclamation remonstrating with the people. But the clubs were masters of the city. One day they carried off from the post-office all the letters of the cardinals, and would have opened them, but that they were rescued out of their hands. The civic guard kept no order at all. Cardinal Antonelli was denounced as a traitor. The clubs demanded the appointment of a ministry without any ecclesiastics. Mamiani, who was a man of liberal tendencies, but of the moderate party, and who had been an exile, and was disliked by the court, though otherwise popular, was sent for, and after some negotiation, he accepted the task of forming a ministry on the understanding that he might carry out the policy of his predecessors, as to the independence of Italy. The only ecclesiastic in the new ministry was the minister of foreign ecclesiastical affairs, a person not unpopular. But the papal court was generally distrusted. At one time the revolutionists had hope of the Pope. Mazzini had written him a letter exhorting him to have faith, in what it does not appear, and endeavouring to convert him to "young Italy." The Italian sovereigns from the same reasons distrusted him. Now he was equally distrusted by both. For though benevolent and conscientious, he had not the vigour of character to act decisively or opportunely. His next endeavour was to negotiate a peace. For this purpose he wrote a letter to the emperor, entreating him for the sake of peace to withdraw from Italy, as nothing would subdue to his empire the spirits of the Lombards and Venetians; and suggesting that the German nation, anxiously speculating on their own nationality, ought to look without disfavour on another nation who had the same object in view. The letter was not calculated to produce much effect. The emperor probably cared very little whether he subdued the spirit of the people or not, as long as he could con-

quer the country, and German nationality was certainly not an object of his. No doubt the Father of Christendom was in a curious position in resorting to temporal weapons, but the anomaly was incident to his position as a temporal sovereign prince, as well as Bishop of Rome.

In the beginning of May, the King of Piedmont advanced against Verona (which was still held by the Austrians), the most important fortress on the Adige, standing at the bend of the river, and covering the route to the Tyrol, in hopes of being aided by a rising of the inhabitants. But the Austrians, who had numerous spies, receiving notice of his intention, were prepared to resist him, and after a sharp engagement of some hours he was obliged to retreat, which he did in good order, having during the battle exposed himself to the hottest fire. When the volunteers of republican principles and of no military experience or discipline saw that they had fought and had not won a victory, they, following the instinct of their nature, abused their general because he happened to be a king (an offence they never forgive), calling him a traitor, denouncing his generalship, and pitying the soldiers—by which means they probably materially disheartened the troops and assisted the Austrians; yet these persons arrogate to themselves the honour of the warmest patriotism. The Austrians always had full intelligence of the movements of the Italian armies, while the Italians were often in the dark as to the Austrian movements; for when the Austrians were expelled by the first insurrection, the Provisional Government, instead of driving out all the Austrian functionaries and police, kept them in their places; and these men, interested more for their old than their new masters, kept them supplied with intelligence, so that they might save themselves in case they got back again. But this was not the doing of the King of Sardinia; besides which,

the Italian volunteers would talk, and no plans could be kept secret.

The papal troops had, in the meantime, to the number of 7000, under Durando, marched to Treviso. General Nugent was approaching, having crossed the Tagliamento after a short opposition. By the 30th of April the Austrian general was not far from the river Piave, with about 16,000 men. It was Durando's policy evidently to throw all the obstacles he could in his way, rather than to hazard an engagement against forces superior both in numbers and discipline. Ferrari was coming up with 10,000 Roman volunteers. At last Nugent, who had been advancing slowly, crossed the Piave between Feltre and Monte Belluno, and marching on the former place, took it without firing a shot, though it had promised to defend itself to the last. Thereupon Durando retreated towards Bassano. Ferrari, with his infantry and 300 horse, and 16 guns, fell back to Cornuda, where, after a contest of some hours, he was forced back to Monte Belluno, slowly at first, but the want of discipline of the raw volunteers threw them into great disorder. The retreat became a flight, and from flying they took to accusing their general of treachery, and from that to murdering, in a most barbarous manner, a prisoner of war named Sisperati, an unpopular person, and suspected of being a spy, together with some others. Ferrari tried to re-organize them and lead them back to Monte Belluno, but it was of no avail: it was treachery to lead them anywhere, even where there was an enemy. Meanwhile Nugent advanced: the Roman general ordered his troops to charge; they hesitated, wheeled round, and ran away—the cavalry running over and trampling many to death. Their flight caused such a noise and raised such a cloud of dust, that the Austrians, thinking they were charged by a column of horse, likewise took to their heels.

After his defeat, Durando had retreated to a strong position behind the river Brenta. Nugent, to draw him out, ravaged the country about Treviso, but he would not stir until he was forced by the mutinous remonstrances of the citizens of Treviso. No sooner was he forced against his judgment to attempt to relieve that town, than Nugent occupied the position he had quitted, gaining a considerable advantage without striking a blow. Ferrari, finding it impossible to induce his runaways to face the enemy, and finding his volunteers of more trouble than use, gave such of them as would, leave to depart home, which many of them did, laying the blame on the Pope's allocution and the generals, instead of on themselves and their own cowardice.

Mamiani, the Pope's prime minister, was a man of moderate principles, and the times were very unfortunate for such. He was only supported by the rabid republicans of the young Italy school, as far as he might lead to the adoption of their views, when he could be cast aside. By the court, the Pope, and the ecclesiastics, he was looked on with suspicion and aversion as one who was intent on admitting the laity to privileges hitherto exclusively theirs. Hence what the ministry did in one direction, the court ecclesiastics were underhand counteracting. The letter of the Pope to the Emperor was ill taken. The Pope's legate was referred from Innspruck to the ministry at Vienna, and after dallying with him some time, it was at last hinted that his mission was distasteful to the mob, and the mob was in the habit of hanging up those disagreeable to it at lamp-posts: on which hint he departed.

On the 13th of May, Charles Albert accepted the command of the papal troops, which had been offered to him. Thus the Pope, after declaring that he would take no part in the war, put his troops under the command of a sov-

ereign engaged in it. They were to fight under the papal flag—an exemplification of the doctrine of infallibility. But he was only fallible because he could not help it, much like other people. He did his best to impede the war; for when his ministers endeavoured to bring to punishment the deserters after the affair at Cornuda, they were secretly screened and aided by the Pope and the clerical party. The ministers sent Count Pepoli to the camp to confirm the spirit of the soldiers, and to bring them to a sense of honour, discipline, and patriotism; while the court sent letters to the camp, which, being handed about, fomented discontent and unruliness, and encouraged desertion. These became an excuse for all the rogues and vagabonds who had a fear of guns to cover that sentiment by the plea of obeying the Pope's wishes. Not that they obeyed him in any other particular, but coming home from the camp as arrogant as heroes, they spread disorder and dissatisfaction over the town and the country. Thus was double-dealing on the part of the court recompensed.

The Neapolitan troops were marched slowly towards the seat of war. The King of Naples had engaged in it unwillingly. In spite of the anxiety of General Pepe, he was, by the intrigues of the court and their influence over his inferior officers, delayed in his march, and had only arrived on the Po when orders came to return to Naples; so that the main body never took any part in the war of independence at all. A fresh revolution had broken out in Naples, and the king was again absolute. Of the king there had been long a deep popular mistrust. He was supposed, and truly, to be averse to the war and inclined to Austria. The chamber of deputies was about to assemble. Some difference of opinion existed between the crown and the elected deputies as to where they should be sworn and how. The rabble, always unruly, took (May 15) the

opportunity of exhibiting their disorderliness. They erected barricades—gave the king an excuse for bombarding the city; and, as his troops were all of a retrograde tendency, they obeyed his orders, without their being countersigned by a minister. When there was a pause in the fight, the king refused to slacken the fire of the troops, saying that as the business had begun it must end. In short, he slew the rabble, intimidated the people, dissolved by military force the chamber of deputies before it had regularly met, and issued a proclamation promising to observe the constitution he had sworn to; but, in fact, he became again absolute and irresponsible. No sooner had this event put the king at liberty to follow his own inclinations, than he reappointed Carretto his minister, recalled his troops and fleet to quell a petty riot and insurrection that the rabble had been considerate enough to stir up as an excuse for him in Calabria. Had their conduct been peaceable or reasonable, these troops would have been present in the campaign, and fourteen or fifteen thousand troops, even though Neapolitans, in addition, under the command of Durando, would, very probably, altogether have changed its result. To republican folly as much as to regal treachery, Italy owes the fact that she was not then freed.

The Neapolitan troops had already reached Bologna and Ferrara, and when the news of their recall reached them, great was the discontent that it produced in those towns and in the country round about. General Pepe resigned the command in disgust to General Statella. The populace threatened to take vengeance on him if he should obey the king, and General Pepe was induced to resume the command; and negotiations were opened with Naples for further orders; and when General Statella had returned, Pepe ordered the troops to cross the Po, but they turned their backs and left him, obeying the secret orders

of the king instead of those of his general; and the greater part of them marched back through the Roman states, where they were treated with as much contempt and aversion by the inhabitants as they had previously been with enthusiasm. Thus, at the very instant that Nugent was working his way to Verona along the north of Lombardy to join Radetzki, General Durando was deprived of these expected succours, which at that moment were of vital importance to him.

Upon this accession of force, the movements of the army of Piedmont had been calculated. The delay of their arrival was the cause of delay in the execution of their schemes; and their desertion of the cause at the critical moment was the direct cause of the destruction of the papal troops. The origin of the disaster was the King of Naples's want of faith, aided by the rabid republican rabble: so often is their alliance and assistance afforded by democracy to absolutism, and so little is the cause of freedom ever advanced by it. To this desertion, much more than to any strategic fault of Charles Albert, is to be attributed the failure of the campaign, and the re-forging of the Austrian fetters of Lombardy and Venice. These events were rather a triumph than otherwise to the republican party. Because the King of Naples had, by their aid, been enabled to withdraw from the struggle for Italy, it gave them an excuse to rail at all kings and princes—whom it is more their delight to abuse than it is to do any thing for the good of their country: it is their one sole touchstone of patriotism.

The imbecile duplicity of the Pope (to speak of him as a man and a sovereign, for his ecclesiastical office is beside the present question), added fuel to the same fire. Hence it came that men talked no longer in whispers of a republic, but openly and publicly. It was clearly perceived in the end of May that this idea was advancing.

The clubs were venting vociferous abuse on the sovereigns in general, and stirring up the people to difference and discord, at the precise period when Italy had need of the united efforts of all her sons to rid her of the foreign oppressor. No doubt great blame is to be attached to the Pope and the court, but probably they knew no better. Learned ecclesiastics are not always diplomatists or politicians: had they been so, they would have known that only two respectable courses were open to them—one, to have thrown themselves with all their force into the national struggle; the other, to have at once said they would not engage in it, and adhered to what they had said. The former would probably have been successful; neither would have been dishonourable; but they did neither one nor the other, and their reward eventually was expulsion.

On the 5th of June, the Roman parliament was opened at the palace of the Cancelleria with a procession of deputies in tricolor scarfs, after an undignified squabble between the Pope and his ministers as to who should write the opening speech. The procession had begun before the dispute was arranged. A speech of no political meaning was made, and ministerial explanations were postponed till the first day of the regular session, which were previously, through M. Farini, submitted to the Pope for approval. On the 9th, Mamiani read the explanation to both houses. It spoke of the reforms the ministers hoped to carry out, of the war in Piedmont, and of Italian nationality. The Prince of Canino asked whether the speech was approved of by the Pope, or was only the expression of the opinions of the ministers? Mamiani answered that it expressed the unanimous opinion of the Pope and his ministers. He was congratulated by the prelates of the court on his oration, and at first the Pope gave no sign of disapproval. But the French party, who call themselves "catholic," raised an outcry against it; and their organ,

the *Univers*, vented all manner of abuse on Mamiani, saying that Rome was swayed by enemies of the Pope and the church. All the Italian papers took up the dispute, some praising, some accusing the Pope.

The successes of the Piedmontese arms in Lombardy, and the incorporation of that kingdom and Venetia with Piedmont, which occurred at this period, gave rise to considerable jealousy. This course had become necessary from the evils and disorder arising from the want of any government sufficiently strong to repress them. The Pope began to fear that his successes might induce Charles Albert to attempt some aggression against Rome; and the republican party, with Mazzini at its head, seeing things likely to turn against their views, and who could not brook any sovereigns but themselves, did their best to bring about disturbances and discord. The incorporation was decided on by the universal suffrage of those states, but this was no satisfaction to Mazzini, who looked on himself as the man destined to liberate and regenerate Italy.

CHAPTER IV.

THE CAMPAIGN IN LOMBARDY, AND THE GENERAL ITALIAN POLITICS TILL ITS TERMINATION.

On the 19th of May the vanguard of General Durando's army reached Vicenza, and repulsed Nugent, who attacked that city on the 21st. The rest of the Italian forces came up, amounting to 10,000 men. After the failure of his attempt, the Austrian general was content to keep open his communications with Radetzki along the Verona road, till orders were received from that general to return to the attack, which was done on the 23d, with 18,000 men and 40 guns. But, after fighting for two days, he was forced again to retire to the Adige. The position of Durando was, however, very critical: he was entirely isolated from the Piedmontese army, and had several times requested Charles Albert to send him assistance; as, though he might be able to retard Nugent's march, he could not eventually cope with his superior forces. But the king could not comply without too much weakening his lines. He had given him orders to retire to the Mincio and the Po, and join the right wing of the Piedmontese army; but hearing of this, Venice made a great outcry, because it left all Venetia uncovered, and complained that the king desired

to leave that province open to the ravages of the enemy, in order to punish Venice for having in the first instance proclaimed a republic, and having delayed the annexation to Piedmont. At first it had been hoped that the Neapolitan troops that were coming up would give the necessary aid to Durando, so that provision for the defence of Venetia had been made, reckoning on their assistance. Thus was the proper strategic position of the forces neglected because of political reasons and popular impatience, a mistake to which the failure of the whole campaign may be greatly attributed.

Peschiera was blockaded, and was defended by 2000 Croats under General Ratt, who had been its governor for twenty-two years. Radetzki did not attempt to relieve it: he had formed the plan of ending the campaign at a blow; and on the 27th he marched out of Verona with 35,000 men, on Mantua, from which garrison he could draw some 5000 troops, so as to give him power to bring about 40,000 into the field. He fell on the Tuscans at Curtatona, and nearly destroyed them, slaying many and taking many prisoners; not above 1800 of them escaped, who, however, retreated in tolerable order. On the other hand, not being relieved next day, and having no provisions, Ratt capitulated, and delivered up Peschiera, on condition that the troops should not serve again during the war. It is said they did not keep to their engagement.

When the king became aware of Radetzki's movements, he hastened to counteract them; and marching southward, met him at Goito; and after fighting a well-contested battle, which hung long doubtful, he forced him to retreat, pursuing him a short distance, and that not very diligently, with his cavalry. He is said not to have made as much use of his success as a more skilful general might have done. He remained inactive for two days, giving Radetzki, who was in a very critical position, and in danger

of being cut off from the Adige, time to recover himself. It was only on the 3d of June that he collected his troops, to the number of 40,000, with 90 guns, about Goito. Charles Albert intended to fall on Radetzki, and drive him back on Mantua. But that commander having come to a knowledge of this intention, set out in haste by night, and marched to Mantua, and thence towards Verona. The king pursued him as far as Curtatona, when, after picking up some 1500 Italian deserters from the Austrian army, he returned to the position he had occupied before the battle of Goito.

General Von Welden was bringing up a reinforcement of 16,000 men from the Tyrol. Radetzki was anxious to effect a junction with him; and then, being between Charles Albert and Durando, as the latter general was a cause of uneasiness in his rear, he resolved to march against him with nearly the whole of his force, only leaving behind him troops enough to cover his movement, and having destroyed the Roman corps, to return to the position he had occupied before Charles Albert was aware of his absence, reinforced with General Welden's division. The Piedmontese generals were doubtful and divided: they hesitated what to do, and remained inactive for a couple of days, which Radetzki turned to good account. Durando, hearing reports of the successes of the Italians and of Radetzki's defeat, remained at Vicenza, and did not, as he would otherwise have done, retreat on Venice. On the morning of the 8th the enemy made his appearance, not with the Piedmontese treading on his heels as Durando expected, and as they ought to have been doing, but prepared to lay siege, with 43,000 men and 110 guns, to Vicenza, while he had but 10,000 to defend it. These were fearful odds to contend against; and after the siege had been continued for thirty-six hours, during which his men were completely exhausted, Durando was forced to

capitulate, as he had no hopes of making good his defence or of being relieved; and no doubt he was right, for the place was untenable, and no good could have come of prolonging the defence; and he got the terms of marching out with the honours of war, with all his baggage, on the sole condition that his troops were not to serve for three months against Austria. The inhabitants had leave to accompany Durando; and if they chose to remain, security for their lives and property was promised. The general was much abused by the republican party for this surrender, not reflecting that if they had conducted themselves properly he would not have been in such a position, because he would have been reinforced by the Neapolitan troops; and had they not run away, he would also have had the command of many more men, who had deserted General Ferrari, and who now were loudest in their reproaches against Durando, forgetting that no general can win battles without soldiers. When Vicenza had fallen, Padua opened its gates, and Treviso, after a few blows, did the same; and Palmanova, an important fortress which had been long invested, was forced to surrender from want of provisions. Thus all Venetia, except the capital and the fortress of Osopo at the foot of the Alps, was open to him. At last the army of Piedmont advanced. After hesitating till the 10th, it moved on Rivoli: 4000 Austrians whom they found there ran away with great haste, and they were forced back at Corona and Dolce without much opposition. The king intended to attack Verona, but was delayed by the heavy rains; and before he did so, came the news of the surrender of Durando and the return of Radetzki to Verona, which thwarted this plan. Even then, had he thrown himself across the Adige on the straggling forces of the imperialists, he might, it is thought, have defeated them in detail: but he instead began to retreat, thus giving them time to concentrate their forces.

Thus he lost his opportunity, and both armies remained for some time inactive, for Radetzki was not anxious to resume the offensive, as he was waiting for reinforcements.

When the news of Durando's surrender reached Rome, it, as might be expected, caused great perturbation: the noisy brawlers who had for two years kept the city in a ferment were no way slack in abusing the general, and passing their judgment on his tactics in the campaign, being heaven-born military commanders in their own opinions, as well as politicians. He was a man in authority, and one of the king's officers, and that alone was enough for them to know. They had long been jealous of him; and when he was beaten, their scurrility and invective knew no bounds. In the Chamber, however, resolutions were passed to provide for the widows and children of those who had fallen at Vicenza; and a declaration was passed, that the Swiss troops who had fought there deserved the freedom of Rome. The anniversary of the election of the Pope came round: an attempt was made to get up the usual processions to celebrate the event, but it was thinly attended, and not exhilarating. A deputation of the Lower Chamber carried up also an address of congratulation to the Pontiff; but their minds were so occupied with the war of independence and the defeat of the Roman troops that little attention was paid to anything else. Some spoke of a levy in mass of the entire population, some of one thing, some of another; and the public, who were admitted to the gallery to hear the debates, shouted and cheered when anything was said that tickled their fancy. Already speeches containing more invective than wisdom or argument, pointed with petulance rather than sarcasm, were addressed to the gallery by a certain sort of orators, of whom the Prince of Canino was the chief; and this habit of appealing from the elected of the people to the urban population of Rome was itself a symptom of the progress of revolution. The Mini-

ster of Finance had propounded his budget, which included a scheme of issuing assignats and imposing certain taxes. Upon this the Prince of Canino exclaimed, that the tax ought only to fall on the rich, and should strike only at luxury—(or, in other words, that the tax ought to be made as unproductive as possible at the greatest indirect cost to the people; for if the rich were crippled, who was to give employment to the poor? Hence the workmen would have been more injured than if their regular work were not interfered with, and they had been called upon to contribute to the state necessities).

The Chambers at the same time passed a vote of confidence in the Ministry, in order to strengthen them, while the Pope constantly said in conversation that he was anxious to change them, so that what the Chambers did in one direction, he did his best to undo in another. These differences led to the resignation of the Ministry, but it was difficult to find successors; and while there was an open breach, it was impossible to carry out any practical measures. The ministers of foreign states, even the Duc d'Harcourt, the minister of the French republic, though they nominally kept on terms with the ministers, in fact paid court to what they considered the permanent authorities rather than to those who were evidently only an expedient for a time.

In the Chamber of Deputies, the question was long debated as to the address to the Pope, in answer to his speech at the opening of the session and the ministerial programme. At length one was adopted, which, after paying ordinary compliments, requested him to apply his endeavours to assemble an Italian diet at Rome, to establish a league of the Italian States—desired that treaties should be made with Charles Albert and other princes as to carrying on the war—suggested that, though it suited the priestly character of their sovereign to inter-

pose spiritually for the sake of peace, yet that the people could not lay down their arms—complained of the prying interference of the police—desired reformed courts for administering justice, and other intended reforms—attributed the beginning of reforms to the Pontiff, and expressed their earnest intention of carrying out the work he had begun. The Pope, in reply, said he had been much astonished to hear that the Council had been invited to consider the means of carrying on war, when it was well known that he was engaged in negotiating for peace, and that such was against his declared intentions; but accepted their address no further than was consonant with the fundamental statute, and only what was a reply to the address of his delegate, treating the ministerial statement as surplusage.

In the Chamber of Deputies very ridiculous discussions took place, and very wild, extravagant notions were expressed. The Prince of Canino wished it to be declared, that all rights proceeded from the people, a proposition of which absolute princes appear to entertain a mysterious and unaccountable horror; for when rightly and plainly looked at, it is a matter of fact of the most indisputable character, as well as the statement, that "all power proceeds from the people." Right and power are, in the two phrases, equivalent. Now the fact is, that an absolute monarch is an absolute monarch as long as the strongest body of the people he governs choose that he shall be so, and no longer. If they—the most powerful body of his people—do not choose to obey him, how is he to make them? An absolute monarch is no more than a particular form assumed by the will of a tyrant majority; it is, in fact, democracy refracted into a focus —the dominion of brute force; and this fact at once accounts for the similarity of disposition, of policy, and interest, of absolute government and democracy. In both,

the will of the few is forced to submit in all matters to the intolerant will of a majority, who will allow no difference of opinion from themselves. As in the United States of America, so in Russia. In the latter country, the party hostile to the absolute rule of the Emperor is composed of the few highly educated nobles — the minority; while, by the opinion of millions of ignorant serfs, he is kept in his saddle, and is, if rightly considered, the most democratic ruler in Europe. He rules only by the will of the ignorant many, and against the will of the educated and enlightened few. What more can they do in America? Is not the law passed by the autocratic many, prohibiting the sale of fermented liquors in Maine, of a similar complexion with the ukase of the one autocrat?

Hence, if men would consider rightly of the matter, both princes and people would not waste their time in such profitless discussions. The same proposition is true in a mixed constitution like ours, only that the word people is taken in its truer sense, of such a combination of all classes of the community, that none can overrule or ill-treat the other in the long-run—or at least ought not to be able to do so.

Sterbini, in a speech, attacked the king of Naples. Canino and he desired to see Sicily independent, and abused all who recommended moderation in anything. They did all they could to aggravate a breach between the Pope and the Ministry. During all the campaign in Piedmont, France kept aloof from giving any assurances to the King of Sardinia, although he repeatedly asked for them. M. de Lamartine has furnished the reason — nominally, that France might not provoke, or be held responsible for war; but really he considered, that if Charles Albert obtained great success, he would unite Lombardy and Venetia with Piedmont, into a kingdom of Upper Italy. In

this case France would have for her next neighbour a first, instead of second, rate power; therefore an army of the Alps was formed on the frontier of Savoy, to watch events, and to interfere to prevent their accomplishment; and on the other hand, if Charles Albert was thoroughly beaten, Austria might attempt to absorb Piedmont, in which case, too, France would have a neighbour too powerful for her comfort; and in case Austria was inclined to do this, France would enter Piedmont—occupy the fortresses — give the Piedmontese time to recruit — encourage an Italian nationality under French protection instead of under Austrian — a policy, like most other policies, ingenious but selfish; and this was the policy of the immaculate patriots, the first rulers of the Republic.

When Morichini was in Vienna for the purpose of negotiating peace, Austria offered to agree to the independence of Lombardy, if it would undertake to pay part of the Austrian national debt; and that the Duchies should be free to join with Lombardy, and that Venice should have a separate administration and an army of her own under the imperial crown. These offers were made through the mediation of the British ambassador, but Lord Palmerston refused to accept the commission of mediation, unless some of the Venetian provinces were also ceded; and as public opinion ran strongly among the Vienna mob, who then were uppermost, against liberality to any body but themselves, and as France professed an intention of entering into the negotiation, the matter was delayed till the affair was settled by appeal to arms, when successful Austria ran off from her original proposals. Her mob, her functionaries, her army, were anxious to fight—men's passions had been roused: on the other side, the army of Piedmont was equally anxious to fight; and if the European powers had interfered and

imposed peace on any terms, probably both would have been equally disappointed.

By the beginning of July, Charles Albert had got together all his forces. He had in all about 70,000 men, but he was weak in artillery. He had but 120 guns, and many of his troops were raw, ill disciplined, ill accoutred, and not to be depended on; and he did not think himself in a position to make head against the enemy, by resuming the offensive. With an army raw and undisciplined, a different mode of fighting has to be adopted from that which may be advantageously employed with an army of a different kind. As long as they are successful they keep together well enough, but the moment the smallest reverse occurs, the bands of discipline are loosened, and they fall into inextricable confusion. Nothing but the most determined discipline can stand a defeat; therefore, with a raw army, nothing must be risked, for the consequences of one reverse are usually fatal. Yet newspaper editors, scribblers, demagogues, heaven-born strategists, all of them insisted on his doing something—abusing him, as they have done, since his complying with their wishes lost him the victory, and charging him with treachery, cowardice, and ambition, all at once. His first idea was to attack Verona. He then thought of Legnago, and eventually moved on Mantua. The Piedmontese forces were disposed on the line of the Mincio, and occupied both banks, from the Lago di Garda to the Po. Radetzki had at Verona about 40,000 men, 20,000 partly in Mantua and partly about Legnago, and 20,000 in Roveredo; while Prince Lichenstein, with five or six thousand men, had advanced on and occupied Ferrara, and ravaged the country thereabouts. On the 21st of July, the corps of General Thurm advanced on Corona and Rivoli. In the former place the Piedmontese resisted some time, and then, finding an overwhelming

force opposed to them, retired in good order. At Rivoli, General Thurm was repulsed and driven back by Sonaz, who then slowly retreated, expecting an attack in greater force: in fact, Radetzki was, with 40,000 men, coming up from Verona, and was concentrating his forces on Custoza. The Piedmontese army were not able, in the northern part of the line, effectually to resist his advance, and retired fighting, to shelter under the guns of Peschiera. By a feint the Austrians succeeded in crossing the river at Salionze without opposition, and the Piedmontese thought it prudent to retire. When the king heard of it, where he lay before Mantua, he thought it was Radetzki's intention to crush Sonaz, and that he could therefore, by leaving Mantua and marching on Villafranca, take him in flank. He arrived there on the night of the 23d, and on the 24th held a council of war, at which it was determined to endeavour to cut off the Austrians from Verona, and force them over to the right bank, and there, if possible, oblige them to surrender. At first the movement began successfully, by General Bava defeating a body of five or six thousand in the valley of Staffolo, whence they retreated in disorder to the main body; but it is said he did not, as he might have done, win Valleggio. The king hoped to complete their success on the following day, thus having the enemy cut in two and broken; and he sent orders to Sonaz to help them to this result, by making a demonstration from Volta.

Radetzki having become aware of what was intended, rapidly brought up his centre and left wing, and called up some troops from Verona, so that he had about 25,000 men. Bava began his movement at nine in the morning against Valleggio; but finding the enemy in greater force than he had expected, he halted, skirmishing with his outposts and artillery till the other columns should come up: but they did not come up in time, and Radetzki hav-

ing concentrated his forces attacked Custoza and Sommacampagna—thus attacking the Piedmontesse positions, while they were attacking Valleggio. The battle raged long with doubtful success. At length Bava gave orders to retreat; and the centre, no longer able to hold Custoza, fell back; contesting every inch of ground, so that both wings effected their retreat to Villafranca in good order. So far, the loss had not been serious, but at Villafranca the king found himself cut off from his provisions and ammunition, and in a critical position, with his troops exhausted, with an enemy in his front more numerous, and in better condition than himself, and successful, while his men were disheartened by defeat. It became necessary to continue the retreat to Goito, which was effected without loss by mid-day next; while the Austrians passed the river at Valleggio, Monzambano, and Salionze, and both armies occupied the line of the Mincio. On the following day an attempt was made by the Piedmontese to gain possession of Volta, which failed, after a sharply contested action, and the Lombard purveyors of provision took flight from the camp; provisions began to fail; in short, the army of Piedmont was driven from its position and worsted.

The king with the advice of his generals proposed an armistice, offering to retire behind the Olio, but Radetzki required that he should retire behind the Adda and yield up all the fortified places, and the duchies, and restore his prisoners. These conditions he would not listen to, and decided to retreat, and on the evening of the 27th took the road to Cremona, hoping to cover a part of Lombardy and Milan. He attempted to make a stand on the Adda at Lodi, but the division in charge of that spot allowed itself to be surprised, and was cut off from the rest of the army; and he was forced to continue his retreat to Milan, which was reached by the 3d of August,

with the Austrians following pretty close on his heels. Milan was in no condition for defence; a few trenches had been dug, and a few obstructions to the defenders been removed when the Austrians came up. The king's troops were diminished to 25,000 men; a division of 15,000 men, and the best part of the artillery having crossed the Po; and many had disbanded and fled. He made, however, a last struggle to save the city, and drew up his troops in front of it. The Austrians attacked them, broke their line, and forced them back on the town: barricades were erected, and the inhabitants and the civic guard were anxious to fight; but the king, feeling sure that the city could not be held, and that its defence would merely exasperate the enemy, and be a useless expenditure of blood, wished to save it, and sent to propose an armistice; offering to evacuate the city and to retire out of Lombardy beyond the Ticino. Radetzki assented; two days were allowed for retreat, and one for such of the inhabitants to depart as chose to do so; and he also promised to respect property and persons.

When the terms of the armistice were known in the city, a great cry was raised of treachery. The republican and Austrian party combined to befoul the king, and got together a riotous mob, attacked the palace, and cursing him for a traitor, threatened to prevent his egress. But he thereupon cancelled the agreement, and declared, if they would fight and be buried beneath the ruins of the city, he was willing to share their fate. When it came to this, the municipality and the bellicose party fell soft, and the agreement was to be acted on; but they still vented their rage on the king, firing musketry at his windows and threatening his life, in so much that he was obliged to wait till night before he made his exit, and was then obliged to clear the streets with his infantry before he could get out. The Austrians were to enter next day at

noon, the 6th of August. On the 9th, the armistice was definitely concluded. The armies were to be divided by the ancient boundary of Lombardy and Piedmont; the fortresses of Peschiera, Rocca d'Anfo, and Osopo were to be given up, and the territory of Venice; and the Piedmontese fleet was to leave the Adriatic.

Thus was the campaign ended: and thus failed the effort to free the Italians from the Austrian yoke. It failed, partly because the Pope was too weak-minded fairly to join the national cause, but halted between two opinions; because the republican party were more desirous of tyrannizing over the rest of their fellow-citizens, than of liberating anybody from anything; and because they helped the King of Naples to follow his own inclinations by their disorderly behaviour, and thus caused the recall of his troops at one of the most critical periods of the campaign; and because the King of Naples was friendly to Austria and absolute rule, and inclined to escape from opposing them by any loophole that their riotous behaviour would furnish him.—"Et quid turba Remi? sequitur fortunam ut semper et odit damnatos."

When the news of the occupation of Ferrara by the Austrians under Prince Lichenstein reached Rome on the 17th of July, the Pope and the populace were exceedingly incensed: both houses of parliament addressed the former, and he protested against the violation of the States of the Church; and the latter in their clubs hurled denunciations at everybody. The rule of the clubs had been gradually increasing in disorderliness; the disbanded papal soldiers, after the capitulation of Vicenza, added to the general uproar; the provinces followed in the same course; the plague of assassinations increased, for they were perpetrated in broad daylight, and the authorities dared not prosecute, nor did the citizens dare to give evidence; and demonstrations of mob rule and against mob rule were usual. For

it was attempted, on homœopathic principles, to cure disorder by disorder.

The ministry of Mamiani was suspected by the Pope and the court, denounced by the rabble, and only supported by the moderate men of a little ordinary sense, a class in Rome at that time possessing neither numerical nor political importance. The ministry only continued in office because no one else could be found daring enough to undertake the responsibility. An attempt had been made to form a ministry with Pellegrino Rossi for its head; for since the revolution of February had deprived him of his embassy and other French appointments, he had been residing at Rome in a private capacity. But though a liberal who had been in exile, as has been previously mentioned, he was unpopular with the rabble, and denounced at the clubs, although, and perhaps because, the Pope had some confidence in him. As a man of abilities and distinction he was much considered by such as consider such qualifications; but he felt that he would be unpopular with the clergy because of his previous life and writings, as well as his having married a protestant, so the negotiation came to nothing. Sterbini had declared that if he appeared in parliament as the Pope's minister he should be stoned; and when the failure of the negotiation was known, the rabble and the clubs cheered Mamiani and abused the priests.

The parliament did its best to preserve tranquillity, but was unable, from constant harass, to attend to law-making or carrying out reforms. The civic guard, instead of preserving order, themselves were a cause of disorder. This "palladium of Roman liberties" one day attempted to get possession of the gates of the castle of St Angelo. Cries of "To arms" were heard in the streets. Violent members of the lower house and the populace in the galleries would hear no one of an opposite opinion from their

own: thus is freedom frequently practised by those who are in their own opinion its most ardent votaries.

Such was the condition of Rome when the news of the battles near Custoza arrived. At first came a report of a signal victory of the Italians. All the church-bells were ringing and the people shouting; but soon the dreary truth was known. The cause of Italy was well-nigh lost. The deputies, at the motion of the Prince of Canino, addressed the Pope, calling on him to levy troops, and put the civic guard in motion to save the cause of Italy. He took their address into consideration; but this next step in the midst of the confusion was, on the following day, finally to dismiss the Mamiani ministry; and on the next day, the 3d of August, he published a proclamation, announcing that Count Fabbri had undertaken to form a ministry, declared his intention to defend the integrity of his states, and complained of the capital having been polluted by sacrilege. The populace having murdered some priests, were highly disgusted at the term of sacrilege being applied to them and to the occupation by some troops of the College of Gesu, and they tore down the proclamation. Thus fell the Mamiani administration, after having been for some months in the throes of dissolution. Though led by a moderate man, it had been able to effect but little, from the distrust of the one side and the turbulence of the other. Desirous of compromise, Mamiani had naturally offended both sides, not from his faults but theirs.

After the defeat of the Piedmontese, the Austrian army pressed forward, and passing the Lombard frontiers menaced Tuscany and Romagna. The intervention of the English and French ambassadors saved the former, but General Von Welden advanced against the States of the Church, breathing threats and vengeance, and saying that he was a friend to the Pope, but a foe to all who should

resist him. The country people of that province rose in arms, and the cities of Ferrara and Bologna threatened resistance. The Pope protested, declared that the Austrians were no friends of his, and that he made common cause with his people, and sent Cardinal Marini and Prince Corsini, and Guerini, to Welden to ask the reason of his violence, and to request him to withdraw, and to say that if he would not, the Pope would use military means to make him. The military in the menaced cities were tied by the capitulations of Vicenza and Treviso, and their commanders would not violate them, so they were marched from the scene of action. In Bologna there remained to preserve order only 200 carabineers, the customhouse officers, and the civic guard. The Prolegate Bianchetti sent to Welden to protest against the invasion, and to know his intentions. He replied that he should encamp round Bologna, and that city must maintain him till he received guaranties for order and tranquillity from the Pope; and on the 7th of August he encamped. On the 9th some of the officers, who were walking through the city, and some of the inhabitants, came to a misunderstanding. It is not easy to learn in these cases the origin of a quarrel, but they mutually fell upon each other, and insult was answered by insult. Welden required the offenders, or six respectable persons as hostages, to be given up to him. The prolegate had himself volunteered to give himself up as one of them, but the people rose, barricaded the city, rang the alarm bells; the rustics rushed into the town; firing on the Austrians began from the windows and housetops. The Austrians, on their part, fired grape-shot and musketry on the Italians. The battle raged four hours, when the undisciplined people succeeded in driving out the Austrian soldiery, with some assistance from the 200 carabineers and the civic guard. A committee of public safety was named; means were arranged for making a desperate

defence. Volunteers flocked in, and a fresh attack was expected, when it became known that the Pope's legates had arrived; that Radetzki had recalled Welden, and that the danger was over for the present. This news, when it arrived in Rome, produced a violent stir. "The people had vanquished," was a theme to occupy club-spouters and pot-house orators. The houses of parliament and the ministry endeavoured to stir up the people to oppose the Austrians; and the Pope was indignant and protested.—(It is difficult to understand on what principle these protests were made: he had certainly sufficiently participated in the war to give Austria a right to consider him at war with them.)

But Bologna, though it had defeated the Austrians, had a worse foe within its walls. The scourings of all Italy had got together to defend it; and finding the Austrians gone and themselves in possession of arms, they resorted to their accustomed luxuries of assassination and violence. They had got the arms of the civic guard; the citizens were cowed by their volunteer defenders; murders were committed in open day, and no one dared arrest or punish. The mob levied contributions of arms, and of furniture for barracks, obtained the pay of soldiers and of workmen at the same time by virtue of bayonets, and called themselves the "people," whose name they disgraced. M. Farini was despatched from Rome to restore quiet, which he would have hardly succeeded in doing had not one of the many-headed fortunately assassinated one of the carabineers, who had hitherto been very lax in helping to keep order. Upon this his companions seized the assassin, and volunteered to help to keep down the populace, who had slain police-officers, judges, and government officers, without their interfering. They sallied out, arrested and disarmed some of the ruffians, and were seconded by some dragoons who had just arrived and some of the civic guard.

The citizens took heart and cheered them: a corps of Swiss arrived with loaded guns and lighted matches, and gradually order was restored; and Zambianchi, the mob-leader, was put in prison. But the rural parts were still for some time infested with plunderers.

At Rome, the credit of the Fabbri ministry being on the decline, it prayed for its discharge; and Rossi was again called in, and his ministry was gazetted on the 10th of September. It was from the first unpopular in the streets and the suburbs, as he had a reputation for firmness: it was known that he was determined to preserve order at all cost. The fortress of Peschiera was, on intelligence of the terms of the armistice, delivered up to the Austrians, but not before it had sustained and repulsed an attack made the same day as the battle of Custoza. Osopo was defended by Venetian volunteers, and they repudiated the terms of the capitulation, and held the place for upwards of two months. Some troops who, under Giacomo Durando, held the Rocca d'Anfo, retreated into Switzerland; and about 1000 men, under Garibaldi, who had made himself celebrated in Monte Video, with whom was Mazzini, made an attempt on the Lago Maggiore to raise what they called a people's war, branding all kings, princes, rulers, generals, and those in authority, under the general and comprehensive epithet of traitors. Venice, garrisoned by about 20,000 men, and defended by her inaccessible position, still held out. The Sardinian fleet had not been able to effect any thing of consequence, because of the desertion of the Neapolitans; and on the news of the armistice they withdrew to Ancona, but remained in the Adriatic, because they alleged that the Austrians had not given up the Piedmontese guns that were at Peschiera according to stipulation.

At Naples, after the explosion of republican ardour on the 15th of May, which gave the first wound to the new-born liberties of the Italians, and the suppression of the

outbreak in Calabria, with little difficulty but much bloodshed, the electoral colleges were convoked for the 15th of June. The elections came; the members of the parliament dissolved on the 15th of May were everywhere re-elected. The king, though at the beginning of his reign not undisposed to moderate reforms, had become disgusted by the perpetual follies of republicans and conspirators; as the national cause receded in the north, so he advanced in despotic hankerings in the south. The parliament was troublesome; and, on the 5th of September, it was prorogued till November 30, and a mob went about Naples crying "Live the king—perish the nation," a sentiment more remarkable for its loyalty than its patriotism. Whether the mob was expressly hired for the job, or took that way of showing gratitude to the king for allowing them, on the 15th of May, the privilege of pillaging, does not appear; but it does seem that the dregs of the people are not fit depositaries of political power.

Leghorn is inhabited by the offscouring of all nations, and the scum of all Italy. In ordinary times it was with difficulty kept quiet by the Tuscan government. There political factions had taken root as in a congenial soil. The Grand Duke had not shown himself hostile to reforms, and had governed in a mild and conciliatory spirit. He was an easy-going man, more anxious for quiet than amelioration; but he had granted a representative constitution, and sent help to the war. When the Tuscans had been worsted in Lombardy, those who returned added to the disorders in Leghorn, for there was not in the rest of Tuscany to be found any deep-seated discontent. Gavazzi, who arrived there on the 24th of August, preached fresh causes of excitement, and his expulsion caused irritation. Rioting occurred in the streets of Leghorn, telegraphs were broken, newspapers burned, the Governor Guinige was seized, a reduction in the price of salt, popular election for the officers

of the civic guard, a reform of the law courts, &c., were demanded. The insurgents threatened to set up a provisional government. The ministry sent as a commissioner Leonetti Cipriani, with full powers and some forces. He ordered the clubs to be shut up: his ordinance was torn down. Some dragoons were attacked by the mob, and one soldier was wounded: artillery was drawn out on the evening of the 2d of September, and pointed on the streets. A sanguinary battle began, which ended in Cipriani being driven out, and being obliged next day to escape by sea. A municipal government was named; and a breach effected by which Tuscany was divided against itself.

The parliament of Sicily, on the 13th of April, had declared that the King of Naples had for ever forfeited the Sicilian crown, and it was agreed to confer the vacant throne on an Italian prince. England offered to recognise any sovereign the islanders might choose, but hinted it had better be an Italian prince. Sicily had grievous wrongs to complain of. She had had a reasonable form of government established there when the English held the island during the last war, which was guaranteed to Sicily by Naples at the union; but no sooner was the union effected than Naples repudiated her part of the bargain. Some adventurers went to assist the insurgents in Calabria; but on the failure of that effort, no further attack was made on Naples. On the 11th of July, the parliament elected the Duke of Genoa, the second son of Charles Albert, to be King of Sicily, under the title of "Alberto Amedeo the First," and sent envoys to offer him the crown, but it was not eventually accepted, for Charles Albert was afraid of further complicating the already tangled web of his affairs; and the throne remained vacant, or only temporarily occupied by Rugero Settimo, who was called regent.

Venice, when it learned the armistice that had been con-

cluded between the Austrians and the army of Piedmont, decreed its separation from Lombardy, and reproclaimed the republic of St Mark, and vigorously prepared for defence. Venice had in this time of trouble given an example of moderation and reasonable conduct which might be followed with advantage by demagogues. Nationally and traditionally inclined to re-establish the form of government under which her glory among the people of the earth had been established, after the expulsion of the Austrian garrison, turbulent mob orators did not lead her rabble, disorders were not committed in her streets; and when events seemed to point to the establishment of a kingdom of Upper Italy, she chose to sacrifice her own peculiar predilections and traditions rather than weaken the cause of Italian independence—an example which, had it been followed by all who called themselves patriots, a very different result might have been attained; and now when, from the misdeeds of others, that object seemed unattainable, the Queen of the Adriatic again declared her independence, and prepared to suffer and resist in the cause of Italy, though deserted by every ally.

During the war the domestic peace of Piedmont had been disturbed by some disorders at Genoa, and by the jealousy of Turin, that in case of a union with Lombardy, Milan should become the capital, a fear which ceased of course after the armistice. Thus stood the domestic concerns of Italy at the conclusion of the campaign. Italian independence was clearly a hopeless cause. Perhaps, on the whole, if, during the first astounding success of the mob in driving out the Austrians, the king had fallen with more vigour on them as they retreated—in short, had he been a Napoleon or a Wellington, perhaps Lombardy might never again have been Austrian. But the opportunity was lost: at that moment, popular enthusiasm would have had its effect on the Austrians, already disheartened and re-

treating, but in the long-run the latter were better troops, better disciplined, better commanded, and less given to mutiny and turbulence; and in a continued campaign these qualifications are essentials to success. As it was, the king appears to have neglected some opportunities, and not to have acted on any decided plan, and to have been too much driven about by any wind of popular desire; while Radetzki acted on a decided scheme, and if he did not always meet with success, he at any rate made his arrangements to meet the chances of failure. But that the Austrian general had a very up-hill game to play, is evident from the fact that in the first instance, when Austria had to fight with all her provinces on the borders of rebellion, she offered to give up Lombardy altogether on its being charged with a portion of the Austrian debt. At the same time it must not be forgotten that Charles Albert's troops were by no means fit for an adventurous campaign of the sort: that the policy he adopted was apparently the prudent one. The only question is, whether, under the circumstances, rashness might not have won the day where prudence failed.

That Charles Albert was not the man for the occasion is clear enough; but there was no lack of causes that must have led him to hesitate. Domestic feuds and civil disorders, no less than foreign diplomacy, restrained his action and impeded his movements. Behind him were republicans plotting at Milan, and creating or threatening disturbances in his rear, and abroad Lord Palmerston was doing his best to restrain him, in hopes of a pacific solution of the case. France, too, he could not trust. Scarce had he turned his back on Piedmont when a column of marauders from Lyons entered it thus denuded of troops, and were only expelled by the inhabitants themselves. The workmen of Lyons, to the number of 30,000, whom financial and political convulsions had thrown out

of work, were gnashing their teeth with rage, and threatening to follow the example. On the other hand, Austria appeared to be in the last throes of dissolution. Could he but prolong the campaign, Radetzki must withdraw from the unequal contest. Cut off from his supplies, he must shortly perish from exhaustion. Diplomacy, too, succeeded in preventing his destroying Austrian commerce on the sea, for fear of incensing the parliament of professors sitting at Frankfort. Altogether he was hampered in all directions. Again, his military moves were dictated, not by military motives, but with a view to diplomatic or political objects. Thus inactive from the restraining causes, he was at times forced imprudently into action by the vociferous outcry of noisy politicians.

Had he been master of his position, he would at once, on crossing the borders, have assumed the dictatorship of Lombardy, levied what supplies he wanted, kept the disorderly volunteers from mutiny by strict discipline; and, at any rate, if he could not have made soldiers of them, he could at least have prevented them talking. The Italians, well disciplined, make excellent troops as long as they are successful and in action; but still or beaten, they always fall into disorder. The only chance of success, as things turned out, would have been the bold course of determined action. But in endeavouring to make war so as to leave an accommodation possible, he lost everything; while by allowing the mutinous and boastful volunteers a perfect liberty of speech, not only was he brought constantly into scrapes, but all information leaked out to the enemy; while, on the other hand, he could with difficulty learn anything of their movements. The campaign was unsuccessful, both because the king did not know how to use his opportunities, and because the people whom he came to deliver did not know how to make use of their deliverer.

CHAPTER V.

FROM THE MURDER OF ROSSI TO THE FLIGHT OF THE POPE TO GAETA, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SUPREME JUNTA AT ROME.

A STATESMAN who endeavours to calm and restrain the clamours of popular excitement until it has fully run its course, until popular license and continued disturbance have produced sufferings and reflection in the many, is certain of being stigmatized as a tyrant. Men will not be taught, they must buy experience.

The ministry of Rossi was not, as has been said, popular with the Roman mob or the high ecclesiastical or Sanfedist parties. There could be nothing so objectionable to the riotous, debauched, and disorderly, as a man who was determined to preserve order at all costs; while a minister who was also determined to uphold and carry out the fundamental statute, was of course unpopular with the Retrogradists. He was cursed by the former as a reactionist, and by the latter as a destructive. In the capital the mob was more disorderly and demoralized than in the provinces; hence Rossi had fewer friends in Rome than elsewhere. At Bologna, where they had lately had experience of the blessings of anarchy, his

supporters were numerous. The finances required the first and most vigorous attention of the minister. He abolished the ordinance which prohibited the export of silver, which had been only productive of smuggling, and persuaded the Pope that the time had come to make the clergy contribute to the state necessities. He summoned General Zucchi from Switzerland to hold the office of minister at war, for the purpose of re-organizing the army, and reducing it to a state of discipline, as a means not only of defence, but of preserving order at home. He took care that those who had been wounded in the war of independence, and the families of those who had been killed, should be provided for. It was arranged that the Pope should confer knighthood on officers who had distinguished themselves. The ministers ordered the construction of two lines of telegraph, which were hitherto wholly wanting in the Roman states—one from Rome to Civita Vecchia, and one from Rome to Ferrara: and set on foot a scheme for the formation and consolidation of a league or federation of the Italian states, beginning with Piedmont, Tuscany, and Rome, and allowing the other Italian states to come into it when they thought fit; the object being to have a central power who should make peace and war, who should regulate traffic and commerce, and assimilate the coins, weights, and measures of the members of the league, in order that free intercourse might bring about a real community of interests or national spirit.

But the negotiations for this purpose came to nothing, partly owing to a change in the Piedmontese ministry. Rossi then drew up a sketch of a convention for a confederation of states, but this did not meet the views of Piedmont. That state wished only for an offensive and defensive alliance, and a guarantee on the part of Tuscany and Rome of her states, old or new, and Rome was not

prepared to follow this course. In short, Piedmont wanted military aid and the command of troops, and Rossi wanted a political league in which the contingents were fixed, the army organized and disciplined, and means taken for forming gradually a strong and permanent federal power, to which the other Italian states might be inclined eventually to adhere. Piedmont said, give us troops and help, and we will negotiate afterwards: Rossi said, fix the contingents we are to send you, and the terms on which we are to send you them, first. In favour of the suggestion of Piedmont, there was the want of immediate help on the termination of the armistice with Austria: in favour of the Roman plan was the more stable and permanent character to be given to the federation and the advance of an Italian nationality. But it is perfectly clear that either plan was better than neither, and both were wrong in not giving way to the other at such a crisis. Perhaps if they could have agreed to nothing else, they might have agreed that one of their plans should be adopted, and left it to chance to decide which, and when chance had decided, to have firmly adhered to its decision.

While the governments were thus quarrelling about trifles comparatively, others were sowing sedition and disorder for the proposed transferring of all rule to the mob, and turning all Italy into a republic, under their tender and considerate reign. Leghorn was still in uproar—Bologna was in dismay. The Tuscan national guard, who had been called out to make a demonstration against the former city, deterred by conspirators and sedition-mongers, came but slowly, and possibly also dreading, on personal grounds, a collision with an angry mob. The Grand Duke was called a traitor for taking up arms against his people, as if the disreputable vagabonds who ruled in the streets of Leghorn had any title to the name.

The ministry fell, and was succeeded by one more dem-

ocratic, founded on club rule in the streets, who spoke of a constituent assembly for Italy, elected by universal suffrage by the whole Italian people, having no regard either to princes, treaties, or the rights of any one—a proposal of course immensely popular with street legislators.

At Turin, on the other hand, at the suggestion of Gioberti, a number of persons from various states met to consult on the subject of a federation in a sort of amateur congress, at which both Rome and Naples took offence, dreading the influence of Piedmont; but this meeting is said to have exercised no real influence on the subsequent events. Meanwhile, the Rossi ministry busied itself in reducing the finances to order, in raising money, in regulating commerce, and in the encouragement of commercial enterprise. It paid attention to the universities and the hospitals. The credit of the state under their care was gradually reviving: the interest on the Rothschild loan was punctually paid, and the sums wanted for the immediate government purposes were obtained without difficulty. Altogether, confidence was becoming gradually restored; even some of the newspapers usually in opposition were speaking in praise of the ministry. Bologna testified its approbation by electing Rossi for its deputy, having occasion to choose one. The party of *disorder* hated him heartily. They said he was haughty in his manner, and they disapproved of some of his French friends, and complained that he had re-combined the ecclesiastic and lay foreign departments. But the real ground of their malevolence was that they loved disorder, and hated whatever interfered with them.

Rossi was unpopular with the functionaries and magistrates, because he kept them at work; and with the priests, because he had taxed them. When Zucchi arrived at Rome, he took vigorous measures to bring the disorderly rogues who composed the papal army into order, and their hymn

of vituperation against the ministers was added to that of the other malcontents. Rossi was anxious to proceed at once to the reorganization of the courts of law, but he drew on his head all the clerical judges, advocates, legal prelates, long robes and short robes, proctors, beadles, criers, and appurtenances—even the hackney-coachmen, who were persuaded they should lose their fares in conveying clients from one court to another in search of justice. At the end of October, the rabble took offence at the Jews, and made an attack on their quarters, but they were brought to reason by the carabineers and the civic guard. Tuscany was in violent confusion—the democratic ministry had endeavoured to make it the centre of the new Italy of the mob, and had even themselves got weary of the host of vagabonds of all countries, climates, and complexions, who had flocked there with the view of assisting in this laudable intention. Bologna was disturbed by the presence of Garibaldi, and Zucchi went there and succeeded in getting rid of him; but the country about it was still infested with plunderers and assassins. He disarmed all persons not on the rolls of the civic guard, and sent Father Gavazzi off under arrest to Rome, as he was said to be rather extravagant in his preaching; and Sterbini and the Prince of Canino, who had lately returned from Turin and Florence, where they had consorted with the clubs, fell to abusing Rossi and his ministry, and praising the democratic ministers of Tuscany, and talking of the wonders to be accomplished by an Italian Constituent Assembly. All these circumstances incensed the mob against Rossi. If he was obliged to send some foreigners off to the frontier, it was denounced as tyranny; if he brought up the carabineers to keep order, he was about to effect a "*coup d'état;*" if an alteration were made in the chamber, he was narrowing the accommodation for the public. On the 14th of November, the day before the opening of the Chambers,

the government Gazette contained an article describing the state of parties. There was one who were intent on plunging the people in anarchy; the other on restoring the past—that both, though with discordant objects, were striving together to upset the constitution which had been established, and that the means by which both hoped to attain their end was disorder, and that, in the reassembling of the parliament, they had the best possible safeguard of order. On the following morning the "Contemporaneo" wrote that the diplomatists of Europe had set about their task. That they were steeped in the blood of bombarded cities; that the administrative clique, of which Metternich and Guizot were the head, were endeavouring to crush the nations of the earth, and till they had succeeded would repeat the slaughters of Naples, Messina, Palermo, Prague, Frankfort, and Vienna; that this school had penetrated to Rome, and that Rossi was to make the experiment on that people. This is the usual style of persons who have no particular charge to make, and is calculated, as it is intended, to rouse the mob to outbreaks and violence. As to the truth or falsehood, the sense or nonsense of the charges made, that is not in any country a matter of the slightest consideration. When disproved, they have probably served their temporary object. So it was here. All this vituperation had excited the populace. A plot was formed to rid Rome of a minister so rigid and unbending—so determined to repress riots and tumults, and under whose rule the mob leaders must sink into insignificance.

On the morning of the 15th there was no show of disturbance—no sign that would have led any one to expect a popular outbreak. There were a few knots of persons talking quietly of parliament and the ministers, but the government had taken measures to preserve order, and indeed there did not appear on the part of the public any

disposition to break it; but it was known that the seditious were busy. A number of conspirators had agreed, it is said, that the minister should be assassinated. They had decided by lot which of them was to strike. A surgeon had instructed him how to deliver the deadliest blow, which, by dividing the great artery of the neck, would at once destroy life. The assassin had practised on a model so as to be sure of his victim, if he got the opportunity. The minister received anonymous letters, in which his life was threatened, but he took no notice of them. He had left it to the president to call in what force he thought necessary to preserve order near the chamber. On the morning of the 15th, he received a letter warning him of his approaching death. A priest even violated the secrets of the confessional, and intimated to him, as he was entering his carriage, the danger he ran; but he would not stay at home. He was a man of too haughty and courageous a disposition to be easily daunted. He said it was his duty to go to the chamber: that if any one thirsted for his blood, there were plenty of opportunities for shedding it.

About noon the square of the Canceleria and the public galleries of the chambers were full of people. A battalion of the civic guard was drawn up in the square. There were a number of persons armed with daggers, in the dress of the volunteers who had returned from Vicenza, and wearing the medals with which they had been decorated: these formed a line from the gate to the staircase of the palace. Rossi's carriage entered the court of the palace, with Righetti, the deputy-minister of finance, on his left hand. A howl of execration was raised at him in the court. He got out of the carriage. Righetti was separated from him by the throng brandishing their cutlasses, and loading him with reproaches. As Rossi turned to one who addressed him, a poniard gleamed in the air and struck him,

inflicting a broad deep gash on the neck. He fell, and the blood spouted from the wound. Those in the uniform of the volunteers gathered round and watched him dying, and then rejoined their companions. Not an attempt was made to seize the murderer, and it was only in May 1854, that a sculptor of the name of Constantadini was convicted of the crime. Thus died Pellegrino Rossi the death of a Cæsar. "Dulce et decorum pro patria mori."

In the hall of the deputies a cry was heard for help. There came a rumour that Rossi was wounded, and such of the members as were of the medical profession left the hall to assist. No one knew what was the truth. Some denied the rumour. Some said he was dead, but not one of them rose to protest against the crime or to denounce the murderer. They gradually separated, and the chamber was left empty. Among the people outside, some few appeared drunk with fiendish delight, but the greater portion were horror-stricken at the event. The majority of citizens, even of liberal opinions, would have supported the authorities, had they acted with firmness and decision. But they were perfectly unmanned, and the Pope was incapable of acting. He ordered Montanari, the minister of commerce, to take the helm for the moment, and attempted to find men to form a new ministry. He ordered Calderari, the colonel of the carabineers, to arrest some well known agitators, and make search for the perpetrators of the crime, but he did nothing. The persons of whom he wished to form his new ministry would not undertake the responsibility: indeed, there were enormous difficulties in the distance besides the immediate one, for Piedmont was notoriously preparing to renew the war at the termination of the armistice; and how was Rome to be governed, with the Pope's known determination to call himself neuter? Time was wasted, and no resolutions taken. It was not

too late, if the troops had been got together and put under command of energetic and trustworthy persons, to have yet saved Rome from the mad freaks of revolution. During the night the carabineers were induced to fraternize with the rabble, and to join a procession of rascals shouting curses on the murdered man. Their colonel Calderari advised them not to resist the people, and said he would not oppose them: thus did military treason establish mob rule. Towards midnight the city became tranquil, but the Pope hesitated: he might still have got troops together into the Quirinal, and called up the artillery. There was not a respectable person in Rome that would not have helped him if he had answered the rioters, who were an infinitesimal portion of the people, with grape-shot and bayonets; but the decent portion of society was paralyzed by the incapable persons who ought to have taken the requisite measures, and who having twelve hours in hand for that purpose, talked, negotiated, and did nothing. Had a firm front been presented to the turbulent on the next day, few in number, they would have at once melted away. At day-break the Pope resolved to call in the presidents of the two councils and Minghetti, but before they arrived, news came that the clubs were preparing a demonstration for the purpose of asking the Pope for a popular ministry and a constituent assembly for Italy, but in a pacific manner. The Pope did not decide on either receiving them or preventing them from coming, and gradually the soldiers got among the people; the churchmen rushed hither and thither in despair. They were wholly incompetent either to advise or act in such a crisis. Some committed themselves to the care of God, but neglected the precautions which were necessary to take care of themselves. The greater part did industriously nothing but wring their hands.

No one put the palace in a state to be defended, or gar-

risoned it so as to resist an attack. There were but the ordinary guard of honour of a few Swiss and Carabineers, perhaps 80 or 100 men. The insurgents moved along the Piazza del Popolo increasing as they marched: there were mixed with them soldiers, civic guards, and disbanded volunteers. Meeting with Galleti, they brought him along with them to lay their demands before the Pope. He, with Livio Mariani and some other leaders, went in. The Pope indignantly refused to come to terms or recognise their interference. When it was announced to the rioters that the Pope would not give way to force, but must be allowed to deliberate in perfect freedom, they cried, "To arms," and those who had left them behind rushed to get them, and returned to the Quirinal. They mounted the roofs of houses and churches, and began to fire musket shots at the walls and windows, and the Swiss guards in return fired on them; a strong company of Carabineers under Calderari reached the spot: the mob wavered; he stretched out his hand and beckoning to them, said he was their friend and was come to help them. Galleti went back to endeavour to obtain concessions from the Pope, but in vain. The Swiss said they would fight it out and protect the Pope. A force of artillery was brought, and was on the point of being fired at the palace. A prelate, Monsigniore Palma, was killed in his own apartments: the shot entered the antechamber of the Pope, when he, turning to the diplomatic body who were round him, said, he must yield to necessity, but that he acted under compulsion, and that his acts would be invalid; he hoped that yielding would prevent bloodshed and other enormities; and thereupon he sent for Galleti and gave him instructions as to the formation of a ministry. Rosmini's name was written at the head of the list, although some of the crowd cried they would have no more priests. Mamiani was second, Galleti, Sereni,

Sterbini, &c., sufficiently demonstrated its character. Galleti announced the news that the Pope had nominated a democratic ministry, and that it was referred to the parliament to deliberate on a constituent assembly for Italy, an announcement responded to by cheers, songs, and blank cartridge.

Rosmini's name had been put down without asking his leave, and he next morning somewhat disdainfully refused to receive the seals of office from the rabble in the streets, and Muzzarelli was named in his stead, who was in favour of the insurgents, and had expressed his opinion to the Pope that the murder of Rossi was a blessing. The ministry issued a manifesto asserting the principle of an Italian nationality to be arranged by the convocation of a constituent assembly at Rome. It was signed by Muzzarelli, Galleti, Sterbini, and Lunati, who were the only ministers then in Rome, and of these Sterbini had the only real power; he ruled in the clubs and the streets: and in those days, that implied ruling everywhere else. The club of the people had made itself the oligarchy of Rome. They desired that the Swiss should be disarmed and sent away; and the Swiss were disarmed and sent away. The club desired that Galleti should be general of the Carabineers, and he was so. They were in fact the only authority in Rome. Everything else was topsy-turvy, and so despotically was their authority exercised that not a newspaper was permitted to denounce the murder of the late minister. Talk of liberty of the press!! Leghorn was illuminated in honour of the event, and though those heartily rejoicing were probably few, how deeply must degradation have entered into the soul of the people. How thoroughly depraved, where scarce a voice was uttered from one end of the peninsula to the other in condemnation of the most atrocious of human crimes—alas! so common in Italy—for fear of democracy rampant

in the streets. Such are the effects of slavery, whether under autocrats or mobs. The government itself refused to allow the deputies to investigate the murder, Prince Canino declaring that the Italian people were real sovereigns of Italy, and would shatter thrones, chambers, and everything else that opposed the will of the first country in the world (meaning Italy). The great unwashed in the galleries intimidated the deputies and compelled them to stifle the inquiry, a circumstance which Pantaleoni desired might be recorded in the minutes, that it might be known what freedom they had to deliberate. The Bolognese deputies, finding that the populace of Rome was to rule the parliament of the country, indignantly withdrew, and addressed their constituents explaining the reason. Some of the other ministers reached Rome in a few days and accepted office. Mamiani, who arrived on the 23d, after consulting with the Pope, refused.

Thus did the club of the people and the mob become in fact sovereign lords of Rome. A minister stabbed—a popular insurrection—an attempt to intimidate the Pope—his resistance—the riotous attack on the palace—a prelate shot through his window—and the coercion of the Pope, followed each other in rapid succession. It was clear that the authority of the Pontiff was annihilated, all order was at an end; and he took the resolution of leaving Rome.

A few days later, he received a gift from the bishop of Avignon, a silver box, containing the consecrated wafer which Pius the Sixth used to wear in exile; he looked on it as an omen, and confided his intention to a few of the most attached of his household. It was known to some members of the diplomatic body, and had been several times privately discussed with them; probably as a contingency at first, latterly as a thing that would have to be come to at last. Thus he was driven to leave the city

where, within two years, he had been the idol of the populace, their toy, their loathing, and the object of their violence. Thus ended all prospect of any regular or solid reforms; henceforth it was evident that violent folly could only be the rule. Had the Pope himself been a man of firmness as well as amiability, things had never come to such a pass: had he even trusted to persons firmer than himself, he might have carried through the ameliorations on which he was bent; but, incompetent himself, he was the cause of incompetency in others: he himself was the originator of the tempest which he was unable to guide.

The resolution taken by the Pope to leave Rome can scarce appear extraordinary: that the intentions of the extreme party were anything but loyal to him as a constitutional sovereign, is evident. On the 22d of November, Castellani, the Venetian envoy, wrote to his government that the heads of that party had asked him whether the time were not come for proclaiming a republic, and that he had answered, that "to the cheers upon the birth of a republic the cannon of an invading army would be the reply."

Most of the persons to whom the Pope had confided his purpose to depart approved of the intention. The Duc d'Harcourt the French, Martinez de la Rosa the Spanish, and Count Spaur the Bavarian ministers, were agreed as to the propriety of his departure, but were not unanimous as to the point to which he should direct his steps. Some thought of his going to Bologna, which city having gone through the throes of mob rule, and having recovered the blessings of re-established order, was not disposed to turbulence; some thought that he should go to Civita Vecchia, where he could be protected by the ships of war of foreign states from the dangers of domestic faction; the Duc d'Harcourt was anxious that he should take refuge in

France; De la Rosa was ambitious to offer him an asylum in Spain; and Spaur was desirous that he should find a refuge in the Neapolitan territory. With these ministers and with his own relatives and attendants, the plans of his escape were frequently discussed. Even members of the constitutional party were not averse to his leaving Rome till order should be restored; but they were kept from consulting with him by an intimation that they would compromise their own safety if they did, as all persons visiting the Quirinal were remarked by the clubs, and the men of moderate principles were looked on by them with more distrust than any other persons. Cardinal Antonelli was charged by the Pontiff with the requisite preparations, who advised his driving out some day through the city, or to St Peter's, to show confidence, so that he might be less narrowly watched, and that when he did go out of Rome, his having been previously seen moving about might make his going out look less suspicious. He inclined to the opinion that he ought not to quit his own dominions, but should nominate a ministry to govern according to the provisions of the fundamental statute, through whom he should give his orders.

The definitive decision as to his departure was taken by the Pope with the knowledge and advice of the French, Spanish, and Bavarian ministers and Cardinal Antonelli. He was himself inclined to accept the offer of a refuge in France; but the uncertain state of the French government kept him undecided; for though he trusted Cavaignac, he did not trust his rival Louis Napoleon. He also thought of accepting the Spanish offer, and taking shelter in the Balearic Isles. But there was no Spanish steamer ready to sail. He thought of going to Gaeta, a port of the neighbouring kingdom of Naples, where a Spanish vessel might call for him, and preparations were made for his taking both routes, that is to say, to Civita Vecchia and

to Gaeta. The Duc d'Harcourt was to hold a French vessel in readiness at the former, De la Rosa a Spanish ship at the latter. Thus both ambassadors hoped that they had secured to themselves the honour of giving the Pope a refuge, while Count Spaur and Cardinal Antonelli, who are suspected to have been in concert with the King of Naples, appear to have hoped that should they once get the Pope into the Neapolitan territory, the king would find means of persuading him to stay there. It was perhaps a mistake on the part of all of them to wish to carry him out of his own states. As the head of the Latin Church, he would certainly not be in exile in any country where that sect was established; but as a sovereign he was in exile anywhere out of his own dominions; and at Civita Vecchia, under the guns of foreign vessels of war, he would have been secured against any outbreak which threatened personal violence to himself. Not only as head of that church ought he to be secured from the tyranny of factions at home, but he ought not to be under the suspicion of foreign influence. It was to secure this independence that the temporal sovereignty of the Roman states had been originally usurped by or granted to the Bishop of Rome.

The Pope was by no means singular in making preparations for quitting Rome. Several cardinals and princes, seeing the probable advent of a very disorderly period, had left it; many foreigners had done the same, and many more were about to follow this example. On the evening of the 24th of November, Count Spaur stationed a travelling carriage outside of Rome. The Pope, Monsignior Stella, and Cardinal Antonelli, left the Quirinal by a back door opening into an obscure alley; the Pope, it is said, was disguised in the livery of a footman.

In order that it might not be suspected that he was gone, the Duc d'Harcourt, who was at the Quirinal, stayed

the usual period, and the lights were kept burning till the customary hour, and no one knew that night that anything remarkable had occurred. A few hours later, the duke, as well as several others, took post and went to Civita Vecchia, imagining the Pope had taken that direction. In the mean time the sovereign pontiff, attended by the Bavarian minister and his wife, had taken the Terracina road, and were making for the Neapolitan frontier; Cardinal Antonelli followed the same night. So secretly was the escape managed that his own relations did not know of it till the next morning, and even then his brothers set off after him, without well knowing which road to take. He reached the Mola di Gaeta without hindrance, and was annoyed at not finding the Spanish vessel in readiness to take him on board. Count Spaur at once went to the King of Naples, who arrived in all haste and besought the Pope to take up his residence at his castle of Gaeta, to which he assented for a short period; and he eventually remained there during great part of his exile. On the 27th of November, he published a protest against what had been extorted from him by violence on the 16th, and despatched it, together with directions to prorogue the parliament. He named a provisional executive commission, who were empowered to act by a quorum of three, with power to add to their number any person they might approve of, and to carry the seat of government from Rome, if that step should become necessary; this commission and protest were sent to Cardinal Castracane, and to the other members of the commission was sent an intimation of their appointment to it. On the morning of the 25th it was intimated to the minister Galleti that the Pope was gone; he had left a letter behind him addressed to the master of his household, requesting him to communicate to that minister the fact of his departure, and to urge him to provide for

the safety of the members of his household, none of whom were acquainted with his intention, and commending the quiet and order of the city to the ministers: a document which certainly appeared to confirm the ministry in their offices. But at the same time he had, with the privity of the diplomatic body, prepared a protest, which was on the 27th published at Gaeta, against all that had been imposed on him by force on the 16th, and the ministry among the rest; which, however, was not known at Rome for some days,—conduct apparently in keeping with his usual weak and vacillating behaviour.

The ministry, when the news of the Pope's departure was known, published a proclamation, saying that he had been "carried away by pernicious counsels." And the populace were naturally excited by the event: some were rejoicing, others fearing gloomy results. Galleti came down to the lower house with the Pope's letter in his hand, saying that, as a confirmation of the ministry, it was a document of great moment, as it gave them authority to act by the invitation of the sovereign. Sterbini called on the house to vote its confidence in the ministry, and the Prince of Canino, by way of smoothing matters, exclaimed, that if they wished to deserve confidence, they must at once resolve on convoking a constituent assembly for all Italy. Thus, instead of attending to the matter in hand, preserving themselves and Rome from dangers, he endeavoured to embroil them with other states as well as with domestic factions. Both houses agreed in issuing addresses to the people, pointing out to them that though the Pope was gone, the government of the state still rested in the hands of the legal authorities, and that the councils were resolved to give their support cordially to a ministry lawfully in office. Mamiani had originally refused office; but on learning the Pope's departure, and the danger the state incurred of being without a govern-

ment at all, he, after much solicitation, agreed to enter the administration in the department of foreign affairs. On the 1st of December he produced his plan for a constituent assembly for Italy. He called it so out of deference to the popular whim of the moment, but it was in fact a congress for an Italian confederation. As the government of each state was to cause its representatives to be chosen in its own way, it was wholly different from the wild scheme of the clubs, of electing a parliament for all Italy by universal suffrage, which was to override all established institutions. This plan leaving untouched the laws of each state, and their separate existence, merely sought to facilitate their combination for mutual help; and was, in fact, very much the same scheme as had been approved of by the Pope, though it was called by a different name.

In order to conciliate Piedmont, which desired offensive alliances and troops rather than congresses and confederations, he suggested that its first business should be to concert measures for accomplishing Italian independence. The plan was favourably received by the house, which was also occupied with other matters of routine that came before it. All things considered, there was less disorder than might have been reasonably anticipated. The ministry was supported by the chamber, had been confirmed by the Pope, and was not unpopular in the clubs and the streets. Altogether, if the Pope had not interfered, there was sufficient authority left to have brought things gradually round into an orderly state: but it was fated otherwise. The Pontiff, from the commencement of his reign, seemed resolved to play the part of L'Etourdi, and his ministers might on this, as on many other occasions, have addressed him:

> "Voyons si votre diable aura bien le pouvoir
> De detruire a ce coup un si solide espoir,
> Et si, contre l'excés du bien qui nous arrive
> Vous armerez encore votre imaginative."

It was already rumoured that he was gone to Gaeta, and news from thence was waited for impatiently. On the 3d of December arrived his protest, and the nomination of an executive commission, consisting of Cardinal Castracane, Monsegnior Roberti, Prince Ruviano, Prince Berberini, Marquis Bevilaqua, Marquis Ricci, and General Zucchi. The persons named, however, did not like the commission they were charged with. Some were not in Rome, and they were of different political opinions; and therefore, though the ministers were not altogether overthrown by this "verbosa et grandis epistola"—yet it went far to shake their authority, and put in doubt the legality of their acts; and as they were the only persons who had, at that period, any chance of keeping order, it greatly contributed to cause tumults and outbreaks.

Mamiani addressed the diplomatic body, saying that he had taken office at the direct request of the Pope, and then only to prevent Rome being without any government. He expressed his detestation of the assassination of Rossi, and his anxiety for the punishment of the crime; and he proposed to his colleagues that, as the Pope had annulled their appointments, they ought at once to resign their offices; and as the commissioners named by the Pope would not undertake the office, Rome stood a great chance of having no government at all. Both Houses thought of holding a secret sitting, to consult as to what was to be done; but the club of the people and the rabble, resenting their exclusion, forced them to consult openly. The president of the deputies, Sturbinetti, threw doubts on the legality of the Pope's brief, as it had no minister's signature attached to it; and after consultation, both Houses authorized the ministry to remain in office, and agreed to send a deputation to the Pope to request his return to his own states, at the same time assuring him of their allegiance, and requesting him to name a commis-

sion to execute the duties of sovereignty during his absence—a course which was also adopted by the Upper House and by the municipality of Rome. The deputations consisted of persons not hostile to the Pope: at the head of them was Prince Corsini, the senator of Rome, a man of eighty years of age, and by no means a revolutionary character; but on arriving at the Neapolitan frontier, an inspector of police inquired the object of their journey, which they were foolish enough to tell him. He at once said that he had orders to prevent any deputations from any body at Rome crossing the frontier to the Pope, and they were compelled to return to Terracina, where they addressed themselves to Cardinal Antonelli, as prefect of the sacred palaces, requesting him to allow them to fulfil their duty. The Cardinal answered that the Pope regretted much that he could not see them, with which curt answer they were obliged to be content, and they went back on their way sorrowing. Thus was a deputation, consisting of persons personally devoted to the Pope, and of great authority in Rome, who had gone to tender allegiance, and for the purpose of promoting concord, sent discourteously away, and just at a period when a gratuitous insult was not likely to pave the way to a pacific solution of the civil troubles. The state required but little additional impulse to cast it headlong into the raging gulf of revolution through which the rest of Europe had already plunged, a result to which the imbecile conduct of the infallible head of the Latin Church in every instance powerfully contributed. It was not only that he acted foolishly and weakly by habit, but that he was so unfortunate as never to act wisely or firmly by mistake. It is impossible to say that any conduct, however firm or prudent, on the part of the papal court at Gaeta, could then have averted the evils which menaced Rome, for that court did not ever make the experiment: all that can be said is, that their

policy was not calculated to counteract those evils, but rather to aggravate them.

The chamber of deputies met on the 8th of December, and Pantaleoni proposed that a committee should be appointed to devise the best mode of meeting the difficulty occasioned by the absence of the sovereign—a proposition which was opposed by the Prince of Canino, arguing "that sovereignty resided in the people, more especially in the Roman states, many of whom had, at different times and of their own accord, become subjects of the Pope; and that in default of the person to whom the sovereignty had been delegated, it reverted to the original grantors; and that the Pope, being in a foreign state, was not to be looked on as a free agent: a fact proved by the refusal to admit the deputation to the Neapolitan kingdom;" and he proposed that three persons should be appointed during the Pope's absence to execute the prerogative and office of sovereign, without prejudice to his rights when he should please to return and resume them; and that the committee should consist of one ecclesiastic and two laymen; and all who refused obedience to such a committee should be regarded as traitors—a proposition which was applauded by the galleries, though it fell rather flat on the house. But though the galleries were fast assuming the rule of both house and country to such an extent, that Bologna in disgust thought of separating itself from Rome, in this instance the house did not succumb; but after a speech from the minister Galleti, showing that there was no substantial difference between the two proposals, the motion of Pantaleoni was carried and the five named. The committee consisted of Rusconi, Sturbinetti, Rizzi, Sereni and Lunati, and there is no doubt that the house itself was desirous of coming to a reasonable accommodation with the sovereign, but the forces were disorganized. They had no real control over the galleries; and the

very carabineers and civic guard, whose duty it was to keep order, were infected by political factions, and were often on the side of disorder, and therefore could not be depended on.

When the murder of Rossi and the attack on the Quirinal were known in Paris, General Cavaignac announced to the assembly that he had given orders by telegraph for 3500 men to embark in steam-frigates, and to sail to Civita Vecchia. He also announced that he had given orders that they should not interfere in any of the political questions then agitating Rome; and that it belonged exclusively to the National Assembly to decide upon the part it would cause the republic to take in the measures that were to be adopted to restore order in the States of the Church. This announcement having been made in the French chamber on the 28th of November, the news of it arrived in Rome at this juncture, and called forth an energetic protest of the ministry against any intervention—a protest which was favourably received by the chambers. They argued that the first part of the order prohibited intervention, and the latter part contemplated it: that the two parts were consequently not consistent. That for an armed force to enter a territory without the consent of the inhabitants, in a state of peace, was a breach of the laws of nations; and that if, as members of the Latin church, they sought to interfere in favour of the head of their faith, that his spiritual authority had not in any way been interfered with, and that if it had, it was no more their duty to interfere than it was the duty of all the other members of the same church—such as Austria or Spain. They declared that such an intervention was a humiliation to Italy, and they repudiated the idea that it could be pleasing to Pius IX. to re-enter his capital under foreign bayonets; and they concluded their protest by saying that they should do all they could to resist.

On the 11th, the house received the report of the committee appointed to consider the best mode of executing the office of sovereign. They reported that the Pope had left Rome, and left no one to act for him in his absence; that the commission of government he had named was informal; that the commissioners were not willing to act; and that a third estate was essentially necessary to constitutional government; moreover, that the two councils had done their best to get over the difficulty by sending in conjunction with the municipality a deputation to the Pope, which had been refused admittance into the Neapolitan state. They said that while the Pope was in a foreign state he must be considered unable to act with full freedom; and that it was necessary above all things to complete the government, in order to avoid the impending danger of anarchy and civil tumult, and to uphold the integrity of the fundamental statute; and that under the extreme urgency of the case they recommended the adoption of the following course:—A supreme junta of state should be provisionally appointed: it should consist of three persons not belonging to the council of deputies, who should be chosen by a majority of that body, and approved of by the upper house. It should discharge all the functions of the sovereign by a majority of voices, and according to the constitution of the fundamental statute: and its functions should at once cease on the return of the Pontiff, or on his appointing any person to act for him by a document having the character of perfect legality.

The Prince of Canino spoke against the project. Some argued that the deputies had under the fundamental statute no power to nominate a substitute for the sovereign; but Sterbini argued in favour of the project, and it was eventually carried, and the senators of Rome and Bologna and the mayor of Ancona were appointed to be the giunta; the deputies present were fifty-six. The decree was confirmed by

the high council, of whom, however, only fourteen were present, but those agreed unanimously; and the ministers announced to the people the decisions taken, in order that they might at once be carried into effect. It is hard to say that the course adopted was otherwise than temperate and reasonable. It was evident that the state was in absolute need of a government of some sort, and as the Pope had not left one behind him, the original right of self-preservation rendered the course perfectly justifiable, for it interfered in no way with the Pope, who was left free to annul the whole by appointing another in its place.

The course adopted, however reasonable and moderate, was at Gaeta stigmatized by a note of Cardinal Antonelli as an infringement of the prerogative of the Pope; while at Rome, it was by the republicans denounced as an infringement of the rights of the people, and the Pope himself on the 7th of December called it a sacrilegious aggression. Those who had been nominated as the commission by him for carrying on business had never acted, and Bevilaqua and Ricci, two of their number, had gone to Gaeta for the purpose of conciliation, and had been in communication with Cardinal Antonelli. But amid the general intemperance of men's minds, their endeavours had led to no beneficial result. Fury and precipitancy characterized the acts and language of the club-leaders at Rome, and the arrival of Garibaldi, whose name for daring gave him great weight with the populace, added to the general excitement. Travelling orators scoured the country, haranguing and organizing clubs, and affiliating them with parent clubs at Rome, in order that the opinion of the people might be made to appear to agree with the desires of the Roman populace. All whose opinions were hostile were kept in the back-ground; thus an appearance of a general wish for the Italian constituent assembly was

obtained. Mamiani was fast becoming unpopular because he was disposed to proceed regularly, and had called out the civic guard on several occasions to preserve order, and had attempted in the assembly to obtain the expulsion from the state of foreigners who were conspiring against public tranquillity, in which he was defeated by Canino. The supreme junta of state, on the 20th of December, issued a proclamation declaring they only held office for the purpose of calling together the constituent assembly, and until it was assembled; and upon this announcement, Mamiani retired from the offices he had held, having in vain endeavoured to keep within the bounds of moderation. Zucchini, the senator of Bologna, had refused to be one of the supreme junta, and Galleti had been put in his stead. A new ministry was formed, of which Sterbini was the soul, being also the head of the club of the people; so that in fact this ministry was an emanation from the clubs.

Thus had papal incompetency thrown away all the chances of accommodation which had been offered it, and done all that blundering could to procure its own overthrow; not that the Pope should have remained in Rome subject to personal insults and assaults; but his leaving the state without a government to shift for itself rendered some usurpation of his legitimate prerogatives almost inevitable. Had he given his countenance to those who were inclined to preserve order, and assisted in the requisite organization, it might probably have been preserved; for in no state is the rabble really preponderant: it is only by the mismanagement of those in power that they ever even temporarily become so.

CHAPTER VI.

GENERAL POLITICS OF ITALY TO THE DEFEAT OF CHARLES ALBERT AT NOVARA, AND HIS ABDICATION.

A PEOPLE unaccustomed to exercise the rights are incapable of performing the duties of freemen. Those accustomed to be led are unable to guide themselves. In a country which has been governed by interference and espionage in all those matters which in a happier climate are left to the natural sense which Providence has given for the purpose, man seems to lose all self-dependence. The want of those on whom he is in the habit of relying for the regulation of his conduct, leaves him, without a compass and without a chart, to the mercy and fortune of winds and waves—a sport to circumstances, a prey to the designing.

In Tuscany a democratic ministry had obtained the helm of the state. They made a vain endeavour to control the power that had lifted them to office. They professed a regard to public tranquillity; Guerazzi declared woe to them that broke it. But the ministry, borne to power by the shouts of the Leghorn populace, were doomed to be its slaves, forced to listen to its suggestions, to fondle its leaders and orators, and to flatter its vices. But to keep

it in order was beyond their skill. The army was in such a state of utter demoralization, that it had executed its general, Giovanetti. Such a force was not likely to preserve order in others. But though the populace had got their own minister and their own way in the streets, the people had a majority in parliament, a circumstance necessarily distasteful to the mob. In order to avoid this inconvenience, the assembly was dissolved and a new one elected; and lest the people should repeat the mistake of electing one of a different political opinion from themselves, the most riotous of the rabble were hired to prevent the moderates from voting; and in Florence, Sienna, and Pisa, where they expected adverse returns, the ballot-boxes were smashed and the voters put to flight. After all, the ministry succeeded only in obtaining a bare majority — a toleration from the country rather than an approval; and many of the Florentines in disgust retired from the town to their country villas. These singular results of democracy are worthy of consideration. It is odd that men's professions and practices should differ in so remarkable a manner.

In Naples the parliament was prorogued from the 5th of September till the end of November, and it is said that the court took the mob in pay to insult the deputies and the respectable citizens, and to shout for the absolute king; which is likely enough. On the 1st of September, an expedition sailed for the purpose of subduing Sicily, which still held out, and was determined to remain separate. Rugero Settimo was still at the head of the government of that island. There were there neither disorders nor democracy. What the Sicilians wanted was separation from a king who had violated the original conditions on which they had remained his subjects, and they desired a king who would maintain them. England was disposed to mediate, and admitted the claims of the island; but Naples

was intent on conquest, and declared, by its ministers both in Paris and London, that the Sicilians were really devoted to the king, and would on the slightest demonstration on his part cast themselves into his paternal arms. It seems, however, they spoke diplomatically; for, on the 3d of September, having in vain endeavoured to effect a landing at Messina, the expedition commenced bombarding the town, directing its fire not on the defences, but on the houses, churches, and the inhabitants. The bombardment having lasted five days, the greater part of the city was destroyed, and many of the inhabitants buried under its ruins. It was continued two days after resistance had ceased, and the soldiery carried fire and sword through the devastation, and fell upon the fleeing inhabitants, whereupon the English and French admirals, who had looked on in disgust at the flagrant violation of the laws of civilized warfare, thought fit to interfere. It is only to be regretted they did not think it their duty to do so sooner. They imposed on both parties a truce. According to Sir W. Temple's note, had the combat been carried on according to the usual practice of civilized nations, they would not have interfered; but from the barbarities which were committed, they could not remain passive spectators of the scene.

When the news that the Neapolitan force was off the island came to Palermo, the minister of foreign affairs came into the house of assembly, and laying the despatches on the table, said he brought them good news, and they then, without further condescending to notice the matter, proceeded to consider the order of the day; and in the streets the people went about hurrahing for the good news, and declaring that every man on the island would fight to the last gasp in its defence. The town was brilliantly illuminated, and warlike and patriotic songs, and curses on King Bomba, as they had nicknamed the

king, were heard on every side. The national guard, which had during the year been partially enrolled and armed, was made movable, so as to serve in any part of the island; lists were opened for the enrolment of volunteers; and extraordinary commissions were sent into the country to call on the people to rise in arms. A loan was raised on the church-plate as a temporary expedient; all the horses and mules were laid hold of for public purposes; every one who talked of submission stood in imminent danger; the commander of Syracuse, being suspected of treachery, was torn to pieces by an infuriated mob; and if the government felt any doubt or hesitation as to the result, they dared not show it. War to the knife was proclaimed against the invaders; extreme means were adopted to raise the funds requisite for the defence. But the authorities felt that they should be compelled to abandon the coast-line and retire to the hills, and in inaccessible fastnesses continue the struggle for independence. They spoke bitterly both of the English and French governments, who had acknowledged their claims but had not prevented the fearful catastrophe of Messina. Nor was their anger allayed till the French packet Hellespont arrived with a consignment of 2000 muskets and 400 barrels of powder for the Sicilian government, and the arrival of the English corvette Sidon, with news of a provisional armistice concluded between Captain Nonoy of the French ship Hercule, and Captain Robb of H.M.S. Gladiator, on the one part, and General Filangieri on the other,—an armistice which was preserved by the English and French fleets, while the two governments negotiated; and by inducing both parties to concede in some matters, they hoped to effect a pacific arrangement: so that for the remainder of the year Sicily was undisturbed.

When the truce was concluded between Austria and Piedmont, Venice resolved to prolong resistance. The re-

public of St Mark was again proclaimed, and a triumvirate, consisting of Manin, Graziani, and Cavedalis, were elected by the assembly. The troops were commanded by General Pepe, who had gone to Venice after the recall of the Neapolitan troops he commanded from Lombardy. The blockade was not so strict, even after the withdrawal of the Sardinian fleet on the 17th of September, as to prevent supplies arriving by sea from Romagna. The advanced posts had frequent skirmishes with the enemy; and the young soldiers were anxious to come to blows. Several expeditions were successfully made against the enemy on the mainland, in which prisoners, guns, and baggage were taken; but they were unable to garrison the places, and quitted them, bringing with them their booty.

In the mean time, Pepe, who was anxious to have struck a heavier blow at the Austrians if the government would have let him, was occupied in drilling his men and fortifying the Lagune. An envoy was sent to France, and a supply of money, of which there was great want, was sought for from the other Italian states. The citizens had given their plate, and made every sacrifice to patriotism. Manin had succeeded in preserving domestic tranquillity amidst the greatest popular enthusiasm. Perfect order was kept in the streets; the secret probably consisted in the fact of the presence of a large military force gradually falling into excellent discipline from being in presence of an enemy, and being officered by men who were acquainted with the duty of soldiers.

Lombardy, again galled by the yoke of the stranger, was sullen and discontented,—quelled, not pacified. Piedmont was torn by domestic intrigues, and factions who bandied about reproaches and blame for the late disaster, mutually accusing each other, while some desired to renew the war with Austria without either men, money, or mus-

kets; so that, in place of uniting for the purpose of rescuing their country, some contented themselves with mutual slanders; and in place of slaying the enemies of their country, were sufficiently engaged on each other's reputations. Had they been as successful against the former as the latter, the humiliation of the imperial arms would have been complete.

Even in parliament the uproar was so great, that the ministry, which was inclined to wait on providence, was forced to tender its resignation, which was accepted, and it retired expressing a desire in parliament that its successors should receive such a support there as should enable them to carry on the king's government firmly, and to rescue Italy. Gioberti, who had been their chief opponent, was charged with the formation of a new one—a task which took some days to accomplish: on the 16th of December he read to the assembled deputies the ministerial programme, explaining the policy they intended to adopt. He spoke of the renewal of the war of independence as necessary, for Italian nationality could not be achieved without the force of arms: he said that the Anglo-French mediation should not be a cause of delay; that a federation of the states of Italy was the corner-stone of nationality. He adopted the cry of an Italian constituent assembly. The ministry were supporters of a representative constitutional monarchy of a democratic tendency, and called themselves a democratic ministry; but they do not appear to have thought that "demos" was quite synonymous with "rabble."

The parliament of Rome was fast losing its consideration; the upper house had gradually thinned till it had ceased to meet, and the lower house was but an impediment to a ministry who relied on the clubs. That chamber itself looked with no favour on Sterbini; and finding that it was likely to be troublesome, the ministry took upon

themselves to dissolve it, with the sanction of the supreme junta, about the end of December, and to convoke a national assembly elected by universal suffrage; but the senator Corsini, who had agreed to the former, objected to the latter measure, and retired from the junta, which was thus left without a full number of members. Galleti and Camerata, the other members, signed the latter decree in conjunction with the ministers; and thus, in fact, there ceased to be either a junta, a ministry, or a parliament, but only a provisional government, who were self-appointed, without any support among the people properly so called. They were tolerated because Rome was worn out with anxiety, and had been altogether abandoned by the Pope and his advisers:—the constitutional party, having endeavoured to keep up a communication with him, and to restore order, on condition of his guaranteeing the execution of the fundamental statute, were looked on sourly. In short, the Pope took every pains to help his opponents and to defeat those of his subjects who were inclined to help him; and one can only suppose he wished for foreign bayonets to put him back on his throne, rather than the desire of his own people, which seems unaccountable. The absolutist or clerical party were cowed, and did not distinguish itself by either high-minded behaviour or devotion to its country, or indeed to anything but itself. Thus, by the incapacity of their national leaders, the people left the conduct of public affairs in the hands of the self-appointed presidents of clubs affiliated over the states, and were led by the most worthless ruffians in all Italy.

The Pope, when he heard of the proposed national assembly, denounced it as sacrilege, fulminated anathemas against all who assisted in electing members to it or were elected—a course of proceeding which naturally prevented his own supporters from taking any part in it. Had he not done so, it is very possible it might have contained

more moderate men than it did. At the same time, though it was a violation of his sovereignty, still he had, by his incompetency, greatly brought it on himself.

The ministry of Piedmont had done their best to induce a reconciliation between the Pope and Rome. They endeavoured to prevent him from calling in foreign intervention. Envoys were sent to Gaeta to offer him the hospitality of Piedmont as long as he wished to remain absent from Rome. They urged, that if he would take up his residence there, and help them in constituting a confederation of the Italian states, that, with the interposition of their good offices, it was very probable he might be reconciled with Rome; that order would gradually be restored, and that he might return on the sure foundation of the affections of the people; but that, should he return under the protection of foreign troops, the outward discontents alone would be suppressed; and that, rankling inwardly, they would always be ready for a fresh outbreak, besides his being open to the reproach of bringing foreign troops on to Italian soil. But their representations were vain. He distrusted Piedmont; he had tried his hand at reforms; he had burned his fingers; he believed nothing but force could restore him; he could not ask for Piedmontese force, because that state was on bad terms with Naples and Austria. In short, it was his object to return, not on the plan of the fundamental statute, but as absolute sovereign and pontiff. The Sardinian envoy was instructed to keep on business relations with the *de facto* government; but on official relations with the Pope alone, to whom he was accredited. He was to discourage the constituent assembly, which the club of the people had proclaimed, and which totally differed from Mamiani's federative constituent, if it were not too late, as such an assembly threw doubt on the sovereignty of the Pope. Should the assembly of the constituent be a fact past recall, he was to endeavour

to prevail on it to recognise the temporal authority of the Pope as a constitutional prince; and that, for the sake of Italy, his main object must be to bring about a conciliation. The conduct of the *de facto* government was uncertain. They spoke in private against the house of Savoy, and pretended to trust and sympathize with them at the same time. They expressed to the Sardinian envoy a desire for conciliation with the Pope privately, and in public declared for whatever the affiliated societies directed them. They promised all things to all men. After considerable negotiation they agreed, in the event of a renewal of the war with Austria, to furnish 15,000 men, to pay them, and to allow a Piedmontese force to occupy the frontier provinces of the Roman states, but urged on Piedmont the immediate unconditional assent to the constituent; and so ill pleased was Gioberti, that he ordered his envoy to proceed to Gaeta, saying, that all that the *de facto* government said was mere moonshine and flash in the pan; and that he was to say to the Pope he would have no so firm defender in his constitutional rights as Piedmont, and offered him the assistance of Piedmontese forces to restore him, and had only not done so before, thinking conciliation practicable without armed collision.

The rampant democracy that swaggered in Tuscany had not a man nor a shilling to help at the liberation of Upper Italy, and were the mere puppets of the Mazzinians, and not of much consideration in the general policy of Italy. On the 28th of November, the Tuscan government sent as consul to Civita Vecchia, a man named La Cecilia—a person who had been once in trouble about a forgery—on a mission to Rome. He was charged to stir up disorders, and to help the government in completing the revolution. After him they sent two other persons of a like kidney to help him. He plainly stated he was come to start a fresh revolution—to

strip the Pope of all temporal power; but he found the ministry vacillating and uncertain, and swayed in every direction; and he describes them to his government in terms by no means flattering, though probably accurate. "Sterbini," he says, "is a man of vagaries, now in the skies, now in the dumps, but fanatical and crack-brained about the federation, and so rigid in his views, that it took him a whole hour to bring him to any sort of reason. Galleti," he said, "was dreaming that he was legally minister of the Pope; but that Bonaparte, the Prince of Canino, 'that political morris-dancer,' bothered legality right well;" and he wrote that Mazzini and Garibaldi were expected in Rome.

On the other hand, Castellani, the Venetian envoy, endeavoured to keep the peace, to moderate the follies of the clubs and the ministers whom they had appointed, or who had appointed themselves, and whom they tolerated, and recommended them to accept the Piedmontese rather than have non-Italian intervention forced on them, more especially as they had not a troop of soldiers on whom they could rely. Bologna, and a considerable part of Romagna, were chiefly disposed to the constitutional party, and were much dissatisfied with the conduct of the Roman government, and meditated a separation from it; and had the Pope come among them, or given them his countenance, he would have found a powerful party inclined to give him a constitutional support according to the fundamental statute he had established. The Pope had ordered Colonel Latour, the commander of the Swiss troops in Bologna, to march with all his 1300 men and 8 guns against Rome, and to pick up about 1000 more men by the way—a force utterly inadequate to the purpose — without sending either pay for his troops, or means of providing for them on their march. But, however impracticable it appeared, Latour thought his duty was to obey.

But the moment the Bolognese heard of it, they were vehemently disturbed, declaring that he should not leave the city, because they feared the rabble if there were no military to keep it in order, and all the officials did their best to persuade him to stay. He applied to the papal authorities for pay for his men to enable him to march, but none was to be had. At length, finding that to get out of the town he should have first to fight on the barricades, and that when he got out he had no means of feeding his men, he was at length, to his great grief, compelled to stay where he was. It would have often been for the Pope's advantage had fortune rendered his orders equally impossible to be executed.

His letter denouncing the constituent assembly, while it produced no effect on his opponents, prevented his friends and the constitutional party from taking any part in the elections. The consequence was, that the republicans everywhere had their own way; and though no one can say that had the Pope not denounced the greater excommunication against all who took any part in the elections, he would have had a majority, or at least a sufficient party, in that assembly to have watched over his interests, and to have prevented the declaration of a republic, yet no one can say that he would not; and as his supporters were inclined to have contested the elections, and were only prevented by his spiritual denunciations, it is probable that they would have been able to produce some effect. Thus the clubs and the ministers vaunted the eternal sovereignty of the people and universal suffrage, but very inconsistently with their professions, at the very time that the constituent was being elected for the purpose of enacting laws, the club ministers themselves, of their own proper authority, enacted others touching civil and criminal tribunals, entails, leases, and mortgages; assumed to themselves the sove-

reign prerogative of mercy, made laws on military matters, established juntas of public safety, and enforced some of the harshest of the laws of Gregory; regulated pensions, established a court-martial for the summary conviction and punishment of all seditious attempts against *their* authority. They abolished uses, trusts, remainders, and life interests; made ordinances as to financial commerce and navigation; levied taxes; and issued money; and, in short, usurped to themselves the whole sovereign authority of the state, and that of the most autocratic form. Thus, while the rest of Europe was slowly recovering from the year's convulsions, Rome was just entering on the downward course of disorder and tumult. Piedmont advised that the first step on the assembling of the constituent should be the immediate recognition of the temporal authority of the Pope, as the only means of producing a reconciliation, and that some one named by the Pope should, if possible, attend to represent him in the assembly, as without this he would be scarce likely to accept their acts or recognise their existence; and Gioberti offered to send some picked Piedmontese troops to preserve order, that there might be no excuse for foreign (that is to say non-Italian) intervention. The papal party were in communication with Spain on the subject; for that power had proposed a congress of the powers of the Latin Church to settle the question of the spiritual authority: a project upon which the ministry of Piedmont threw cold water, as not being by any means what was wanted; saying that the congress, if it sat at all, would have to interfere in temporal matters, for the two were so mixed up as to be inseparable, and that it was much better if possible to avoid foreign intervention in either case for the future tranquillity of Italy.

Notwithstanding the best endeavours of the clubs, when the deputies assembled in Rome, some were found not

republican, but desiring to recognise the papal sovereignty. These formed a club, and met under the presidency of Mamiani, while the republicans met under that of the Prince of Canino; but the Pope would not listen to any moderate counsels. Martini, the Sardinian envoy who had come first to Rome, and on finding that it was impossible to do anything with the persons in power, had been sent on to Gaeta, was, in the first instance, refused an audience on several grounds, the real objection being, that the court of Piedmont had had business transactions with the *de facto* government of Rome, with whom the Pope would hear of no terms of accommodation; after a time he was received in his private capacity, but not in that of envoy. The Pope talked of an Austrian intervention, which he appeared to have asked for, and was in expectation of. He called the *de facto* government rebels and assassins, names which certainly fitted some amongst them; and Count Spaur, the Bavarian minister, said that an Austrian ambassador was expected, and that in a fortnight the Roman nuisance would be at an end. At this the Duc d'Harcourt in the name of France protested. At last, when Martini had been by his government ordered to withdraw if he were not recognised, the Pope consented to receive him, and on the 23d of January he was received in form as ambassador from Piedmont.

Various schemes were at that time canvassed in the papal court for procuring the restoration of the Pope to Rome. At one time an Austrian and Neapolitan intervention was spoken of as probable, and the formation of a camp on the southern frontier, and an attack on Rome in that direction. The Prussian envoy suggested that Austria should occupy the north of the Papal States, and France the south, but the Duc d'Harcourt again recommended moderation. All Europe was more or less anxious on the subject, and even the Czar sent to the Pope

a message of sympathy and condolence with his misfortunes, and a proffer of his alliance and help. It was Martini's object to prevent Pius from calling in foreign aid; and though he appeared occasionally to be convinced of the eventual impolicy of this course, yet what he had admitted on one occasion he usually unsaid on the next, being brought round again as was supposed by the cardinals and the King of Naples. At length the breach between Piedmont and Naples went so far as that they ceased to hold any diplomatic intercourse.

On the 4th of February, Count Maurice Esterhazy, the Austrian ambassador, arrived at Gaeta. It was resolved to ask forthwith for the armed assistance of Austria, France, Spain, and Naples (Piedmont, to her great annoyance, being left out). The request for assistance was made to these powers, both jointly and severally, so that it would not be necessary for all of them to co-operate; so that those who were ready first would march first: by this device the papal court hoped to confine the intervention to Austria and Naples, in whom they more trusted than in republican France; but the remonstrances of France, and the disinclination of Austria to get into fresh difficulties, caused the contrivance to miscarry. Charles Albert was deeply annoyed at Austrian intervention being thought of, and Gioberti wrote to Martini to say that they had 100,000 men, who could fight the Germans just as well in the Papal States as on the Mincio or the Adige; and Cardinal Antonelli having complained that the king had, by counselling moderation in Rome, prevented things from coming to their worst in order that they might mend, Martini took the opportunity of mentioning a maxim contained in a work little studied at Rome, though elsewhere held in respect, denouncing them that do evil that good may come.

Thus the court of Gaeta turned its back on the consti-

tutional party, and the King of Piedmont, and moderate courses, and resolved to trust to physical force alone for its restoration to power. Its desire for bringing things to the worst was abundantly, though unintentionally, seconded by the events at Rome. On the 5th of February, the constituent assembly met in the hall of the Cancelleria, which had previously been occupied by the lower house. A hundred and forty representatives were present.

Arminelli, one of the self-elected provisional government, mounted the tribune, and delivered a harangue on the sovereignty of the people and the freedom of Italy; and, after passing in review the events of the reign of Pius, he declared somewhat unwarrantably, as subsequent events showed, that they had the sympathy of all peoples democratically governed, for that an alliance of peoples every day waxed firmer and larger, to abase and combat if need be even that of kings; and vaunting universal suffrage, he exclaimed that they were that day called to the Capitol to inaugurate a new era for their country; that they met amid the monuments of two mighty epochs; on the one hand were the ruins of the Italy of the Cæsars, on the other the ruins of the Italy of the Popes. It was their duty to reconstitute the nation, to clear it at once from the old incubus of tyranny, and on these ruins to reconstruct a fabric that should sit firmly on the fragments, and inaugurate their labours under the two "most sacred names, Italy and the People"—a speech which was lustily cheered in the public galleries and in the chamber, although it is said not to have been approved of by all his colleagues. The assembly then proceeded to call over the names of the representatives and to verify the returns. When the Prince of Canino's name was called, he, always first in any work of destruction, cried, "Long live the Republic;" and Garibaldi exclaimed "that it

was no use wasting time in vain formalities—the delay of a moment was a crime—Long live the Republic." The rabble shouted in the galleries, but the chamber differed in opinion; and Sterbini, usually one of the foremost in disorder, recommended prudence, that nothing should be done in haste, and that they should proceed according to the regular forms of a parliament—even he had learned that popular shouts did not always dictate prudent policy—a suggestion which was assented to, and the returns regularly verified. After this business had been concluded at the meeting on the 8th of February, the Prince of Canino opened the debate by praising the government for convoking the constituent, but rebuked it sharply for having dared to enact laws before its meeting.

While Arminelli and Sterbini were being heard in answer, the Venetian envoy, Castellani, who was in the diplomatic gallery, received a despatch from Gaeta, saying that France had agreed with Austria for an armed intervention, and that Bedini and the secretary to Count Esterhazy had gone to Paris to negotiate matters with reference to it. Upon this he went to find Borghetti, and told him of its contents; but he objected to communicate the fact to the assembly, as nothing reasonable would have any effect on them, as he had experienced in reading to them some of the despatches of the Piedmontese ministers, whereupon they had shaken their fists in his face; and that, having given the reins to passion, they were prepared to plunge unaided into anything with all the world against them. Meeting with Sterbini, he informed him of his news. "Do you believe it?" said he with a grin. "Yes," said the other. "Then," quoth Sterbini, "I admire your credulity;" and he turned back. And now the debate began. The first man who spoke besought them as a Christian people to declare once for all that Popes should not sit in the seats of kings, for that their dominion was not of this

world. After him Mamiani spoke. He said, "Only two forms of government were possible, that of the Pope or that of Rienzi. Republic was a noble word, but it required virtue in the people, and where was that? It was their business not to speculate, but to look at facts. When the French proclaimed a republic in the beginning of the century, that had an army 300,000 men strong; now *they* had neither arms nor money. That the republican flag would not work the miracles they anticipated from it. Tuscany alone of the Italian States might follow the example of Rome; and there even it were easier to get rid of the old, than to establish a new, form of government. That in Piedmont there was a strong royalist feeling, that Austria would turn their troubles to her own account, and that France was undergoing, and had undergone, a strong reaction. That, considering the certain jeopardy and mischief that must result from the proclamation of a republic, it was advisable at once to declare the sovereignty of the pontiff, but to leave the readjustment of the constitution to the federative assembly of Italy when it should meet."

Masi, the secretary of Prince Canino, in answer, said that he preferred the government of a Rienzi to that of a Pope, and that they ought to seize the opportunity God had given them, and establish a democracy,—his claptrap, of course, drawing more plaudits from the gallery than the arguments of Mamiani. Filopanti, a professor of mathematics, spoke next, and moved that it should be declared that the popedom was deposed from its temporal power, and that the new government should be a pure democracy, and the state named the Republic of Rome. He said that the fortunes of twenty-four millions of Italians hung on their decision, and that these fortunes must be trusted to audacity, and that the Pope should receive sufficient guarantees as the head of the Church.

Other speeches followed, and the debate was adjourned to the evening, when Sterbini appeared not to have made up his mind, but read a speech, halting between two opinions, but, at the same time, endeavoured to show historically that the temporal power of the popes had always been highly detrimental—abused popes and Bourbons, but concluded without proposing anything. Audinot had warned them of the danger they ran of bringing down on them the armies of Europe by deposing the Pope. Then came club orators, who repeated in big voices that which others had repeated before them. Austria was falling to pieces, and France was in their favour. Canino felt the sacred soil vibrating under his feet, opining that it was the spirits of their ancestors boiling with impatience, and shouting in their ears, "The Roman Republic for ever!" If he really perceived any vibratory motion at all, for after all it was perhaps but a figure of rhetoric, probably it might have been occasioned by the stamping of the unwashed in the gallery.

Mamiani's motion was first put—"That the assembly referred to the constituent of Italy the choice of a political organization for the Roman States." The debate was concluded by a young banker, a club-orator, who cried—"Either the Pope, the Provisional Government, or a Republic. Of the first I should blush to speak; the second would be but protracted agony; there remains nothing but the Republic." Sterbini then, anxious to make up for his former wavering, suggested that if they proclaimed a republic, it should be declared on the following morning from the Capitol. Saffi remarked that the deposition of the Pope was already *ipso facto* resolved by the convocation of the constituent assembly. There was some uproar in the gallery as to the way the votes should be taken, and even Canino appealed to the president to call them to order, and to protect the members in delivering their

opinions; but the president did not, as he ought to have done at once, turn the whole of them out into the street. Some members protested that if every one was not allowed to express his opinion, they should withdraw,—some of them of opinions "liberal," as they are called. Mamiani's motion was lost. Then came Filopanti's. Of the 142 members present, ten voted against it, twelve refused to vote, and the rest voted in its favour. All the members of the provisional government voted for it. And then Galleti, the president, announced the following decree:—

Art. 1. The Popedom is deposed *de facto* and *de jure* from the temporal government of the Roman States.

Art. 2. The Roman Pontiff shall enjoy all the guarantees necessary for his independence in the exercise of his spiritual power.

Art. 3. The form of the government for the Roman States shall assume the glorious appellation of the Republic of Rome.

Art. 4. The Republic of Rome shall bear towards the rest of Italy the relations demanded by the common nationality.

The whole audience huzzaed for the republic, and the sitting was closed at two o'clock in the morning of the 9th of February, and the republic was proclaimed on the same day from the Capitol to the responding cheers of a crowd improvident of the future, and incapable of surmising the evils that they were entailing on themselves and others. Their hope, their aspiration was accomplished; they forgot that

> "Nocitura togâ nocitura petuntur militiâ,
> Evertere domos totas optantibus ipsis
> Di faciles."

They had forgotten that when success is apparently the greatest, a reverse is usually at hand:

"Sperat infestis metuit secundis
Alteram sortem bene preparatum
Pectus"

was never a maxim with the mob.

With them the new-born republic was their last toy; and they played with it for the moment, not thinking of the explosion they were likely to bring on themselves, much as children would in sport throw a hot cinder into a barrel of gunpowder, and with about as much precaution and experience. Doubtless, while they were going through the mad orgies of installation, there were some prudent men who were able to see what was coming, and who must have regarded with grief, not unmixed with a bitter mirth, the fooleries that were enacted around them.

Thus was power transferred from the Pope to the ragamuffins of Rome, consisting of the greatest rascals in all Europe,—an unenviable distinction, which appears from the earliest historic period to have been the inheritance of the eternal city. Indeed, if fables are true, its origin was some such assemblage of refugees from all the neighbouring states. So it appears that extremes meet in a very unexpected manner. Was it possible that the present motley assemblage under Sterbini should produce as brilliant results as that under Romulus?—a question to which the sequel will be a reply.

Theoretically there was established the absolute rule of the majority, or, in other words, the absolute rule of brute force, which is, in point of fact, the theory of all absolute rule; so that this theoretical multiplication table of perfection of freedom more nearly approaches despotism than any other form of government. Absolute sovereignty, whether of people or kings, is the sovereignty of force, and it is a matter of the most perfect indifference to the minority whether their will is individually overborne by the many acting by themselves, or by their representative; and yet there are not a few persons who figure to

themselves, in advocating the suffrage of the many, they are advancing the cause of real freedom, forgetting that freedom is the greatest possible amount of individual action and thought, unfettered by the interference of any one, consistent with public security, together with an impartial administration of justice. But, faulty as was the theory on which this government was contrived, in practice it was much worse; it was not the people who really elected, or who were the real sovereigns; it was the clubs, —that is, the urban rabble,—a very small portion of the people, and by far the worst, most uncivilized, and depraved class of it;—in fact, it was the worst of oligarchies who thus set up themselves to rule over the rest. Armenelli, Montecchi, and Saliceti were the executive. Among the ministers were Muzzerelli, Sterbini, Campello, and Saffi. The sovereigns in the streets were disposed to disport themselves, and sometimes would adorn their own heads, sometimes the cross in the Piazza del Popolo, with the cap of liberty. One day they fell upon and insulted and pelted all the servants in livery.

The Grand Duke of Tuscany had found his democratic ministry and mob disagreeable, and had withdrawn, under plea of his health, to Sienna, where he could be less disturbed by them. It is said that all along he had remained on terms with his Austrian relatives; but this is not proved. On the 8th of February he went out as for an airing, and proceeded to San Stefano, a small fishing village on the coast, where he was protected by an English frigate and war-steamer, whither he was followed by the foreign ministers. Meanwhile the populace sang and shouted, and planted trees of liberty, and set up what they were pleased to call a republic. Upon this Charles Albert offered his assistance to replace him on his constitutional throne, which offer was at first accepted; but hearing from Gaeta that it would be taken amiss by Aus-

tria, who would fall on Charles Albert if he did, he recalled his acceptance; and after the provisional government had dissolved parliament and summoned a national assembly, and after he had ordered his troops to march on them, and had recalled the order in consequence of having declined the assistance of Piedmont, he took refuge on board the Bulldog, and steamed to Gaeta.

The flight of the Grand Duke was highly pleasing at Rome; it threw a neighbouring state into the revolutionary fever, and Rome and Tuscany would henceforth make common cause. But about the same time came very unsatisfactory news from Ferrara. The Austrians, who held the citadel, were under agreement not to go into the town except for the purpose of communicating across the Po, and for the purpose of visiting the hospital. One day some of them, having left their accustomed route, were insulted and pelted. Two days after, another similar occurrence took place, in which several of both parties were slain; in consequence, the citadel began to bombard the town. However, matters were arranged, and were going on tranquilly, till Haynau, who was in the neighbourhood, threatened to take summary vengeance; and crossing the Po with 6000 men and 22 guns, under the threat of a bombardment, which the city had no means of resisting, compelled it to hoist the papal flag, to pay a fine of 200,000 crowns (which he transmitted to the Pope), and to supply him with provisions. Meanwhile, in the assembly at Rome, one of the first steps was to impose an oath on the functionaries, civil and military, of faith to the republican government,—a measure which, though it might well have been carried by motives of prudence, it is suggested came to be enacted because many of the deputies wished for the places they hoped would be resigned in consequence. But the greatest difficulty of the government was to find a remedy for the intolerable consumption

of purse under which they laboured. The exchequer was empty, and there were no very ready means of filling it. They issued paper for a legal tender, but their authority and credit were not sufficient to keep it at par. The suspension of cash payments (such as once carried ancient Rome through the Punic war) requires, as then, the most perfect credit in the stability of the government at home. Coin was becoming scarcer, paper fell below par, and the taxes which had been repealed ceased to come in, and those unrepealed became unremunerative; so the ministers took to abusing the money-changers and banks because the paper was not at par, and they fell upon the Bank of Rome. But under their difficulties they were obliged at last to come to the bank to borrow, which yielding to *apparent* compulsion, in order to keep on terms with the Pope should he ever get back, lent them paper money to the amount of 900,000 crowns, and was permitted to issue 1,300,000 crowns of legal tender paper on their own and government security. Then recourse was had to a compulsory loan, which was to bear interest at the rate of 5 per cent.; but as the many were uppermost, they desired only to make the few—the wealthy—contribute, which they did by a graduated tax, reaching in the highest 66 per cent. of the income; but the tax falling only on the few, the rich, was, as any person of common sense would have known, utterly inadequate to the occasion, although confiscatory in amount.

The Swiss regiments, who had sworn fidelity to the Pope, asked for their pay and their discharge, but they got neither, and in consequence would not serve the republic, as they probably would have done had they been disbanded, for they would then probably have entered into a fresh engagement. Campello, the minister at war, did his best to bring his troops into order and to procure arms, but it cannot be said that his endeavours were very suc-

cessful. Garibaldi had arrived at Rome with a following of about 1000 men, whom he kept in good order by prompt and severe punishment in case of misbehaviour, so that they looked greater rogues than they were. Whatever were the causes of uneasiness to thinking men, they were at Rome in a minority; the populace during the Carnival laughed, shouted, and danced quite as much, if not more, than on previous occasions. The government attempted to enter into diplomatic intercourse with other nations, but they were not recognised, and so they contented themselves with issuing manifestoes to the discontented in foreign states.

Piedmont, under the ministry of Gioberti, was, though beaten in its contest with Austria, still intent on rescuing Italy alike from foreign domination and from domestic brawls. Shortly after the Austrian expulsion from Lombardy, the Emperor, as has been mentioned, accepted the mediation of France and England, and at one period appeared not unwilling to listen to Italian claims. But not only was Austria successful in the field, but the national party, or those who assumed to themselves that name, had conducted themselves in a manner so utterly discordant with respectable behaviour, that the very mediators on whom they had to rely were alarmed at the idea of encouraging them: thus they strengthened the position of Austria and absolutism. If such persons had to be kept in order—and for the peace of Europe that was a necessity—by the force of bayonets, Austria might as well do it as any one else. When the Pope was driven out of Rome, and the Grand Duke out of Tuscany, and disorder reigned in their stead, there was an opportunity of showing to the world that the cause of Italian independence was not the cause of disorder; hence the offer of Piedmont to the Pope, if need be, to assist him with force of arms. Hence, too, when the Grand Duke wanted help,

Charles Albert at once offered it, in order that, having re-established order in Italy, he might stand before Europe not only as the supporter of Italian independence, but also as the supporter of thrones and the preserver of tranquillity,—a character with which Europe was likely to sympathize. The rabble had made the cause of Italy the cause of no Pope, no monarchy, no government, no order, no anything but rabble—demagogues, clubs, and spouters. Gioberti and Charles Albert hoped to save Italy in spite of them, and they were much annoyed in consequence; but when the Pope refused his mediation, and when he was excluded by the other powers belonging to the Latin church from the treaty of intervention, and when the second communication from the Grand Duke recalled his previous request of assistance, Charles Albert hesitated. Gioberti recommended a bold policy, the king still did not know what course to adopt, and the minister fell, deserted alike by the favour of the people and the king, and very much to the loss of both one and the other.

Mazzini, in the mean time, both in Tuscany and at Rome, where he had been elected a deputy, had laboured without success to obtain the union of the two states. In Rome itself more order was kept than might have been expected, but in the provinces gangs of assassins spread terror and destruction far and wide. One of the first state necessities, after meeting their financial difficulties by a base coinage, was to suppress this state of things, which existed especially in the neighbourhood of Imola, to which place Saffi, minister of the interior, sent a few carabineers and a select body of townsmen, and succeeded in arresting the gang unawares, and then proclaimed that the republic would execute summary justice on all who dared to violate the law.

In the month of March, Charles Albert again resolved

to try the fortune of arms, and the French envoy, M. Mercier, having in vain attempted to dissuade him, came on to Gaeta, where the news was for the most part gladly received, and he then came to Rome, with an introduction from the Duc d'Harcourt to Mamiani, and consulted with him and some of his friends, saying that foreign intervention must come; to which Mamiani replied, if it must, that a French intervention was a lesser evil than an Austrian one; and while M. Mercier returned to Gaeta, he promised that France would uphold, nevertheless, constitutional rights.

Charles Albert, though resolved on war, was anything but well prepared for it. He had been increasing his army till its nominal strength reached 135,000 men, but what he had gained in quantity he had lost in quality, for his troops were ill disciplined, and did not know their officers, and though his artillery was excellent, it was scanty. A Pole, Chrzanouski, had the chief command; and among his commanders were Durando, who had in the last war led the Romans, Ramorino, who had not distinguished himself creditably in the ridiculous expedition of Mazzini into Savoy, and whom the influence of political clubs had now given the command of the Lombard division, and La Marmora, a young commander of much promise; but of the 135,000 men, not above 90,000 could be brought into the field, a force in point of number, though not organization, about equally matched with the Austrians, who were commanded in chief by Radetzki, and the five corps of whose army were commanded by Wratislaw, D'Aspré, Appel, Thurm, and Wocher. "For Turin," cried Radetzki, as he marched towards the frontier to anticipate the king.

On the 20th of March, having concentrated his five divisions on Pavia, the Austrian general threw himself across the Ticino, without any opposition on the part of Ramorino, who was in charge of the post. On the 21st, while the king

was reconnoitring across the river, he was surprised to hear no cannonade in the direction of Pavia, which Ramorino had been directed to occupy, when news came that he had not been at his post, and that the Austrians were on Piedmontese ground, and were marching towards Novara. The Piedmontese advanced to meet them, and shortly after passing Mortara, they encountered the enemy. The battle began with the artillery, and raged till nightfall, when the Piedmontese were driven through the town of Mortara in confusion, which town the Austrians succeeded in holding, and through whom La Marmora cut his way after nightfall, getting clear off with only fifty men, the rest of the party having laid down their arms. When Chrzanouski heard of this disaster, he fell back to before Novara without encountering any obstacle, and waited for the enemy at Bicocca, a village to the south of Novara. The battle began between ten and eleven on the 23d, and raged all day with great fury and various success. Bicocca was several times taken and retaken at the point of the bayonet. The Austrians were compelled successively to bring up fresh forces, and the Piedmontese, wearied, were toward night driven in confusion on Novara, but not before they several times repulsed the Austrians with great slaughter. Their actual loss was not such but that they might have easily recovered it, but the demoralization of the army was complete. None but veterans can be in any degree depended on after defeat, and these were not veterans; it was almost all an army of recruits. The king had been himself foremost in every affair of the day, fighting like a knight-errant; he had staked everything on the throw, and was resolved to conquer or die, and was at length with difficulty persuaded to leave the field. The army was virtually dissolved, and could not be brought to face the enemy. A council of war was held; it was resolved to sue for peace; an officer was sent to Radetzki to ask a truce. He offered terms too

hard for Charles Albert to accept, requiring as a preliminary the immediate dismissal of all the Italians from other states who had fought with the Piedmontese army; and after communicating Radetzki's reply to the council, the king said that these terms were inadmissible, and asked if there were any means of offering effectual resistance. They replied that there were none. The king then said that he was himself an obstacle to their obtaining more favourable terms, and that he would resign in favour of his son, with whom there would be less personal feeling on the part of the enemy, and who, he hoped, would be able to make better terms with Radetzki. After a personal interview of the new king Victor Emanuel with Radetzki, a truce was agreed on.

The Lombard troops were to be discharged, the army was to be reduced to a peace establishment, a mixed garrison was to hold the fortress of Alexandria, and 20,000 Austrians were to be maintained by Piedmont in the district between the Ticino and the Sesia. While these negotiations were going on, a handful of men in Cassale were summoned to surrender by General Wimpffen; but having closed and barricaded the gates, they repulsed him, and gave him much annoyance during the night. Next day, however, they heard of the armistice. Charles Albert left Novara with a single valet, with a passport made out as Count di Barge, in the direction of Nice; and a few miles onward was stopped by the Austrians, who only allowed him to pass after examining his passport and verifying his identity by the evidence of a Piedmontese prisoner, who, recognising his sovereign in a difficulty, declared he knew him to be the person he represented himself. On the 25th he arrived at Nice, and thence he crossed the French frontier, and arrived at Antibes on the following day. He did not long survive his misfortunes. He appears to have been a man of courage, but lacking

prudence—more an enthusiast than a politician—more generous and impulsive than calm, or consistent, or calculating. He was a gentleman and a soldier, but he was neither a statesman nor a strategist.

On the very day of the battle of Novara, Brescia rose against its Austrian garrison, and was by Haynau treated after his accustomed manner. When the news of the defeat reached Genoa, that city added to the misfortunes of Italy by bursting into a flame, crying that Italy was betrayed, and pulling down the Sardinian flag, so that it required force under General La Marmora to cause the recognition of the new King Victor Emanuel in that city; but, by firmness as well as temperance, it was speedily reduced to order. At Rome the martial ardour of the people appeared to be kindled, as far as talking, and shouting, and voting went, but not further. Could Italy have been thus defended, she had been free indeed. Some were for throwing the whole people in mass on Lombardy, some on Naples, but the mass went neither to the north nor to the south. The Assembly stormed and cursed over the fall of the Piedmontese, and rejoiced with a criminal joy in the rising of Genoa. But when it came to be known that La Marmora had suppressed that rebellion by force, they cursed him, as such men always curse and vilify when their own brute force is encountered by their own weapons. Mazzini had by this time become one of a triumvirate, and, in fact, was autocrat in Rome. Upon the renewal of the war, the court at Gaeta held their breath in suspense, and even the diplomatists ceased their consultations, feeling that so much hung on the war, and that the diplomatic knot would be cut by the sword.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE FRENCH INTERVENTION IN ROME, &c. TO THE RESTORATION OF THE POPE.

THE last act of the drama was approaching. The continued disturbances and unruly behaviour of the Italians produced foreign jealousy and foreign intervention from the neighbouring states; for perpetual civil broils cannot occur in one state without more or less affecting the passions and interests of all its neighbours. Neither princes nor people at home could restore the desired quiet. The weakness of one and the turbulence of the other were about to inflict on their country the disgrace of occupation by foreign troops. In Rome, acts, laws, and proclamations were plenty, but very little was done. The work-people were set to excavate in the forum, for the purpose of finding an excuse for paying them wages. There were processions to amuse the people, and at Easter they got some rogue of a priest to perform the function of pope, and after celebrating High Mass at St Peter's, to bless the people. Perhaps if they were equally satisfied, after all, they were no great losers. Then there were illuminations of the dome of St Peter's—in short, anything for a spectacle and to keep the populace in good humour; and preparations were

being made for the conflict for the Roman republic, that all now knew must come; for the Austrian and French diplomatists at Gaeta were arranging who were to make the intervention; and at the same time, M. Mercier was in communication with such of the Constitutionalists as were at Rome as to the conditions of a restoration; and the Secretary of Legation was plotting with the clergy and Sanfedists for a restoration without any conditions. Thus was France at once dallying with both parties, while Young Italy was occupied with its own hallucinations, and in the patriotic employment of cursing the new King of Piedmont, together with all kings and princes, and Austrian cruelties in Lombardy; and though the former used his victory over the turbulent at Genoa with rare moderation, and the latter were behaving as Austrians usually behave, these discriminating persons made but little difference between them. They were blind to the fact that the whole of Europe, weary of discord, was now reactionary, and intent on tranquillity at all cost.

But though the flame of Italian independence was quenched in the blood of Piedmont and Brescia, Venice still maintained the unequal conflict. She had made ready to resume the offensive; and on the 2d of April, having received from Haynau a summons of instant surrender, the Assembly was convened, and resolved to resist at all hazards. The President Manin was, for the purpose, invested with extraordinary powers; private citizens came forward by subscription to meet the financial difficulties.

In Naples, the king, who during the heat of the revolution had sworn to anything, and courted the mob while they were uppermost, not having either courage or power to resist, was now worrying the discomfited supporters of the constitution to which he had sworn; and having taken

in pay a set of lazy rogues, employed them in bullying and insulting the deputies, who had assembled on the 1st of February at his summons, and whom, at the moment, Ferdinand was not strong enough at once to dismiss. They complained to the king of his administration, but the administration set the parliament at nought, prevented them from laying their complaints before the king, and finally dissolved them on 13th of March, and then began a course of political persecutions. The negotiations which the English and French admirals had undertaken on behalf of Sicily were not crowned with success. The terms which were offered by the king were such as not to give any sufficient security, and as such, they were definitively refused by the island—a course which appears to have been a political blunder, as the island had no means of efficient resistance, and was, in fact, easily reconquered; and the terms were certainly better than nothing, and perhaps that is all that could be said in their favour. Perhaps, as on the union of Sicily to Naples, at the conclusion of the war, England was in some sort a guarantee for the institutions she had herself established in that island, she did less in the matter than might have been expected of her.

Tuscany was becoming heartily sick of her philanthropic regenerators. A rabble of lazzaroni in Leghorn insulted every one and everything respectable to such an extent that even Guerrazzi was indignant. On the 25th of March the Constituent met, and had named him dictator, and on the 4th of April had rejected the proposed union with Rome; while a physician named Venturucci had openly proposed in the Assembly the restoration of the constitutional throne which had been overturned—a project which was only suspended by the insurrection of Genoa, whence Guerrazzi hoped to obtain assistance; but when that was suppressed, he came into the same view, that it was the only course that could be prudently adopted, although he kept

his change secret. But the rabble of Leghorn had grown more uproarious, and were intent on beating the Florentines, who in their turn took arms for the purpose of giving them a warm reception. During Easter, the taverns were filled with brawls; and on the 11th of April, the Florentines sounded their bells, and ran to arms to fall upon the Leghorners. Blood was shed, and Guerrazzi having in vain endeavoured to make peace, succeeded in carrying off the Leghorners by railway to the fortress of San Giovanni; whereupon the municipality assumed the reins of state, and proclaimed the restoration of the throne, and invited some of the most distinguished citizens to share with them the duties of provisional government. In the streets the people shouted, "Capponi for ever! none but honest fellows for us!" Guerrazzi on his return hesitated, seemed half inclined to join the provisional government, but they solved his doubts by putting him in prison. When Mazzini at Rome heard of it, he denounced it as treason which had spread from Piedmont to Tuscany; for, in his philosophy, any people who hold opinions differing from his are guilty of that crime: so much for liberty of thought. He did not in consequence recommend prudence; on the contrary, energy doubled and tripled energy, and, after the manner of Jack Cade, ordained that salt should be sold for one halfpenny a-pound, and that the property of the clergy should be divided off and let on long leases to the people; and Sterbini exhorted the assembly to make solemn oath never to swerve from the republican principle, on which they rose, shouting, "Yes, yes;" and next day a decree was posted up to that effect all over Rome, with a further proclamation from the triumvirs exhorting the people to firmness, and offering a shelter to all republicans from the rest of Italy who would flock to the Roman standard. Then came the republican constitution, which had to be voted by the constituent assembly. When this was

debated, Audinot said, "that Europe was looking on distrustfully; that the 'Catholic powers' wanted a guarantee for the independence of the Pope, and were of opinion that this was inconsistent with the republic, and that they ought with these powers to negotiate terms for securing this object:" of course meaning, by "Catholic," members of the Latin Church, although one might suppose otherwise, both from the meaning of the word and from the assembly addressing England as well as France on the subject. They framed a manifesto to the parliaments of those nations, asserting the right of self-government, but stating they fully recognised the spiritual power of the Pope—an expression of opinion in which England at least was not likely to coincide. The finances had got into such a tangle that the commission, whose business it was to investigate, at once closed all the old accounts and opened fresh ones, as the former appeared to have been kept with a view of preventing any one from understanding them: not even Galli himself, the winder of the skein, could make anything of it.

The financial difficulties and the hopes of foreign intervention had stimulated various outbreaks of country people on the Neapolitan frontier, headed by their priests, in favour of the Papal authority, but they had been suppressed; for the Papal troops chose rather to obey the republic than the Pope, and were but little inclined to obey either. It became necessary to punish some one of consequence. They fell on a certain Padre Rossi; convicted him on the evidence of what purported to be a circular from Gaeta, which was said to have been found among his papers, urging him to promote risings, &c., and which, in fact, was no evidence in itself of any intention on his part to do so; and it is very doubtful whether it was not put where it was found, by government agents, as he has, both before and since the restoration, denied that it was genuine. However, he was thereupon

condemned to the galleys; but there is no doubt that the court at Gaeta did desire these risings in its favour, and had encouraged them. The tidings of the restoration of the Tuscan throne on the basis of their constitution is said to have caused lively disappointment among the lovers of absolutism. Even the Grand Duchess is reported to have exclaimed that they had missed the chance of a good restoration—a very unworthy sentiment, if she uttered it—for, having made arrangements with Austria for military help, it was disappointing to be only partially restored to power, though by the good-will of the people. The Duc d'Harcourt, on the other hand, hoped that Rome might be induced to follow the example, as by that means alone could any vestiges of freedom be preserved. M. Mercier announced to the constitutionalists, with whom he was in communication, the speedy arrival at Civita Vecchia of some French troops, as he said, to prevent Austria domineering at Rome, and the extinction of all liberty; but he could not induce the civic guard and the carabineers to effect a constitutional restoration—indeed the constitutionalists would do nothing—and the negotiations were continued without any result. But the march of events was not sufficiently rapid to satisfy France. Diplomatic delays would allow of Austria stepping in, and must infallibly exclude French influence from the whole peninsula. The President Louis Napoleon, a few days before his election on the 2d of December 1848, had written a letter, explaining his absence from a division on the question of sending a force to Civita Vecchia, saying, that however desirous he might be of securing the freedom and authority of the supreme pontiff, he could not sanction by his voice a military demonstration, which he considered dangerous to the peace of Europe—a prudent view, in which he was undoubtedly right. But if Italian freedom, such as it was, was doomed, French intervention was certainly

preferable to Austrian, though Italy would probably have willingly dispensed with either or both. In the middle of April, M. Drouyn de L'Huys, minister of foreign affairs, announced to the French envoy at Vienna that the circumstances which had occurred rendered an intervention necessary to the preservation of a just French influence in Italy—how much influence that was, he does not explain. At the same time, he wrote to the Duc d'Harcourt, desiring him to inform the court at Gaeta of the departure of General Oudinot for Civita Vecchia, and to recommend the Pope to take advantage of it to publish a manifesto securing to his subjects liberal institutions; for that such a manifesto, published on the landing of the French troops, would at once contribute to the bringing about of an accommodation; and that it would be better for the Holy Father to make himself acceptable to his people—advice which the Pope was not wise enough to follow.

The French assembly was induced to approve of the despatch of the troops, under the representation that they were not sent for the purpose of imposing any form of government disagreeable to the majority of the people, but of preventing Austrian interference, and the domineering of a small but violent dominant faction of rabble, and of allowing the people to choose for themselves; and, if Austria interfered, to save at any rate, if not the republic, at least the liberties of Italy. Instructions were given to General Oudinot, commander-in-chief of the expedition, to proceed to Civita Vecchia, and there to request of the governor admission into the Ecclesiastical States, but he was to land whether or no. Though he was not to interfere finally in settling matters, he was authorized to receive any proposition the *de facto* government might make for accommodation; but he was to avoid in matter of form recognising their legal existence—he was to communicate at once with the Duc d'Harcourt and M.

Raynval, who were charged by the government of France to conduct at Gaeta all business relating to the matter in hand. He was to send one of his officers to Rome to inform the *de facto* government he could not recognise them, but to request them to assist in rescuing the country from the frightful crisis which hung over it. He might march on Rome if he thought it prudent to do so, but was advised to wait till he was sure of a favourable reception by the people. How far the instructions to the general were consistent with the representations to the assembly, is a question perhaps difficult of solution. On the 20th of April he read to his troops at Marseilles an order of the day, in which he said nothing of Pope or papal government, but of the French flag, which was to be planted on the Roman territory, in testimony of affection to its inhabitants (in fact they loved them so much that they have never since parted with them), whom they could not think of leaving subject to a foreign power, or the domination of any party not approved by the majority.

When it became known in Rome that the troops were despatched, Mazzini himself appears to have been deceived, for he said in the assembly that perhaps their aim might be to hinder the intervention of Austria, and defend the Roman territory, and said that, in the mean time, Rome ought to give the "Catholic powers" fresh guarantees for the free and full exercise of the Pope's spiritual authority. On the same day Captain Dubois landed at Civita Vecchia, M. Latour d'Auvergne and M. Espinivent bearing a letter to the governor, requesting that the troops might be properly received on landing. The governor asked fourteen hours for consideration, which was sufficient time to get instructions from Rome, but threatened in the mean time to resist the landing, and convoked the municipality. Espinivent handed them a proclamation of Oudinot's, disclosing the intention of restoring the Pope, whereupon

they reproached him with bitter words; but he then shifted his ground, said they came as friends, that the electoral assemblies should choose whatever form of government they liked, and that France only desired the accomplishment of the public wishes; and of these assurances he left a note in writing, and also promised to pay ready money for whatever was required by the troops. When this was published, the municipal body leaned to pacific councils; but the governor wrote word to Oudinot he would be governed by instructions from Rome, for which he wrote, and in the evening he caused the mouth of the harbour to be closed, and the draw-bridges to be hoisted, and the city prepared for resistance, and brought into it a battalion of sharpshooters. Meantime the Assembly, having been convoked at midnight, resolved to protest and resist, throwing on France the responsibility for the consequences, and sent off orders to Civita Vecchia to this effect; but that port raised a cry for peace, and on learning that the military officers were preparing to obey the orders of the central government, they made an insurrection on the morning of the 25th, and it became necessary, in consequence, not to oppose the landing of the French troops; so they landed, the people shouting, "Live Italy! Live the Republic!" and the troops shouting the same sentiments.

The general published a proclamation, which spoke of having come to compose the troubles of Italy, and to establish a government equally removed from the abuses which the generosity of Pius IX. had destroyed for ever, and from the anarchy of the last times,—a form of expression which troubled the republicans, who met and protested; but the general put their protest in the fire, had it torn down, and closed the printing-office. This was the first practical act of the French after landing. How far it was consistent with their professions, or how far

their professions to different parties were consistent with each other, it is for the reader to judge. Usually speaking, when persons say one thing to one person, and the reverse to another, one is in the habit of considering such conduct as shuffling. There does not appear any reason why governments should be exempted from the rules of conduct which bind ordinary mortals, although they appear to be of a different opinion in many countries, not excepting our own.

Thus, talking liberally and acting very much the reverse, the French kept possession of Civita Vecchia. They at first kept the civic guard in arms, and the local magistrates in office, but exercised the real power themselves. General Oudinot stopped a legion of 600 Lombards, who were on the way to the Roman States under Colonel Manara, saying, "What business had Lombards in the affairs of Rome?" to which their colonel very naturally answered, "And you, general, do you come from Paris, from Lyons, or Bordeaux?" He was appealed to in vain, but received the deputies of the Roman assembly with great plenty of liberal expressions, saying he came for a friendly purpose; to which they replied, that the object of restoring the dominion of the clergy savoured little of friendship; on which he denied any such design, and said that the Roman people might settle their affairs as they liked, let them only receive the French soldiers as friends. He sent to Rome Colonel Le Blanc, who intimated to the triumvirs that the Papist nations would no longer tolerate the exile of the Pope, and were resolved to reinstate him; on which the Assembly resolved to meet force by force; and immediately arrived the deputies who had been sent to him, and Captain Fabar with a proclamation, declaring he did not come to exercise an oppressive influence, but to preserve them from the heaviest calamities; that the French banner was

planted on Roman soil in token of a lively sympathy, and that they might confide in his devotion. Captain Fabar said that an Austrian and Neapolitan invasion was imminent, and without a French garrison Rome must fall hopelessly into their hands, and Colonel Le Blanc retracted what he had said as to restoring the Pope. If the subsequent military conduct of Oudinot did not redound to his glory, at least in one respect the French did well in sending him to Rome. He could not complain,—"Quid Romæ faciam, mentiri nescio." Some were for coming to an accommodation. But the opinion prevailed that Rome should resist, and of this opinion were the galleries. The civic guard was assembled, and exhorted by orators to defend their country, and to maintain their liberties at the cost of their blood. They shouted—"Yes, yes."

Preparations for the defence went on. Ramparts were raised, loopholes made in the walls, and barricades were erected. In each district a captain of the people was appointed, and stages were erected from which orators exhorted the populace; the women were engaged in preparing bandages for the wounded; no one was allowed to pass in or out of the gates without permission, and an attempt was made to forbid the rise of prices. Thus, while preparations were making for their reception, the French were about to make an immediate attempt on the city, totally unprepared, it is said. There was not among them either a map of it or a scaling ladder. Perhaps this was well in the character of an invited arbitrator, but it was singular generalship. The papal party were going about with wonderful stories as to the faith of and the deeds to be done by the French President, and represented that the French had only to make their appearance to be hailed by Rome as deliverers, which it appears they believed, supposing that there would be an immediate demonstration in their favour within the walls. But the

court at Gaeta was not so delighted with a French intervention as it would have been had it not prevented the intervention of more decided friends. Civita Vecchia was declared in a state of siege.

Oudinot set out for Rome with 6000 men and two batteries of artillery. At Romo were about 10,000 soldiers, regular and irregular. Their cavalry amounted to about 500. Garibaldi was posted outside with some 3000 men. The 5th article of the French constitution* was printed in large letters, and scattered in the way the troops would advance. On the 29th, Oudinot took up his position at Castel del Guido, and to those who told him he would meet with resistance at Rome, he replied, "The Italians don't fight;" in which, however, he was mistaken; for, arriving before the city next day, by eleven o'clock he heard the bells sound to arms, and while some said that this was only the usual sign of midday, the combat began. Captain Fabar, who declared he knew the country well, offered to lead them round to a gate where a demonstration in their favour would be made; but they fell under the fire from the walls, he himself was slain, and the rest were repulsed, abandoning their guns; Garibaldi, making a dash at them, succeeded in taking about 300 prisoners. These were the first French who entered Rome, and that in a manner they had not anticipated. Italians had fought, and Oudinot was forced to apply to his government for fresh succours.

About this period was published at Gaeta an allocution of the Pope, addressed to the College of Cardinals, in which he gave a history of the events since the beginning of his reign; of course taking a very one-sided view of them, inasmuch as, praising himself, there were few others

* "Elle respecte les nationalités étrangères comme elle entende faire respecter la sienne, elle n'entreprend aucune guerre dans les vues de conquête, et n'emploie jamais la force contre la liberté d'aucun peuple."

on whom he did not cast blame—a frame of mind by no means enviable in a Christian, or even in a Pope, but in which he insinuated his intention of not abiding on his return by the fundamental statute.

The Romans, after they had repulsed the French, took to jeering at them; but they treated their prisoners well. Nevertheless, their perils were great. Not the French only had invaded the country, but the Spaniards had landed at Ostia. The Austrians menaced them from the north, and the Neapolitans from the south. The populace was kept in spirits by constant flattery and excitement, and on one occasion they tore in pieces three persons whom they laid hands on outside the city, on the suspicion of their being Jesuits, though it is by no means clear that they were not vine-dressers; and much injury was done to private property in the neighbourhood by the destruction of houses and villas outside the walls, on the plea of their interfering with the defences, although it has been said that the destruction was at times wanton, and occasionally dictated by other motives. A regular system of pillage of houses and goods was carried on by private rogues in the name of the public, which the government endeavoured to prevent.

Great disturbances took place at Bologna. In the other provinces disorders and assassinations were prevalent on both sides, republican and reactionist. Some, desirous of restoring the dominion of the clergy, were stimulating the country people to revolt; while the municipalities having been convened for the purpose, sent in their adhesion to the republic, declared their enmity to the dominion of the clergy, and protested against foreign intervention. Perhaps their expressions in favour of the republic were not worth very much; but they were more than the partisans of clerical government ever obtained from them. After some days the French and Romans agreed to an exchange

of prisoners, and mutual good offices passed between them, and they arranged a sort of provisional fraternization till further instruction.

When the news of the events at Rome reached Paris, there was, as might be expected, a great outcry in the Assembly. After the revolution, universal suffrage had virtually disfranchised the middle classes, and had returned a body in which religious and conservative influences were ascendant. Its tendency decidedly retrograded; nevertheless, it had made one of the laws of the constitution, that it should not be lawful for France to carry arms against other countries endeavouring to gain their independence, and it became somewhat ashamed of the attempt against Rome, the more that it had been unsuccessful. Even some of those who had consented to the expedition against Civita Vecchia, spoke against it, saying that the French had gone to protect Italy from Austrian fury, not to bombard Rome. Odillon Barrot said that Oudinot had addressed the Romans as brothers, and had said that the French had come into Italy as auxiliaries of the great cause of liberty, "and that every one must know that France could not enter Italy except in the interests of liberty" (what he meant is a curious problem); and he denied expressly that General Oudinot had any orders to attack Rome. The House resolved that it had been perfectly understood they were to remain at Civita Vecchia to watch events, and to prevent the violence of counter-revolution; and they invited government to provide that the necessary arrangements should be made in order that the expedition should not deviate from its original objects. For the purpose of conducting the necessary negotiation, the government sent M. Ferdinand Lesseps in character of an envoy. His object was to be to rescue Rome from a state of anarchy, and at once to steer clear of either recognising the *de facto* government as a legal one, or in any way of

hurting the sensibilities of the Pope; in short, the instructions meant very little; but if they meant anything, it was, that he was to get the Pope restored unconditionally if he could, though the French Government did not like to say so in so many words,—instructions which do not appear to agree with the view of the Assembly, or at least what they expressed; but Odillon Barrot said that impossible abuses should not be restored, and talked of solid and real guarantees for the liberty of the Roman state.

M. Lesseps arrived in the French camp just in time to dissuade General Oudinot from returning to the attack. He had written word to the President that Rome was already invested, and the submission of the party that governed it would be infallibly secured; for he flattered himself still that he was in sufficient strength to force an entry.

The Neapolitan army, consisting of 16,000 men, and commanded by the king in person, had entered the States of the Church, and lay between Albano and Frascati, and had occupied itself in the congenial pursuit of arresting suspected persons, and doing duty as amateur constables; but it was kept in check by Garibaldi, who with a handful of skirmishers hung about it, carrying on a sort of guerilla warfare. His troops were more disciplined as a tribe of Indians than as European regulars; but as the intention of the French was doubtful, he marched past them, and re-entered Rome during the night, on the 12th of May. Lesseps announced that Oudinot would make no league with the Neapolitans, and some began to hope that the republic might still be saved. The negotiations were begun by arranging a truce between the two armies. M. Lesseps wrote word to Oudinot that the whole city was in arms, and that the general would, if he forced an entry, be compelled to pass over the bodies of all those classes who were in France the firmest in the cause of

order. In fact, pressure from without was consolidating the republic within; it was not Mazzini and the rabble who were attacked, but Rome, and all her sons would rise in her defence.

Roselli, who had the chief command of the Roman army, upon the truce being announced, took the opportunity of delivering a blow at the Neapolitans, and marched out at the head of from 10,000 to 12,000 men. The news of the truce with the French having come to the ears of the court, they fell into perturbation, and recommended the king to return and save himself—"curare cutem summa est constantia civis."

Roselli had planned the order of battle, and had ordered Garibaldi not to advance; but he disregarded his orders, and falling like a thunderbolt on the enemy, from pure audacity and reckless courage defeated them and drove them back, though he exposed the Roman army to considerable risk by having disobeyed his orders.

The Duc d'Harcourt appears to have been really in earnest in endeavouring to procure for the people a security for the necessary reforms and for a liberal policy; but he was misled by the idea that if the French were once in Rome, they would be able to dictate their own terms to both parties, forgetting that the tanned hide of obstinacy is impenetrable as walls and barricades. The French were naturally annoyed at the stain on the glory of their arms which had been incurred by the defeat before Rome, and were anxious to remove it by speedily getting into that city. Negotiations went on between M. Lesseps and the triumvirs, but they could not agree; while Oudinot outside grew impatient, and declared he offered far too easy terms, and complained of being obliged to remain inactive. Mazzini was more anxious to preserve his own authority and his own crotchets for the time, than to arrange a permanent accommodation on any variation from

them. Upon this Lesseps declared the negotiations broken off, and, in conjunction with Oudinot, forwarded a protest to this effect to the triumvirs, and said they would send an eight days' notice of the interruption of the armistice. But Mazzini was not to be induced in anything to give way; he preferred that Rome should again fall under clerical oppression, and Italy under Austrian bayonets, rather than that the papal government should be restored on any terms, how favourable to reforms and freedom soever, and the consequence is, that Italy is now paying for his improvidence; for, had he consented to negotiate on rational terms, clerical dominion could not have been re-established in the absolute manner it afterwards was. In this state of affairs M. Lesseps wrote to Paris to give an account of his mission. He said it would be best to give time for the Romans to come to a just estimation of their own interest. He had pressingly urged on General Oudinot to maintain the truce; but he required reinforcements of men, to the extent of 20,000 or 25,000, to give weight to negotiations with Austria, but not siege artillery, which would give the appearance of wishing to bombard Rome. After the negotiations were interrupted, he was led to believe that he was marked out for the dagger of the assassin. And it is quite possible that those who stabbed Rossi would have been glad to wreak their vengeance on any one who was in their way; and as he, by attempting to bring about an accommodation, was obnoxious to them, it is sufficiently probable that plots may have been laid against his life, but at the same time there is not any proof of them. After this he appears to have lost his head, and took to writing nonsense about Mazzini, and eventually advised force.

The Austrian course of proceeding had at least the advantage of simplicity and straightforwardness to recommend it: they were resolved to restore the Pope and the

priests at all cost, and having set up the papal arms at Ferrara, they advanced on Bologna for the same purpose; but the city prepared for defence, and only capitulated after sustaining a siege of eight days. It is said that some of the terms of the capitulation were not observed by the victors; and the Austrian officers are accused of appropriating the private arms which were given up as a temporary measure,—a charge which yet requires refutation.

In the rear of the Austrians followed the priests, and Bedini was installed in the government of the city. When these events came to be known in the French camp, and when the Austrians were reported to be marching across Romagna for the purpose of opening communications with the Neapolitan troops, the French envoy again became anxious to arrange matters with Rome, and General Oudinot wrote to the Austrian general to say that any movement towards Rome he should look on as an insult and a sign of hostility to France, and that if their soldiers met it might lead to unpleasant conflicts. The meaning of all this was, that he looked on Rome and the Romans as his manor and game; and though he was inclined to batter the one and shoot the other, he was determined to prevent poaching. He was anxious at once to begin, but the envoy requested him to wait till fresh instructions came from Paris. The triumvirs reopened negotiations, and again softened M. Lesseps' ruffled dignity. He wrote again to Paris to recommend delays and accommodation; but they acted on his previous letter, and disregarded this one.

England had also been applied to by the republic to procure, if possible, its recognition. Lord Palmerston had received with courtesy Canuti, who had been sent by Mamiani, and told him that he looked on it as necessary immediately to come to an understanding with the Pope,

and to restore him with liberal institutions, otherwise they would certainly have the Pope, but without these. Afterwards he held similar language to Count Marioni, who, on the 23d of May, wrote to Rome that Lord Palmerston had told him to advise those who governed the republic to treat at least with France, and that England would help: let them accept the Pope and a constitution, with freedom of the press and a lay government, and lose no time about it. If they let the favourable moment slip, it was their own fault; and if they refused, it would be in the end made worse for them. Mazzini, to whom so much common sense was eminently unpalatable, put the letter in his pocket, and showed some other letters from England, which appeared to say that it was probable that they might be recognised —a course too economic of honesty.

Now, though the people of Rome had given themselves up to the Assembly, and the Assembly to the Triumvirs, and the Triumvirs to Mazzini, yet he was unable to keep his own immediate rabble in any order; and accordingly they used the dagger and the firebrand wherever they listed with impunity, though the government did their best to put an end to their enormities. A scoundrel named Zambianchi undertook to be judge and executioner of all the priests he could lay his hands on, and effected his diabolical project on a considerable number, till the government succeeded in rescuing from his clutches about a dozen who were still on his hands; and the same disorder of assassination, which appears to be inherent in the Italian character, still raged in the provinces.

Ancona fell into the hands of the Austrians; and Alpi, a renegade Italian who followed them, chose to quarter himself in a gentleman's house, and to occupy his own rooms; and on the master remonstrating he sent him to prison, and the Austrian officers, to whom he appealed, condemned him to be shot if he did not make an apology; and

the gentleman (Prince Simoneti), who had been of some service to the Pope, appealed to him, from whom he received courteous words, but that was all.

Still M. Lesseps hung back, insomuch that M. Rayneval came over from Gaeta and reproved him, and repudiated all responsibility as to what had been done since his arrival. He replied, he had told his government the whole truth, and was waiting for orders, and defended his policy; but he agreed, nevertheless, to attempt to bring matters to a speedy conclusion, and he and General Oudinot settled a declaration, saying, that, considering the advance of the Austrians, and the other circumstances of the case, he asked the Roman authorities to agree to invite the protection of the French republic That France did not contest the right of the Romans to choose their own form of government; that the French army should be received as a friendly one, and allowed to enter the city for its defence, and to occupy such situations as were advisable; and that the French should guarantee the territory occupied by them from foreign invasion. The declaration was delivered to the Triumvirs, and twenty-four hours given them to consider it. They sent back a counter proposal, saying, that the French should protect it from the outside, and that it could be defended by its own people. General Oudinot swore he never would disgrace French arms by agreeing to remain outside. General Le Valliant arrived from Paris, and was the immediate precursor of the recommencement of hostilities. Oudinot declared he should give orders for the assault the following morning. Lesseps remonstrated that he should not, in the face of Europe, violate the laws of nations in attacking the place before the twenty-four hours he had given them had expired, on which he agreed to postpone it. Next morning he set off for Rome with a modification of the articles proposed by the Triumvirs, which he eventually signed, admitting that

the French troops should remain outside Rome. With this document he went off in a hurry to the camp at midnight, and found the general in bed. "At last we have brought things to an end," cried he, flourishing the document, and reading it. When he came to the article about the French troops keeping outside of Rome, the general fell in a rage, jumped *sacrè*-ing out of bed, and, gesticulating in his night-shirt, swore he never would sign terms so disgraceful for France, and might his hand wither before he subscribed such infamy. The general in his shirt, in great heat inwardly, but very cool about the legs—the self-complacency of the envoy, who thought he had succeeded, and the gradual working up of both parties into a passion, must have been a scene bordering on the ludicrous, had it not been for the consequences.

The general sent a letter to the Triumvirs to say that he looked on the agreement as void. M. Lesseps did not change his opinion, but sent a messenger to Paris, and was preparing to follow, when he received thence a despatch terminating his mission, a notification of which was also sent to Oudinot. On the 1st of June he set off for Paris, where he was reproved, and accused by ministers, and censured by the council of state. On the same day, Oudinot declared war. His army numbered 35,000 men. His artillery consisted of 60 guns, some battering pieces, some field; on the other side were not more than 19,000 in all, and of them near half were irregulars. Their guns were small and not efficient. They succeeded in casting and manufacturing five brass guns during the siege, and carried on a manufacture of gunpowder.

Though it had been agreed not to attack the *place* till the 4th, the suburbs were taken possession of by surprise on the 3d—a course which seemed to be rather making use of a quibble, and against which the Triumvirs protested. When the Romans heard of the circumstance, they sallied

out to retake them, and succeeded for a time in driving the French from some villas they had got possession of; but they were repulsed, and rather expended their men and exertions in desultory conflicts than in any decided, well-ordered plan of defence. The skirmishes were fought with great courage and obstinacy; but as they were deficient in discipline, they appear to have trusted more to personal prowess than to the experience and generalship of their commander-in-chief. Their officers were in the habit of fighting musket in hand as common soldiers, rather than of planning the ordos of battle beforehand. Thus many valuable lives were lost to no purpose. Deeds of individual heroism were done, but the days of personal conflicts were past: the valour of Hector would have availed nothing against discipline and strategy.

While the French cannon were thundering on the walls of Rome, about 7000 Spaniards, under the command of General Cordova, landed on the coast, and in conjunction with the Kingof Naples, sent to General Oudinot to offer to come up to his assistance; but he answered, that since the 30th of April, he had lost hope of bringing the Romans to reason except by force, and that the reparation to France would be incomplete unless they fell by French force alone, and he could not therefore allow any army to approach in the character of an ally, and should be obliged to repel it as an enemy should it advance. On the 12th, having completed his approaches, he sent a proclamation to Rosselli, announcing to the inhabitants, that if they did not open their gates, he should proceed to extremities. Mazzini, however, was determined not to give in, founding his hopes on an anticipated revolution in Paris, which did not happen, rather than on any means he possessed of resistance. He forgot that Cavaignac had the year before read the Parisians a lesson they were scarce likely so soon to forget, and he encouraged the people to resist even when he

knew resistance to be hopeless. He professed a desire to wait till France had pronounced an opinion on the articles which had been agreed to by M. Lesseps, of which, however, as far as the French government were concerned, he could be in no doubt, for they had recalled that envoy, and censured him. But Mazzini declared that the convention M. Lesseps had signed was valid till it was either cancelled or ratified at Paris; and he complained to the general of his breach of faith in commencing the attack before the time had expired which he himself had given them. But though the triumvirs wrote thus, the artillery kept still playing on the walls, and the Assembly sat in permanence; and the foreign consuls in vain appealed to the general to cease throwing shells into the city, which injured the buildings and monuments, and killed the peaceable citizens, without hurting the defences or helping the besiegers.

While the cannons were pounding the walls of Rome, the clerical dignitaries and potentates assembled at Gaeta were hugging themselves on the hopes of a speedy return to power. Piedmont alone endeavoured now to temper the restoration, and to moderate the views of the restored, and for this purpose sent Count Cesare Babbo as ambassador to represent these views to the Pope and the King of Naples; but he was coldly looked on, and was not able to effect anything. In Rome, discord began within the walls. Garibaldi, ardent and impetuous, ill brooked the commands of any one; rash in his enterprises, he laid the blame of their failure on others. He would not obey Rosselli, the commander-in-chief, and defeated his plans; and owing to his remissness and neglect on the evening of the 21st of June, the French effected, without meeting any resistance, an entry of the breach, and retained possession of it. When this was known, Rosselli gave orders on the following morning to have everything in readiness

for expelling them from it. In the meantime, Sterbini went about and excited the populace. He wanted to make Garibaldi commander-in-chief, and himself dictator. He cursed the Triumvirs and Mazzini; he talked about treachery, the usual language of vanquished demagogues; he ran hither and thither making his complaints; and he was only reduced to order by a young man showing him the muzzle of a musket, and hinting that he had better carry his complaints to the magistrates, and not be brawling in the streets. But the assembly, to whom he next appealed, did not appreciate the blessings he was anxious to bestow upon them, and declined his services. Even on the 22d, Mazzini wrote, "he considered Rome as fallen, but he would not subscribe his name to the capitulation;" but his friends, the same evening, spread abroad that there was fortunate news from France. On the 24th, the French having got possession of the bastions and the breach, began to thunder on the ancient Aurelian wall, and on the night of the 29th they entered the city, and a hand-to-hand conflict followed in the streets; but Rome was not yet subdued. On the following day the Assembly met in the Capitol. It was proposed that further resistance should be declared impossible. Mazzini said there were three courses: to surrender, to fight in the streets and houses, or to leave the city and continue the war in the provinces. Garibaldi was sent for, and appeared covered with blood and sweat, and declared resistance impossible: they could but hold out a few days, and that it was vain to defend the streets when the French were masters of the heights; and they agreed to surrender, declaring that "they ceased from a defence which had become impracticable, but remained at their post." The business of treating with the foe was left to the municipality. But the municipality could make no terms with the conqueror, and eventually delivered up the city to his hands uncondition-

ally, who came in at one gate as Garibaldi with four or five thousand men escaped at another. On the morning of their entrance, the Assembly caused the republican constitution which they had completed to be promulgated from the Capitol. Mazzini and his colleagues had resigned, and other triumvirs had been appointed in their stead; but as neither one act nor the other had any effect whatever on any person, the present mention of them may be considered sufficient. The old triumvirs and ministers escaped, not having been looked after very closely by the French, and the Assembly resolved to await the arrival of the general. On the 3d of July he entered the city amid the gloomy silence and occasional jeers of the people. He at once shut up the Assembly, prohibited newspapers, put all matters in the hands of the military, closed the clubs, and established military tribunals. He despatched Colonel Niel to the Pope to carry the news of the fall of Rome, who returned him his blessing. Garibaldi, who had left Rome, first thought of falling on the Austrians, and then turned his thoughts to Venice, which still resisted. Hearing that there was much dissatisfaction in Tuscany, he turned his steps thither; but his troops got worn out with fatigues, and dropped behind, and fell away from him. At length he returned broken to the Adriatic, and taking some fishing-boats, attempted with three hundred men to get to Venice; but he was stopt by Austrian ships, and his boats dispersed, and he and his wife (who was great with child) were thrown on the Roman coast, where, after wandering some days, she died exhausted with fatigue. He eventually succeeded in escaping. He was a daring soldier, but wanted both strategy and subordination. In the middle ages he would have been a hero; in the present, he was a very valiant rebel.

Thus fell the republic of Rome. Though it was suppressed by foreign invasion, it would have fallen to pieces

of itself had it been let alone. There was not among them the virtue required for a republic. "It is as difficult to make a nation of slaves into freemen as it is to make a nation of freemen into slaves." They certainly fought courageously, but they were incapable of discipline, and under no command; and a turbulent rabble was always ready to interfere in all matters, whether they understood them or not. Assassinations appeared to be inherent in its nature, and were perpetrated under the very eyes of the French on their entrance. In short, the rabble of Rome are the greatest scoundrels on earth. Not that they are so much to blame for being so—they are creatures of circumstances like others—let those bear the blame who have made them what they are.

When the French became masters of Rome, though they regulated everything by military law, yet they, very much to the disgust of the court at Gaeta, neither imprisoned nor prosecuted, but gave passports to all who wished to leave the country; and although they were anything but civilly treated by the inhabitants, it is to their credit that they did not resort to insolence in return, but behaved with exemplary moderation. M. de Courcelles, who had been charged to attempt to moderate the ideas of the court, found his task no easy one; indeed it was eminently unsuccessful. Till the French had taken the city, when the Pope was applied to to publish a manifesto recognising the fundamental statute, he said, that till he was fully restored to power, it would have the appearance of having been extorted; but when he was restored, he shuffled, and refused to do anything of the sort. The French had been in such a hurry to conquer, that they did not see that they could treat much better with the Pope if they made conditions before fighting his battles than after; consequently they failed in one of their objects, which was to moderate the return of the past system, and establish a form of

government which might restore the people to tranquillity.

It appears to be the misfortune both of princes and peoples, that they can never rest contented with practical measures of improvement: the one class appears to be designed to punish the faults and misdeeds of the other. When a people desires reforms, and these are granted by their sovereign, they almost invariably misuse the freedom they have obtained; and when, after the sovereign has been expelled, gradually becoming disquieted with the anarchy they have established, they restore him, he almost as invariably at once retracts those reforms which were originally granted; although they are often necessary to the well-being of the people, and the want of them previously was very likely the real reason of the rebellious spirit which had broken out: indeed, had they been persevered in, the people would have been gradually trained to the habits of freemen,—a sort of persons who are found in practice much more easy to govern than either slaves or anarchists. When people are allowed to take care of themselves, they become capable of combining for the legitimate purposes of order and government; but when enslaved, their only alternative is anarchy,—a position, one would suppose, equally inconvenient to the prince as to his subjects.

The French hoped that the gratitude of the Pope would grant what they wished, but they were mistaken. The priests and the cardinals were perfectly willing to sing *Te Deums* in their honour, and to toast them as restorers of the Pope; to declare that the Spirit of God had moved General Oudinot to declare the victory had freed Rome from a foreign yoke,—a form of speech which to any intellect save a cardinal's would have seemed to savour somewhat of another quarter altogether. After a time the restoration of the old system began; the courts eccle-

siastical, lay, and mixed, with all their venerable abuses, were restored; and all of the papal party who had been imprisoned during the time of the republic were set at liberty, and many of them put into the police to worry their previous oppressors—a course apparently more dictated by faction than by prudence. The civic guard was disarmed, the publication of all newspapers was forbidden, and all assemblages in the streets of more than five persons were prohibited. When all things were nearly restored to their former order, the Pope named Cardinals Della Genga Vanicelli and Altieri commissioners for carrying on the government, and the Romans called them the red triumvirs.

Though the whole Roman States were declared to be in a state of siege and under military law, the French were much milder in their proceedings than the Austrians, who denounced execution and imprisonment against singing particular songs, wearing particular hats and ribands, and all disobedience to the soldiers. They executed several even without the form of a court-martial. This is what in civilized states is termed murder; possibly in Austria they call it policy. Some of the acts of the Red Triumvirate were rather remarkable. One day, having paid off a number of state creditors in republican paper at par, they next day reduced it in value 35 per cent. This is very like what in civilized countries is termed swindling; probably the Triumvirs considered it as finance. Many of their acts were absurd. They called in the money of the republic not because it was base, but because the arms of the republic were stamped on it; and though there was great want of coin, they put the public to considerable inconvenience because of this whim. The Bank of Rome, which had lent its paper to the republic after yielding to gentle violence, was in a great fright; but having among its directors nephews and other nearer relatives of cardi-

nals in office, it managed to escape. Mamiani, who, it may be remembered, had made the last stand for the temporal authority of the Pope, was for his reward sent into banishment; and some of the authorities condescended to break into his portmanteau and pilfer from it his manuscripts —a piece of petty spite, not to call it larceny: they probably called it state craft. In the night of the 24th of October they broke into the Ghetto, the Jews' quarter, and robbed their houses (arresting some men for nothing particular)—a crime in civilized states designated as burglary; they may have called it religious zeal: and they seemed, in short, anxious that in all the crimes in which the mob are proficients to overcome them, and were on that ground at least entitled to the confidence of Rome. These excesses the French ambassador bore with great impatience. The Pope was applied to to manifest moderate views, to which he replied that he "daily prayed for his people;" but it appeared he was not willing to do anything else for them. He would, he said, in a few days, come to Castel Gondalfo in the midst of the French army.

Meanwhile, General Oudinot had been superseded by General Rostolan, and to him the French President sent M. Edgar Ney with a letter, saying that, in short, what was required for the temporal government of the Pope was—a general armistice, the secularization of the administration, the code Napoleon, and a liberal government,—a letter which the general refused to allow to be published, but which was published notwithstanding in a Florence newspaper. It excited the people, and threw the Pope into a prodigious pucker; so that, upon this, instead of going to Castel Gondalfo, he went to Portici, where, finding it necessary to do something, he published on the 4th of September a *Motu Proprio*, which, as usual, said nothing at all at great length, and with which Louis-Napoleon was very much dissatisfied; and had he at that

time had the power he subsequently gained, he would have enforced reasonable terms; but he was not strong enough in the Assembly to resist the union of the papist party, combined with the Orleanists and Legitimists, who on that occasion went together, leaving him only the republicans and the Napoleonists; in consequence of which the Assembly did themselves the discredit of voting the absolute restoration of the Pope unconditionally, very much to the annoyance of the President. On the 18th the Pope published a pardon, which excepted such a numerous class of persons that it looked more like a proscription, which in practice it very much appeared to be, for punishments fell with severity and on great numbers.—"Tantæ ne animis cælestibus iræ?" Thus the clergy have succeeded in making themselves as disagreeable as possible to the people over whom they rule, and success in any object is perhaps a proof of the prudence with which it has been undertaken. The only person who passed unscathed through the ordeal, first of republican anarchists, and afterwards of clerical restoration, was the minister of finance, Galli, who having for ten years conducted the accounts of the exchequer in a mysterious manner, and on arithmetical principles which no one could understand but himself, was indispensable to each in turn to explain his own figures.

Venice continued the almost hopeless conflict with Austria till the fall of Hungary under the Cossack. Kossuth had helped Austria in the first instance against Italy; but when Austria turned against Hungary, and fomented against it the Croat insurrection, he encouraged Venice to resist; and for a time it seemed as though Magyar gallantry was about to triumph, and if it did, Austria would not have been in a condition to carry on the war. But Hungarian freedom was quenched on the scaffold of Arad, and Venetian resistance became hopeless. She had fought a fight worthy of her ancient glory—worthy, too, of a

happier fate. After holding out till the certain intelligence arrived of the fall of Hungary, the government resigned their offices, and the municipal authorities were left to treat, and towards the end of August the Austrians again entered into the devastated and silent streets. Thus did the Muscovite intervention indirectly crush the only remaining particle of independence in Italy; and thenceforth full scope was given to the absolute governments, both of Austria and Naples, to imprison, banish, and otherwise punish and bully, all whom they even suspected —a facility which both governments more copiously than prudently availed themselves of. In the latter, however, added to its impolicy and cruelty, it involved a breach of faith; for many persons were punished for principles to which the king himself had sworn.

The new ministry in France were only anxious to bring back the Pope on any or no terms, and to pacify his anger, which had been excited by the President's letter to M. Ney. But the Pope, who remained at Portici, was not pleased at the recall of General Rostolan, and the appointment of General Baraguay d'Hilliers, who was reported to be more devoted to Bonaparte than to the clergy. The French soldiers were kept in excellent discipline, but were not blindly devoted to the papal police; indeed, they were occasionally induced to wink, if not to assist, at the escape of wretches on whom the police wished to lay their clutches, Achilli among them; while the Austrians were shooting, imprisoning, and flogging and putting in irons, and levying contributions on the neighbouring country, and indeed acting as usual like a tribe of marauding savages. In the northern provinces, in which they ruled, they maintained no sort of police, and allowed highway robberies and all manner of crimes to be committed with the most perfect equanimity. The fact was, they had in the early part of the war been thoroughly beaten, and they

wanted vengeance, which they wreaked perfectly indiscriminately.

Mazzini, who had safely taken refuge in Switzerland, still imagined himself to be dictator of Rome, and thence published manifestoes; and even that had no effect but rendering himself ridiculous. He appointed his different ministers, and powerfully ruled over a small band of miserable exiles.

Thus ended the year 1849 in Italy. The Pope was still at Portici. He did not return to Rome till the 12th of April 1850, when, having blessed the King of Naples, who accompanied him to the borders, he was conducted by the French troops into his capital (a curious position for the father of the Church). His government was not after his return distinguished either for prudence or moderation, and proceeded to imprison, beat, and bully many unoffending persons, insomuch that there is scarcely a layman in his states that would not delight in driving him out of them if he could—a course which has enabled Mazzini to sow seed for fresh discontents and difficulties. Those who refused to smoke in order to injure the revenue had a new crime invented against them of conspiracy against smoke (as a certain Pope anathematized tobacco and all who used it, this is a singular example of infallibility). Their conduct seemed guided by childish spite, of which, as an example, Barroni, a physician of eminence who had been surgeon to Gregory, was deprived of his office because he had attended the military hospitals of the republic. Such are the men who profess to be the direct representatives of God's mercy to man.

Of the whole Italian peninsula, Piedmont alone enjoys a vestige of freedom. The new king, Victor-Emmanuel, has courageously, and, in defiance of the wishes of popes, emperors, kings, princes, and grand dukes, has faithfully maintained the faith he swore to his people, and has

naturally incurred the hostility of all who feel that his example is an opprobrium to themselves. Rome is particularly bitter against him; for in Piedmont there has been and still is going forward the struggle by which the laity are endeavouring to shake off the incubus of clerical power. They have succeeded in establishing religious toleration, at which the papists rail at Rome, while they are loud in their outcry in England at any suppression of their titles, or Bible-burnings. That Piedmont should have succeeded in preserving its freedom, is perhaps, nay probably, owing to the greater freedom of spirit which has been kept alive by the existence of different religious bodies. It was the earliest seat of Protestantism, and the Church of the Waldenses has existed there (often under persecution) ever since.

So the state of Italy remains to the present moment. On the part of the Latin Church there is the desire and attempt not only to reinstate itself in its temporal authority, but to spread a spiritual despotism from one end of Europe to the other, and yet, endeavouring to aggress on the laws and institutions of Protestant Europe, they are utterly without influence at home. There is no city so devoid of all religion as Rome—in no country in Christendom has Christianity less influence on the lives and morals of the people than in Italy; and whatever authority the clergy possess is derived from the physical force of a foreign army, either Austrian or French, by which the population is kept in check. The government of the priestly caste is the object which they have in view. As to the Christian religion, it is a convenient shield under which to fight; but Bud or Joe Smith would be canonized, if Bud or Joe Smith were available for the purpose. The Latin Church in Italy has worn out all practical Christianity, and nothing remains but that to which all religions have in human

hands, a tendency to run, the superstitious worship of material objects, and the domination of a priesthood; and for this principle, this domination, it is ever contending. Hence the aggression on England, Holland, and Prussia. Political power is the object for which it strives, get it how it may; and owing, as it does, obedience to a foreign crown, political power it can in no foreign state be safely allowed to wield. It would seem that not only does it desire to govern, but that its special mission is to encourage misgovernment; at least, bad as the rest of Italy is in this respect, Rome is worse; nor is Ireland a bright example of its influence. Divided allegiance does not seem to conduce to patriotism, except of a very turbulent character. That in all countries, and in every age, both among the clergy and laity of the Latin Church, there have been exemplary Christians and godly men, who can doubt? It is not that the individual is vicious or insincere, but that the polity of the governing body is self-ended and grasping. When the priest ceases to be a key to open for man the kingdom of heaven, man too often becomes a key to open for the priest the kingdoms of the earth.

Thus, though at home he could not keep on his seat for an hour in the absence of foreign bayonets, the Pope manages to persuade the rest of Europe that he is still some one. The father of Christendom has aptly illustrated the truth of his claims by making many of the people of Italy confound all religion with clerical misgovernment, and hate Christianity, because they hate those who inculcate its superstitions for their own personal aggrandizement. In Italy, as elsewhere, has absolutism been re-established more harshly than ever out of the orgies of revolution.

END OF VOLUME I.


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